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This dissertation explores the role of Japan’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
program and its deterrent effect upon North Korean behavior. A mixed-methods approach 
is employed to analyze the topic. Empirical quantitative data included tabulated monthly 
cooperative-conflictual behavioral interaction between Japan and North Korea spanning a 
22-year timeframe (1990-2011). In addition, a strategic profile developed from deterrence 
theory provided essential qualitative background to compliment the quantitative analysis. 
Japan’s BMD program was divided into four periods reflecting decision points or phases 
of program development. Results indicated varied BMD deterrence effectiveness, with 
two periods indicating Japan’s BMD program strengthened deterrence, one period 
indicating it undermined deterrence, and one period it had no effect. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 The threat from North Korea is daunting: there are large numbers of offensive 
ballistic missiles; possible possession of missile-capable nuclear weapons; and, a 
propensity for risky behavior such as export of nuclear and missile technology. In 
Northeast Asia, North Korea’s large stockpile of missiles can, in a matter of minutes, 
endanger military, civil, and economic targets in neighboring countries like Japan. But 
while North Korean possession of ballistic missiles provides it cover for a wide variety of 
coercive behavior short of war, Japanese possession of missile defenses could offset the 
North Korean ballistic missile advantage and, in part, deter North Korea’s coercive 
behavior. The key question, then, is Does Japan’s BMD deter North Korea’s behavior? 
Or, does Japan’s BMD undermine it? Are these deterrence effects seen in any specific 
periods of Japan’s BMD program?  
 As a way to familiarize the reader with the research undertaken to address this 
question, this introductory chapter is outlined as follows. First, a brief review of the 
research findings will be presented. These findings are a short summary of those provided 
later in the dissertation. Second, a short section of background material is provided 
briefly describing the setting, including the nature of the North Korean threat as well as 
Japan’s BMD program. Third, theoretic ideas will be described along with key gaps. 
Fourth, the dissertation’s subsequent chapters will be summarized. Lastly, some closing 
thoughts will be providing as a segue to Chapter Two: History.  
General Findings 
The mixed-methods research and analysis explored the question of whether 
Japan’s BMD deterred North Korea and whether other alternative factors, such as the role 
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of the U.S. or China, contributed to North Korea’s behavior toward Japan. In reference to 
the direct question of Japan’s BMD, the research indicated that Japan’s BMD was 
correlated with cooperative North Korean behavior toward Japan in some circumstances 
and conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan in others. This was consistent with 
the missile defense-deterrence literature.  
First, Japan’s BMD program during the period immediately following North 
Korea’s 1998 TD-1 launch (September 1998 – November 2003), marked by a high 
commitment in Japan to BMD research and development, had a positive effect upon 
North Korean cooperative behavior toward Japan. Using identified deterrence 
effectiveness criteria, these results suggest Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence against 
North Korea in this period. Second, Japan’s BMD program in the period surrounding 
(and following) North Korea’s TD-2 missile launch (February 2009 – December 2011), 
when Japan’s leadership operationally employed their BMD to the field (manned and 
ready to shoot), reduced North Korean conflictual behavior toward Japan. Using the 
deterrence effectiveness criteria, these results suggest Japan’s BMD strengthened 
deterrence against North Korea also during this period. Third, Japan’s BMD program in 
the period following Japan’s initial deployment of its first operational BMD capabilities 
(March 2007 – December 2011) increased conflictual North Korean behavior toward 
Japan. Using the criteria identified, these results indicate the initial deployment of Japan’s 
BMD undermined deterrence against North Korea in this period. Fourth, Japan’s BMD 
program in the period following the formal decision by Japan’s leadership to acquire and 
field its own BMD system (December 2003 – February 2007) did not reflect statistically 
significant cooperative or conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan. These results 
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indicate Japan’s formal decision period had no deterrence effect against North Korea in 
this period. Japan’s BMD, therefore, varied in deterrence effectiveness, an outcome 
generally supported across the totality of deterrence literature.  
More broadly, given their historical interaction, increasingly conflictual 
interaction between North Korea and Japan was expected to characterize their overall 
relationship. However, this was not reflected in the analyses. Significant cooperative 
interaction was revealed in the data and analysis and the patterns of interaction do not 
appear to yield large swings of either reductions to cooperative North Korean behavior 
toward Japan or increases to conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan. BMD did 
not appear to be a contributor to any worsening of the Japan-North Korea relationship 
generally. Japan’s BMD did, however, appear to be correlated with favorable shifts in 
provocative and coercive North Korean behavior toward Japan with ballistic missiles in 
the later (TD-2) BMD period.  
Given the hostile relationship between North Korea and the U.S., and the alliance 
between the U.S. and Japan, increasingly conflictual interaction between North Korea 
and Japan was expected. However, the statistical analyses did not support this 
expectation. None of the models with U.S. behavioral variables significantly affected 
either cooperative or conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, nor did they 
change any of Japan’s BMD-related variables in any significant way. 
The expectation that China’s influence over North Korea would affect North 
Korea’s behavior toward Japan was supported by the statistical analyses. This was 
reflected with cooperative PRC behavior toward North Korea indicating an increase in 
North Korea’s cooperative behavior toward Japan. Cooperative Chinese action toward 
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North Korea, possibly including inducements, predictably strengthened North Korea’s 
cooperative interaction with Japan. Such an outcome would generally support China’s 
strategic interests. While cooperative Chinese behavior toward North Korea was 
statistically significant in cooperative North Korean behavior toward Japan generally, the 
analysis did not indicate correlation of Chinese behavior toward North Korea and Japan’s 
BMD program variables. 
Background & Setting 
The North Korean Threat 
Within the scope of all the security problems facing the world today, few are 
more important than the challenges of the state of North Korea. Much has been written 
addressing the military threat, its development of nuclear weapons, prospects of conflict 
on the Korean Peninsula, its reclusiveness, its pariah status, and its leaders and their 
peculiar ways. Western observers generally see North Korea only as a threat to security. 
For example, Gavan McCormack claimed that of the 600 books written about North 
Korea since the 1990s, nearly all portrayed North Korea as “virulently hostile” (Shin, 
Park, & Yang, Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: The 
Korean Experience, 2007).
1
 To be sure, the modern regime in North Korea is today a 
threat to Japan, with ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and 
provocative behavior.
2
 Indeed, North Korea regularly parades its ballistic missiles 
through the center of Pyongyang, not only for domestic audiences, but as a source of 
confidence in their coercion strategy.
3
 However, North Korea is also a relational actor 
                                                          
1
 In his chapter, “Difficult Neighbors: Japan and North Korea.” Page 155. 
2
 Politically, North Korea has been described with exasperation as an “impossible state” (Cha, 2012). 
3
 On North Korea’s strategy of coercion, see, for example: Sugio Takahashi (Takahashi, Ballistic Missile 
Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military Transformation, 2012), page 23; Paul French (French, 2007), 
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and the threat it poses to Japan today is but the latest chapter in a two-millennia-long 
story of conflictual and cooperative interaction. Little research or writing, however, has 
addressed Japan’s relationship with North Korea in the modern context of Japan’s 
development of BMD. 
North Korea’s ballistic missile program began in the early 1960s and has become 
an integral part of the North’s security motivations and overall coercion strategy. North 
Korea’s offensive ballistic 
missile program has 
flourished and includes 
large numbers, types, and 
ranges of missiles and it 
has become a major 
exporter of missiles and 
related technology, 
though this activity has 
declined in recent years. 
Today, North Korea possesses short-range Scud, medium-range Nodong, intermediate-
range Musudan and, under development, intercontinental-range Taepodong missiles. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
pages 223-4 and 228; in Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North 
Korea’s Strategic Culture” (Schneider & Post, 2002), pages 129-30, where Baird indicates, for example, the 
August 1998 missile test that overflew Japan was a “nuanced” method of pressure or coercion, implying 
the threat of worse action in the future if regional actors did not provide North Korea needed; Keith 
Payne (Payne K. B., 1996), pages 30-5; Narushige Michishita’s chapter, “North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic 
Campaign Strategies: Continuity versus Change” (Pollack, 2004), pages 59-62; Kerry Kartchner (Kartchner, 
2002), pages 2-4; Rex Kiziah (Kiziah, 2000), page 6; Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman (Wilkening & 
Watman, 1995), page 32; and, DoD (Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 2010), page iii. Generally, 
North Korea’s past behavior has included violent acts on the order of the sinking of the Cheonon, artillery 
strikes into South Korea, political assassinations, bombings, acts of terror, kidnappings, and missile and 
nuclear weapons related provocations. 
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Figure 1 shows some key North Korean missiles that threaten Japan and others (Public 
Affairs Office, 2010).
4
 Hundreds of North Korea’s offensive ballistic missiles are within 
range of Japan, some of them assessed to be capable of carrying weapons of mass 
destruction (Pinkston, 2008).
5
 Tokyo, as the center for Japan’s economic and political 
activity, is especially vulnerable. See Figure 2 for a map depicting North Korean ballistic 
missiles that could threaten Japan and their ranges.
6
 These offensive missile systems 
provide a backdrop for North Korea’s coercive, and sometimes provocative and violent, 
behavior. Effectively countering ballistic missiles could potentially influence (deter) 
North Korea by moderating its behavior in its regional strategy toward Japan. 
Theoretically, some doubt missile defenses can deter adversaries.
7
 
BMD and Japan  
The principal purpose of missile defense is to provide crisis or wartime kinetic 
intercept and destruction of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft in flight.
8
 In 
general, though, it is argued that missile defenses are used to dissuade the development of 
ballistic missiles, deter their use if developed, and defeat their use in attack (Department 
of Defense, 2010).
9
 Missile defenses provide opportunities for other benefits to nations 
                                                          
4
 Figure taken from page 11. 
5
 Pages 2-30. 
6
 A figure copied from the DoD Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (2010); page 5. 
7
 Barak Mendelsohn argues, for example, that Israeli possession of missile defenses did not Iraqi Scud 
attacks in the Persian Gulf War. See, “Israeli self-defeating deterrence in the 1991 Gulf War,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies, 26:4, pp. 83-107, 2003. Stephen F. Cimbala argues adversaries will simply develop 
technical countermeasures to missile defenses or simply develop non-standard methods of attack. See, 
“Deterrence and Friction: Implications for Missile Defense, Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 
201-220, 2002. 
8
 BMD has been used defensively, though not always with sterling results. For example, the U.S. Patriot 
was used in 1991 against Iraqi missiles; the U.S. PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability) was used against Iraq 
again in 2003; the U.S. used a modified SM-3 (Standard Missile) from an Aegis-class BMD ship in 
Operation Burnt Frost in 2009 to shoot down a failing satellite; and, the Israeli Iron Dome was used 
against short-range missiles in 2011 and 2012. 
9
 See page 11.  
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under missile attack, including damage limitation to military forces, population centers, 
industry, leadership, and critical infrastructure.  
Japan has begun to emerge somewhat quietly from a strict “pacifist” nation, a 
consequence of its World War II defeat (Chanlett-Avery & Nikitin, Japan's Nuclear 
Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests, 2009).
10
 To the surprise of some, 
Japan has reinterpreted portions of its postwar constitution for the sake of addressing 
national security concerns like North Korea. It has also modernized its military, including 
the purchase of 42 F-35 
stealth fighters from the 
U.S. (Takenaka, 2011). 
Further, in 1998 North 
Korea tested a Taepodong-
1 ballistic missile over 
Japan, an event that 
frightened Japan’s 
population and surprised 
its leadership. This event stirred Japan’s leaders toward BMD, a program demanding 
significant financial and political commitment.
11
 Having cost $12 billion so far, Japan’s 
missile defense system is now the second best in the world, behind the United States’ 
                                                          
10
 Page 1. 
11
 Japan’s economy struggled in the late 1990s (Kaihara, 2008). Despite this, after the 1998 TD-1 launch 
over Japan, the government of Japan committed large resources to BMD. On the other hand, BMD was 
good, if not essential, for Japan’s defense industry. There was an economic angle to pursing BMD as well 
as a long-term consideration for maintaining the health of the defense industry with both technology and 
capacity in order to hedge against emerging and future threats. In 1995, prior to the start of Japan’s heavy 
investment in BMD following the 1998 North Korean TD-1 launch over Japan, “the survival of the defense 
industry” in both Japan and the U.S. was an “urgent” issue (NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN, 1995). 
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(Dawson, 2012).
12
 For Japan, BMD represented a strategic choice, not only for defense of 
Japan in potential wartime contingencies, but also for deterring North Korea’s coercive 
behavior in peacetime. 
Japan possesses a multilayered missile defense system capable of engaging 
ballistic missiles at various distances and altitudes. This includes sea-based Aegis 
midcourse defenses that use SM-3 missiles capable of intercepting short, medium, and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The Japanese system also includes land-based 
Patriot or PAC-3 missiles capable of engaging incoming missiles in the terminal phase of 
flight. Tokyo is the primary area of defense (Kang & Lee, 2009).
13
 Japan’s BMD system 
is a very capable one. Twomey suggests, “The United States and Japan deploy the most 
successful area defense program,” adding, “the existing system already enables Japan to 
protect its home islands against a North Korean threat with only one or two Kongo-class 
ships ‘on station.’ Japan’s current fleet of six ships allows for adequate coverage and 
continual time on station, if Tokyo chooses” (Twomey, 2011).14 
Japan’s BMD is comparable to the early U.S. antiballistic missile (ABM) system 
as well as the more recent U.S. national missile defense in terms of its technological 
development and emergence overall in a small number of key programmatic phases. 
There were also similarities in the life-saving potential given the nature of the threat.
15
 
                                                          
12
 The number two ranking was based on system sophistication, not numbers of interceptors deployed. 
The commitment accounts for about 15% of Japan’s entire defense budget (O'Donogue, 2000); pages 8-
11. 
13
 See also Masako Toki (Toki, 2009). 
14
 Page 62. Japan’s own BMD capabilities were first deployed in March, 2007 two and one-half years after 
the initial operational deployment of U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defenses (GMD) interceptors in 
September, 2004 (Samson, 2010); page 45. Samson points out that initial operational fielding by the U.S. 
was rushed and was followed by systemic failures. 
15
 In the early Cold War period, for example, the U.S. ABM system was once considered simply as a 
defensive system that would save lives in a nuclear conflict, perhaps as many as 50 million (Adams, 1971); 
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However, there are key national security related differences between the two systems. For 
example, in their discussion of geopolitics and deterrence, Patrick Morgan and George 
Quester state that the U.S. strategy adopted to address regional security problems 
following World War II was extended nuclear deterrence—an approach to deterring 
conventional attack on an ally by threats of punishment, not by “denial” deterrence with 
vast defensive capabilities (Shultz, Drell, & Goodby, 2011).
16
 For Japan, the problem 
with this approach was that North Korean ballistic missiles could attack Japan directly 
with conventional or WMD payloads, meaning Japan’s hope for its security would be 
dependent on others: the U.S. and North Korea. First, Japan would depend upon North 
Korea believing U.S. post-attack punishment threats provided in extended deterrence 
would be credible to avoid the initial North Korean attack in the first place. Any benefit-
denial capability of U.S. national missile defense, developed later, was sufficient only for 
protecting the United States from attacks; they simply could not cover Japan against 
North Korean missiles like the Nodong.
17
 The second problem with this approach was 
that Japan would need to depend upon the U.S. actually carrying through with punishing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
page 150. Later, both the U.S. and USSR came to see defenses more as a means for protecting their 
nuclear strike forces. 
16
 In Chapter 1, “How History and the Geopolitical Context Shape Deterrence.” Page 8. 
17
 In May, 1993, North Korea tested four missiles including a Nodong-1launched toward a buoy between 
North Korea and Japan, an event deemed threatening by Japan’s leaders (Burns, 2010); page 97. Reducing 
the “coercive influence” of Iran’s ballistic missiles is one of the purposes of U.S. BMD expressed by the 
U.S. Department of Defense (Fact Sheet: The Phased Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense in Europe, 
2009); page 2. Influencing Iranian behavior with missile defenses, despite U.S. overwhelming conventional 
and nuclear offensive power, is remarkable in that it supports the notion that regional “rogue” actors like 
Iran and North Korea are less likely to be deterred by U.S. nuclear weapons and, instead pursue 
asymmetric capabilities, including ballistic missiles and WMD, both to deter others and undergird coercive 
behavior. Japan’s BMD, likewise, was intended to have a comparable effect on North Korean behavior by 
diminishing the value of their ballistic missiles to coerce in peacetime or achieve operational benefits in 
crisis or conflict. 
10 
 
an attacker if deterrence failed. Unfortunately, U.S. credibility with Japan has waned.
18
 
With deterrence depending on U.S. credibility and North Korean willingness to 
acquiesce, Japan chose to acquire its own BMD capability which not only contributes to 
conflict deterrence through defense of wartime missile attacks, but deterrence of North 
Korean coercive behavior toward Japan in pre-conflict conditions through perceptual 
effects on North Korean decision factors that U.S. nuclear retaliation forces cannot 
provide.
19
 
Literature Gaps 
In general, deterrence literature in recent years has begun moving beyond basic 
questions of Cold War nuclear deterrence, comparing strategic forces, international 
relations issues such as arms control, and cases involving the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). More recently, for example, the literature provided additional 
insight into expansion of deterrence concepts beyond merely fear of cost-imposition to a 
broader idea of “influence” of an adversary’s perceptions (U.S. Department of Defense, 
                                                          
18
 Regarding wartime contingencies and the prospects of U.S. punishment of regional adversaries who 
would attack Japan, doubts have emerged within various circles inside Japan that helped fuel the need to 
acquire and deploy an autonomous Japanese BMD capability. Frank Miller, for example, suggested “The 
US must recognize the huge shift in Japanese political circles on nuclear weapons that has occurred as a 
result of generational change and Chinese and North Korean programs. Senior Japanese officials and 
politicians are uncertain whether the US has the political will and/or nuclear capability to extend 
deterrence. While the deterrent may be credible in aggressors’ eyes, we have a major assurance problem” 
(Murdock, et al., 2009); quote by Frank Miller in a briefing to the CSIS Workshop (June 2009); page 46. But 
the problem of Japanese uncertainty over U.S. extended deterrence commitments—and Japan’s decision 
to acquire BMD—goes years further back from this workshop described by some as more of a problem of 
trust. Even as Japanese leaders were contemplating the decision to acquire Japan’s own BMD system, one 
of the considerations in their calculus was supposedly “a certain level of distrust vis-à-vis the credibility of 
the U.S. nuclear umbrella” (Urayama, 2000); page 618. These factors moved Japan toward BMD 
acquisition and deployment—of little surprise when considered together. 
19
 See also Colin S. Gray on how BMD deters an adversary’s freedom of action either to intimidate or 
attack (Peoples, 2010); pages 186-9. Borrowing from Clausewitz’s notion that war is an instrument of 
policy, and citing cases of defensive-dominated conflicts, Gray argues that technology and defenses in 
general have been lost in modern deterrence theory, caught in Cold War logic of parity. Several pros and 
cons of Japan pursuing BMD emerged. It was clear to Swaine, et al, that Japan’s BMD program would 
“exert a significant influence” on its relations with regional actors (Swaine, Swanger, & Kawakami, 2001); 
pages 4-8. See also Lars Abmann for a summary of BMD pros and cons (Abmann, 2007). 
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2006) and recent recognition of deterrent implications (both positive and negative) of 
missile defenses. However, very little deterrence literature involves Asia and most 
missile defense-deterrence literature addresses U.S. national missile defense issues, with 
most of those relative to deterring nuclear war. Of the 30+ missile defense related books, 
and several similar articles located and reviewed on missile defense-deterrence, none 
were devoted to the deterrence effect of Japan’s missile defenses toward North Korea 
over time under general deterrence conditions.
20
 Further, of the 54 specific arguments 
identified on whether missile defenses strengthen or undermine deterrence, none of the 
arguments were based upon research of the Japan-North Korea case and there simply is 
not definitive discussion of ballistic missile defense (BMD) in the Japan-North Korea 
case under general deterrence conditions over time using empirical data.
21
 
One problem was the limitation of the traditional view of general deterrence, 
described in the 1980s by Patrick Morgan as a purposeful managing of an existing 
adversarial relationship between two states under relatively peaceful, status quo 
conditions. Theoretically, general deterrence fails when one of the two parties creates a 
crisis by considering an attack on the other (called immediate deterrence) with a view that 
war may be imminent (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001).
22
 The theoretic options were 
peacetime, crisis, or war, with no meaningful levels of fidelity to the range of peacetime 
                                                          
20
 A small sample: Michael W. Simon, “Rogue State Response to BMD: The Regional Context,” in Defense 
& Security Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2002, pp. 271-292; Palmore, Julian, and Francoise Melese, “A Game 
Theory View of Preventive Defense Against Ballistic Missile Attack,” Defense & Security Analysis 17, no. 2 
(August 2001); Theodore A. Postol, “Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot,” International 
Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter, 1991-1992), pp. 119-171. 
21
 Relations between the two states during this period existed loosely in general deterrence conditions; 
that is, marked predominantly by peacetime conditions where the threat of war has not been placed in 
jeopardy by threatening behavior by one side. Traditional views describe the sub-conflict period between 
two antagonists as either general deterrence or an escalated situation of acute crisis (immediate 
deterrence) where war is possible if not intended (Huth and Russett, 1993); pages 61-73. 
22
 Pages 372-3. 
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interactions between two states in this type of interstate relationship. There also was not 
much attention paid to positive, cooperative interaction that could happen even between 
two otherwise adversarial parties under general deterrence conditions. As described, 
general deterrence was lacking somewhat as a theoretic frame for exploring a more 
detailed, behavioral approach to the Japan-North Korea case and the deterrent effects of 
Japan’s BMD over time. According to Stephen Quackenbush in his recent book on 
general deterrence, “formal theories of general deterrence have never been subjected to 
direct empirical testing” (Quackenbush, Understanding General Deterrence: Theory and 
Application, 2011).
23
 But he, too, was very constrained in his approach to general 
deterrence and the type and level of empirical analysis conducted. For example, he used 
only single, annual data entries for observing events, and these events were limited to 
binary outcome decisions by states to either attack or restrain; he did not consider the 
Japan-North Korea case.
24
 Greater fidelity was needed within general deterrence. This 
was provided in the dissertation, in part, by using empirical monthly data summaries, an 
intensity weighting scale for behavioral interaction between states, and “stretching” 
general deterrence to include both cooperative and conflictual behavior. 
Complicating the literature on general deterrence is the common creation of a 
theoretic bridge between general deterrence and extended deterrence. Extended 
deterrence refers to a three-way situation in which a state power, like the U.S., threatens 
retaliation upon an adversary who would attack an ally of the state threatening the 
retaliation (Huth P. K., 1988).
25
 Cases of extended deterrence—like the provision of 
security guarantees provided Japan by the U.S. through extended deterrence—usually 
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refer to cases of deterring conflict and threats of nuclear retaliation. Many suggest 
effective extended deterrence maintains a stable, general deterrence environment. 
However, North Korean provocative and coercive behavior, which occurs under general 
deterrence conditions but has included many things (i.e., ballistic missile tests, 
development of nuclear weapons, tests of nuclear devices, and violence and loss of life), 
is not deterred or prevented by the overwhelming power that is threatened via extended 
deterrence. This tension creates false theoretic expectations of general and extended 
deterrence as well as “gray areas” or gaps for policymakers. For example, Sugio 
Takahashi pointed out that U.S. extended deterrence commitments would not trigger U.S. 
retaliation of North Korean “cheap-shot strike” missile raids in small numbers (1-2 
missiles or more) conducted upon Japan (Takahashi, Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan: 
Deterrence and Military Transformation, 2012).
26
 Such sub-conflict behavior by North 
Korea is but one possible example of North Korean coercion toward Japan placing the 
onus for the defense—and deterrence—of such behavior upon Japan. Since North 
Korea’s ballistic missiles provide the threatening foundation for its coercion strategy with 
regional actors, Japan’s BMD—as a check upon that source of power—play an 
instrumental role in Japan’s deterrence strategy toward North Korea. 
Subsequent Chapters 
The dissertation research was oriented around the central question of whether 
Japan’s BMD deterred North Korea under general deterrence conditions. Unpacking the 
Japan-North Korea relationship, and the specific question dealing with the role of Japan’s 
BMD in deterrence, put a spotlight on the troubling international security and theoretic 
issues described in the preceding paragraphs. The dissertation, therefore, is organized in 
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the following manner: Chapter Two: History sets the stage for analysis of the deterrence 
effects of Japan’s BMD by considering how the historical interaction between the two 
actors informs their modern security challenge; Chapter Three: Literature Review, lays 
the groundwork for understanding deterrence, how missile defenses might contribute—or 
undermine—deterrence, and identifying core factors of an adversary needed to aid in 
deterrence strategies; Chapter Four: Research Design, developed the details of how to 
pursue researching the question and strengthening the confidence of the results; Chapter 
Five: Strategic Profile – Part I, builds upon the information found in the literature review 
for identifying core factors that matter in adversary decision-making and explores the 
first two of three major sections including North Korea’s identity and cultural factors, 
followed by KJI’s personal factors; Chapter Six: Strategic Profile – Part II, looks at the 
third major section of North Korea’s core factors—environmental factors—and breaks 
these into various internal environmental factors, such as economic and military 
elements, and external environmental factors, such as diplomacy, trade, and relations 
with other actors; Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis, provides statistical analysis 
using empirical data for the entire 22-year period being examined and incorporates 
qualitative data from the preceding chapters to aid analysis; and, Chapter Eight: 
Conclusions, summarizes the research and analysis and its contributions to the literature, 
and offers closing views for the future of Japan-North Korea relations and Japan’s 
emerging threat—China. Each of these components was an essential piece to the research 
and is introduced below, beginning with historical background. 
Chapter Two: History 
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Chapter Two: History provides essential background to the lengthy political 
relationship between Japan and North Korea. The more recent post-Cold War dynamics 
should be viewed in context of this long historical relationship, leading to the current 
deterrence challenge. This chapter shows that cooperative, positive interaction has 
occurred in their past as well as negative, conflictual interaction. This range of interaction 
in the research provided early indications of what would need to be some rethinking on 
general deterrence in Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis. The dataset and 
measurement criteria for Japan-North Korea behavioral interaction used in Chapter Seven 
relied upon a wide scale of cooperative and conflictual interaction, contrary to the 
traditional view of general deterrence, but much closer to the realities of the historical 
relationship. Chapter Two also described briefly Japan’s imperial past and some of the 
connections with the people of Korea. Beyond military occupation of the territory, 
Japanese imperialism affected Korean culture, law, government, education, and involved 
abuses of the people that affected their social and national psyche. Together, a deep and 
abiding distrust of Japan developed that resonates among Koreans on both sides of the 
border to this day and impacts both cooperative and conflictual interaction in their broad 
political relationship.  
This chapter also captures the divide of the peninsula and the beginnings of the 
North Korean state led by its anti-Japanese fighter, Kim Il-Sung. Connections to Soviet 
and Chinese communism aided the development of North Korea and the outcome of the 
Korean War in the 1950s. The breakup of the Soviet Union—and loss of political and 
financial support—around 1990 came in a period of North Korean decline. Increasingly 
isolated, North Korea turned to a strategy of developing its own nuclear weapons 
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capability to thwart would-be invaders and regime-changers (e.g., the U.S.) and a 
coercive strategy aimed primarily at regional actors to maintain if not improve North 
Korea’s regional position. The regional changes, and the U.S. preoccupation in the 
Middle East, contributed to Japan’s political evolution from defeated and disarmed World 
War II antagonist, to pacifist ally of the U.S, to its more recent rise in autonomy and 
military capabilities including choices for its BMD program. These themes demonstrate 
that the relationship between Japan and North Korea today is a continuation of the past in 
many ways. This relationship includes cooperative and conflictual interactions, 
suggesting a need to better understand one another—a need addressed, in part, in 
Chapters Five and Six. These themes also describe the sources of their mutual distrust, 
North Korean needs for strengthening its political sovereignty, and the North Korean 
value of ballistic missiles. This background, then, set the scene for Japan’s BMD program 
to emerge as in integral part of its deterrence relationship with North Korea and the 
theoretic situation to be explored in the next chapter. 
Chapter Three: Literature Review 
Chapter Three: Literature Review is an important feature of the dissertation. It 
begins by describing the evolution of deterrence thought and how deterrence has 
experienced several “waves” of theoretic development. It was expected that since the 
Japan-North Korea relationship over the past 20+ years being researched in the 
dissertation was a general deterrence case, then unfolding general deterrence theory 
would provide a clear framework to aid in understanding the Japan-North Korea 
deterrence relationship and analytic ways to research the problem. But while some ideas 
were found, the dissertation research intended to delve into behavioral interaction that 
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could be counted, measured, and analyzed statistically to consider whether BMD affected 
change in North Korean behavior indicative of deterrence being strengthened or 
undermined. Even current writings on general deterrence were not of much utility. This 
chapter also mapped the evolution of deterrence in context of changes in technology and 
military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and missile defenses. 
Doing so helped understand how the U.S. missile defense program evolved in primary 
phases and informed identification of the four Japanese BMD periods address in Chapter 
Seven: Quantitative Analysis. The nature of deterrence literature changed dramatically 
with the end of the Cold War.
27
 This period was marked by the rise of regional actors—
including North Korea. One significant highlight was the regional conflict between a 
U.S.-led coalition and Iraq in 1991 involving use of ballistic missiles and missile 
defenses, thus reshaping the missile defense-deterrence reference point from arguments 
solely about superpower balance of power to utility of missile defenses in conflict.  
In addition to changes in weapons and warfare, scholars (and policymakers) once 
free from the dominance in deterrence theory of the bipolar Cold War U.S.-Soviet 
nuclear rivalry, recognized the need to provide greater fidelity in understanding of an 
adversary, in recognition that deterrence had failed in some unexpected cases and that 
individuals making national security decisions were informed in their decision-making by 
emotions and other psychological factors not considered important by most who used the 
simple, rational actor model of the Cold War era. Through this literature review, the 
ingredients and organization of a deterrence-related adversary strategic profile emerged 
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and was developed in Chapter Five: Strategic Profile – Part I and Chapter Six: Strategic 
Profile – Part II, which were applied to offer insights in Chapter Seven: Quantitative 
Analysis. These linkages are described further in Chapter Four: Research Design. 
Chapter Four: Research Design 
Chapter Four: Research Design showed how the research was ordered to try to 
isolate the Japan-North Korea case and the research question under consideration. As 
outlined in the design, this involved a brief review of the Japan-North Korea relationship, 
including periods of Japanese interactions with peoples and kingdoms of the Korean 
peninsula spanning over two millennia. This was done to provide context for the 
dissertation’s research and analysis of the more recent period since the end of the Cold 
War (found in Chapter Two: History). It also involved a thorough theoretic examination 
of deterrence, missile defenses, and the interaction of the two (see Chapter Three: 
Literature Review). 
In order to answer the question of whether deterrence “worked” on North Korea 
requires measuring change in the object of the deterrence strategy. In the case of the 
dissertation—the subtleties of general deterrence conditions, having relatively modest 
relational changes in the sub-conflict, even sub-crisis, situation between Japan and North 
Korea—a measurable object was the behavior of North Korea toward Japan. This was in 
keeping with Chapter Three: Literature Review which indicated deterrence was to be 
aimed at influencing a state leadership as that state’s decision-maker, but that the 
outcomes of their perceptions, thinking, and choices would be reflected primarily in their 
state-level behavior. This type of behavior was captured using media reports of empirical 
events and technologies for converting those reports into measurable data between Japan 
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and North Korea. This technique allowed four basic criteria for deterrence effectiveness 
to be identified that reflected the behavioral measures captured from the data, proving to 
be an effective methodology. The results yielded some statistical findings indicating 
Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence and undermined deterrence of North Korean 
behavior in different BMD periods and in different ways. Qualitative data from the 
strategic profile in Chapters Five and Six were then considered to help interpret the 
statistical findings. 
Chapters Five and Six: Strategic Profile 
Contemporary deterrence literature strongly recommends a deeper understanding 
of the one to be deterred and, to the degree possible, tailor your deterrence strategy the 
things that matter to them in their decision-making. One approach to such an 
understanding is through development of an adversary strategic profile, a qualitative 
research endeavor that explores national, personal, and environmental factors important 
to deterrence. The strategic profile was developed based upon the insights gleaned in 
Chapter Three: Literature Review. Non-essential material dealing on North Korea was 
not included. What remains is a detailed assembly of deterrence-related qualitative data 
that, when properly ordered into its various factors and described, provides a broad 
understanding of North Korea, its leaders, and their personal and national values. Thus, 
one’s understanding of an adversary is not only internally consistent, but can be used 
more effectively in helping to better understand the statistical results in Chapter Seven: 
Quantitative Analysis. Research of the North Korea leadership indicates a pragmatic and 
rational regime that ascribed to a value system consistent with its national history, 
culture, and ideology. Unfortunately, the North Korean value system used by its leaders 
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sees its people and neighbors instrumentally for the benefit of the regime and state. 
Central to this view is securing state sovereignty and protection from intervention and 
occupation—enduring problems of the past, including Japan’s imperial rule over Korea. 
The military forces, particularly ballistic missiles and WMD, came to play a dominant 
role. KJI responded to environmental influences—at least in his relations with Japan—
including the deterring effect of Japan’s BMD. The qualitative data in the strategic profile 
provide many of the sources of KJI’s decisions and behavioral actions of North Korea 
toward Japan. 
A consequence of theoretic review of literature in Chapter Three, the strategic 
profile organized the data on North Korea into three main categories: (1) North Korea’s 
national identity and cultural values; (2) the personal factors of Kim Jong-Il (KJI); and, 
(3) internal and external environmental factors. Because of the length of the material, 
these three categories were divided into two separate chapters: Chapter Five: Strategic 
Profile – Part I includes the first (identity and culture) and second (KJI) categories; 
Chapter Six: Strategic Profile – Part II includes the environmental factors. Chapter Five 
provides historical insights to North Korean national values and how those values might 
inform the security-related beliefs of North Korea’s top leaders. Chapter Five also 
provides the cognitive and psychological factors that informed KJI in the 22-year period 
explored in the dissertation. Chapter Six examines the many internal and external 
environmental factors of the North Korean state and the North Korean behavior that may 
have resulted from KJI’s interpretation of those factors. 
Importantly, these three categories do not simply describe division of material. 
Rather, the categories are also related one with another: KJI, as the leader and decision-
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maker in North Korea, made decisions, in part, based upon his own style, worldview, and 
psychological makeup (KJI’s personal factors); however, KJI was also a reflection of the 
people, and the face of North Korea’s culture, history, and national values (identity and 
culture); and, KJI was the one who ultimately interpreted the internal and external 
environment and changes within environmental factors. For example, a North Korean 
strategy that includes punishment of Japan for past grievances, such as terrorizing Japan 
with ballistic missiles, exploiting Japanese citizens through capture and military utility, or 
making demands for reparations, is also a reflection of national values and satisfies 
emotive needs of North Korean people.
28
 Japan’s BMD, however, was a challenge to 
North Korea and KJI personally. As interpreter of changes in the environment, KJI led 
the North Korean responses to Japan’s BMD. These key relationships among the North 
Korean factors, either separately or in combination, are reflected in North Korean 
behavior resulting from the decisions made by the North Korean leader. And it is this 
behavior that is captured as North Korean directional events toward Japan in the dataset 
and used in Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis. 
Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis 
The preceding chapters lead to Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis which 
provided the statistical analysis of North Korean behavior toward Japan over a 22-year 
period. When North Korea lost its Soviet sponsorship when it dissolved at the conclusion 
of the Cold War, North Korea’s new security reality shaped its strategy trajectory for the 
period since then. For this reason, and because statistical data were available, the dataset 
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started in 1990. The dataset was acquired from Dr. Doug Bond and VRA (Virtual 
Research Associates) and included monthly data of state-level events for the period 
January, 1990 through December, 2011. These data indicated: events that were 
directional (for example, data were tagged as coming from North Korea and oriented 
toward Japan); whether the events were cooperative/positive or conflictual/negative in 
nature; the weight, or intensity of each cooperative-conflictual event using an event scale 
provided by Joshua Goldstein; and, a total count of directional events each month for 
each country. Thus both cooperative and conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan 
could be measured as either increasing or decreasing over time. North Korean 
cooperative and conflictual behaviors toward Japan were the two dependent variables 
assessed in the statistical analysis. Starting in 1990 not only captured North Korea’s 
behavior after the Cold War era when it experienced greater independence, it also 
allowed for a substantial period of time before Japan began its BMD program and, 
therefore, an adjoining period absent BMD programmatic decisions in which statistical 
comparison can be made.  
The literature review of Chapter Three helped identify key BMD periods to 
analyze, stemming from the similarities of the Japanese and U.S. missile defense systems 
in terms of overall program development. These periods were then devised as key 
independent variables used in the statistical analyses. Other control variables were also 
developed to isolate the statistical effects of Japan’s BMD. These control variables 
included: the cooperative and conflictual behavior of the U.S., China, and South Korea 
toward North Korea, taken from the dataset; the periods of rapprochement between Japan 
and North Korea; and, political parties in the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. Various 
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regression models were employed using these variables which analyzed Japan’s BMD. 
Four criteria for deterrence effectiveness were created. These criteria reflected the four 
possible outcomes of change in North Korean behavior toward Japan (increase or 
decrease in cooperative behavior; increase or decrease in conflictual behavior)—that is, 
North Korean behavioral change was conceived as either strengthening or undermining 
deterrence in general deterrence conditions.  
Though a few differences were noted, the qualitative data, mainly from Chapters 
Five and Six, generally affirmed the statistical analysis. For example, the statistical 
analysis suggested Japan’s BMD in the TD-2 period (early 2009 to the end of 2011) 
correlated to reduction of conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, an effect also 
suggested by the qualitative data including changes in North Korean ballistic missile 
testing patterns in this time period. The findings indicated Japan’s BMD was a significant 
factor in North Korean behavior toward Japan. This is not a surprise, given that BMD can 
undermine the primary source of North Korea’s coercion strategy—its ballistic missiles. 
What was interesting was how BMD affected North Korean behavior: it strengthened 
deterrence in two periods, undermined deterrence in one period, and did not matter 
statistically in one period; and, the two periods where deterrence was strengthened were 
reflected in two different ways (increased cooperative, positive behavior toward Japan in 
one period; decreased conflictual, negative behavior toward Japan in another period). 
This shows the value of the models and the deterrence effectiveness criteria created for 
applying these data to general deterrence situations. Other important findings were the 
lack of impact of the U.S. in affecting either cooperative or conflictual North Korean 
behavior toward Japan in any of the BMD periods, and only a modest role of China. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusions 
In Chapter Eight: Conclusions, the preceding analyses are summarized and 
distilled further. Analysis of the four Japanese BMD periods, for example, portray 
evolution of Japan’s BMD, but also changes in Japan’s capabilities over time and Japan’s 
increasing political commitment, and national security stake for its own defense. The 
results from the dissertation analysis indicate Japan’s BMD did deter North Korea. The 
statistical analysis did not support BMD as strengthening deterrence in all four BMD 
periods—indeed it was not significant at all in one of the four periods. This suggests, as 
the missile defense-deterrence literature generally indicated, BMD can create both 
positive and negative deterrence effects under different circumstances. It also showed that 
deterrence effectiveness, as a reflection of North Korean cooperative and conflictual 
behavior toward Japan, is not simply a binary question—did the adversary do undesirable 
action X or did he refrain—as suggested by a DoD concept (U.S. Department of Defense, 
2006). Nor is deterrence effectiveness simply a question of whether the adversary’s 
conflictual behavior moderated. Rather, it can include increases or decreases in 
cooperative behavior in addition to decreases in conflictual behavior. This addressed one 
of the thornier theoretic and analytic gaps in deterrence: whether deterrence, as an 
influence activity, can be evaluated in any way as to the success or positive impact of its 
activities or, as Handberg argues, can only be “measured by its failure” (Handberg, 
2002).
29
 Further, the period preceding Japan’s BMD program (1990-98) indicated 
relatively low intensities of interaction between Japan and North Korea, suggesting the 
North Korean priority was on developing nuclear weapons first, and then employing its 
coercion strategy further. Chapter Eight also provides a brief review of many of the 
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missile defense-deterrence theoretic arguments through the lens of the Japan-North Korea 
case and the analyses provided in the mixed-methods approach. This review indicated 
that many of the arguments were germane to the Japan-North Korea case.  
Chapter Eight also revisits some of the deterrence-related IR theoretic challenges 
or gaps, suggesting the dissertation played a role in narrowing those gaps somewhat. For 
example, the challenge of deterring a regional “rogue” adversary was taken from a 
completely different perspective. Rather than taking a U.S.-centric position, the 
dissertation approach explored deterrence from Japan’s position, with its BMD as the 
focus, in day-to-day conditions. The pervasive deterrence theoretic element of threat of 
military retaliation was not of significant importance in this case. Secondly, the 
dissertation provided a strategic profile of North Korea that incorporated and 
consolidated the many ideas in the past 25 years on improving one’s understanding of an 
adversary, not only to help explain his behavior, but to help deter and influence that 
behavior in ways that include both cooperative and conflictual interactions. Third, 
empirical analyses of general deterrence emphasized adversary decisions to go to war and 
lacked granularity of adversary behavior over time. Empirical analyses of general 
deterrence also lacked granularity in the role of BMD over time to contribute to general 
deterrence. The dissertation addressed both of these through use of a mixed-method 
approach. From this approach, four new criteria of assessing deterrence effectiveness in 
general deterrence emerged, providing a repeatable methodology for assessment of 
general deterrence over time. Having researched the Japan-North Korea deterrence 
relationship, Chapter Eight also provides ideas for Japanese security in light of the key 
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regional dynamics of uncertainty over North Korea’s future, a rising China, and 
increasing Japanese autonomy. Japan’s BMD will play a central role in the future. 
Conclusions 
Japan has become more assertive and confident in regional affairs, a reflection of 
greater autonomy for its own interests and security (Takesada, 2001).
30
 This autonomy, 
or greater freedom of action, included such things as the sinking of a North Korean spy 
ship in 2001 (Chanlett-Avery, The U.S.-Japan Alliance, 2011),
31
 pursuit of a UNSC 
permanent seat, and a space program that could, with its BMD technological capacity, 
provide Japan the option of converting its missiles into offensive ballistic missiles. For 
Japan, rising autonomy may not be a choice as it projects into the future: the fate of the 
North Korean regime, its weapons of mass destruction, even Korean unification, are also 
serious concerns for Japan; disputes with China over territory rich in energy resources 
adds significant risks to Japan; and, long-term projections indicating Japanese and U.S. 
overall decline in the wake of the rise of China and India suggest the need for greater, not 
less, Japanese autonomy in the out-years (National Intelligence Council, 2012). Japan’s 
strategic choice of BMD provides a hedge against such weighty uncertainties. 
Understanding the role of Japan’s BMD to deter North Korean behavior contributes to 
the knowledge of North Korea and its behavior, missile defense-deterrence literature, and 
the application of a mixed-methods approach to deterrence effectiveness in general 
deterrence conditions over time employing empirical data. This could also aid in 
exploring the future of Japan’s BMD in light of other regional challenges not too distant 
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on the time horizon—including deterring Chinese behavior—and the possible effects of 
other BMD programs being considered in other regions of the world.
32
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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY 
 Japan’s missile defense is an essential instrument of Japanese power and 
influence. Further, this recent development must be considered in light of its increasing 
independence and in the historical context of regional and global international relations. 
Below is a brief review of the highlights of regional events and considerations intended to 
acknowledge some of the larger and recurring issues in Northeast Asia security as context 
for the dissertation topic.
33
 
Regional History 
Imperialism 
 In the thread of Northeast Asia security, one of the more significant factors that 
emerged in modern history is the impact of imperialism within broader Asia. According 
to Dower, imperialism “defined” 20th Century Asia, and Japan’s imperial exploits 
followed that of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United States (Dower, 1999).
34
 
For example, from 1839-42, Britain battled with China in the Opium War gaining special 
privileges (which expanded later to the U.S. and France) and control over key Chinese 
ports along it coast including Hong Kong. In 1854, the U.S. forced Japan to open trade 
relations (Bueno de Mesquita, Principles of International Politics: People's Power, 
Preferences, and Perceptions, 2003).
35
 Japan, likewise, pursued its own imperial path 
including the colonization of Korea. 
Japan’s Imperial Past. 
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 Japan’s imperial conquest was expansive and impacted many regions.36 The 
empire covered, often by military force and war, much of Northeast Asia, including 
Korea, the islands of Hokkaido, Okinawa, and Sakhalin; Southeast Asia, including 
Taiwan, Micronesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma; and parts of 
Manchuria, eastern China. China was large but its military was no match for Japan’s 
organized, trained, and modernly equipped forces (Masselos, 2010).
37
 However, its 
encroachment upon its subjects went beyond material exploitation to attempts at cultural 
transformation. One of the most profound areas of impact was Korea—an historical 
period that influence Japan-North Korea relations to this day.  
 The two key slogans for Japan’s imperial period, also known as the Meiji 
Restoration, lasting from 1868-1945, were: “a rich country, strong army;” and, “Japanese 
spirit, Western techniques” (Masselos, 2010).38 The former connected the need for 
economic cooperation with Japan’s colonies, if not outright theft of their resources and 
forcible use of their people for labor, to growth of Japan’s military forces. The latter 
connected Japan’s unique position as an Asian imperialist power with selective practices 
observed by Western powers in Asia. 
Part of the impact of Japan’s imperialism was its smothering effect politically, 
culturally, and militarily. In 1875-6, Japan forced the Korean government to sign the 
Kanghwa Treaty, the beginning of the end of Korean sovereignty, through “gunboat 
diplomacy,” a type of action Japan copied from the United States. As Japanese 
imperialism over Korea expanded, Japan justified its actions, including extensive 
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assimilation practices, by “protecting” Korea from China, teaching Korea, and serving as 
Korea’s cultural “doctor.” Over time, Japan replaced Korea’s cultural and political 
institutions, their religious symbols, language, formal dress attire, food, and education 
(Caprio, 2009).
39
 Japanese troops assassinated the Korean queen in Seoul in 1897 (Shin, 
Park, & Yang, Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: The 
Korean Experience, 2007).
40
  
One of Japan’s greatest grievances during this military buildup was the forcible 
taking of thousands of young women, including Koreans, as “comfort women” to provide 
sex to Japan’s military personnel (Dower, 1999).41 Many of these women were raped in 
proximity to the battlefield or brought to military quarters and kept as sex slaves. A 
reasonable total number of such women is 50,000 (higher estimates go to 400,000). The 
number of just Korean women is in the tens of thousands, all facilitated by Japan’s 
colonial presence and force (Soh, 2008).
42
  
Japan also forced military mobilization of Korean and Formosan subjects during 
its preparations for World War II (WWII). Hundreds of thousands of Koreans were 
brought to Japan during WWII, not only for “comfort women,” but to serve in Japan’s 
armed forces and as a labor pool for Japan’s industries. By war’s end over two million 
stateless Koreans resided in Japan, though this number fell significantly as many returned 
to Korea after war. It took decades to overcome loss of rights, insurance, and veterans’ 
pensions. Racial friction with Japan’s “expatriate community” continues (Ryang, 
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Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin, 2000).
43
 Japan’s reach included 
takeover of Korea’s judiciary system, police, and prison system, and included extensive 
use of flogging prisoners (Dudden, 2006).
44
 Japan’s imperialist practices also included 
censorship and use of locals, including artists, for its rampant propaganda measures 
(Mayo & Rimer, 2001).
45
 One of the most notorious and violent events of Japan’s 
imperial action to control China (ultimately proving unsuccessful) was its 1937 “Rape of 
Nanjing” where Japanese soldiers captured the capital of rebel Chiang Kai-shek and 
killed 200,000 people in a large-scale atrocity (Masselos, 2010).
46
 
World War II and its Aftermath 
 Imperialism intertwined the economic, political, and military forces of East and 
West, ultimately leading to World War II and the end of the imperial era in Asia. As the 
war ended, new realities, including the rising Communist threat and the Cold War, 
emerged concerning regional security, resulting in long-term U.S. commitment in the 
region and the Korean War. A few historical events are highlighted below along with 
post-Cold War issues. 
United States. 
U.S. commitment to South Korea included leadership in the Korean War and 
placement of nuclear weapons on South Korean soil (later removed) in response to 
threats it perceived from Communist nations. Following the Cold War, the U.S. 
redirected its regional commitments as regional threats, such as Iraq, dominated U.S. 
attention. This included addressing the rising ballistic missile threat by North Korea and 
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others. However, this has not been a smooth security transition as the U.S. sought to 
address ballistic missile threats, rising proliferation and maintain regional alliances. For 
example, Burns argued the U.S. national missile defense system was focused on 
defending against North Korean and Iranian missile threats and, therefore, dissuading 
them from ballistic missile proliferation. However, this strategy failed with North Korea 
as it continued to pursue a nuclear weapons capability and missile technology did not 
abate, possibly fearing regime change. North Korean nuclear and missile tests ensued, 
leading to Japanese choices on BMD (Burns, 2010).
47
 In other words, Japan was most 
afraid of aggressive U.S. actions initiated toward North Korea in its new post-Cold War 
power projection role that could embroil Japan as a potential target of North Korean 
ballistic missiles. However, in recent years the trend has been toward allied uncertainty 
over U.S. credibility.
48
 
Russia. 
Russia’s role in Northeast Asia has been less prominent especially since the Cold 
War ended. According to Victor Cha, Russia has the least amount of influence over North 
Korea of all regional actors, sharing a common border of only 12 miles. At one point, 
Russia represented North Korea’s top trading partner. A former Communist sponsor of 
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North Korea, economic aid from Russia (then the Soviet Union) ended around 1987.
49
 As 
the Cold War ended, the Soviet Union retracted its security guarantees over North Korea, 
all but ceased trade and economic aid, and in 1990 normalized relations with South Korea 
and began economic ties with the ROK (Kawashima, 2005).
50
 North Korean leader, Kim 
Jong-Il (KJI) viewed this as a breach of trust and, in his discussions with Soviet Foreign 
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Pyongyang, threatened to develop his own nuclear 
weapons in lieu of an alliance-based deterrent from Moscow. Eleven years later KJI 
traveled to Moscow and smoothed over relations with President Putin, reportedly turning 
back to the idea of trust and sincerity over diplomacy and partnerships between the two 
countries, stating “I don’t want to be a ‘partner.’ You don’t say ‘partner’ with friends” 
(Cha V. , 2012).
51
 Today, Russia holds nearly $9 billion of North Korea’s total $12.5 
billion debt load (Cha V. , 2012).
52
 Relations with North Korea center on the prospects of 
railway connections and a gas pipeline from Russia across the Korean Peninsula (Cha V. 
, 2012).
53
 
China. 
 While China did not develop industrially or technologically as fast as the Soviet 
Union did following WWII, China had rising interests in the region. With the collapse of 
imperialist strongholds, and having fought its own civil war, China was keen to avoid any 
use of the Korean Peninsula as a path to invasion again as Japan had done. Having a long 
border with North Korea, and much of its industrial capacity centered near that border, 
China was willing to pay significant costs to prevent adversaries from positioning 
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themselves on its border in North Korea. For this reason, it was willing to embroil itself 
in the Korean War. As evidenced by its normalization of relations with Japan and South 
Korea, China is interested in balancing its support to North Korea with stable relations 
with the U.S. and Japan, though it has used its increasing regional and international clout 
to pressure the U.S. and others (Clough, 1976).
54
 Today, China provides North Korea aid 
to try to maintain a semblance of stability. However, China’s primary motivation to 
continue a large-scale economic predator-like “extraction” policy of North Korean 
natural resources and minerals to facilitate Chinese development. One study places the 
value of North Korean mineral deposits—which include iron, copper, coal, limestone, 
molybdenum, and magnesite—as 140 times its GDP (Cha V. , 2012).55 
Republic of Korea. 
The Republic of Korea (ROK), also named South Korea, rose from the events of 
WWII weak, ideologically separate from the North, and fraught with internal instability. 
Democracy and economic strength did not emerge for nearly three decades. More 
recently, ROK has emerged strong and confident, reflecting a greater sense of 
nationalism as it considers its own security interests (Perry & Yoshihara, The U.S.-Japan 
Alliance: Preparing for Korean Reconciliation & Beyond, 2003).
56
 For example, under 
President Kim Dae-Jung, South Korea pursued a “sunshine policy” with North Korea in 
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the 1990s, seeking to moderate its behavior (Hagstrom & Soderberg, North Korea Policy: 
Japan and the Great Powers, 2006).
57
 
The threat from North Korea, including vast numbers of ballistic missiles, 
however, remains a key security concern for South Korea. Victor Cha, for example, 
suggests in wartime the ROK could be faced with a threat of 600 Scud missiles attacking 
various targets in the South with chemical weapons, including airports, train stations, and 
sea ports to deny civilians escape routes from Seoul and other metro areas (Cha V. , 
2012).
58
 South Korean strategy has been to advance its BMD capabilities and, unlike 
Japan, deploy and strengthen its offensive ballistic missile force capable of reaching 
most, if not all, targets in North Korea. Proximity of Seoul, the ROK capital, to North 
Korean territory and threatening missiles places great stress upon the ROK government 
and pursuit of technical remedies to defend itself.
59
 Today ROK is in a similar situation to 
Japan in some respects, such as maintenance of an alliance with the United States. 
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 Japan normalized relations with ROK in 1965 and pledged $500 million in 
colonial period restitution payments over a 10-year period (Kawashima, 2005).
60
 Because 
of the dual alliances the U.S. has with Japan and ROK, Japan seeks to maintain favorable 
relations with ROK (Rozman, Togo, & Ferguson, Japanese Strategic Thought toward 
Asia, 2007).
61
 Without question a complex relationship, Japan’s BMD activities could be 
viewed as an important avenue for military-related information or training exchanges 
between Japan and ROK as both face ballistic missile threats from North Korea. 
North Korea. 
Ironically, it was North Korea that emerged from WWII as “the most 
industrialized and urbanized Asian country” stemming in large part to Japan’s industrial 
foundations laid in its occupation of Korea prior to the war. When the war ended, the vast 
majority of mining, heavy industry, and electricity capacity lie in the North. Liberated by 
the U.S. and USSR, Korea split between camps loyal to each. As a leader of the anti-
Japanese guerilla campaign, Kim Il-Sung became the leader of the North, having aligned 
himself with the Soviet Union. In the South, many of those who collaborated with Japan 
were utilized in the U.S. occupation and administration of the South, a fact not lost on 
North Korean propagandists. Many of the advantages disappeared following the Korean 
War and the toll taken on North Korea. Soviet infusion of funding and technology helped 
keep North Korea ahead of the South until the 1970s when technology and trade began to 
pass Communist trading partners. By the 1980s South Korean modernization took hold 
                                                          
60
 Page 76. Much higher estimates suggest total payments could reach $12 billion (Shin, Park, & Yang, 
2007); in Gavan McCormack’s chapter, “Difficult Neighbors: Japan and North Korea.” Page 168. 
61
 Page 6. 
37 
 
and key indicators reversed (Cha V. , 2012).
62
 By the 1990s military capabilities, too, 
began serious decline in North Korea. 
 North Korea emerged in the early post-Cold War period facing near-complete 
isolation, unlike South Korea with normalized relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 
and China in 1992. North Korea sought to avoid such isolation and rebalance itself by 
seeking to establish ties with the U.S. and Japan. Mutual mistrust among the parties 
involved left North Korea in a political stalemate (Rozman, Togo, & Ferguson, Japanese 
Strategic Thought toward Asia, 2007).
63
 
Japan. 
 Japan, too, was looking ahead to its security interests, even before the end of the 
war. For example, as WWII progressed, Japan began negotiations with the U.S. for a 
peace agreement, instead of unconditional surrender, in which Japan would retain its 
imperial control over Korea and Taiwan. Its strategy was not only to retain its external 
sources of power, but to convince the U.S. and the West that a strong Japan was essential 
to thwarting Soviet and Communist expansion, a worry shared in Washington. The 
Soviets objected to such negotiations and this strategy proved futile in the end (Chol, 
2004).
64
 Like others, Japan suffered significant losses by war’s end including: 2.7 million 
dead (3-4% of Japan’s wartime population); millions more wounded or injured; loss of 
65% of Tokyo’s homes; and, destruction of a third of the national wealth (Dower, 
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1999).
65
 Further, after years of rethinking in the postwar period many in Japan’s political 
circles ask, “Can Japan survive?” (Curtis, 1999).66 It is also not surprising the worth 
Japan ascribes to defenses. 
Ralph Clough, in his reassessment of the security situation in Northeast Asia 
following the conclusion of the Vietnam War, reminded readers that U.S. forces, 
including its tactical nuclear weapons, were placed in South Korea principally as a 
deterrent against Chinese, not North Korean, military intervention (Clough, 1976).
67
 
However, and importantly for the dissertation, he also stated, and U.S. and Japanese 
leaders publically declared, that U.S. forces were needed in South Korea principally 
because of the U.S. need to address Japanese security concerns. Japan has sensed 
insecurity stemming from Korea since the time Japan engaged in conflict with China and 
Russia and occupied the Korean peninsula near the turn of the 19
th
 century. This 
insecurity persisted if not increased after Japan’s surrender following World War II. 
Under those circumstances, Japan was unable to influence the regional security 
conditions in its favor, in part due to constitutional limitations on its use of military forces 
imposed by the U.S. as occupier. Japan viewed its alliance with the U.S. as designed to 
prevent a hostile power from threatening Japan through Korea. In other words, Japan 
supports South Korean defense as a way to protect its own homeland (Clough, 1976).
68
 
The increasing threat from North Korea later on, coupled with a heightened need 
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domestically for greater autonomy in providing security for its own sovereignty, led 
Japan to pursue other avenues of “influence” including BMD capabilities.  
Neighborhood Dangers 
Ballistic Missiles and WMD 
Proliferation of ballistic missiles by regional actors is problematic as they develop 
or acquire them as a new technological military tool to span great distances in which 
parties are often separated by oceans or great distances. The ballistic missile proliferation 
problem is a significant one. For example, in 1972, there were nine countries with 
ballistic missiles (including the U.S.). By 2006 that number had swelled to 25 states with 
ballistic missiles (Missile Defense Agency, 2009).
69
 Further, there are now nearly 6,000 
ballistic missiles in the world (not even counting those in the U.S., NATO, Russia, and 
China), with over 1,200 ballistic missiles fielded just since 2006 (Missile Defense 
Agency, 2012).
70
 North Korea may have as many as 800 ballistic missiles in the field or 
ready to be deployed (Scobell & Sanford, North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's 
Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, 2007).
71
 
Further, North Korea continues to be the world’s leader in ballistic missile proliferation 
(Samson, 2010).
72
  
The Japan-North Korea relationship also lies in context of the advent and 
proliferation of nuclear weapons following WWII, as well as chemical and biological 
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weapons in the region. Of the key players in the Northeast Asia region, several, including 
the U.S., Russia, China, and more recently, North Korea all possess nuclear weapons 
though the number of weapons North Korea possess is relatively low, perhaps less than 
twenty. Other regional states, including Taiwan and South Korea have explored the 
development of nuclear weapons in the past. Further, nuclear use by the U.S. was 
potentially a decision factor in the Korean War, and the prospect of nuclear weapons 
being introduced in wartime scenarios is an ever-present danger. While Japan and U.S. 
territory is separated from the other regional actors by bodies of water, the proximity and 
potential stakes of these actors raises the risks of escalation stemming from North Korean 
provocation or miscalculation.
73
 
North Korea’s Pattern of Provocation 
For years, both during the Cold War and in the two decades since its end, North 
Korea has engaged in behavior, sometimes using violence, that many describe as 
provocative, to serve its domestic purposes or incite reactions of some kind. Kawashima 
characterized North Korean behavior as “destabilizing” (Kawashima, 2005).74 The 
following is not a comprehensive list, but illustrative of the political and military nature 
of North Korean provocations, including some affecting Japan. Some examples include: 
(1) withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and (2) cruise missile 
tests over the Sea of Japan (Perry & Yoshihara, The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Preparing for 
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Korean Reconciliation & Beyond, 2003);
75
 (3) development of a variety of ballistic 
missiles; (4) development and possession of nuclear weapons and other forms of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD); (5) the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel killing 
dozens; (6) artillery attacks on South Korea; (7) conducting nuclear tests, with 
radioactive debris falling near Japan; (8) ballistic missile flights toward/over Japan; (9) 
proliferation of missiles, nuclear technologies, and other military capabilities; (10) 
abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s (Kawashima, 2005);
76
 (11) armed 
naval intrusions into Japanese territorial waters (Kawashima, 2005);
77
 (12) North Korean 
capture and imprisonment of two Japanese fishermen in the mid-1980s (Kawashima, 
2005);
78
 and, (13) the sinking in 2001 of a North Korean ship by the Japanese Coast 
Guard (Chanlett-Avery, The U.S.-Japan Alliance, 2011).
79
 
 Security strategies have been tried, and are ongoing, to try to modify North 
Korean behavior, such as: Six-Party Talks to curb North Korean nuclear weapons 
development; the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to curb external proliferation 
activity; and trade, finance, and direct investment sanctions and carrots. Ballistic missiles 
present one of the biggest threats as they offer North Korea a cover for other 
provocations. Japan’s response has been the development and deployment of missile 
defense capabilities to offset North Korea’s extensive ballistic missile threat as a strategic 
choice to deter North Korea, influence its pattern of provocative behavior, and defend 
itself if needed. 
Consequences 
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Sentiments of Japan’s imperial legacy in the region remain, often in raw 
exhibition such as arguments or demonstrations over textbook historical interpretations or 
Japanese leadership visits to shrines to honor its war dead. Japan was a source of 
imperialism and the conflict that it wrought in WWII. Today, both North Korea and 
Japan are living with these consequences. As the Cold War ended, North Korea found 
itself isolated and in decline; Japan found itself on the rise and increasingly autonomous. 
As Japan steadily grew in autonomy in the post-Cold War period, one consideration is the 
effect of Japan’s autonomy with respect to stable relations with North Korea and the 
threats North Korea presents. 
Japan-North Korea Relations
80
 
 The role of Japan’s missile defenses upon North Korean behavior lies in context 
of their broader political relationship. Domestically, philosophical perspectives shape 
Japan’s views on its security. Japanese pacifists argue Japan has only been invaded once 
(12
th
 Century) and reject the notion of deterrence, whether it relies on the U.S., Japanese 
forces, or a mix of the two. Realists, on the other hand, argue lessons of European history 
suggest Japan must take its security seriously, and effective deterrence and stronger 
military capabilities are best. National polls favor the latter (Kawashima, 2005).
81
 
Generally, Japanese perceptions of the North Korean threat have risen steadily. Polling 
showed rising animosity among Japan’s population toward North Korea, from 44% in the 
1990s to 79% in 2005 (Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: 
Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States, 2011).
82
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 Politically, Japan has addressed the security challenges posed by North Korea on 
various levels: bilaterally, including the prospects of normalization; trilaterally, in 
conjunction with the U.S. and ROK; and multilaterally with many players such as the 
Six-Party Talks (Armstrong, Rozman, Kim, & Kotkin, 2006).
83
 Recently, Victor Cha 
argued that, despite the dangers, Japan exhibits a guarded optimism in nurturing a 
cooperative relationship with North Korea as opposed to a heavy-handed one. Further, 
Japan seeks a peaceful outcome on the Korean Peninsula with a state friendly to Japan. A 
proactive approach appears its best alternative and, if successful, has the potential to 
provide a long-term hedge against China (Sokolski, 2005).
84
 Japan’s BMD plays a 
prominent role in “effective” deterrence and has strengthened its hand diplomatically 
with North Korea, China, and others. 
Historical Interaction 
 Japan has had a long, historic relationship with the peoples of the Korean 
Peninsula. Like its modern relations with North Korea, Japan’s relations with Korea have 
been marked by both cooperative and confrontational, or conflictual interactions. Cultural 
and economic interaction has existed between various regional leaders of Japan, China, 
and Korea for two millennia. Japan was essentially on the outer periphery of an 
international trade network between China and others. Interaction, especially trade, 
gradually shifted from simple assimilation of foreign techniques, to importation, to heavy 
exports by the 14
th
 Century (von Verschuer, 2006).
85
 Trade included an extensive amount 
of silver from Japan’s Tsushima district to Korea for their use in trade with China—an 
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activity described as a “Silver Road” (Kim Y. , Korea and Japan: The Clash of 
Worldviews, 1868-1876, 2006).
86
 
 Japan attempted to invade the Korean Peninsula in the 16
th
 Century, a fact not lost 
on Korean views of Japan to this day. On the other hand, the Kingdom of Korea 
maintained cooperative relations with Japan for nearly 300 years following that event. 
With modernization efforts in mind, and observations of imperialism of others in the 
region, Japan’s Meiji government began movement toward Japanese imperial expansion. 
Militarily armed, Japan clashed with China over Korea in the 1894 Sino-Japanese War 
and later, in 1904, with Russia over Korea and Manchuria. This led to Japan’s annexation 
of Korea in 1910 and years of Korean humiliation (Kawashima, 2005).
87
 The Cold War 
was the dominant framework for the years following WWII and the end of imperial 
domination. As the Cold War ended, significant shifts occurred and it is at this juncture 
the dissertation begins emphasis. 
Post-Cold War Period 
 While the Cold War came and went, repatriation of Koreans living in Japan back 
to North and South Korea occurred in context of “Asia’s Cold War,” something not yet 
settled. For example, in the 2002 summit between North Korea and Japan in Pyongyang, 
one part of the forthcoming Pyongyang Declaration was agreement to “sincerely discuss 
the issue of the status of Korean residents in Japan.” Furthermore, there was the more 
recent issue of 13 Japanese civilians captured by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 
1980s and taken there to train their spies. This issue did not unfold until the late 1990s. 
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The summit acknowledged this issue but it remains unsettled and a great source of 
consternation in Japan (Morris-Suzuki, 2007).
88
 More broadly, Japan has not yet settled 
its imperial past with North Korea despite having done so with Taiwan in 1952, ROK in 
1965, and China in 1972 (Shin, Park, & Yang, Rethinking Historical Injustice and 
Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: The Korean Experience, 2007).
89
  
 As Japan’s security evolved, it was faced with three overall policy choices: rely 
wholly upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella to manage threats; depend increasingly upon its 
own capabilities, including BMD; or, develop its own offensive nuclear weapons 
capability (Perry, Davis, Schoff, & Yoshihara, 2004).
90
 Yutaka Kawashima argued 
another option was available: present North Korea with a “grand bargain” of peace in 
exchange for supporting the regime, an option not palatable by many (Kawashima, 
2005).
91
 Following the 1998 surprise North Korean missile launch over Japan, Japan’s 
approach was to acknowledge the threat and address it methodically through BMD and 
other activities, but also to engage North Korea politically in a positive way to reduce 
danger (Rozman, Togo, & Ferguson, Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia, 2007).
92
 
Japan chose BMD, at least for the near-term.  
 The Japan-North Korea relationship intersects important factors summarized 
below. These security factors also resonate with Japan’s thinking in terms of choices 
made for research, development, acquisition and production, and deployment of its BMD 
system. They include: (1) the U.S.-Japan Alliance; (2) Japan’s increasing sense of 
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independence and autonomy; (3) efforts between Japan and North Korea at political 
rapprochement; and, (4) the rise of the North Korean threat to Japan. 
U.S.-Japan Alliance. 
 Japan struggles to define itself from a strategic culture perspective. Most seem to 
desire to guide Japan toward becoming a “normal country” free from its historical past, 
particularly its colonial, occupation, and wartime records. To do that, some, such as 
conservatives, justify militarization with regional threats, content to follow U.S. political 
leadership within the alliance structure—for now. Liberals within Japan, however, think 
it best to normalize political relations with North Korea and pursue regional 
reconciliation (Pollack J. D., Korea: The East Asian Pivot, 2004).
93
 Without doubt, BMD 
strategies can serve both interests. 
The Alliance between the U.S. and Japan is important to both parties. The mutual 
security arrangement between the U.S. and Japan in the form of the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty provides for Japan’s defense by the United States. The treaty, which provides for 
access of U.S. military forces to Japan, is limited to U.S. aid in the event of “armed 
attack;” Japan carries no such commitment to aid the U.S. in case the U.S. was attacked 
(Governments of Japan and the United States of America, 1960).
94
 The treaty was 
principally an outcome of the Cold War and anti-Soviet expansion though potential 
adversaries were not named in the treaty. With the Cold War’s end, the security focus 
shifted to regional threats like North Korea and WMD (Kawashima, 2005).
95
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Redefining the post-Cold War threat by the U.S. and Japan, Japan experiencing 
partial freedom from its war guilt, and Japanese maturation (including its own economic 
and military capabilities) have placed the security relationship under some stress and 
raised some question as to the future role of the formal defense treaty. For example, in the 
1990s, when Japan’s economy was rapidly expanding, some suggest the U.S. began to 
view Japan with suspicion and as a threat to the U.S. (Rozman, Togo, & Ferguson, 
Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia, 2007).
96
 Additionally, gaps in security 
affiliation were revealed in the financial (not military) support Japan ultimately provided 
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Heginbotham & Samuels, 2002).
97
 Still others argue 
the Alliance can actually get in the way, such as the Koizumi-Kim summit in August 
2002. This event, part of Japan’s efforts at political normalization with North Korea, ran 
counter to U.S. policy at that time (Hagstrom & Soderberg, North Korea Policy: Japan 
and the Great Powers, 2006).
98
 
The U.S. also provides extended deterrence for Japan by threatening to punish 
nuclear attacks upon Japan with U.S. nuclear retaliation. Ken Jimbo argued the credibility 
of U.S. extended deterrence to Japan, too, was fragile. In this case, and in light of threats 
from North Korea, Japan would rely upon its own BMD and, if necessary, develop its 
own conventional military capabilities, options other regional actors do not welcome. 
Japan would not, however, likely “go nuclear” in Jimbo’s view (Self & Thompson, 
2003).
99
 Still others argue Japan should go nuclear to contain the North Korean threat.
100
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Japan’s Increasing Independence 
Cultural, economic, and political factors have been driving Japan toward greater 
autonomy and independence since WWII. Culturally, Dower argues Japan experienced a 
“forced Americanization” following its own colonial experience and defeat in WWII, a 
feature of Japanese culture that added to national disgrace and impacted national identity 
(Dower, 1999).
101
 Japan also finds itself entrapped by its past in some respects, though 
there is a growing belief Japan has been forced to abide by standards no other nation has 
faced and must somehow escape its postwar “legacy of subordinate independence” 
(Dower, 1999).
102
 Still alive through the Alliance structure, these psychological features 
may help explain Japan’s partial willingness to avoid complete dependence on the U.S. 
for its security. 
In fact, Japan’s security position has changed markedly since its period of 
weakness following WWII: its economy is one of the world’s strongest; its technology 
base is of global stature; and, its leadership role in the region on political and economic 
issues continues to rise (Green & Cronin, The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and 
Future, 1999).
103
 Richard Samuels argued Japan’s strategic culture is now marked by 
moves to a grand strategy “based on respect.” More than simply autonomous, Japan’s 
emergence in the new security environment means its junior status with the U.S. itself 
                                                                                                                                                                             
policy and technical self-restraints which should allay fear of a Japanese nuclear breakout: transparency in 
international inspection and safeguards; storing of most surplus plutonium overseas; lack of technical 
expertise in bomb or warhead design; and, overlapping policy bodies to police each other (Self & 
Thompson, 2003); page 176. See also: (Chanlett-Avery & Nikitin, Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, 
Prospects, and U.S. Interests, 2009). It must also be remembered that Japan, like other states in the 
international system, has an inherent right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
Development and deployment of BMD is clearly a Japanese right. 
100
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may have fundamentally shifted, a partnership he suggests “may be slipping into history” 
(Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, 2008).
104
 
BMD, while serving political purposes with Japan’s relationship with the U.S., is also an 
important part of Japan’s overall interest in recreating an autonomous military industrial 
complex following WWII (Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army:" National Security and 
the Technological Transformation of Japan, 1994).
105
 
For these reasons Japan today reflects a much more assertive political and military 
posture. Kenneth Pyle, for example, identified several ways in which Japan, since the end 
of the Cold War, adapted itself to the new security environment. These include: (1) 
ending a ban on overseas deployment of its forces allowing, for example, deployment of 
noncombat troops to Cambodia in 1992; (2) easing of the long-held narrow constitutional 
interpretation of Article 9 banning collective self-defense activities, permitting 
deployment of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq; (3) acquisition of power-projection 
capabilities such as air refueling Boeing 767 tankers; (4) breaking of the taboo of 
discussion of acquisition of nuclear weapons; (5) breaking of the prohibition of sharing 
military technology and exporting arms through acquisition of BMD capabilities from the 
U.S. but then sharing related advanced technology; (6) growing its defense spending; 
though officially about 1% of GDP, Japan has masked its military spending throughout 
the budget and it could now be the world’s third or fourth largest; (7) abandoning 
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prohibition of the military use of space, including decisions to deploy reconnaissance 
satellites in 2003; and, (8) make other institutional changes beyond easing Article 9 
interpretation, such as enlarging the role of the office of prime minister in defense issues; 
the passing of many new laws to afford more nimble crisis management in case of attack 
or crises; and, raising the Defense Agency to ministry status, with a new headquarters 
complex built upon the original site of Japan’s Imperial War Ministry (Pyle, 2007).106 
Japan’s autonomous rise is also reflected in how it carries itself in its relationship 
with North Korea, China, and in international organizations. For example, Linus 
Hagstrom and Marie Soderberg argue Japan has since the early 1990s pursued an 
autonomous strategy toward North Korea, acting in the post-Cold War period out of 
concern for its own security interests and in light of regional changes. Japan was 
essentially becoming a “normal” military power and this was showing itself with North 
Korea. Japan has also threatened to cut funding to the UN unless it is elected a permanent 
member of the Security Council (Hagstrom & Soderberg, North Korea Policy: Japan and 
the Great Powers, 2006).
107
 Economically, Japan interacts with key actors, including 
potential U.S. adversaries, such as Iran and China, to guard against what Japan sees as 
economic threats, suggesting Japan’s willingness to depart from U.S. interests to protect 
its own in the future is rising (Heginbotham & Samuels, 2002).
108
 The U.S., for its part, 
has had to work to allay fears in China and ROK that Japan’s emergence will not be a 
militarily assertive one (Menon, 2007).
109
 Japan’s BMD specifically faces strong 
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opposition by China, citing fears it undermines its nuclear deterrent capabilities (Cossa, 
Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Toward a More Equal Partnership, 1997).
110
 
Rapprochement. 
Japan seems to have taken a long-term political approach in its relational 
strategies with North Korea, particularly since the end of the Cold War. This reflects the 
preferred deterrence approach advocated by George and Smoke. They argued deterrence 
can be described in short-term (crisis) problems and long-term influence strategies 
between two actors seeking to coexist. The deterrer, they argued, should seek to guide 
change between the two actors in a favorable political direction rather than existing in a 
perpetual deterrence relationship. Rapprochement and political normalization is a 
reflection of this reality for Japan (George & Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign 
Policy: Theory and Practice, 1974).
111
 
 Near the end of the Cold War it was North Korea that proposed normalization of 
relations with Japan in late 1990, presumably after losing political and economic support 
from the failing Soviet Union. North Korea expected compensation for Japan’s colonial 
past, as it had done with South Korea. The ROK objected, fearing a large infusion of 
funds would merely fuel North Korean military capabilities and alter the balance of 
power on the peninsula much more in North Korea’s favor (Kawashima, 2005).112 That 
deal fell through, as did attempts in subsequent years. The key stumbling block 
surrounded money—an instructive lesson for North Korean coercive use of its ballistic 
missile activities to exploit Japan and others. Reconciliation stalled due to North Korean 
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demands for financial compensation, specifically on four counts: for Japan’s colonial 
rule; for Japan’s WWII war reparations; for losses North Korea incurred when Japan 
normalized relations with ROK; and, damages North Korea incurred due to Japan’s 
complicity during the Korean War (Hagstrom & Soderberg, North Korea Policy: Japan 
and the Great Powers, 2006).
113
 It is difficult to assess what the total amount of all of 
these demands would be, but the figure would be many billion dollars.  
A deal appeared closer in 2002. An executive-level summit emerged in 
Pyongyang on 17 September 2002, producing: the Pyongyang Declaration; Japan 
apologizing for colonial suffering; the waiving of all colonial-era claims; KJI personally 
apologizing for abductions; and North Korean agreement to extend a missile testing 
moratorium (started in 1999). A second summit between KJI and Prime Minister 
Koizumi occurred in Pyongyang on 22 May 2004. The moratorium was extended and 
North Korea released family members of two abductees; Japan agreed to provide food 
and health aid. But this exchange did not play well in Japanese domestic politics 
(Hagstrom & Soderberg, North Korea Policy: Japan and the Great Powers, 2006).
114
 No 
significant measures since then have furthered the political process of rapprochement, 
though this is clearly Japan’s long-term preference. 
Rise of North Korean Threat to Japan.
115
 
The threats from North Korea to Japan stem from its ability to deliver munitions 
via ballistic missiles in minutes and how they use that capability to coerce. Being able to 
do so, and testing the missiles in provocative ways, can create a range of threatening 
effects: instilling fear among its population; coercing Japan to concede an economic or 
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political benefit; provoke a response favorable to North Korea domestically or in its 
relations with China; to punish it for past grievances; or, to exploit its vulnerability to 
being drawn into a conflict between North Korea and the U.S. and incurring grave 
consequences as a result. North Korea’s ballistic missiles lie at the center of its threat 
because it can use these directly to threaten, or as an escalatory tool. 
Regarding North Korea’s ballistic missile threat, Victoria Samson argues North 
Korea’s main threat to Japan and the U.S. stems from its short-range ballistic missiles 
(SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), not its intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM) class Taepodong. These include 500 Scud B and C model SRBMs and 
320 Nodong MRBMs, the latter of which is WMD-capable (including nuclear-armed) 
and can range Japan but cannot be intercepted by the U.S. homeland-defending 
interceptors in Alaska and California (nor were the U.S. interceptors designed for these 
range missiles). She further suggests North Korean missiles, because they have poor 
accuracy, are likely planned more as “shock” weapons than precision weapons. North 
Korea continues to be the world’s leader in ballistic missile proliferation (Samson, 
2010).
116
 
But even conventionally-armed ballistic missiles are a threat to Japan given North 
Korea’s intentions to use them for coercive purposes. Robin Ranger recognized 
conventional ballistic missiles were a strategic threat because of their very significant 
political effect upon the one attacked (especially if civilian casualties occur) and, 
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similarly, the high political gain that could be wrought by the attacker. Such was the 
scenario when Iraq used conventionally-armed ballistic missiles in the Gulf War to split 
Arab members from others in the coalition and to cause enough civilian and military 
casualties in places like Saudi Arabia to retard military operations against Iraq. This 
demonstrated that ballistic missiles had become the weapon of choice for “strategic 
intimidation” by regional actors against the U.S. and its regional allies (Ranger, 1998).117 
These types of factors and historical events likely weighed heavily in Japanese leadership 
calculations concerning missile defenses since the Gulf War demonstrated the value 
missile defenses can have against such threats. Tokyo, Japan, for example, is particularly 
vulnerable to coercion by fear of any type of ballistic missile attack or accident.
118
 These 
fears might stem from, for example: Japan’s imperial domination of the Korean 
Peninsula; Japan’s alliance with the U.S. and basing of its military forces in Tokyo; and, 
Tokyo is the center of Japanese economic vitality and the source of a preponderance of 
Japan’s economic output. 
Both North Korea and Japan recognize the significance even of North Korean 
ballistic missile tests. These events, and the reverberations that follow, demonstrate their 
value to North Korea, but their source of anxiety by Japan. In September 2002, in an 
agreement with Japan, North Korea extended a pledge to maintain a moratorium on 
ballistic missile flight-tests. However, only a month later North Korea acknowledged 
existence of a secret uranium program, significantly raising regional tensions. On 4-5 
July 2006, North Korea resumed missile tests including several short and medium-range 
and a long-range TD-2 missile. Japan was the initiator of an emergency meeting of the 
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UNSC as a result. North Korea conducted its first test of a nuclear device on 9 October 
2006. Reaction in Japan to the nuclear test was “relatively restrained” though public 
discussion of Japan pursuing a nuclear weapons program emerged with more openness 
(Burns, 2010).
119
 More missile tests occurred in 2007 and 2008. On 5 April 2009 another 
TD-2 was tested, followed by a second nuclear test 25 May, and then more short-range 
missile tests. Between 2-4 July 2009 North Korea launched 11 missiles, including KN-
01, Scuds, and three Nodongs, all landing in the Sea of Japan and precipitating a strong 
Japanese reaction that included a government characterization of North Korean behavior 
as a “serious act of provocation against the security of neighboring countries” (Burns, 
2010).
120
 
The ultimate threat to Japan is attack with nuclear weapons. North Korea, in the 
early 1990s, used its plutonium reactor to begin producing sufficient quantities for a 
small number of nuclear bombs, but it had the potential to produce 100 weapons per year 
if unchecked. A deal was struck in 1994 to curtail such expansion but not before North 
Korea had stored up plutonium for 2-3 weapons. Japan’s part of the deal was to provide 
$1 billion worth of funding to help build a no-threat nuclear reactor in North Korea 
(Kawashima, 2005). Efforts to curtail North Korea’s nuclear program have had mixed 
results at best. While uncertainty remains over exact North Korean nuclear weapons 
capabilities, it appears possible it can deliver these weapons with ballistic missiles against 
regional actors including Japan. 
Japan’s BMD Program.121 
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As sketched above, Japan’s response to the threats include development of a 
capable BMD program to deter North Korea by denying the North its underlying, if not 
blunt, instrument of coercion, and to defend against ballistic missile attack in wartime.
122
 
Japan is faced with the situation in which North Korean shorter range missiles, immune 
to U.S. national BMD systems, could threaten or attack Japan independent of any general 
attack on the peninsula. As a result, BMD not only defends U.S. forces in wartime 
contingencies, but more closely connects to protection of Japanese people and its 
interests, particularly in pre-conflict situations.
123
 Japanese possession of a credible 
domestic BMD system of its own would set the U.S. retaliatory option in the background 
behind Japan’s independent defensive capability. Defenses, however, if possessed and 
deployed are expected by the public for basic national security. This argument, too, 
makes sense from a Japanese vantage point where the North Korean threat (given its 
behavior and stockpile of ballistic missiles) and Japanese domestic politics (given 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), its national homeland defense subset of BMDS called the 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, or former U.S. missile defense names, including 
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constraints on offensive military capabilities) combine to undergird the value of ballistic 
missile defense.
124
 BMD should, however, be recalled as an instrument in context of the 
broader Japan-North Korea relationship in which cooperative engagement also exists.
125
  
 Japan engaged in various activities in response to the ballistic missile threats it 
perceived including many internal and cooperative studies (other decisions, such as 
creation of BMD-related governmental agencies, limited research and production of 
missile defense technologies, and decisions on BMD-related acquisition followed).
126
 By 
far the most significant event pushing Japan toward actually fielding a BMD system was 
the North Korean test flight of a Taepodong-1 (TD-1) missile on 31 August 1998. The 
                                                          
124
 While defense of Japanese homeland with PAC-3 missiles, for example, does not raise constitutional 
issues, other scenarios are less clear or deemed prohibited. Using Japanese BMD to defend against missile 
attacks on Japanese ships at sea is legal, while defending U.S. ships at sea is less clear as that might be 
construed as “collective self-defense.” Likewise, in a Korean peninsula or Taiwan Strait conflict, Japanese 
BMD might be expected to defend U.S. troops in Korea or near Taiwan, though this is clearly not self-
defense. Further, intercepting an attacking missile in its boost-phase would be considered collective self-
defense since Japan’s BMD would essentially be defending all regional nations because the attacking 
missile’s type and heading would not be known. See, Abmann (2007), pages 339-57, including the charts 
on p. 344 and p. 357. On Article 9 of Japan’s constitution, see also pages 367-9. For a discussion of these 
scenarios see pp. 376-90. 
125
 Kiziah states it as follows: lower the value of North Korean and Chinese ballistic missiles (given their 
proclivity to use them to antagonize others in the region), thereby deterring North Korea and China from 
using their ballistic missiles for political or military objectives; and, to protect U.S. and allied interests if 
deterrence fails (Kiziah, 2000); pages 11, 13. According to Thomas Christensen, cited in Kiziah’s book, 
Japan is more likely to oppose Taiwan’s integration with mainland China than the United States, given 
Japan’s economic and historical connections to Taiwan. See page 21. 
126
 Many studies were conducted and included: the “Western Pacific Missile Defense Architecture Study,” 
undertaken in 1989, which recommended Japan consider acquisition of THAAD and sea-based missile 
defense capabilities in response to the Nodong, considered to be the greatest threat to Japan; a security 
policy vision report in August 1994 that recommended development of military reconnaissance satellites 
and development and deployment of a BMD system to counter ballistic missile threats from North Korea 
and China; the Japanese-led “U.S.-Japan Bilateral Study on Ballistic Missile Defense,” initiated in January 
1995 and completed in 1997, which identified various technologies Japan could develop that also had 
value to the U.S.; the “On Research Concerning Ballistic Missile Defense” report issued by the Japanese 
Defense Agency (JDA) in August 1995, which recommended Japan pursue missile defense capabilities 
beyond the PAC-2, considered deficient to match the threat; a three-year feasibility study by JDA begun 
following the December 1995 Mid-Term Defense Program for FY 1996-2000 and completed in 1998, 
which examined a layered BMD approach modeled for defending against “tens of North Korean IRBMs” 
with 80% effectiveness, a capability estimated to cost $20 billion and 40% of Japan’s annual defense 
budget; and, a report called “The Joint Declaration and Future National Security” issued April 18th, 1997, 
by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Policy Affairs Research Council, which recommended more joint 
studies with the United States (Swaine, Swanger, & Kawakami, 2001); pages 29-32. 
58 
 
missile’s trajectory, consistent with that expected of a launch to place a satellite into orbit 
(North Korea’s stated intentions for the flight) took the TD-1 directly over Japan. The 
TD-1 was a three-stage missile, with the first stage falling into the Sea of Japan, the 
second stage falling into the Pacific Ocean near the northeastern coast of Honshu 
(Japan’s main island), and the final stage failing partway into powered flight and landing 
in the ocean. The launch was a surprise to all, creating feelings of unpreparedness among 
Japan’s public, but the test was also a technological surprise even to the U.S. in that it 
used a third stage: a capability not attributed to the TD-1 missile nor to North Korean 
engineers. The first stage was a Nodong and the second a Scud C, both North Korean 
produced missiles (Kiziah, 2000).
127
 
 The time had come for studies to transition to action. While other domestic 
constituencies existed in Japan, immediately after the launch both houses of Japan’s Diet 
condemned the launch and recommended Japan seek the means necessary to provide 
protection of its population (Swaine, Swanger, & Kawakami, 2001).
128
 At that time, 
Japan had three broad military options available to address the ballistic missile threat: 
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offensive measures; passive defenses; and, active defenses. Only active missile defenses 
would have the needed psychological deterrent effects upon North Korean leadership 
(Swaine, Swanger, & Kawakami, 2001).
129
 The formal, publicly-announced Japanese 
government decision to pursue BMD emphasized the defensive nature of the system with 
a principle purpose “to protect life and property of the citizens of Japan against ballistic 
missile attacks.” Further, the “system requires interception of missiles by Japan's own 
independent judgment based on the information on the target acquired by Japan's own 
sensors” (Government of Japan, 2003).130 This clearly stated Japan’s intent to have a 
capability that can operate and defend Japan independent of U.S. capabilities or 
oversight. 
 Japan’s BMD development path has taken it in two directions: acquisition of its 
own capability to address current North Korean threats; and, joint development of new 
capabilities to address future threats with the SM-3 Block IIA missile system years away 
from deployment (Takahashi, Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military 
Transformation, 2012).
131
 The former is the emphasis of the dissertation as it is 
foundational to Japan’s deterrence strategy. Over time, Japan would devote significant 
resources and political support to pursue its BMD system through development, outright 
purchase and acquisition, and deployment. The Japanese multilayered missile defense 
system, using its sea-based Aegis and land-based Patriot PAC-3 BMD assets, provides 
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Japan with autonomous capabilities against ballistic missile threats. “Layering” of BMD 
provides different interceptor missiles to engage attacking missiles at different altitudes, 
engaging the missiles with overlapping layers of defensive coverage. Japan’s BMD 
system is also “interoperable” with the U.S. BMD system through radar detection 
capabilities based in Japan (Missile Defense Agency, 2009).
132
 In 2007, Japan deployed 
its first operational BMD asset and to date has deployed four BMD-equipped Aegis ships 
and 16 PAC-3 firing units, along with the necessary command and control assets (Japan 
Ministry of Defense, 2010).
133
 The latest government projection is that Japan will acquire 
and deploy six Aegis BMD ships and six PAC-3 firing units (Japanese Ministry of 
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mobile missile defense sensor, and a land-based AN/TPY-2 X-band radar positioned at Shariki Japan. 
These radar are essential in providing discrimination of target warheads from decoys (Samson, 2010); 
pages 51-2 and 57. In addition to Japan’s pursuit of its own reconnaissance satellites, it could use 
commercially-available quality satellite imagery such as that provided of a North Korean launch facility by 
the civilian Ikonos satellite (Handberg, 2002); page 147. 
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 Page 9. Japan plans deployment of 133 SM-3 Block IA and IB missiles to Aegis ships by 2013 and, to 
address threats from longer-range missiles, the SM-3 Block IIA is being developed jointly by the U.S. and 
Japan. This missile, which will fly faster than the Block I variant, will improve Japan’s potential to intercept 
IRBMs like the Nodong, and will have a limited capability against ICBMs. While Aegis SM-2 missiles engage 
attacking missiles inside the atmosphere (endoatmospheric intercept), SM-3s engage in the 
exoatmosphere. Another principal difference between these missiles is that the SM-2 uses a blast-
fragmentation type warhead while SM-3’s warhead actually collides with the target (Burns, 2010); pages 
124-5. According to Samson, Japan is also interested in purchasing THAAD to work with its PAC-3 and 
Aegis systems (Samson, 2010); page 133. The THAAD system, designed to engage missiles in the upper-
tier, provides a layered capability when joined with Patriot PAC-3 missiles which can engage lower-tier 
missiles. The United Arab Emirates, in 2008 purchased THAAD from the U.S. and, later that year, ordered 
the purchase of PAC-3s from the U.S. providing it a layered BMD capability. 
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Defense, 2010).
134
 This could mean approximately 540 SM-3 missiles on Aegis and 120 
PAC-3 missiles, providing Japan a capability to defend against potentially dozens of 
attacking ballistic missiles.
135
 
 Japan is addressing the missile threat both with organizational and technical 
remedies. The flight time of a North Korean offensive ballistic missile to Japan is about 
10 minutes, compressing time available for decision-making and defense (Kaneda, 
Tajima, Kobayashi, & Tosaki, 2007).
136
 For this reason, Japanese leaders have provided 
delegation of authority to launch BMD assets below the political leadership to military 
commanders. This is also why early detection capabilities are of significant concern to 
Japan. Launch detection in particular is provided only through U.S. Defense Support 
Program (DSP) space-based capabilities (Kaneda, Tajima, Kobayashi, & Tosaki, 2007)
137
 
raising questions of Japan’s ability to provide for its own security independently. An 
indigenous tracking capability provided through its Aegis system provides Japan an 
autonomous BMD capability able of independent operations against North Korean 
ballistic missiles without tracking capabilities otherwise provided by the United States. 
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 See the table, page 20. 
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 The figures here are pieced together from different sources and may not reflect the realities of Japan’s 
actual BMD interceptor force or the capacity of that force to engage North Korean attacking ballistic 
missiles. The potential Aegis BMD missile totals stem from Laura Grego’s analysis (Grego, 2012) that Aegis 
destroyers carry 90-96 interceptors per ship (therefore, Japan’s six Aegis BMD ships could have 540-576 
missiles total); Japan’s MOD BMD document (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2010), slide 13, states each of its 
six firing units has five launchers each pictured with four missile tubes per launcher for a total of 20 
missiles per firing unit (therefore, the six PAC-3 firing units could have 120 missiles total); the net total of 
Japan’s BMD interceptors available to shoot, therefore, could be 660 or more. The idea of dozens of North 
Korean attacking missiles comes from using a 4:1 ratio of BMD interceptors per attacking missile (Larson 
& Kent, 1994), pages xii-xiii and 56-8; this could potentially allow Japan’s BMD to engage 165 incoming 
missiles, though this would vary greatly under different conditions. 
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 Page 92. 
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 Page 84. Such short flight times are also why preemptive “offensive defense” capabilities make sense 
to some in Japan: credibly threatening to strike ballistic missiles on their launch pads with conventional 
precision-guided weapons, coupled with effective layered BMD, would provide Japan a far more robust 
deterrence set of tools. However, the challenges to such a policy are many. 
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What was lacking is a capability to detect a North Korean missile at the time of its 
launch. Such a capability could be provided by infrared sensors located in space, a 
capability currently provided by the U.S. on behalf of Japan, but not possessed by Japan. 
Alternatively, surface-based radar, such as the land-based x-band radar deployed in 
northern Japan in 2006 can provide the U.S. and Japan detection and warning of missiles 
early in flight. This facility, however, and the new facility planned for 2013 in southern 
Japan, is operated by the U.S., not Japan.
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On April 5 2009, a longer-range variant of Taepodong was launched, but the 
North Koreans opted to comply with a United Nations request for safety of flight and 
navigation pre-launch notifications. In the lead up to the launch Japan gave orders to field 
its BMD assets, defend Tokyo and other areas, and prepare to shoot the missile down 
(Japan Ministry of Defense, 2009).
139
 The behavior and statements of North Korea for the 
2009 event were clearly different from the 1998 surprise launch—did North Korea 
change the missile’s flight profile to one that was less threatening to Japan in response to 
awareness of Japan’s BMD? If so, Japan achieved a deterrent effect for which its BMD 
was designed.  
In April and December 2012, North Korea launched Taepodong missiles from its 
new Sohae Satellite Launching Station in northwestern North Korea. In both cases Japan 
again deployed BMD assets and were prepared to engage the North Korean missiles. 
Both missiles flew southerly over open ocean (the April launch failed shortly after 
                                                          
138
 According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Japan’s Basic Space Law was enacted on 27 August 
2008 lifting the ban on military use of space. Then, in January 2009, Japan’s MOD released its policy on 
military use of space including how such actions will improve Japan's BMD system (Toki, 2009); see the 
section entitled, “Japan's space policy change.” These improvements will help Japan be more autonomous 
in space to support its BMD system but will not, however, provide it with an infrared launch detection 
system similar to the U.S. DSP. 
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 Issued in response to advance notice provided on March 12, 2009, by North Korea to the UN. 
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launch; the December launch successfully placed a satellite into orbit for the first time in 
North Korean history). The 2009 and April 2012 launches were not handled well by 
Japanese authorities due to miscues in information handling and decision errors: in the 
2009 launch, the MoD announced the launch a day ahead of the actual launch; in the 
April 2012 launch they did not announce the launch until an hour later; these issues 
seemed to be remedied by the December 2012 satellite event (Takahashi, Ballistic 
Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military Transformation, 2012).
140
 Despite 
these shortcomings in Japanese command and control, North Korea again changed its 
missile flight behavioral pattern in Japan’s favor by launching missiles to the south away 
from Japan’s main population centers. It is possible North Korean missile launches to the 
east could no longer fly the distance North Korea desired fearing they would be shot 
down by Japan’s BMD, or the North Koreans desired lower conflictual interaction with 
Japan at that time. 
Consequences 
Japan-North Korea relations exist as an independent interactive political process. 
However, historical events, security alignments of various parties, threats and military 
capabilities interplay in, and occasionally overshadow, these relations. Several factors are 
dynamic, reflecting a changing security environment for Japan, including: a relative 
decline of U.S. global and regional hegemony particularly given China’s rise; greater 
Japanese independence; and changes to North Korea internally. Japan is adapting and 
must confront the near-term threat it perceives from North Korea. BMD is a key feature 
of this adaptation. 
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 In the long-term, Japan seeks a political solution with North Korea. Rozman, for 
example, believes Japan will do so through economic integration policies. This, he 
argues, will only occur after North Korean capitulation on the abduction issue and the 
threats presented by its ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons (Rozman, Strategic 
Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and 
the United States, 2011).
141
 Such a long-term approach is complicated by the North’s 
internal stability, however. Many have forecast North Korea’s demise for years and 
predict its eventual collapse. Victor Cha, for example, claims North Korean survival to be 
merely an “accident of history” (Cha V. , 2012).142 However, its resilience cannot be 
understated. Alternatively, North Korean leaders may reflect a shrewdness to navigate 
their political hand. A more careful understanding of North Korea and its leaders is, 
therefore, an essential component in exploring effects of a deterrence strategy oriented 
against it.  
Regional Deterrence Situation 
 Japan’s missile defenses exist to deter North Korean behavior, not only as 
defensive systems to protect Japan should deterrence fail. Japan is faced with both the 
threat of political coercion and threat of attack by North Korea. Japan’s BMD is intended, 
in part, to deter North Korea from such political decisions. Japan might be attacked with 
North Korean ballistic missiles as part of a broader conflict involving the United States 
since the U.S. defense of Korea involves the use of its forces staged at various locations 
in nearby Japan. As such, Japan’s role in the defense of Korea has a high probability of 
either making it a target of North Korean coercion to refrain from supporting the U.S. 
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combat effort or, if it does, a physical target of armed ballistic missiles. The history since 
the end of the Cold War, however, is generally not related to crisis involving armed 
confrontation upon the Korean Peninsula. As a result, the principal coercive threat from 
North Korea toward Japan is for other regional security goals of the North Korean regime 
and for other political needs including financial gain. Threatening and provocative North 
Korean statements and behavior therefore, specifically oriented toward Japan, are the 
primary focus of Japan’s deterrence strategy. Given North Korea’s history of challenges 
to its sovereignty or outright defeat and occupation, it uses the long-range technology and 
destructive power offered with ballistic missiles to deter others from armed intervention 
in North Korea, but also as a visible instrument for political coercion of others. 
Therefore, Japan’s BMD is a logical choice of deterrence, especially as Japan becomes 
increasingly independent from the U.S. politically. Further, Sugio Takahashi states 
limited North Korean ballistic missile attacks or raids fall below the “threshold for 
retaliation” by the U.S. under extended deterrence conditions (Takahashi, Ballistic 
Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military Transformation, 2012).
143
 What this 
means is that it will take many North Korean ballistic missiles to cross a threshold for 
war and U.S. retaliation as part of the U.S. extended deterrence security guarantee, 
placing Japan’s BMD at the center of deterring North Korea in scenarios below such 
large-scale attacks including political coercion or limited missile attacks. 
While Japan has its own security interests to consider, including its deterrence 
strategy against North Korea, the U.S. is also active in deterring North Korea. Key 
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 Page 23. Takahashi is with the National Institute for Defense Studies and also a Deputy Director of the 
Office of Strategic Planning in Japan’s Ministry of Defense, both in Tokyo. 
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differences exist, however, and are summarized below to help bring further clarity to 
Japan’s situation and the deterrence area of emphasis for the dissertation. 
U.S.-North Korea Deterrence Situation 
While the U.S. is generally concerned about North Korean provocations, the U.S. 
deterrence problem set is principally about deterring war on the peninsula. With North 
Korea’s arsenal of ballistic missiles, the U.S. worries about their use in conflict. These 
missiles could, for example, target U.S. military force bases in Japan or ROK in order to 
drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies (Perry, Davis, Schoff, & Yoshihara, 
2004).
144
 In wartime, such a wedge could be driven with North Korean use of WMD as a 
way to blackmail Japan from allowing the U.S. to use its territory, severely weakening 
the U.S. warfighting position (Kawashima, 2005).
145
 Being dragged into conflict driven 
principally by the interests of the U.S. is precisely the type of “entrapment” scenario 
Japan fears (Sokolski, 2005).
146
 The strike forces of the U.S. at bases in Japan may also 
serve to punish North Korea following a North Korean wartime attack on these bases. 
Japan’s BMD could, therefore, provide the U.S. with a “damage limitation” capability for 
U.S. retaliatory forces (Takahashi, Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and 
Military Transformation, 2012).
147
 Thus, the deterrence challenge for the U.S. is a 
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 Pages 143-4. 
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 Pages 91 and 143. 
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 In his chapter, “Japan’s Grand Strategy of the Korean Peninsula: Optimistic Realism.” Page 237. 
According to Victor Cha, the U.S. and ROK forces have planned for war on the peninsula through 
Operational Plan 5027 since the early 1990s, a plan intended to fight North Korea on its territory and end 
its regime. Prepositioning of U.S. forces in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii is part of the defensive scheme. North 
Korea could threaten or actually attack Japan with 100 chemically-armed Nodong missiles, the purpose 
being delay of U.S. forces to the peninsula (Cha, 2012); pages 212 and 218. 
147
 See pages 23-4. While Japan’s BMD could limit damage to U.S. forces at bases in Japan, it would 
require a large North Korean ballistic missile raid to achieve. Further, the U.S. possesses other 
strike/retaliatory forces that could be brought to bear. Under wartime conditions, it does not appear the 
damage-limitation role of Japan’s BMD for U.S. combat forces would be a decisive one and, therefore, 
may not be a significant factor in deterring war itself. 
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complex one. BMD may play a small deterrence role in this situation where the 
deterrence objective is to deter war—a task that exceeds BMD expectations—whereas 
the U.S. and ROK provide extensive conventional forces and the U.S. its nuclear 
weapons punitive capacity to deter North Korean aggression. 
Japan-North Korea Deterrence Situation 
Japan’s deterrence problem is principally against North Korean behavior short of 
the wartime scenario sketch above. Japan’s situation is better categorized as a “general 
deterrence” (status quo) or possibly an “immediate deterrence” (crisis) situation. Japan’s 
missile defenses deter in this situation by having influence over North Korean behavior. 
This is the area of the dissertation’s focus. 
Japan’s deterrence strategy does not use BMD exclusively, however, and includes 
the “carrot” of deterrence through cooperative engagement with North Korea. 
Engagement, through use of food, energy, and compensation-based financial 
inducements, seeks to attract North Korea to better behavior. Japan seeks to deter North 
Korean behavior by disincentivizing it with its combined capacity of national power, 
including its BMD that is also used as a safety net. While Japan is unable to threaten 
punishment of North Korea with offensive kinetic military power, Japan is uneasy about 
any aggressive U.S. posture as it could trigger conflict (scenario above) and North 
Korean attacks on Japan (Perry, Davis, Schoff, & Yoshihara, 2004).
148
  
 By the time Japan fielded its first operationally deployed BMD assets in 2007, 
intellectual work was also underway to further Japan’s deterrence-related strategy vis-à-
vis BMD. For example, a Japan Institute of International Affairs report reviewed the 
development of deterrence, and the role of missile defenses, conceptually in the U.S., 
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arguing Japan’s thinking followed that of the United States. They cited, for example, the 
2004 version of the U.S. Defense Department’s deterrence concept document, drafted by 
U.S. Strategic Command, in Omaha, Nebraska, in the development of Japan’s thinking 
on deterrence—a source of foundational conceptual thinking applied in the dissertation 
(Kaneda, Tajima, Kobayashi, & Tosaki, 2007).
149
 The authors feared key U.S. 
conventional capabilities, such as carrier battle groups, could redeploy out of Northeast 
Asia, as has happened in the past. The JIIA report also reflected on the 2006 North 
Korean ballistic missile tests, suggesting diplomacy may have been more effective had 
Japan had deterrence-capable BMD deployed, which it did not at that time. The report’s 
authors also argued BMD meant Japan will not need to “surrender” to such intimidation, 
arguing BMD carries significant emotive meaning to Japan given the strains of 
unconditional surrender at the termination of World War II. More robust BMD 
capabilities, they argued, would deter more effectively North Korean “reckless behavior” 
and forms of political intimidation (Kaneda, Tajima, Kobayashi, & Tosaki, 2007).
150
 
 Some argue North Korean behavior toward Japan reflects more of coercion rather 
than threats to attack and wage general war—to get something from Japan, such as aid, 
reparations, or opposition to U.S. basing access, without military attacks. Part of Japan’s 
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 The dissertation reflects more on the 2006 version, the DO JOC, though the basic conceptual tenets of 
deterrence of both documents are the same. As the authors of the JIIA report developed the thinking of 
deterrence in Japan, they included the following essential discussion points: technology is critical, 
including both the nature of the threat and defenses brought to bear to deter and defend against that 
threat; Japan relies on the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee for nuclear threats to Japan, inferring 
conventional and non-nuclear WMD threats fall principally to Japan to deter; BMD primarily delivers 
deterrence by denial by restraining the political and military advantages sought by the enemy through 
actual or threatened ballistic missile attacks; BMD also deters and makes an enemy more cautious by 
complicating an enemy’s “strategic calculation” by increasing uncertainties he will achieve his goals or 
objectives; BMD restrains an enemy from deploying greater numbers of ballistic missiles and from 
proliferating them to other countries; deterrence will be further enhanced by successful BMD tests and 
exercises; passive defenses also provide benefit-denial deterrence; and, BMD provides Japan’s leadership 
rational decision-making even in crisis. See pages 137-9. 
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task, therefore, would be to deter North Korean coercion, particularly through use of its 
ballistic missiles.
151
 As such, Japan is interested in deterring North Korean ballistic 
missile tests, or at least those that threaten Japan’s population given sensitivities to aerial 
attacks from the past and the surprise overflight in 1998. However, the backdrop of U.S. 
nuclear weapons providing extended deterrence of North Korea for Japan has shown its 
limits. Just as the U.S. threatening massive nuclear retaliation against small threats 
proved to lack credibility in the Cold War, so, too, U.S. nuclear threats do not avail 
themselves for deterring provocative North Korean behavior such as missile tests. 
According to Victor Cha, the U.S. views North Korean ballistic missile development and 
tests as woeful U.S. deterrence failures stating in 2012, “The United States has failed for 
over twenty years to deter DPRK development and testing of its ballistic missiles” (Cha 
V. , 2012).
152
 This fact, and the ability of North Korea’s shorter-range ballistic missiles to 
strike Japan free from being intercepted by the U.S. national system has shaped Japan’s 
thinking of its deterrence situation and the value of its own BMD to devalue North 
Korean ballistic missiles and deter their behavior. In Japan, where even test missiles can 
fly over and endanger civilians, change of North Korean ballistic missile launch and 
testing patterns might be viewed with relief and guarded optimism of deterrence success, 
such as the change in flight profile in the North Korean 2009 Taepodong missile test. 
Japan’s development and heavy investment in BMD suggests it is a primary instrument in 
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 North Korea’s ballistic missile tests and overflight of Japan could be considered “coercive diplomacy,” 
essentially backing a political demand with the threat of punishment for noncompliance. For example, 
prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the U.S. attempted to deter Japanese aggression through the 
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Harbor as a signal of U.S. resolve. Later, it chose to move from deterring aggression to coercing Japan to 
remove its military forces from China with the same threats, although the U.S. policy became a de facto 
embargo by way of internal administrative mishandlings (George & Simons, The Limits of Coercive 
Diplomacy, 1994); pages 2, 58-71. In this way, a ballistic missile test communicates a threat of punishment 
for noncompliance. 
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 Pages 223-4. 
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such a deterrence strategy, not only serving to deter ballistic missile attacks in support of 
U.S. war plans against North Korea for peninsular-wide scenarios, but more practically 
against North Korean flight profiles that instill societal fear, and doing so without 
dependence on the U.S. or violation of Japan’s constitution. Deterring ballistic missile-
related behavior denies North Korea its principle tool of coercion and could, therefore, 
have a constraining effect on other behavior toward Japan. 
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Deterrence Theory and Missile Defenses 
Deterrence retains a few core concepts but has, especially in the post-Cold War 
era, experienced development of thought. Described by some as “waves” of thought, 
scholars of modern deterrence thinking have sought to adapt deterrence to meet a variety 
of security challenges and new technologies and capabilities including BMD. Considered 
an influence-oriented activity, deterrence can occur in peacetime and crisis (referred to as 
“general” and “immediate” deterrence, respectively) and in conflict. Political leaders can 
devise deterrence strategies using all of the instruments of power at their disposal. Taken 
from the context of the Cold War bipolar security context, deterrence has moved for 
many theorists from strictly a nuclear threat deterred by other nuclear capabilities to: 
conventional, nuclear, and cyber threats, for example; provocation to coerce; and 
technical acquisition such as Iran pursuing a nuclear weapons program. 
Further, deterrence is no longer isolated to cost-imposition, but can be 
accomplished in other ways of influence, including benefit-denial and affecting an 
adversary’s perceptions of not acting, or the costs and benefits of restraint (the latter term 
is also dubbed the “carrot” of deterrence, as opposed to the “stick” of traditional cost-
imposition). The means of deterrence have not only moved beyond nuclear weapons but 
can include other military capabilities such as cyber, BMD, space, and reconnaissance, 
and non-military instruments such as diplomacy, financial sanctions on banks, trade 
restrictions, and law enforcement. Another departure from Cold War practices is the 
move from simple counting rules, comparing numbers of various forces and assuming 
parity was stable, or just a little more than the opponent was even better for deterrence. In 
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place of numeric comparisons, emphasis shifted to qualitative and psychological 
understanding of the adversary. BMD in the Cold War was considered for its deterrent 
value, but national systems were questionably effective, costly, and more political 
baggage than they were worth. President Reagan’s grandiose vision in the 1980s of 
defenses making nuclear weapons obsolete, and regional threats, such as Iraq in the early 
1990s, changed many views on deterrence and BMD’s contribution to it.153 While it is 
difficult to establish with precision, Japan’s views on deterrence also evolved: echoes of 
deterrence were voiced periodically by its leaders and today its official positions reflect 
modern adaptations found in U.S. literature. For Japan to view BMD as a central 
component of its deterrence strategy is a direct reflection of the knitting together of 
modern military capabilities with modern deterrence thought.
154
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 Not everyone has made the intellectual jump from BMD defending to BMD deterring, however. Aaron 
Karp also reflects the idea that deterrence has transformed to a greater emphasis upon defenses and now 
the two exist as parallel concepts. Deterrence has declined because nuclear confrontation between 
traditional Cold War rivals has declined. Conventional conflict and terrorism have overtaken the 
international security landscape, making missile defenses of value for warfighting in regional scenarios 
only. National missile defenses in the U.S. defending against nuclear attack by Russia or China does not 
make sense (Karp, 2004); pages 72-5 and 81. While Karp’s description of the decades-long transformation 
from Cold War deterrence to an increasingly dominant international security framework of defenses helps 
place Japan’s missile defense program into a larger international security context (and one emphasizing 
threats from regional actors like North Korea), like some others he does not address any conceptual or 
practical relevance of missile defenses to deterrence. For example, if missile defenses contribute to 
regional warfighting capabilities, does this not have any effect on regional stability or deterring regional 
conflict? 
154
 Navigating terminology within the “deterrence” lexicon is challenging, especially when seeking clarity 
on the simple question of whether BMD deters or simply an enabler for the “real” instrument of 
deterrence—nuclear weapons—to work. For example, in a timely revisit of his 1966 classic, Arms and 
Influence, Thomas Schelling draws distinction between defense and deterrent defense. The difference, he 
suggests, is the intent of the action. For example, “pure defense” is in play if the intent of the defender is 
to block or resist the adversary such that he cannot succeed in his plan. However, “deterrent defense” is 
purposefully inducing the adversary from proceeding at all (Schelling, 2008); pages 78-9. Japan’s BMD, 
therefore, can be considered both pure defense, in the sense of simply working to save lives under 
ballistic missile attack, and deterrent defense as they are also intentioned to sway North Korean leaders 
from making the decision to use ballistic missiles in the first place, or from other aberrant or unwanted 
behavior that could escalate somehow. 
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As a strategy generally, deterrence is a component of one’s national security. In 
execution, deterrence cuts across many lanes and is especially woven into the fabric of 
foreign policy. For example, the U.S. seeks to gain foreign basing access at various 
locations throughout the world in order to deter specific regional threats. It could take 
years of diplomatic negotiation to accomplish, and may entail other U.S. political or 
economic commitments. Deterrence could not be accomplished, however, without the 
intertwining of national security and foreign policies. Theoretically, deterrence 
compliments other international relations streams or activities, crossing events of history 
no less than other political science or IR emphases. For example, in the Cold War, 
deterrence was closely aligned with non-proliferation and arms control, including the 
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, ratified by the U.S. and USSR to help 
maintain stable deterrence without an offensive arms race. Deterrence is also related to 
peace and conflict studies, alliances and interdependence, political psychology, and 
constructivism. But if deterrence has conceptually expanded one would expect wide 
revision in other international relations theoretical approaches or policy applications.
155
 
In total, the dissertation research has identified over 50 theoretic arguments of 
how BMD can support or undermine deterrence. This represents the largest list of such 
arguments consolidated that could be found. Some of these are conceptual ideas, others 
from an analysis of a specific historical event. As such, it can be difficult to judge which 
theoretic view applies to any one deterrence situation. Such a large number of 
perspectives can also create theoretic and policy confusion in the expectations of missile 
defenses to deter. 
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As a strategy, deterrence has existed since ancient times. It is essentially about 
one party influencing another from doing something the first wants to avoid or finds 
harmful. Deterrence operates in the legal domain, such as a community deterring criminal 
behavior through use of its law enforcement capabilities and creation of prison sentences 
for prosecuted criminals. At the interstate level, deterrence works through various levers 
of national power to influence an adversary’s thought processes and calculations of 
actions under consideration. Various threats of punishment or means to deny the 
adversary perceived benefits of such action are useful deterrence tools. In recent years, 
ballistic missiles emerged both as an instrument to threaten by an adversary and to deter 
by the threatened. Likewise, defensive capabilities against ballistic missile threats also 
grew in prominence, both in consonance with the threat and as needed technological 
hurdles were crossed enabling ballistic missile defense to be cost-effective and credible. 
Most theorists and practitioners agree missile defenses are an important new military 
capability, though disagreement exists as to their efficacy as a tool of deterrence. 
In exploring the concept of deterrence and the contributions of missile defenses 
historically, much is to be gleaned from the literature as it relates to the U.S. experience. 
For example, many of the fundamental ideas of deterrence relied upon today have their 
origins in the Cold War period. So, too, were some of the central arguments of the roles 
and deterrent effects of missile defenses. No value is lost with respect to the applicability 
of these deterrence concepts to Japan and its use of missile defenses as a deterrent tool 
against North Korea since Japanese thinking on deterrence tends to be similar to that of 
the United States. However, while deterrence thought has developed in many ways from 
its early beginning, there remain several gaps germane to the Japan-North Korea case. 
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For example, little is written dealing with Japan-North Korea relations generally and 
empirical data is lacking with respect to the deterrent role of Japan’s missile defense 
capabilities toward North Korea. Further, little is addressed empirically as to the deterrent 
role of missile defenses in status quo (non-wartime) conditions or how the development 
of a missile defense capability over a long period of time, as Japan has done, contributes 
to deterrence. Additionally, the pros and cons of missile defense contributions to 
deterrence are widely scattered—no single compilation can be found from which 
theoretic or empirical case study analyses can be based. These and other gaps will be 
highlighted throughout this chapter. The dissertation will address some of these empirical 
gaps. 
Deterrence theories have ranged from a simple proposition of having more forces 
than one’s opponent, on the one hand, to the great difficulty understanding adversary 
psychology or how deterrence works on the other. Questions were raised about why 
deterrence had failed in many cases and pointed to the need to better understand one’s 
adversary including cultural and psychological factors that inform his national security 
decision-making. Analyses, plans, and policy ebbed, too, including how deterrence was 
addressed between the U.S. and regional allies. As missile defenses rose in prominence to 
address regional threats increasingly armed with greater numbers and more lethal 
offensive ballistic missiles, so, too, did debate in the U.S. about how missile defenses 
contribute to, or undermine, deterrence of those threats—over 50 arguments, some 
contradictory, have been identified in the research of the dissertation and are captured in 
Table 1 at the end of this chapter. All of these developments were highly relevant as U.S. 
allies, including Japan, considered partnering with the U.S. in such enterprises or 
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embarking on missile defense programs of their own. Dependent, in part, upon the U.S. 
for its security, Japan has also looked to the U.S. experience to inform its own thinking 
on deterrence concepts and the special role of missile defenses for its own security. Such 
considerations are exceedingly relevant for a country no longer possessing formidable 
offensive military power, but who is nevertheless forced to confront a very near and 
present danger from North Korea.  
The evolution of the missile defense-deterrence dynamic has provided important 
and revised concepts, including lessons learned from past historical deterrence failures or 
illuminations of historical events, valuable to Japanese decision-making with respect to 
its research, acquisition and deployment of its own ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
system. This chapter, therefore, will be divided into three parts: the development of 
deterrence theory, including the importance of the Cold War period as well as 
understanding deterrence theoretic development through “waves” of thought; modern 
features and ideas of deterrence, including the role of regional actors, general vs. 
immediate deterrence conditions, deterrence tailoring, improved adversary understanding, 
and use of various capabilities to influence; and, missile defenses, including the historical 
development of BMD, the technical characteristics of ballistic missiles and BMD, and the 
arguments for and against BMD in deterrence. Application of ideas described to the 
Japan-North Korea case, as well as theoretic gaps and shortfalls to that case, will be 
provided and summarized within the chapter’s three parts. 
Deterrence Theoretic Development and Features 
Historical Evolution 
The Cold War Period. 
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 According to a recent U.S. Department of Defense report, “deterrence operations” 
are defined as “integrated, systematic efforts to exercise decisive influence over 
adversaries’ decision-making calculus in peacetime, crisis, and war to achieve 
deterrence” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009).156 Today, the Japanese perspective is 
similar. Such a broad definition reflects decades of theoretic evolution and debate, with 
Cold War era deterrence serving as the point of departure, at least for most theorists. 
 In a prominent theoretic study nearly four decades ago, Alexander George and 
Richard Smoke provided important background on the development of deterrence 
thinking and conceptual ideas for its application. Considered an influence type of activity, 
deterrence was present conceptually in early writings such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, 
and others in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, though an important distinction for political 
leaders in those days was that deterrers had the capability to threaten harm only after they 
defeated their opponent’s military forces. Technology, however, changed this dynamic. 
With the advent of strategic bombing in World War II and later, nuclear weapons, 
deterrence was able to be conceived as a separate strategy since it was possible to 
threaten grave national consequences without defeating the opponent’s armies first. For 
the U.S., it was not until the 1950s that any coherent deterrence strategy emerged 
(George & Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, 
1974).
157
 While there is empirical evidence technology advanced deterrence thinking 
considerably, it fails to address Japan’s current situation in which it needs to deter North 
Korea without offensive military arms. The term “deterrence,” according to Dougherty 
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and Pfaltzgraff, “did not appear in the literature of international relations or strategic 
theory prior to World War II” (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001).158 
 George and Smoke described deterrence as a relational process of influence by 
one over another, but confined deterrence to threats of punishment, and in the modern 
era, emphasized nuclear weapons in context of nuclear scenarios between nuclear-armed 
states (George & Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, 
1974).
159
 The North Korea-Japan case in the dissertation lies beyond the types of 
deterrence cases presented by George and Smoke, reflecting just how much of the 
modern era theoretic development, policy, and concomitant literature on deterrence 
originated in the post-war period of relations between the U.S. and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) and how regional situations like the Japan-North Korea case 
were simply ignored. 
 In his early volume on national security strategy (first published in 1959), Bernard 
Brodie provided a classic perspective on deterrence and described components of early 
deterrence thinking, many of which remain operative, or are at least debated, today. For 
example, given the nuclear circumstances with the USSR, he presented three broad 
approaches to U.S. national security, including preventive war, preemptive attack, and 
massive retaliation (Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 1965).
160
 The credibility of 
massive retaliation deterrence relied upon an overwhelming, “embarrassing” amount of 
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 Pages 344-5. 
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 Pages 38-9, 48-9, and 102. 
160
 Pages 223-63. The term “massive retaliation” was coined by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 
1954 in which those offensive nuclear forces responsible for retaliating to nuclear attack would form the 
backbone of U.S. deterrence in part because there was, at that time, “little alternative.” Pages 248 and 
252. 
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power with one’s nuclear weapons, though conventional forces could provide a 
deterrence “signaling” role (Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 1965).161  
 By the mid-to-late 1950s, however, the U.S. was faced with other security 
choices, impacted in part by military technologies. These options included: deterrence; 
war-winning; and defense (Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, 
Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972, 1977).
162
 While active and passive defenses could 
save lives and provide protection of various points of high value, missile defenses could 
specifically enhance deterrence by limiting damage to U.S. offensive forces (Yanarella, 
The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972, 
1977).
163
 As technology improved and as the numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery 
systems increased on both sides, the only core change in the deterrence equation, at least 
on the U.S. side, was a move from the idea of mutual vulnerability to each other in a first-
strike scenario, to mutual invulnerability to a first strike (Adams, 1971).
164
  
As if to acknowledge mutual unease of the destabilizing effects of ballistic missile 
defenses upon deterrence, however, the U.S. and USSR agreed to two simultaneous arms 
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 Pages 253 and 273. Brodie also suggested, as others did, the decision-makers of governments were 
rational people possessing widely varying temperaments though, under extreme circumstances, can make 
unreasonable choices and may in fact make most decisions out of intuition without careful weighing of 
objective facts. In this regard he argued effective deterrence was based upon a “subjective feeling” in the 
adversary’s mind. Pages 277-80 and 397-9. 
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 Page 50. 
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and must be accomplished by more and more capable offensive weapon systems. See pages 76-7. 
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 Pages 169-70. First strike invulnerability was made possible due to the hardening of intercontinental 
ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, survivability of at-sea submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on 
submarines, and warning and readiness of manned bombers. This meant both sides were actually assured 
destruction if either initiated a nuclear war due to the certainty of facing a large nuclear second strike in 
retaliation. Beliefs and perceptions coupled with actual estimates of nuclear forces of the opponent were 
central to achieving deterrence and so long as the forces of both sides were comparable in overall 
balance, a stable psychological or cognitive environment would exist among leaders on both sides, thus 
deterrence would remain operative. Also, in the most active period of research, development and 
deployment (1959-1969), a review of literature on the policy debate was overwhelmingly against U.S. 
BMD. See page 247.  
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control agreements in 1972, only a few years after the U.S. deployed the SAFEGUARD 
BMD system. This was effectively a “closing off of the defensive realm” to afford 
assured destruction to retain centrality in deterring nuclear conflict (Yanarella, The 
Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972, 1977).
165
 
Later, it became apparent that U.S. thinkers had engaged in “mirror-imaging” of the 
Soviet Union, assuming (falsely) they were attracted to a mutual goal of stability. In 
reality, the USSR was pursuing a nuclear war-fighting capability marked by a mix of 
offensive and defensive systems, including active ballistic missile defenses (Goure, 
Hyland, & Gray, 1979).
166
 Pursuit of extensive damage-limitation capabilities indicated 
MAD was no longer “mutual” (Goure, Hyland, & Gray, 1979).167 
The U.S. in the 1980s considered three basic strategy alternatives: retaliation 
only; prevailing or warfighting; and a defense-dominant approach (Office of Technology 
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 These treaties were the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I, limiting offensive nuclear arms) and 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Pages 185-6. Robert McNamara, following his decision to 
recommend deployment of a U.S. BMD system in the 1960s, argued missile defenses not only could deter 
the minimal Chinese threat but discourage other consequences, such as nuclear proliferation by other 
states—his central argument for favoring missile defenses. Ironically, when a robust U.S. BMD system 
began deployment, significant diplomatic efforts at both offensive and defensive (BMD) arms control 
between the U.S. and Soviet Union emerged, with many claiming U.S. operational deployment of BMD 
playing a positive role in the U.S.-Soviet political relationship generally and the stabilizing of the overall 
strategic deterrent relationship. This is an important prospect in the dissertation since stable relations in 
the Japan-North Korea case generally are, likewise, used as a benchmark for the deterrence relationship 
as described above in the U.S.-USSR case. 
166
 Page v. War-fighting capability, argued Gouré, not only included offensive counterforce capabilities, 
domination at war’s end, and ability to recover, but active and passive defenses. Further, the reason the 
Soviets agreed to the ABM Treaty was not because they accepted the MAD concept for their security but 
because they saw, at the time of the treaty’s debate, U.S. superiority in defenses—something the USSR 
saw as integral to a successful war-fighting strategy. Having stopped U.S. missile defense deployment and 
technological research, the Soviets began their own process of catching up and speeding by the U.S. in 
critical deterrence capabilities, including missile defenses. See pages vi and viii-ix. Further, Soviet military 
officers described features of their strategy and the rising role of defenses, including missile defense, civil 
defense, and protective measures such as offensive force mobility. The Soviets were also pursuing other 
BMD technologies, such as lasers and charged-particle beam systems. These capabilities would present 
benefits over use of ballistic missiles for defense, including: faster response time against incoming 
warheads; radars used in BMD would not be blinded by the effects of nuclear-armed ABM missiles; and, 
there would be unlimited capacity to shoot at incoming warheads. Page 24 
167
 Page 20. 
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Assessment, 1986).
168
 Proponents of a defense-dominant strategy viewed missile 
defenses increasingly as providing clear deterrence value by making an adversary’s 
objective more difficult by protecting at least some of his intended targets and by making 
his planning more uncertain by denying him knowledge of how many, and precisely 
which, warheads will get through (Office of Technology Assessment, 1986).
169
 For the 
USSR, defenses were to help them absorb any first blow by the U.S., providing the 
Soviets valuable time and decision space before proceeding in conflict (Goure, Hyland, & 
Gray, 1979).
170
 Despite U.S. fears that Soviet BMD and other war-fighting technologies 
presented it first-strike capabilities, Hyland argued Soviet military leaders had for years 
suggested BMD provided both sides deterrence value (Goure, Hyland, & Gray, 1979).
171
 
As in the U.S.-Soviet case, little empirical study exists on North Korean leader thinking 
with respect to deterrence generally or to how a regional actor’s BMD might deter North 
Korea. 
 As relations with the Soviet Union began to stabilize around more pragmatic, less 
ideological, factors, reconsideration was given by some in the U.S. of the value of BMD 
to enhance deterrence (Starsman, 1981).
172
 This discussion moved to the fore under 
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 Page 31. This advantage, with active missile defenses at the center, was comparable to Soviet strategy 
in World War II in which it traded territory temporarily for time to regroup against German attacks. 
171
 Pages 31-2. In 1964, for example, Soviet General Talensky published an article claiming active defenses 
helped provide “balance” since they added to the options one side could pursue to compensate for any 
advantage by the other. Talensky also remarked such defensive systems maximized deterrence by placing 
such capabilities into your own hands rather than relying on the goodwill of the other side to restrain. 
172
 Page 2. For example, Colonel Raymond E. Starsman, in a study at the National Defense University, 
suggested BMD could make the new MX (later called Peacekeeper) ICBM more survivable. He argued that 
the ABM Treaty forced U.S. planners to focus attention on offensive systems, particularly their 
modernization and basing options. This was reflected, in part, in U.S. research and development (R&D) 
funding on BMD over 25 years. Starsman showed that BMD funding rose rapidly from the early 1950s, 
peaked in the late 1960s, and continued a rapid decline through the ABM signing period and bottomed 
out around $.3M per year in the late 1970s through 1980. The central technological feature of offensive 
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President Ronald Reagan when he revealed his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 
1983, providing a broad vision of redefining deterrence in national security through use 
of defenses. The vision of SDI relatively quickly succumbed to technical limitations, 
however, and more modest thoughts of the emerging role of missile defenses 
(Binnendijk, 1986).
173
 Nevertheless, U.S. strategic doctrine was in transition from an 
offense-oriented to a defense-oriented doctrine.
174
 The period following SDI’s start 
forced many new studies and reevaluations to provide U.S. leadership more options than 
massive retaliation or surrender (Binnendijk, 1986).
175
 It was feared by some in the U.S. 
that the transition period from a deterrence strategy based on retaliation to a defense-
dominant one would be risky (Office of Technology Assessment, 1986).
176
 Another 
significant shift in thinking about BMD, however, occurred at the end of the Cold War, 
particularly in the period surrounding the Gulf War in 1991. Deterrence strategy 
increasingly focused on regional and operational threats (Payne K. B., Missile Defense in 
the 21st Century: Protection against Limited Threats, 1991).
177
 Despite this new and 
profound shift in attention to regional threats, including North Korea, and the rising role 
of BMD, no empirical studies examined implications of regional BMD, such as Japan’s 
early program, for deterring North Korea. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
forces driving current thinking was MIRV capability, providing great offensive prowess and reducing ABM 
value except for the most robust and technically superior missile defense systems. Page 4. 
173
 Page 5. There were, however, benefits of newer SDI technologies, including the fact BMD no longer 
required use of a nuclear warhead atop the interceptor and BMD could successfully deal with the problem 
of attacking MIRVs. See pages 11-2. 
174
 Page 17. This transition was also reflected in political-military strategy games and operational 
wargames. 
175
 Pages 78-9. This led to the concept of “escalation control” and emphasis upon a U.S. nuclear reserve 
force. Critical to these studies, according to Sloss, was the emergence of the U.S. countervailing strategy 
which sought once again to find the proper mix of offenses and defenses to deter and hedge against 
deterrence failure. 
176
 Page 113. 
177
 Pages 4-7. 
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Schools of Thought, “Waves” of Theory, Models Employed. 
 In addition to the historical approach, another method of exploring the 
development of deterrence thought—and its relevance and relationship to BMD—is 
through the broad schools of thought, or periods of thinking on the subject. Robert Jervis 
and others have described the theoretical development of deterrence over time in terms of 
“waves” of ideas expressed by various scholars. The first wave grew following World 
War II and spoke of the immense implications of the advent of nuclear weapons upon 
international relations and realist thought. Bernard Brodie was a leader among first wave 
scholars (Jervis, Deterrence Theory Revisited, 1979).
178
 More systemization was applied 
in the second wave by Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Glenn Snyder, Roberta Wohlstetter and 
others. Like the first wave, the second wave was also framed by the need to address the 
nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Use of games was common, 
though perhaps in an over-simplistic manner. Another feature, and source of criticism, 
was the overestimation of objective, benefit-maximizing, utility oriented rationality in 
leader decision-making through development and use of the rational actor model (Jervis, 
Deterrence Theory Revisited, 1979).
179
  
 The “classic model” of decision theory in international relations, with its roots in 
the Enlightenment period, is the rational actor model (RAM) used extensively in first and 
second wave literature. The RAM presumes a decision-maker calculates based upon 
objective consideration of the utility and probability of alternatives and chooses the 
option that maximizes expected utility given a value-based rank-ordering of his 
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preferences (Allison, 1971).
180
 Many early, predominantly realist, theorists, such as 
Morgenthau, Schelling, Kennan, Waltz, Kissinger, and Bueno de Mesquita used the 
classical model. Several theoretic problems with the rational actor model have arisen, 
however, as others in later waves explore other empirical cases or approaches. For 
example, RAM, and other game-theoretic approaches, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma or 
Chicken, always relies on the element of retaliation in the formal deterrence model 
(Langlois, 1989).
181
 This is a considerable gap for the Japan-North Korea case. Japan, for 
example, does not possess an offensive, retaliatory, and especially nuclear-armed 
capability and the value of such games for insights in this particular case appear very 
limited. Further, while the RAM can provide some insights into “tacit” and diplomatic 
bargaining (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001),
182
 game-theoretic deterrence models, 
however, are admittedly not representative of reality in international relations (Franck & 
Melese, The Access Deterrence Scenario: A New Approach to Assessing National 
Missile Defenses, 2002).
183
  
Another problem is that the rational actor model avoided incorporation of 
qualifying features from constructivist or psychological theories. Herbert Simon offered 
the idea of “bounded rationality” and “satisficing” decisions that are good enough and 
reached without complex matrices of all conceivable decision factors (Dougherty & 
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 Pages 10 and 35. In his examination of the key decisions involved in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 
Graham Allison introduced the model as the “classical” approach to understanding calculations and 
decisions of leaders. This model focused upon the choices made by U.S. and Soviet senior leaders and 
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Process Model, which focused on routines and outputs of organizations, and a 
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crisis. Pages 245-56. 
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 Page 67. See also Exploring the Stability of Deterrence, edited by Jacek Kugler and Frank Zagare (Kugler 
& Zagare, 1987), though their approach, like many others, emphasized the U.S.-USSR stability problem 
and retained common game-theoretic assumptions. 
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 Pages 234-6. 
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Pfaltzgraff, 2001).
184
 Many theorists since the early 1990s have stressed the need to take 
a more eclectic conceptual approach. As Alex Mintz suggested, national security related 
decisions were “best explained as the amalgam of a mixture of theories” that capture 
personal, environmental, and social or cultural identity factors (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 
2001).
185
 This is the dissertation’s approach; as such, application of simple rational actor 
modeling to the Japan-North Korea case is of little value. 
The third wave stressed theoretic development of deterrence along the lines of 
psychological factors and risk-taking in decision-making. Third wave deterrence theorists 
explored more fully the decision calculus elements of leaders, including the probability 
estimates of perceived consequences of their choices, but Jervis argues more was needed 
in this area, too, to understand how leaders actually employed probabilities. For example, 
their estimates tend not to be made with the precision suggested by formal theory. 
Additionally, third wave deterrence explored the idea of commitment, suggesting leaders 
“generally place a greater value on keeping what they have than on making further 
gains.” Finally, third wave deterrence began to explore the role of a leader’s political 
goals in his decision-making more fully. An adversary’s reason for initiating movement 
from status quo to crisis or conflict mattered immensely, but was not addressed with 
vigor before third wave deterrence (Jervis, Deterrence Theory Revisited, 1979).
186
 
 Constructivist theory’s contribution to decision-making and broader decision-
making theory played a central role as deterrence thinking expanded in the third wave. 
Constructivism, for example, suggests leaders’ perceptions of various components of the 
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external and internal environment around them, such as technology, resources, and social 
demography, influence their decision-making, sometimes creating bad decisions due to 
informational gaps in the environment or erroneous interpretations of environmental 
activity or change. Alexander Wendt, Robert Keohane and others argued that the national 
interests of a state were socially constructed from the identity, values, norms, and culture 
of the state’s people (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001).187 But these ideas did not generate 
a significant series of study on North Korea and how these factors inform their 
deterrence-related decision-making with respect to Japan, where historical interactions 
clearly resonate in North Korean culture. The dissertation, through use of the strategic 
profile, will seek to address this gap. 
 Robert Jervis stressed the need to approach deterrence from a psychological 
perspective, or at least to unpack an opponent’s psychological factors as part of an 
approach to deterrence. As part of the third wave of thinking, he suggested that 
“deductive logic,” the premise of rational choice modeling, ran contrary to reality and 
history in many cases since opponents in international relations rarely have a good 
understanding of the other (Jervis, Lebow, & Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, 1989).
188
 
Perceptions can skew reality (Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics, 1976).
189
 In analyzing the decision-making leading to crisis and World War I, 
Jack Levy, for example, suggested key psychological factors may have contributed to the 
outcome of war (Levy, 1986).
190
 While the North Korean leadership resides in a closed 
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 Pages 3-4 and 8. 
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stemming perhaps from leader insecurities, uncertainties, or value conflicts under stress. In general, this 
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society, and fidelity of the psychological factors of its leadership lacking, the dissertation 
will seek to address these factors where possible and related to Japan’s BMD. 
 Jeffrey Knopf describes a “fourth wave” of deterrence theoretic and conceptual 
focus that aims to better understand deterrence with respect to regional actors and non-
state actors. Fourth wave deterrence is influence-oriented, includes non-punitive and 
communicative measures, and inclusion of empirical research (Knopf, 2010).
191
 
However, he does not provide any analysis of the role or utility of BMD in deterring 
regional actors such as North Korea. Knopf also suggested clarity in deterrence tailoring 
by adding deterrence objectives to adversary understanding and use of leadership profiles 
(Knopf, 2010).
192
 It is, however, difficult to imagine any tailored deterrence strategy that 
does not include both elements.  
In general, there is very little quantitative academic literature on North Korean 
behavior, especially in its foreign policy over an extended period, and none solely on the 
North Korea-Japan relationship. Also, very little deterrence literature involves Asia and 
most missile defense-deterrence literature addresses U.S. national missile defense issues 
and many of those relative to deterring nuclear war. Of all the academic literature sources 
reviewed on missile defense-deterrence, none of the cases were on the deterrence effect 
of Japan’s missile defenses toward North Korea. Further, of all the specific arguments 
identified on whether missile defenses enhance or undermine deterrence (summarized in 
Table 1 at the end of this chapter) none of the arguments were based exclusively upon 
research of the Japan-North Korea case.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
could lead to discounting new information that conflicts with one’s existing policy, generating 
misperceptions and bad or irrational decisions. 
191
 Pages 2-4. 
192
 Pages 26-7. 
88 
 
Significant Features of Modern Deterrence 
Emphasizing Regional Actors. 
 An important factor—particularly since the end of the Cold War period—is the 
emergence of regional states as new and significant threats to U.S. and allied security, an 
obvious point of interest for the dissertation. Keith Payne argued that the post-Cold War 
period would not be dominated by superpower confrontation but by regional powers, 
including North Korea, obtaining ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and, with these 
capabilities, seeking to deter the U.S. and then coerce others in the region with greater 
impunity. Stakes would be high for such regional powers making deterrence more 
challenging (Payne K. B., 1996).
193
 These actors were less constrained from coercion and 
use of force, more risk-tolerant, lack effective communication with opponents, and, 
shared an asymmetry of stake where only their survival was at risk (Kartchner, 2002).
194
 
Regional actors were not, however, “suicidal” (Butler, 2001).195 Key decisions were 
influenced by high motivation stemming from the attacker’s values or the psychology of 
its leader; misperceptions of consequences; or, perceived vulnerabilities in an opponent 
(Wolf B. , 1991).
196
 Another characteristic of modern regional actors was the real threat 
they posed to civilians (Payne K. B., Missile Defense in the 21st Century: Protection 
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 Pages 30-5. Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold recognized Western powers were becoming “expeditionary” 
in their focus to address regional “rogue” threats (Ranger, 1998). See page 10. For the U.S., however, 
domestic tolerances for intervention were reducing over time, and despite a formidable nuclear force, 
deterrence of regional actors would be harder (Handberg, 2002). See pages 90-1. 
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 Pages 2-4. 
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 Page 112. 
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 Pages 5 and 17. All three of these, he argued, could be present in the emerging regional states such as 
North Korea and why he advocated for BMD. Missile defenses not only limit one’s vulnerabilities, but can 
defend and limit damage should deterrence fail. While Wolf’s emphasis was on U.S. defense against such 
a regional actor, it is reasonable to consider the three factors of North Korean decision-making to threats 
to Japan, not just the U.S., as well as the value of Japan’s BMD, not just that of the U.S., to deter and 
defend. 
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against Limited Threats, 1991).
197
 While North Korea began to emerge as a significant 
concern for U.S. deterrence, no empirical research explored Japan’s deterrent problem set 
vis-à-vis North Korea. Part of the reason is likely the continued focus by theorists upon 
deterring with punitive measures; BMD was viewed only in relation to those punitive 
measures. Having no military punitive capabilities, Japan was excluded from deterrence 
literature, despite its proximity to an immediate threat from North Korea. 
 Payne introduced the idea of placing emphasis upon what an adversary considers 
to be “reasonable” in his decision-making, based upon lessons of the Gulf War and 
dealing with Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein. What was not understood, according to 
Payne, was that adversary behavior operates more upon what he believes to be 
“reasonable” given his own values, expectations, and goals (Payne K. B., Missile 
Defense in the 21st Century: Protection against Limited Threats, 1991). Regional actors 
were less well understood than the Soviet Union. As a result, deterrence against such 
actors may fail, increasing the value of missile defenses.
198
 This should have driven deep 
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study of regional actors, including North Korea, two decades ago, but there is little 
evidence of interest in doing so or empirical research based upon such study. 
General vs. Immediate Deterrence. 
In the early 1980s, Patrick Morgan separated deterrence problems conceptually 
into general and immediate deterrence categories. General deterrence deals with the 
purposeful managing of an existing adversarial relationship between two states, perhaps 
over considerable time. No crisis threats implying war was imminent are present and the 
situation could be considered stable, status quo, or relatively peaceful. Immediate 
deterrence, however, is when one of those states has transitioned from stable conditions 
into crisis by contemplating an attack and the other side is considering how to deal with 
the potential egregious action, including making threats of retaliation. This concept was 
examined later with a wide variety of studies by Paul Huth and Bruce Russett (Dougherty 
& Pfaltzgraff, 2001).
199
 In his recent study, Stephen Quackenbush speaks of general 
deterrence as being much broader than transition to crisis-oriented immediate deterrence. 
General deterrence is regulatory and deals with “everyday decision making in somewhat 
conflictual or adversarial relationships” (Quackenbush, Understanding General 
Deterrence: Theory and Application, 2011).
200
 Quackenbush, however, does not explore 
North Korea or the Japan-North Korea case in his study. He also limits his study to a 
game-theoretic approach and does not conduct any in-depth qualitative case study 
material for any of the adversaries considered. These are significant gaps in 
understanding deterrence. 
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 Pages 372-3. Freedman further states that general deterrence is operative as the deterred chooses to 
respect the vital interests of the deterrer, creating a more stable relationship the longer this lasts. Political 
changes can, however, upset these conditions, creating instability between the actors and, if going 
unchecked in some way, crisis and immediate deterrence (Freedman, 2004). See page 42. 
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 Page 4.  
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 Military procurement activities, such as Japan’s BMD, can be considered part of a 
general deterrence strategy. Patrick Morgan, for example, suggests “procurement of 
weapons systems” is one type of deterrence-related action in the strategic engagement 
between the deterrer and deterred as the latter assesses the overall strategic environment 
(Freedman, General Deterrence and the Balance of Power, 1989).
201
 Japan’s BMD can 
also be seen as a central component of a Japanese general deterrence strategy, while 
North Korea assesses Japan’s BMD within the overall security environment. However, 
this critical detail has not been addressed in any significant general deterrence empirical 
research. 
Assessing whether general deterrence is working is analytically challenging 
though an essential component of policy. When general deterrence is working, Colin 
Gray argued, “it is apt to leave a shortage of convincing evidence for the data mills of 
social scientists,” a phenomenon “utterly beyond research” and “well out of sight.” It is, 
nevertheless, “at work” in influencing the behavior of foreign political leaders in part 
through norms (Gray, Maintaining Effective Deterrence, 2003).
202
 Gray acknowledges a 
critical gap but appears to resign assessment of general deterrence to the realm of 
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 Page 203. Colin Gray also speaks of capabilities, even intangible ones, such as the determination of a 
civilian population, as “strategic currency” used to achieve one’s political and military ends (Gray, War, 
Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History, 2007). Page 254. Japan’s BMD, for 
example, could be viewed as such a “currency” in its relations with North Korea under general deterrence 
conditions. 
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 Pages 29-30. As the author has suggested in an edited volume, deterrence is a “competition of wills” 
between political leaders. Further, this competition need not wait until crisis to be operative. In keeping 
with the concept of general deterrence, deterrence operations include activities done in peacetime in a 
purposeful, dynamic, ongoing way to influence adversary leaders (Kamp & Yost, 2009). In the dissertation 
author’s chapter entitled “Concepts for Deterrence Operations.” Pages 197-9. From a different point of 
view, Handberg argued that deterring nuclear conflict in the Cold War was easy to conceptualize. 
However, as the level of potential conflict decreases, deterrence becomes more ambiguous and difficult 
to operationalize as a concept (Handberg, 2002). One can presume from his argument, therefore, 
deterrence of adversary behavior in general deterrence or crisis conditions is even more challenging. See 
page 105. 
92 
 
impossible. However, if this is the case, then adversary behavior that conforms with, or 
departs from, such norms can be a useful measure of general deterrence effectiveness. 
The dissertation seeks to address this gap through use of the strategic profile and 
quantitative analysis to offer insights into the challenges of North Korean behavior under 
general deterrence conditions. This offers a unique approach to general deterrence and 
the possibility of a “norming” effect of Japan’s BMD in the Japan-North Korea case.  
The challenge of assessing general deterrence could also be supplemented with 
other approaches to provide analytic insights. For example, using an approach similar to 
the dissertation, A. Cooper Drury and Stephen Quackenbush analyzed the impact of U.S. 
national missile defenses upon deterrence with three other states. They did this by 
examining the levels of dissatisfaction in their relations, assuming satisfaction reflected a 
stable deterrence relationship (Drury & Quackenbush, 2007).
203
 As a result, the 
dissertation will also consider the broader stability of Japan-North Korea relations as an 
indicator of the deterrence relationship. This is also a unique empirical approach to the 
Japan-North Korea case and will be done in the review of cooperative-conflictual 
interactions in the quantitative analysis chapter. 
Japan’s general deterrence challenge can in some general ways be compared with 
the Israeli model, though violent interaction is the norm in Israeli experience. In 
describing the Israeli experience and evolution of its concept of deterrence, Thomas Rid 
suggested that deterrence was “restrictive,” and not absolute. This means that most 
deterrence relations, including the ones to which Israel is enjoined, do not anticipate 
                                                          
203
 Pages 9 and 13-4. Further, their approach incorporated data from the IDEA dataset and measures of 
dissatisfaction reflecting WEIS indicators, aspects used in the dissertation’s quantitative analysis. Their 
findings, though not incorporating very much qualitative analysis, showed missile defenses, in these 
cases, had no significant effect on dissatisfaction and, therefore, did not upset otherwise stable 
deterrence relationships. 
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absolute and permanent adversary restraint in aberrant behavior; rather, the use of force is 
considered by Israel to be necessary occasionally for deterrence to succeed. Further, 
instead of deterrence by threats of high retribution, deterrence is achieved in a “golden 
range” of interactive behavior between two actors in a relationship of norms—norms are 
achieved by limited use of force, if needed, with low levels of retribution in play (Rid, 
2012).
204
 The Israeli concept suggests “tacit bargaining” occurs in “violent dialogue” 
between two actors. This idea also reflects legal philosophy where violence cannot be 
removed from society, and instead is mitigated by law enforcement mechanisms in a risk-
management strategy. The use of force creates and maintains rules, but disproportionate 
use of force is only for redefining or reestablishing the rules of the game that occasionally 
are breached by the adversary. The goal, therefore, given the realities of an ongoing 
deterrence relationship, is to deter through decisions and actions not too low to be weak, 
not too high to be provocative or escalatory, but through actions in the “golden range” of 
acceptable cooperative-conflictual interaction—doing just a little more when needed to 
encourage the adversary back down when he breaks the rules (Rid, 2012).
205
 
 The North Korean deterrence challenge for Japan is, therefore, somewhere 
between traditional general deterrence and immediate deterrence—a deterrence literature 
gap. Further, it is somewhere between traditional general deterrence and the behavioral 
“norms” ascribed by the Israelis in their “golden range” of violence that lies somewhere 
just short of immediate deterrence. North Korean behavior is neither completely status 
quo under peacetime general deterrence conditions, nor frequently or continually violent 
as violence is the accepted norm. North Korea, on the other hand, presents periodic 
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 Pages 127-8 and 137-40. 
94 
 
provocations and aberrant behavior, including occasions of violence. In this case, Japan 
can use its BMD, and supplement its BMD as needed, to carefully manage North Korean 
behavior with the expectation that there will be episodes of cooperation short of 
permanent peace and competition short of armed conflict. For Japan, BMD is a staple of 
deterrence and through various BMD-related decisions and activities can “bargain” with 
North Korea in a “law enforcement” way to maintain North Korean norms of behavior. 
This type of approach is not addressed empirically in the deterrence literature. 
“Tailoring” Deterrence. 
 In studying a case of deterrence, Raymond Aron (1969) broke it into five 
meaningful parts: (1) the actor doing the deterring; (2) the actor being deterred; (3) what 
that actor is being deterred from doing; (4) the circumstances that exist during the 
deterring; and, (5) the means being used to deter. This is an early suggestion that 
deterrence must be “tailored” in its approach in order to be effective (Dougherty & 
Pfaltzgraff, 2001).
206
 The early 1980s also saw a change in U.S. thinking about the nature 
of deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, including the ideas of tailoring deterrence to the 
adversary and continually adjusting that strategy. The idea of tailoring required taking 
into account, and then purposefully shaping, Soviet perspectives (Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1986).
207
 Ironically, the U.S. approach to deterring the Soviet seemed to 
capture third and fourth wave deterrence ideas at the end of the Cold War and not its 
beginning. 
However, unlike the long period of Cold War superpower confrontation, recent 
years have been characterized by dynamic shifts in international politics, the centers and 
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strengths of relative power, and sources and types of threats. A “one size fits all” 
deterrence approach under these circumstances seemed dubious if not perilous. M. Elaine 
Bunn suggested that deterrence “tailoring” could be done in three general ways: to 
specific actors and situations; by kinds of capabilities; and, communicating intentionally 
(Bunn, 2007).
208
 Michael Mazarr and James Goodby argue deterrence strategy should be 
approached by policymakers as a “highly contingent tool” requiring careful consideration 
of the context for which it is being called upon (Shultz, Drell, & Goodby, 2011).
209
 This 
approach is similar to the approach in the DO JOC and represents the relationship 
described between Japan and North Korea in the dissertation. 
Adversary Understanding. 
 Regardless of whether one is deterring a formidable nuclear power, such as 
Russia or China, a regional actor, such as North Korea or Iran, or a non-state actor, 
emphasis is placed on the need for a deeper understanding of that adversary and its 
leadership. Not simply a review of its military capabilities, adversary understanding 
entails what they perceive in the environment, and how those perceptions interact with 
other perceptions of national identity and personal psychological factors. Adversary 
understanding, therefore, requires a broader case study including a biographical sketch of 
its leader making the decisions one seeks to deter. In this section, in addition to ideas on 
adversary decision-making modeling generally, another important feature has been 
consideration of the adversary’s decision calculus in deterrence strategy, particularly the 
psychological factors involved in adversary leader decisions and ideas for better 
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 In Chapter 2 entitled, “Redefining the Role of Deterrence.” Pages 51-8. 
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understanding them.
210
 Psychological analysis is no panacea. However, Jerrold Post, 
Stephen Walker, and David Winter suggest a leader’s personality can matter a great deal 
under certain circumstances, including when the actor occupies a strategic location (Post 
J. M., 2003).
211
 This may apply to North Korean leaders given their position in Northeast 
Asia and its security affairs. 
 Walter Langer’s report on Adolf Hitler was a pioneering biographical sketch and 
psychological analysis of an adversary leader conducted for the U.S. Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) early in World War II (Langer, 1972).
212
 Langer organized his project 
around the person of Hitler and considered many of the types of topics still used by others 
today in adversary studies or biographical sketches including, among other areas, the 
social construct in which he led Germany and his emotive qualities (Langer, 1972).
213
 
                                                          
210
 A significant amount of research and theorizing exists on this topic, some of it repetitive, some 
conflictual, others unique. Some of the details will be provided in the introduction to Chapter Five: 
Strategic Profile – Part I. Robert Joseph and John Reichart refer to this type study as a “strategic 
personality of the adversary” (Joseph & Reichart, 1999). See page 29. Robert Butterworth, given the 
dynamics of the 21st Century strategic environment, finds the notion of using deterrence as an organizing 
strategy troubling. Butterworth argues, “Deterrence, in sum, can be a desirable goal but an impossible 
guide. In pursuing it the country is seeking security through a concept that requires unavailable data 
about unknown processes, that is not empirically testable, and that cannot be shown to be working.” He 
does, however, acknowledge the DO JOC and its analytic approach in his footnote. The weaknesses and 
challenges notwithstanding, the dissertation will use the DO JOC, in part, to explore the influential effects 
of Japan’s BMD upon North Korean leader perceptions, decisions, and behavior (Returning to 
Fundamentals: Deterrence and U.S. National Security in the 21st Century, 2011). See pages 4, 7.  
211
 Pages 1-2. 
212
 Pages 5, 11 and 25.  
213
 Pages 153-233. Interestingly, Langer laid out eight possible future scenarios and addressed each with 
psychological factors developed after examining Hitler’s patterns of behavior, concluding that if things 
turned against Germany, the most plausible outcome was Hitler committing suicide—the culmination of 
successive defeats and loss of self-confidence. See pages 237-41, 254. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff warn, 
however, of the difficulty of drawing, for example, a definitive causal linkage between a distant past 
emotive event of a foreign leader and his present behavior. The dissertation uses a mixed methods 
approach in order to understand, where possible, correlations of North Korean behavior in relation to 
Japan’s missile defense program activities. In doing so, the dissertation seeks insights into this relationship 
from study of variables and data on both sides while avoiding drawing overly confident causal linkages 
(Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001). Page 559. 
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One of the earliest authoritative reports on how various psychological factors 
correspond to nuclear conflict prevention, including deterrence, was published in 1964 by 
a group of psychiatrists formed in 1946. Psychological factors were placed among other 
factors in decision-making, including social, economic, and political factors (Committee 
on Social Issues, 1964).
214
 These experts suggested that key psychological factors can be 
grouped in six categories: psychological defense mechanisms, such as denial and 
emotional isolation; the effects of fear or panic that can lead to impulsive behavior 
without regard to long-term consequences; dehumanization of man and society to 
depersonalize suffering consequent to conflict involving use of WMD; ethnocentric 
perceptual distortions or nationalism, creating stereotypical views of the opponent, 
ineffective communication, distrust, and misperceptions of what is reasonable behavior; 
mutual distrust fostering bad expectations leading to self-fulfilled bad behavior; and, the 
realities of the situation, combined with the psychological factors above, create internal 
conflict within political leaders seeking to maintain power and prestige domestically, on 
the one hand, while trying to deescalate tensions with the adversary in that situation 
(Committee on Social Issues, 1964).
215
 These types of psychological factors may also be 
part of North Korean leadership decision-making and will be addressed where possible in 
the strategic profile chapters.  
 Process-wise, the perceptions of an adversary leader, including images, 
environmental stimuli and the behavior of other actors, are shaped through the leader’s 
mental processes and form cognitive constructions of the circumstances and situation at 
hand. How such a leader perceives the situation will in turn shape his view of the possible 
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range of choices and any decisions that follow by that leader. Perceptions, therefore, are 
the essential ingredients of a decision. While conceptually this is a simple explanation of 
adversary decision-making, psychologists and theorists alike agree reality is complex, 
complicated further by a lack of in-depth empirical information from leaders in the 
process of perception formation and decision response (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 
2001).
216
 Jervis’s approach addresses “how decision-makers perceive others’ behavior 
and form judgments about their intentions” using two parts or steps. The first is the 
actor’s perceptions (images held and beliefs) as a cause of his behavior. The second step 
is comparison of the perception with previous information or perceptions (Jervis, 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 1976).
217
 Cognition, then, 
generally deals with a decision-maker’s “process” of information-handling—it is 
essentially a mental activity.  
 Cognition has certain elements and steps of order, including: input source (i.e., the 
environment); method of input reception (i.e., written communication; action); 
interpretation of the input; and, ascription of meaning to the decision-maker and decision 
calculus. Cognition merges objective or rational inputs with psychological factors 
throughout the cognitive process. For example: dissonance and heuristics may arise early 
in these steps; sentiments of national identification or other social factors may emerge in 
the middle; and, personal emotions of the leader may play a factor later in the process. 
Perceived consequences in a decision calculus, then, are cognitively constructed but 
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 Pages 29-31. He cautioned, however, in placing too much emphasis or reliability on psychology in 
international relations and suggested five ways psychologists err: over-emphasis on emotional versus 
cognitive factors of misperception; laboratory experiments drive psychological theories, not the real 
world; policy biases exist in most analyses; “over-psychologizing” overlooks the existence of an 
international system and its components; and, they do not explain how people think since they are based 
in large measure on relatively small, unimportant beliefs. See pages 3-4, 8. 
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environmentally and socially informed. Further, calculus perceptions can be discounted, 
accentuated, dropped, or misinterpreted as psychological elements interact with more 
objective cost-benefit calculations. The mixed-method approach in the dissertation relies 
on tools like the strategic profile of North Korea, long-term data of broad external 
relations, and an analytic evaluative section to infer North Korean perceptions and their 
sources and how these may relate to Japan’s missile defenses. 
Psychological factors also emerge in adversary actions in deterrence relationships. 
Negotiations, for example, involve psychological aspects to be successful, including: 
avoidance of weakness; respect for the power position of the other; identification of 
shared values, principles, and goals; and appropriate use of candor or concealment of 
information (Committee on Social Issues, 1964).
218
 Some adversary leaders also displace 
blame of domestic problems on external factors including historical animosities or 
interactions with others (Committee on Social Issues, 1964).
219
 This type consideration 
appears to be another gap in the deterrence literature, particularly the Japan-North Korea 
case. This situation could be present in the North Korea-Japan relationship given their 
historical and conflictual past.  
Other psychological factors involved in deterrence relationships could include: 
unmotivated biases—results of inherent cognitive limitations and the need to avoid being 
overwhelmed by environmental complexity and ambiguity—which lead to 
misperceptions of reality (Jervis, Lebow, & Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, 1989);
220
 
problems associated with a leader’s health, including masking illness by a leader’s inner 
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 Taken from chapter one, “Introduction: Approach and Assumptions.” Pages 4-5. 
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circle, drug and alcohol abuse, and, aging and personality (Post & Robins, 1993);
221
 pride 
as a motivation for accepting higher risks in crisis and conflict (Payne K. B., Missile 
Defense in the 21st Century: Protection against Limited Threats, 1991);
222
 cognitive 
dissonance, where too much information or stimuli can simply overload a leader and, to 
cope, he might distort the information to match his core beliefs to simplify decision-
making (Smith, 2006);
223
 uncertainty generally, explains why adversary decision-making 
requires calculating (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001);
224
 interpretation of environmental 
factors or the filtering of information through the leader’s inner decision support group 
(Raser, 1969);
225
 one’s willingness to suffer pain, perhaps enduring pain over time 
(Lebow, 1996);
226
 overconfidence in one’s abilities (Jervis, Deterrence and Perception, 
1982-1983);
227
 failing to recognize the value of other policy alternatives (Jervis, 
Deterrence and Perception, 1982-1983);
228
 the tendency to assimilate new information to 
fit one’s preexisting beliefs (Jervis, Deterrence and Perception, 1982-1983);229 or, the 
notion of “learning” through interactions (Bennett & Bueno de Mescquita, 2003).230 
While there are too many factors to explore in the scope of the dissertation, some of these 
psychological factors, such as pride or the limiting role of a leader’s inner circle, will be 
                                                          
221
 Pages xiii-xv. One case explored was the health of U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt late in his 
presidency, and his decision-making and behavior representing the U.S. in negotiations with foreign 
leaders at the 1945 Yalta Conference. In this case, Roosevelt’s decision-making was clearly impaired by 
various illnesses. The consequences included: very little intervention in discussions; lack of mental vigor; 
difficulty formulating and expressing his thoughts; drifting from consciousness; and, diminished reasoning. 
See pages 25-30. Illness may have been a factor both in the lives of Kim Il-Sung and his son, Kim Jong-Il, 
the two North Korean leaders reigning during the period considered in the dissertation. 
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 Pages 118-20. 
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 Page 33. 
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 Pages 553-5. 
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 Pages 51-2. 
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 Pages 20-4. 
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 Pages 20-4. 
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considered in the strategic profile. Doing so may offer insights into the North Korean 
calculus and how Japan’s BMD may influence it. 
Ways and Means of Deterrence. 
The ways and means of deterrence can best be understood as approaches to 
influencing the adversary’s decision calculus. “Ways” include, for example, imposing 
costs or denying benefits. “Means” refers to military and non-military instruments of 
power that can be applied against the different “ways” with a view toward influencing 
adversary decisions and behavior. 
Snyder includes at least three parts of a deterrence decision calculus described 
later by the DO JOC, including benefits of restraint, costs of action imposed if he acts, 
and benefits of action denied if she acts. Snyder characterizes benefit-denial as 
influencing the probabilities of an adversary achieving his objectives by, for example, 
holding one’s territory, and by limiting damage to one’s forces and nation (Snyder G. H., 
1961).
231
  
 Cost of restraint as a deterrence concept was described by Kenneth Watman and 
Dean Wilkening in their explanation of prospect theory and deterrence. Prospect theory, 
stemming from psychology, economics, and political science together, suggests the 
“prospect” of losses can influence leader decision-making in ways contrary to predictions 
of expected utility (Watman & Wilkening, 1995).
232
 This description closely resembles 
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 Pages 4, 9-11, and 14-5. 
232
 Pages 22-3. In one way, they will take more risk to avoid a loss than obtain a gain—losses simply weigh 
more than gains. In a second way, higher losses are risked with acting to avoid smaller, but sure, losses of 
not acting. According to the authors, this is referred to as “the strategic costs of inaction,” where such 
costs of restraint are simply unacceptable and push the decision-maker to action. In this case, “leaders 
facing losses can be expected to choose a course of action that runs the risk of greater losses so long as 
this choice contains the possibility of averting the loss.” Probabilities of the risks are important and play 
upon the decision. The original article on prospect theory by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky was 
described as an alternative risk-based model to expected utility. A key feature was the replacement of 
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the “costs of restraint” described in the DO JOC, though the DO JOC concept tends to be 
risk-neutral; should an adversary be deemed risk-acceptant, then prospect theory would 
suggest the costs of restraint may weigh more than other factors in his decision-making. 
These ideas are also expressed in the exceptional 1962 book on U.S. and Japanese 
decision-making in and around the attack on Pearl Harbor by Roberta Wohlstetter 
(Wohlstetter, 1962).
233
 
 According to the 2006 Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC), 
the DoD’s most extensive and recent concept document on deterrence, “Deterrence 
operations convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten US vital interests by 
means of decisive influence over their decision-making. Decisive influence is achieved 
by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs while encouraging restraint 
by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome” (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2006).
234
 The idea of influence over adversary decision-making 
is central to the dissertation. 
 The DO JOC also described several assumptions for deterrence strategy. First, 
adversary “decisions to act are based on actors’ calculations regarding alternative courses 
of action and actors’ perceptions of the values and probabilities of alternative outcomes 
associated with those courses of action.” According to the DO JOC, the adversary leader 
is informed in his decision calculus from various sources, including: “historical, cultural, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
one’s expected utility of final assets with “values” of relative gain or loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). See 
page 263. 
233
 Pages 354 and 356-7. She argued Japan was faced with a decision of going to war with U.S. or face 
national collapse and dishonor. The difference, in the Japanese calculation, was that at least in the war 
option the Japanese “wishfully” calculated the probability of U.S. acquiescence. The risks of not attacking 
were so overpowering, “the Japanese never seriously considered restraint.” The U.S. simply did not think 
Japan willing to accept such risks. 
234
 Page 8. 
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religious, ideological, political, military, informational, organizational, bureaucratic, 
personal, and other factors” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006).235 Alternative “courses 
of action” appear to be either choosing to act or choosing to refrain from taking action. 
Alternative “outcomes” are described in terms of various perceived “consequences” of 
acting (benefits or costs) or restraining (again, benefits or costs). Perception “values” 
suggest a hierarchy of perceived consequences (i.e., some perceived consequences will 
matter more than others). Perception “probabilities” suggest the adversary judges some 
consequences to be more likely than others. His decision to act or restrain will, therefore, 
be based upon some internal calculations that consider more important factors and their 
likelihoods. Second, acknowledging the lack of ideal information about adversary 
leadership and its decision-making, the DO JOC states the assumption that “some 
adversary values and perceptions relevant to their decision-making can be identified, 
assessed, and influenced” by others, particularly the deterrer (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2006).
236
 The dissertation will be based upon partial information of North 
Korean leadership, and that in large part provided by outside sources including outside 
experts and analysts with modest or no firsthand experience or interaction with the 
North’s senior leaders. Third, the DO JOC assumes, at least for deterrence planning 
purposes, the adversary leader to be “rational,” meaning he calculates his decision based 
on perceived consequences of action and restraint. Irrational leaders, such as those who 
make decisions based upon random factors, are rare (U.S. Department of Defense, 
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2006).
237
 This closely compares with the description of rationality provided by Keith 
Payne and others and is applied in the dissertation. 
 Further, the DO JOC describes an ends-ways-means approach to deterrence 
operations. The “end” is decisive influence over the adversary’s decision such that he 
chooses to restrain from egregious action. The “ways” speak to altering each of the four 
broad perceptual components of his calculus (costs and benefits of action; costs and 
benefits of restraint). Lastly, the “means” speak to various instruments of national power 
that can affect influence over the adversary’s perceptions in some way, including a wide 
variety of military and non-military kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities (U.S. Department 
of Defense, 2006).
238
  
 Deterrence in theory and practice is about decision calculations and influencing 
the calculations of your opponent. Such calculations can either be material or 
psychological. Forms of influence might broadly include diplomatic, economic, and 
military means employed in many types of activities. Military means can include nuclear 
and non-nuclear strike forces; conventional combat power; defenses including BMD; 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; cyber warfare capabilities; 
and space-related capabilities. Non-military instruments of power can include diplomacy; 
economic and financial sanctioning capacity; and, law enforcement means. A deterrent 
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 Pages 19-20. The author, in his 2009 NATO article, expands upon the calculus components by 
suggesting, from the adversary’s perspective, perceived benefits of action and costs of restraint 
“undermine” deterrence because they both work in favor toward an adversary choosing to act 
(deterrence failure). Benefits of action are attractive and “pull,” as it were, the adversary’s choice toward 
acting. Costs of restraint are painful motivators that “push” the adversary to acting. On the other hand, 
perceived costs of action and benefits of restraint “enhance” deterrence since they favor restraint. In a 
similar push/pull fashion, costs of action can be fearful inhibitors that “push” the adversary to restrain, 
while benefits of restraint, oftentimes dubbed “carrots” of deterrence, attract or “pull” the adversary’s 
choice toward restraint from action. The role of deterrence strategy is, therefore, to use available means 
to “moderate” those perceptions that incentivize him to act and “reinforce” those perceptions that 
incentivize him to refrain (Kamp & Yost, 2009). See page 204-5. 
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activity can include, for example, the movement and positioning of the defender’s 
military forces (Huth P. K., 1988).
239
 This type of behavioral feature compares to Japan’s 
activities with its BMD development and deployment over time. Another activity can be 
the use of targeted financial sanctions to deter, as was done on North Korea in 2005 in 
response to weapons sales, counterfeiting activities, and general concerns over North 
Korean nuclear proliferation (Shultz, Drell, & Goodby, 2011).
240
  
As described earlier, nuclear weapons have played an essential role in 20
th
 
Century deterrence, though that role has changed with the end of the Cold War and 
emergence of regional threats. Acknowledging the post-Cold War security environment, 
Lawrence Kaplan argued “…when the point is to deter a group of states that, between 
them, possess fewer than two dozen ICBMs, enshrining defenselessness in official policy 
makes no sense” (Dudley, 2003).241 BMD, therefore, makes much more sense in defense 
and deterrence, particularly in Japan’s case. 
                                                          
239
 Page 34. 
240
 In Chapter 2 entitled, “Redefining the Role of Deterrence.” Pages 60-5. The U.S. Treasury Department 
undertook sanctioning charges against Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a financial institution in Macau handling 
funds for illicit North Korean activities. The immediate effect was the freezing of $25 million in assets 
belonging to the North Korean regime. That same month the U.S. offered a nonaggression pledge as a 
step toward normalization of relations. The financial sanctions could have proven an effective deterrent 
tool but in the end had the opposite effect: the North Koreans abandoned the Six Part Talks; they 
conducted missile tests; and, they tested a nuclear device. The authors argue a key problem was 
managing deterrence expectations. Deterrence in the modern era, with challenges such as North Korea, 
requires nuanced approaches to influencing “discontinuity” from the status quo. Failure in this case led to 
U.S. self-restraint and North Korea meeting its objectives of regime survival, unambiguous movement to 
being a nuclear power, and continuation of illicit behavior. It was as if the U.S. understood the demands of 
peacetime, general deterrence, with little engagement and emphasis upon static capabilities, and that of 
immediate deterrence, with crisis action and overt saber-rattling. It did not, however, know how to 
navigate between the two with a state like North Korea. This is precisely where Japan finds itself today. 
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 Pages 70-3. In the case of chemical and biological weapons atop ballistic missiles, as in the threat facing 
Japan, Jon Day concluded deterrence and missile defenses to be the critical elements for addressing those 
threats (Ranger, 1998). See pages 22-8. Missile defenses are also an instrumental component of policy 
and a technological response to specific types of threats, an idea dating back to Sun Tzu and Clausewitz 
(Peoples, 2010). Pages 1 and 11-6. 
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 Anne Sartori argues that deterrence is a form of communication or a “form of 
talk.” Deterrence is, therefore, essentially interstate communication and diplomacy the 
public face of deterrence. For example, the well-known “diplomatic protest” is both a 
verbal or written statement of unhappiness toward another country, but it carries an 
intrinsic message of sanction behind it. As such, it is a form of deterrence (Sartori, 
2005).
242
 There are many examples of diplomatic activities, even protests over ballistic 
missiles, from Japan toward North Korea that can be categorized, therefore, as deterrence 
activities. Related to diplomatic activities are “signaling” and strengthening one’s 
reputation in the mind of the adversary. 
Signaling, according to Richard Ned Lebow, can communicate one’s limited 
objectives to an adversary in crisis or conflict to avoid wider violence, though signaling 
has a mixed record in deterrence (Jervis, Lebow, & Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, 
1989).
243
 Schelling also emphasized the need for signaling (Lebow, 1996).
244
 Signaling, 
either through communication or physical action, can also be a means of escalation 
management to set a norm or to establish one’s reputation (Morgan, Mueller, Medeiros, 
Pollpeter, & Cliff, 2008).
245
 These are important considerations to Japan in its signaling 
with BMD to North Korea. However, as Lebow points out, the adversary may not ascribe 
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 Taken from chapter 9, “Conclusions.” Pages 204-6. Lebow provides examples of how psychological 
factors can interrupt deterrence strategies, including “signaling” activities to the opponent. Two common 
mistakes occur by otherwise well-intentioned states seeking to signal effectively. First, they assume their 
adversary shares common symbols in communication, even though they may speak different languages or 
have different cultures. Subtle signals, therefore, have a poor track record of success. Unfortunately, even 
“calibrated signals” usually fail for this reason. Complexity in signaling and signaling during high drama 
make reception and understanding of the signal challenging for the receiver. Second, they fail to 
understand the context of the signal and how that context can ascribe certain meanings to the signal, 
including unintended inferences. For example, a signal must depart in some way from the “norm” of 
activity such that it draws attention by the adversary. 
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 Pages 564-5. 
245
 Pages 30-3. 
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meaning, or salience, of the signal sent in the same way as the sender (Lebow, 1996).
246
 
This suggests that North Korean reactions to Japan’s BMD activities may not follow as 
Japan intended or as some missile defense-deterrence arguments suggest. 
 Deterrence assessment, in the end, is an exceedingly difficult challenge given the 
literature review provided above. Then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 
acknowledged the difficulty in knowing whether deterrence strategies are working, in 
contrast to earlier thinking which measured differences in forces. He argued deterrence 
success was an intangible, stating, “We can never really measure how much aggression 
we have deterred, or how much peace we have preserved (Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1986).”247 Snyder, likewise, did not provide any process for the deterrer in 
making effectiveness evaluations, since the calculus factors are “highly intangible, 
unpredictable, unmeasurable, and incommensurable except in an intuitive way” (Snyder 
G. H., 1961).
248
 Further, Handberg suggested that, because deterrence success is the 
appearance of nothing happening, it can be self-deceptive to rely on lack of activity as a 
measurement of success. He argues that, in reality, deterrence has only been measured in 
failures (Handberg, 2002).
249
 This notion is one of the greatest and most enduring 
deterrence theoretic and analytic gaps in the literature. While the mixed method approach 
to the dissertation is a new one in which analytical inferences may be available, 
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 Pages 566-7. For example, while the U.S. saw crossing the Yalu River from North Korea to China akin to 
someone crossing over the Rio Grande into the U.S., the Chinese simply did not see the Yalu nor the 
restraint from crossing it the same way. The consequence was they did cross it, marking that incident as a 
“failure in strategic communication.” Lebow suggests that different people and states have different 
organizing principles which lead to perceptions of environmental stimuli that can be not only different 
from the one deterring but can be unpredictable altogether. Modern social psychology, he argues, seeks 
to better understand the role of these organizing principles, or frames of reference, in forming, 
influencing, and changing perceptions. 
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 Page 77. 
248
 Pages 14-6, including footnote 11. 
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 Page 89. 
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inferences from the qualitative strategic profile and North Korean behavioral activity 
captured in the quantitative chapter suggest some assessment is possible. Even modest 
improvement in general deterrence assessment, however, would help address this 
considerable gap and generate new thinking on the “impossible.” 
Missile Defenses 
Historical Development 
 Technical development of missile defenses in the United States began near the 
close of World War II as the U.S. and allies sought solutions to new long-range rockets 
used by Nazi Germany, such as the V-2 rocket. The combined threat of long-range, soon 
to be intercontinental-range, ballistic missiles with nuclear and then thermonuclear 
weapons drove research of defenses capable of engaging nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. 
This research raised serious technical and feasibility questions and, as the notion of U.S. 
offensive and defensive capability mixes emerged in response to the threats posed by the 
Soviet Union and China so, too, did questions of how best to deter such threats (Adams, 
1971).
250
  
Key decision points for the United States in its missile defense program 
development can provide comparisons for Japan’s program development. For the U.S., 
four periods can be defined; these four periods also compare generally to the key decision 
points and periods of Japan’s missile defense program, making review of the U.S. case 
even more germane to this dissertation. The first period of consideration was 
approximately 1945-1955, and includes: the end of World War II; technical growth 
coming from the need to address the German air and rocket threat; the rise of Soviet and 
Chinese ballistic missile and nuclear threats; and exploration of some concepts for missile 
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defenses (Adams, 1971).
251
 This period provided a baseline of U.S. thinking and activity 
prior to the later BMD development period. The second period in the U.S. ballistic 
missile system program development, 1955-1958, saw initial study; and, by later 
standards, small U.S. military efforts into missile defense feasibility. This activity drew 
on experience in air defense technical development in the post-war period and included 
research mostly for the U.S. Army, such as Project NIKE, Hercules, and ZEUS (Adams, 
1971).
252
 The third period, 1958-1967, marked a large resource commitment by the U.S. 
government for ballistic missile defense research, development, and testing (Adams, 
1971).
253
 Given the resource commitment, technological growth was rapid, leaving ZEUS 
behind in favor of an improved NIKE-X, then SENTINEL (a dual-missile defense 
system), and eventually the SAFEGUARD system designed less for point defense of U.S. 
military bases and more for wide area coverage of U.S. population centers. The fourth 
period lasted from 1967-1976 and was a period of U.S. BMD deployment in the face of 
Soviet (especially the SS-9 ICBM) and Chinese ballistic missile and nuclear threats 
(Adams, 1971).
254
 The SAFEGUARD system was deactivated in 1976. In his policy 
review of the introduction of U.S. ballistic missile defenses, Benson D. Adams argues 
that the central decision upon which U.S. policymakers wrestled in the 1950s and 1960s 
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 Page 111. All U.S. BMD systems were to be armed with large nuclear weapons to destroy incoming 
adversary warheads. 
254
 Pages 177-249. The SAFEGUARD system was chosen, first to provide area coverage of U.S. cities against 
Chinese attack (the fledgling Chinese ballistic missile and nuclear threat was deemed defensible by U.S. 
BMD, but could also provide limited defense against various Soviet attack options). It could have as many 
as 12 different sites around the U.S. However, as U.S. domestic resistance grew to the prospects of 
nuclear-armed defensive missiles located in or near U.S. population centers (e.g., Seattle and Chicago), 
and as arms control discussions occurred with the Soviet Union (including controls on BMD) the U.S. 
chose to field SAFEGUARD around U.S. missile sites to protect them from Soviet ICBMs and in limited 
numbers as part of the arms control bargain. 
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was what kind and how much effect missile defenses would have on deterrence (Adams, 
1971).
255
 
 A very significant shift in the debate about deterrence and defense occurred 
following President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983. This shift 
fundamentally altered U.S. development of national security strategies and how BMD fit 
into those strategies. In particular, the U.S. weighed deterrence, war-fighting, and 
defensive focused strategies, recognizing overlap among them and ultimately preferring 
the latter as the central approach to national security. These debates shaped the thinking 
about missile defenses and deterrence for many years into the future. Deterrence-only 
strategies were those where the “sole objective of strategic nuclear forces is to deter” and 
deterrence operated through the threat of retaliation (Carter & Schwartz, 1984).
256
 War-
fighting strategies assumed nuclear war could occur and would, therefore, demand 
extensive planning for using nuclear weapons, defenses, and terminating conflict with a 
favorable outcome (Carter & Schwartz, 1984).
257
 The defense-centric strategies were 
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 Pages 37-40. Two primary deterrence strategies emerged, differing only in what was to be targeted, 
that helped frame the role and value of missile defenses. First, “minimum deterrence” described a way to 
deter by possessing nuclear capabilities that threaten targets most valued by the opponent including his 
cities or industrial centers. BMD was thought to be destabilizing in this strategy since it would only lead to 
a nuclear offensive arms race. Opposing this was the “countervailing strategy” which targeted adversary 
military forces and leadership. BMD had value in this strategy, since it could protect U.S. ICBMs and 
command and control nodes it necessary to survive Soviet counterstrike. 
257
 Pages 41-3. To be effective, these strategies required high technologies for employing nuclear weapons 
with minimal collateral damage and for defense of one’s high value military and civil assets. The central 
deterrent feature in these strategies was benefit-denial—denying the adversary his desired political or 
military objectives. In the 1960s, war-fighting was abandoned as a plausible “damage limitation” strategy 
and the U.S. instead focused its war-fighting capabilities on offensive systems and “assured destruction,” 
a form of minimum deterrence in that deterrence, in a formulaic way, was assessed to be operative if 
sufficient U.S. counterstrike forces were available to destroy 20-30% of Soviet population and 50-75% of 
its industrial capacity. After President Reagan unfolded the SDI quest for the feasibility of a 
comprehensive defensive shield over the U.S., thinking on war-fighting strategies changed in that they 
provided confidence in defense of the nation and, in doing so, enhanced deterrence of adversaries and 
assured allied as well. Not only did new war-fighting strategies require a high “damage expectancy” 
confidence level with offensive systems, but quality defenses could ensure the U.S. a favorable position 
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preferred by the Reagan administration, though were less well-defined. The objective was 
to render Cold War deterrence strategies and nuclear offensive forces “obsolete” through 
the development and deployment of an expansive and technically superior strategic 
defense system, including vast midcourse and boost-phase BMD capabilities, coupled 
with offensive force reductions (Carter & Schwartz, 1984).
258
   
Technical Characteristics of Ballistic Missiles and Missile Defenses 
Ballistic Missiles. 
Offensive ballistic missiles have different properties associated with them 
throughout the duration of their flight. These “phases” of flight of the attacking missile 
have, therefore, been used to develop BMD capabilities, with some defending in one 
phase while others defend in other phases. Having multiple ballistic missile defense 
capabilities to defend in multiple phases of attacking missile flight is referred to as a 
“layered defense” system. These phases of offensive ballistic missile flight include: boost 
phase (from initial launch through layers of atmosphere, lasting 3-5 minutes); post-boost 
phase (when the warhead, decoys, and other penetration aids separate from the “bus” 
carrying them and fly into the exoatmosphere, lasting up to 6 minutes); midcourse phase 
(flight of warheads and other objects through exoatmospheric to high endoatmospheric 
altitudes, lasting as long as 20 minutes); and, the terminal phase (the reentry period when 
decoys and penetration aids fall behind and the warhead passes through lower altitudes to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
after nuclear conflict ended. To do so, strategic defenses needed to protect five categories of priority 
assets in the U.S.: offensive forces; command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) facilities; 
population centers; industry; and, other critical resources of the nation. BMD, along with other 
components of defense, would need to expand greatly in this strategy. 
258
 Pages 43-6. This strategy, too, featured a benefit-denial concept that would deter by making the 
prospects of attack uncertain. Proponents of this strategy argued that pressures within the U.S. and Soviet 
Union would push the two sides toward a defensive strategy, given moral and political arguments and 
technological improvements. They further argued imperfect defense would still be sufficient to deter. 
Opponents argued that it could still be interpreted as a war-fighting strategy and would, therefore, make 
the U.S. more willing to wage war since we could act with relative impunity. 
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its target, lasting several seconds perhaps as long as one minute) (Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1986).
259
 Offensive ballistic missile range is affected by the missile’s 
booster power, makeup of the missile, its shooting angle or trajectory, the target it is 
aiming at, and climate conditions (Abmann, 2007).
260
 
Opponents can employ various countermeasures to defeat or disrupt specific 
BMD components. These can be categorized as follows: blinding; spoofing and hiding; 
hardening; and, evading and fast-burn techniques. Further, an opponent could use a 
systems-wide approach to BMD countermeasures, including: saturation with a larger 
number of attacking warheads (thought to be far cheaper than the defenses needed to 
protect against such saturation); circumvention of part of the BMD system by evading its 
area of coverage (e.g., use of depressed-trajectory missile flight profiles); and, 
suppression, or directly attacking defensive components (Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1986).
261
 Of the various tactics available to offensive capabilities, 
penetration aids carried on ballistic missiles offer the attacker ways to stress missile 
defenses and improve the chances of successful attack (Carter & Schwartz, 1984).
262
  
Missile Defenses. 
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 Penetration aids can include: decoy warheads; chaff; aerosols; maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs); 
jammers; and, antiradiation homing vehicles. Decoys are intended to fool missile defenses into attacking 
harmless objects causing the actual warhead to get through. Decoys are more effective in space 
(exoatmospheric altitude) since there is no drag in weightless conditions of space and decoys fly like 
actual warheads. Designing a decoy to fly and look like an actual reentry vehicle at lower altitudes of 
approach (endoatmospheric) is very difficult. Chaff (fine metallic wires that reflect radar signals) and 
aerosols (small beads that reflect light) can be employed at exoatmospheric altitudes to confuse 
defending radars and optical sensors, respectively. Chaff and aerosols are not effective in the atmosphere 
since they are slowed behind attacking warheads due to the effects of atmospheric drag. Pages 107-8, 
including footnote 8. Other approaches to offense cited by Carter & Schwartz include: more ICBMs and 
RVs; other weapons such as cruise missiles; attacking defenses; attacking C3 of the defenses; employment 
tactics such as lofted trajectories; manipulation of nuclear effects; and shoot-look-shoot strategies. See 
pp. 105-09. 
113 
 
 Functionally, missile defenses have changed little from their early development in 
the post-war period. These generally include: acquisition and detection warhead or 
reentry vehicle (RV) part of the missile through active radar surveillance; tracking of the 
RV and, if possible, providing trajectory predictions; discrimination of the RV from other 
incoming parts such as the missile booster, dummy or decoy RVs, and radar signal 
saturating chaff; guidance and tracking of the defending interceptor missile to the 
incoming RV; and interception of the RV by the interceptor or effects of its detonation 
(Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-
1972, 1977).
263
 Likewise, the components of a BMD system have remained essentially 
the same since the post-war period. These include: the radar for surveillance of enemy 
missiles and RVs; computers for processing the vast amounts of data needed to 
effectively engage defending against attacking missiles; the interceptor missiles (early 
U.S. BMD systems were nuclear-tipped); and command, control, and communications 
networks to knit all components together for display, decision-making, and engagement 
(Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-
1972, 1977).
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 As missile defenses proved their value during the Gulf War the prospects for 
missile defense proliferation increased along with ideas for their role and deployment 
patterns. One study conducted by analysts at RAND used a quantitative model of cost-
effective allocation. This study, which focused on conventional theater ballistic missile 
threats, such as that posed by North Korea, stated regional ballistic missile threats, 
coupled with WMD, could deter U.S. action or constrain it from achieving desired 
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objectives in regional conflict. The Gulf War caused a shift in U.S. focus on missile 
defenses, away from a comprehensive national system associated with the goals of SDI 
and toward theater systems to defend against regional threats with limited offensive 
missile forces (Larson & Kent, 1994).
265
 Modeling the outcomes of missile defense 
engagements with one, two, and then three layers of defenses, demonstrated the more one 
layers defenses to engage attacking missiles passing through each “phase” of flight, the 
fewer total interceptors one needs to shoot to achieve a reasonably high probability of 
kill. The study suggested optimum defense requires a layered approach utilizing a 4:1 
ratio of defending missiles to attacking warheads. It further argued early engagement of 
attacking missiles provided the highest payoff in missile defense efficiency (Larson & 
Kent, 1994).
266
  
Ballistic missiles can be defended with two types of “kill mechanisms:” kinetic 
kill and directed-energy kill. Directed-energy systems (lasers and particle beams) use 
three primary means to destroy or disrupt an attacking missile: functional kill (prevents 
electronic components of the offensive weapon from performing properly); thermal kill 
(heating attacking boosters to the point they weaken, deform, or melt); and, impulse kill 
(shock waves collapse the target). Kinetic systems are designed to “hit” the attacking 
missile or component and disrupt or destroy it through kinetic energy. Kinetic systems 
use two primary means: nonnuclear kill (attacking missile is destroyed by collision); and, 
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 Pages xii-xiii. By allocating interceptors among layers, the study’s authors argue a theater BMD system 
defending with 90% effectiveness against a regional adversary with over 500 potential attacking warheads 
would cost about $15 billion, but about $10 billion less than a single-layer system built to defend the 
same threat. Pages 56-8. 
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nuclear kill (missile is disrupted or destroyed by impact or effects of the defending 
missile’s nuclear blast) (Office of Technology Assessment, 1986).267 
Reliability of BMD has plagued its development and political support, possibly 
raising doubts in adversary minds about its effects in crisis or conflict. Some of these 
questions have been addressed with testing over time as well as operational experiences 
in conflict (Burns, 2010).
268
 More recently, the PAC-3 missile was reportedly “100% 
effective in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” a claim provided by the missile’s producer 
(Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2006).
269
 Performance of other, newer BMD systems is 
vastly improved. For example, from 2002-2008 Aegis-based SM-2 and SM-3 systems 
were successful in 18 of 22 tests while THAAD, from 2005-2009, was successful in 6 of 
6 tests (Burns, 2010).
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Arguments For/Against Deterrence 
Summary. 
The Japan-North Korea deterrence problem set is not simply to deter war, or even 
armed attack with ballistic missiles. As the various missile defense-deterrence arguments 
portray, BMD can influence an adversary’s behavior by playing upon many perceptual 
nuances or consequences of his decision under consideration. Adversary choices, 
especially in the North Korean case, can involve behavior in many ways other than 
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 Pages 155-8. The U.S. no longer retains a nuclear-armed kill mechanism (the Safeguard ABM system 
used this type of kill mechanism), but Russia maintains an ABM system using nuclear-armed defensive 
missiles. 
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 Pages 74-5. For example, Philip E. Coyle, III, head of DoD’s weapons testing programs from 1994-2001, 
believed Patriot PAC-3 batteries in the upcoming 2003 invasion of Iraq would suffer from unreliability and 
be able to successfully engage less than 50% of Iraqi Scud missiles. After the invasion, the success rate 
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marks a significant improvement over PAC-2 performance in the Gulf War. According to a Government 
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Scuds. See page 110. 
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simply choosing to fire, or not fire, ballistic missiles. The North Korean security posture 
and power-based approach to diplomatic and economic relations are all undergirded by 
its ballistic missiles. BMD, therefore, can influence North Korean choices across the 
board. This broad perspective is the approach taken in the dissertation. The question is, as 
Japan brought forth BMD to deter North Korean behavior, have any of the various 
perceptions or influences of BMD presented in the literature factored into North Korea’s 
calculus and possibly affected its choices and behavior? The 50+ arguments presented in 
Table 1 below represent all of the pros and cons discovered in the dissertation’s research, 
along with one other postulated by the author. For the sake of brevity, narrative 
descriptions have been omitted here. The points of view, describing both how BMD can 
enhance or help deterrence and how deterrence can be hurt or undermined by BMD, have 
been categorized into a handful of broad “domains” of activity (i.e., political) and into 
decision calculus categories perceived by the adversary (i.e., costs, benefits). The 
arguments are taken from a variety of sources; some originate from a single case, others 
from many cases. If the perspective has been repeated in several sources, multiple 
sources may be cited; the source citations are not intended to be exhaustive but merely to 
capture at least one source from which the idea originated. The author has, on occasion, 
broadened the view captured in literature sufficiently to apply to the Japan-North Korea 
case where, in the author’s judgment, this is possible. Other views are so narrow, such as 
those dealing with implications for U.S.-USSR nuclear arms control, or those with 
consequences explicitly in wartime conditions, that they are identified as N/A—not 
applicable—to the focus of the dissertation and will not be addressed further. 
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It appears, then, there are four broad ways to approach deterrence effectiveness 
assessment or analytically to address whether an adversary’s decision-making 
perceptions and behavior are changing. The first way is a lack of evidence of deterrence 
failure. In other words, if deterrence was failing, or had failed, one would expect to 
observe or hear certain types of statements or behavior or activities from the adversary. 
The second way is if the adversary changes behavior or course of action altogether, away 
from the thing being deterred. The third way one could assess deterrence may be working 
is in drawing inferences about the adversary’s decision values and the effect of one’s 
deterrence strategy upon those values as suggested above. Fourth, there may be relational 
change with the deterrer politically or with respect to national security. Looking at 
strategic profile and decision calculus types of qualitative information along with 
quantitative data may provide insights or inferences into whether or not Japan’s BMD 
program has had any deterrence effects in any of the four areas above. This is a unique 
approach to addressing North Korean behavior and the effect of Japan’s BMD in KJI’s 
calculus. 
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Table 1: Arguments 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN 
Introduction
271
 
 In the past 20 or more years, scholarly research has emphasized the utility of 
missile defenses in warfighting, such as the 1991 Gulf War, or how defenses protect the 
U.S. homeland against regional powers developing long-range missiles and nuclear 
weapons. Japan, however, chose to develop and deploy its own BMD system for 
deterrence of North Korean political coercion undergirded by ballistic missile threats 
under general deterrence conditions and to defend itself against possible North Korean 
raids with small numbers of non-nuclear ballistic missiles. Understanding whether and 
how Japan’s BMD program contributed to, or undermined, deterrence of North Korean 
coercion was the main idea of the dissertation and was pursued using multiple research 
methods: (1) a review of historical interaction; (2) in-depth theoretic review of 
deterrence, missile defenses, and their relationship; (3) in-depth study of North Korea and 
its leadership; (4) research and development of a deterrence-oriented strategic profile; (5) 
statistical analysis of North Korean behavior and possible changes correlated to Japan’s 
BMD and other variables; and, (6) integrated analysis pulling upon information from all 
the above. This basic framework is described below in greater detail. A discussion of the 
research design begins below with a brief review of the theoretic background of 
deterrence and missile defense. 
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 A note on nomenclature used in the dissertation: rather than using the formal title “Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea,” or DPRK, the terms North Korea and North Korean were used for readability 
within the narrative; since the names of North Korea’s leaders are used with various spellings by different 
authors and sources, one common style was adopted for use in the dissertation for all three of North 
Korea’s leaders including Kim Il-Sung (founder and first leader, also abbreviated KIS), Kim Jong-Il (son of 
KIS, second leader, dominant object of research in the dissertation, also abbreviated KJI), and Kim Jong-Un 
(son of KJI, third and current leader, also abbreviated KJU); and, in Korean culture family surnames 
precede given names and this style is maintained in the dissertation. 
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 The North Korean strategy with regional opponents has for years been one of 
political coercion undergirded by a strong ballistic missile force capable of reaching a 
wide variety of targets in the region, including targets in Japan. Though North Korean 
coercive behavior is not limited to threats with, or provocative tests of, ballistic missiles, 
the underlying threat against regional opponents is that of ballistic missiles—either with 
overflight of missiles being tested, or the threat of direct missile raid as punishment for 
noncompliance with the wishes of North Korean leaders. Further, the predominant North 
Korean ballistic missile threat is regional; that is, North Korea’s missiles are not yet of 
the range required to strike the continental United States. Instead, the vast majority of 
their missiles is capable of, and likely intended to, reach targets within the Northeast Asia 
region, including Japan. North Korean coercion toward Japan is not conceived, however, 
as a binary behavioral decision of North Korea’s leaders where they were either highly 
coercive toward Japan or highly cooperative. This would not be consistent with North 
Korean patterns of behavior. Rather, North Korean behavior was expected to reflect 
increases or decreases in cooperative and conflictual toward Japan in smaller gradients of 
behavioral intensity over time across a wider range of positive and negative behavior. 
This broad perspective is the approach taken in the dissertation. 
 For these reasons, ballistic missile defense (BMD) may play a special and 
significant role for regional actors like Japan seeking to deter North Korea coercion or 
attack with ballistic missiles. While BMD could certainly play a decisive role in conflict 
involving attack upon Japan with ballistic missiles, it is the counter-coercion, deterrence 
aspects of BMD of concern in the dissertation. Many theorize about the defensive value 
of missile defenses in conflict or how BMD can help deter war from happening in the 
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first place. But few discuss the possible deterrent effects of BMD in general deterrence 
situations like that between Japan and North Korea. Nuclear retaliation is not an option 
open to Japan, and while such a capability contributes to the prospect of escalation to 
conflict, nuclear threats would not likely be very credible in general deterrence conditions 
anyway. Japan finds itself needing its own, non-nuclear capabilities to deter North 
Korean coercion independent of U.S. capabilities. In this way, Japan’s BMD would serve 
to moderate North Korea’s behavior toward Japan and help establish norms of behavior 
less provocative than they would be otherwise. 
Two recent events involving North Korea’s Taepodong long-range offensive 
ballistic missile point to the relationship between North Korea and Japan and the 
potential role of missile defense to influence North Korean behavior. The first event was 
the launch of Taepodong-1 on August 31, 1998, which overflew Japan. This event helped 
solidify Japan’s pursuit of ballistic missile defenses, which were later accelerated after 
North Korea, in 2006, first tested a nuclear device. On April 5, 2009, a longer-range 
variant of Taepodong was launched, but the North Koreans opted to comply with a 
United Nations request for safety of flight and navigation pre-launch notifications. The 
behavior and statements of North Korea were clearly different from the 1998 event. But 
why did they modify their behavior? Did deployment of Japan’s missile defenses 
influence North Korea’s decision to test the missile in a less-threatening manner? 
The advantages missile defenses provide the defender can, for example, influence 
the attacker’s decision-making by denying the operational benefits sought—at least to the 
degree BMD is effective—and denying political benefits sought by the attacker with the 
use of his missiles whether or not BMD is highly effective. In this case, use of missile 
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defense decreases the adversary leader’s perception of the probability the missile attack 
will successfully reap the benefits sought, and illustrates but one way missile defense can 
deter an aggressor from carrying out a missile attack in the first place. However, because 
ballistic missiles are such an integral part of North Korea’s strategy toward Japan, the 
influence of Japan’s missile defenses upon North Korean leadership will likely be 
reflected widely across North Korean behavior.  
The central question was not simply whether Japan’s BMD affected only North 
Korean ballistic missile-related activity—this was too narrow. Rather, the question was 
whether Japan’s BMD affected North Korean behavior toward Japan generally and in 
areas not specific only to missile activity. This is because North Korean behavior, 
whether cooperative or conflictual, was carried out in the shadow of North Korea’s 
ballistic missiles which undergirded its overall political coercion strategy. Overall North 
Korean behavior, therefore, was a gauge of the strength of the underlying missile-related 
strategy. The question, then, was whether Japan’s BMD strengthened or undermined 
deterrence of North Korea. But other related questions were also informed by the 
research of the dissertation. Did North Korea show more restraint, especially in its 
relations with Japan, in the shadow of Japan’s missile defense program? Did Japan’s 
missile defenses have the opposite effect? Or, might Japan’s BMD strengthen deterrence 
in some circumstances and undermine deterrence in others? In what other ways might 
Japan’s BMD influence North Korean behavior? The missile defense-deterrence 
literature provides many arguments regarding BMD strengthening or undermining 
deterrence in various situations. However, there was not any in-depth research of BMD 
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over time in the Japan-North Korea case especially under general deterrence conditions. 
That was the subject of this dissertation.  
Theoretic Background 
Deterrence Theory 
The general state of affairs between North Korea and Japan is often framed in 
international relations theory in terms of a deterrence relationship where Japan is seeking 
to deter North Korean coercion or even aggression. This is understandable given Japan’s 
constitutional constraints since WWII, its lack of offensive military arms, and the danger 
posed by North Korea the past several decades with its ballistic missiles and threatening 
behavior. This creates a unique deterrence situation for Japan since their BMD 
capabilities are in a purely defensive posture. Theoretically, Cold War-era deterrence 
came to describe how one side’s offensive arms influenced an opponent from taking a 
hostile action, particularly nuclear attack. The dissertation, however, explored how the 
use of defensive capabilities influenced adversary behavior along a wider spectrum of 
behavior under peacetime—but coercive—conditions between two actors with a 
conflictual history. Further, one could argue that the U.S. extended deterrence 
relationship with Japan is a powerful backdrop for Japan’s position and that researching 
the Japan-North Korea case must acknowledge a dominant U.S. position both over Japan 
and in North Korea’s behavior over Japan. But this would be valid only to the extent 
extended deterrence security was provided Japan by the U.S. to include North Korean 
behavior short of war—the focus of the dissertation. While extended deterrence clearly 
looks to a scenario of North Korean war against Japan, no evidence was discovered that 
extended deterrence by the U.S. included peacetime security guarantees regarding North 
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Korean coercive or provocative behavior. In fact, Sugio Takahashi, Deputy Director of 
Japan’s Office of Strategic Planning in their Ministry of Defense, stated North Korea 
could conduct a “cheap-shot strike” against Japan using a limited number of ballistic 
missiles (“one or two”) as blackmail or coercion without triggering U.S. military 
retaliation (conventional or nuclear) as part of U.S. extended deterrence security 
guarantees; a greater number of North Korean ballistic missiles attacking Japan (a 
number was not suggested) would be needed to cross a “threshold” for U.S. retaliation 
(Takahashi, Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military Transformation, 
2012).
272
 There is room, therefore, to provide analytic separation between Japan and the 
U.S. to address the impact of Japan’s BMD capabilities to influence North Korean 
behavior short of war. 
Such a deterrence-oriented relationship between Japan and North Korea continues 
today. More specifically, relations between the two states during this period existed 
across a spectrum ranging from general deterrence, at the one end, and an escalated 
situation of acute crisis or immediate deterrence at the other end (Huth & Russett, 
General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models, 
1993).
273
 Theoretically, this helped frame deterrence by Japan, in context of Japan-North 
Korean relations, as an activity upon North Korea’s behavior, not simply deterrence of a 
North Korean decision to wage war. But the potential range of cooperative and 
conflictual interaction between two actors in general deterrence conditions is undefined 
in the literature with any precision. As a result, general deterrence in the dissertation is 
conceived to include a relatively wide range of Japan-North Korea cooperative and 
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conflictual interaction, just as North Korean coercive behavior (mentioned above) can 
include a wide range of interaction short of crisis or war. While the dissertation was 
grounded in deterrence theory, of necessity it was tailored to the influencing role of 
missile defenses. 
The Japan-North Korea deterrence problem set is not simply to deter war, or even 
armed attack with ballistic missiles. As the various missile defense-deterrence arguments 
portray, BMD can influence an adversary’s behavior by playing upon perceptual nuances 
or consequences of his decision under consideration. North Korean choices can involve 
behavior in many ways other than simply choosing to fire, or not fire, ballistic missiles. 
The North Korean security posture and power-based approach to diplomatic and 
economic relations are all undergirded by its ballistic missiles. BMD, therefore, can 
influence North Korean choices in many ways and, in general deterrence conditions short 
of war or even short of war-related crisis.  
From the theoretic literature review, 54 arguments regarding how BMD may 
strengthen or undermine deterrence were identified, many with small differences of 
nuance. Over half of these were identified by the author as having some possible 
application to the Japan-North Korea case. Most of the 54 arguments were optimistic, 
suggesting BMD strengthened deterrence and did so usually by denying the adversary 
some sort of benefit he perceived if he were to use his ballistic missiles in any way, 
whether actually shooting them or coercing others with them. A considerable number of 
these arguments reflected benefits perceived in the political and/or military domains. See 
Table 2 for a summary of the various missile defense-deterrence arguments taken from 
Chapter Three: Literature Review. This table helps understand the broad areas where 
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BMD may have been a factor in Japan’s efforts to deter North Korean coercion in general 
deterrence or provocative—but sub-conflict—conditions.    
 
Literature Gaps 
 One of the benefits stemming from the dissertation research design is helping to 
address gaps in the literature. First, there is very little quantitative academic literature on 
North Korean behavior, especially in its foreign policy over an extended period, and none 
solely on the Japan-North Korea relationship over time. Neither is there any long-term 
quantitative international relations (IR) literature on the impact of Japan’s missile defense 
program upon North Korea’s behavior. Further, there is little IR literature on missile 
defenses generally (e.g., in Table 1, there were only 10 academic sources in the past 10 
years), and there appears to be a specific need for improving deterrence literature 
regarding the effects of modern non-nuclear capabilities, including missile defenses, upon 
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potential adversary behavior over an extended period of time under general deterrence 
conditions. The rigidity of general deterrence theory also seems inadequate for addressing 
modern IR security challenges such as dealing with coercive strategies like that of North 
Korea. Additionally, there does not appear to be examination of the various arguments of 
missile defenses to support or undermine deterrence in a single long-term, time-series 
case study, especially one employing a mixed-method approach. 
 Most deterrence-related literature dealt with traditional military issues of Cold 
War Era nuclear warfare and strategic forces, international relations issues such as arms 
control, and cases of U.S. strategies historically as part of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Very little deterrence literature involved Asia and most missile 
defense-deterrence literature addressed U.S. national missile defense issues and most of 
those relative to deterring nuclear war. Of the 35 books and numerous articles of 
academic literature reviewed on missile defense-deterrence, none were on the deterrence 
effect of Japan’s missile defenses toward North Korea over time.274 The closest 
discussion was Lars Abmann’s volume (Abmann, 2007), which looked at all regional 
BMD efforts, including Japan’s, but predominantly through the lens of Chinese security 
interests. Another source was Michael D. Swaine, et al (Swaine, Swanger, & Kawakami, 
2001), which discussed the early period of Japanese contemplation of BMD following the 
1998 surprise TD-1 launch over Japan. Both of these volumes, however, were very dated. 
Further, of the 54 specific arguments identified on whether missile defenses enhance or 
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 A small sample: Michael W. Simon, “Rogue State Response to BMD: The Regional Context” (Simon, 
2002); Palmore, Julian, and Francoise Melese, “A Game Theory View of Preventive Defense Against 
Ballistic Missile Attack,” Defense & Security Analysis 17, no. 2 (Palmore & Melese, A Game Theory View of 
Preventive Defense against Ballistic Missile Attack, 2001); Theodore A. Postol, “Lessons of the Gulf War 
Experience with Patriot” (Postol, 1991-1992). 
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undermine deterrence, none of the arguments were based upon exclusive research of the 
Japan-North Korea case. 
In recent years, deterrence literature began moving beyond basic questions of 
Cold War nuclear deterrence to provide additional insight into: the basis for 
understanding the deterrent functions upon adversary behavior short of war (general 
versus immediate deterrence);
275
 expansion of deterrence concepts beyond merely fear of 
cost-imposition (now more emphasis on benefit-denial and consequences of restraint);
276
 
and increasing recognition of the positive and negative deterrent implications of missile 
defenses. The emphasis in the literature, however, was upon U.S. BMD in defending the 
U.S. homeland or U.S. use of BMD in conventional conflict in the Middle East over the 
past 20 years. However, all three of the areas in deterrence literature above have failed to 
address the role of missile defenses upon adversary behavior generally, or the Japan-
North Korea case in-depth over time. 
In the early period of the Cold War, the crux of the debate was the meaning of 
U.S. anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems not only to defend the nation but the 
specifically offensive nuclear forces. However, the Japanese BMD case was essentially 
free of the constraints of this argument since Japan had no meaningful offensive 
capabilities capable of attacking or retaliating against North Korea in response to an 
attack. The advancement, however incremental, in deterrence concepts and theory failed 
to explore the case of Japan’s BMD with analytic rigor, though it offered an opportunity 
to further theoretical development. 
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 Huth and Russett articulate the great uncertainties present in deterrence generally, 
and regarding measuring outcomes specifically (Huth & Russett, Testing Deterrence 
Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference, 1990).
277
 In the statistical analyses in the dissertation 
the direction of North Korean behavior was utilized as a measure, though it was 
understood such analyses are statistical correlations only. Adding additional analysis 
from qualitative research aided in clarifying or strengthening analyses. Generally, 
however, uncertainty in deterrence analysis is unavoidable apart from undisputed 
declaration of intent and thought from the adversary leader deliberating decision-making 
perceptions and ultimately making the choices. 
 One key limitation in Huth and Russett’s early approach to deterrence assessment 
was theorizing about deterrence only at the level of conflict or armed attack (Huth & 
Russett, Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference, 1990).
278
 The approach 
of the dissertation was within general deterrence conditions, a theoretical category largely 
ignored in their early analysis. Later, when Huth and Russett sought to address the topic 
of testing general deterrence, they chose data that involved crises that lead to full-scale 
war (Huth & Russett, General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three 
Competing Models, 1993).
279
 But this approach was too limiting in that general 
deterrence was assessed successful if armed challenges did not lead to war, and in a 
recent analysis by Stephen Quackenbush (Quackenbush, Understanding General 
Deterrence: Theory and Application, 2011), general deterrence was studied without 
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exploring cooperative or conflictual behavior by the adversary or general deterrence in a 
time-series approach. The dissertation’s research explored “gradients” in general 
deterrence and approached its statistical measurement through cooperative and 
conflictual behavior below the level of armed challenge or war. 
Research Design 
General Approach 
Methodologically, in order to research or understand the impact of Japan’s missile 
defenses (independent variable) upon cooperative and conflictual North Korean behavior 
toward Japan (dependent variables), the overall research design employed a mixed 
methods approach using both qualitative case-study analysis and quantitative statistical 
analysis. To ensure data quality in the research and writing of the dissertation, the 
research design considered the ideas and guidelines for qualitative and quantitative 
design and systematic data collection and evaluation found in Designing Social Inquiry 
(King, Keohane, & Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research, 1994).
280
 Many of the research design features of the dissertation were 
informed by these guidelines.  
Understanding the complexities of general deterrence—marked by the strategies 
and actions of some with provocations and coercion—is a challenge theoretically and 
practically. For example, it is far easier to recognize an “immediate deterrence” threat 
posed by the movement of large military forces to the border of an opponent, or of 
outright deterrence failure with an armed attack. Increasingly, threats are made and 
carried out at levels short of war—sometimes through the coercive or provocative use of 
ballistic missiles and the underlying threat they communicate.  
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If two opponents are to create acceptable norms of behavior with each other, the 
first step is better understanding of each other, past behavioral interaction, and how 
different instruments of power such as BMD or other tools such as regimes and 
institutions contribute to deterrence and norm-setting. The dissertation sought to navigate 
these issues, for example, by: 1) exploring briefly the historical interaction between two 
actors, in this case Japan and North Korea—this essential background not only helped 
characterize the Japan-North Korea relationship in modern times, but helped identify 
possible alternative influences or variables to be considered later in the dissertation; 2) 
exploring deterrence theoretically and all the ways BMD might strengthen or undermine 
deterrence—this identified several possible ways in which Japan’s BMD could influence 
North Korean behavior under general deterrence conditions that could be considered in 
the qualitative and quantitative analyses; 3) constructing a theoretically-supported profile 
of North Korea as the “deterree” to help understand its people and leadership—this 
provided potential deterrence-oriented factors of value in North Korean leadership 
decision-making regarding security issues and analytic cues to how they might interpret 
Japan’s BMD program; 4) and, employing empirical data from a dataset tailored to 
Japan-North Korea interaction—analysis of these data permitted insights into changes in 
North Korean (as deterree) cooperative and conflictual behavior toward Japan and the 
role of Japan’s BMD in that interaction.  
Thus, the historical background and literature review informed: how to construct a 
strategic profile of North Korea; how BMD might influence an adversary like North 
Korea; and, how a statistical framework could be constructed to support empirical 
analysis of Japan’s BMD program upon North Korean behavior over time under general 
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deterrence conditions. Information from the literature and profile was then drawn upon 
again to help explain the statistical findings and how possible North Korean perceptions 
regarding its coercion strategy vis-à-vis Japan, as reflected by empirically-based North 
Korean behavioral change, were affected by Japan’s BMD. Concluding analysis in the 
final chapter revisited appropriate missile defense-deterrence theoretic arguments 
(excluding, for example, arguments dealing with U.S. national missile defense 
capabilities providing protection for nuclear retaliation in a conflict with a nuclear-armed 
opponent) in light of core North Korean decision factors from the strategic profile and 
statistical results from the quantitative chapter to offer summary inferences and insights. 
Use of Mixed-Methods 
In addition to the guidelines in Designing Social Inquiry, overall mixed-method 
design features included consideration of guidelines provided with the “Program Effects” 
case model application in order to enhance the quality of the data used and inferential 
analysis stemming from it (United States General Accounting Office, 1990). In such a 
design, a case is studied to assess and understand the effects of a program as well as 
reasons for the program’s success or failure. In the case selected for the dissertation, 
Japan’s missile defenses were the “program” and the “effects” determined were the 
cooperative and conflictual North Korean behaviors. Two distinct “design features” 
included combining qualitative and quantitative data and surveying before-and-after 
effects. Exploring the deterrent effect of Japan’s missile defenses upon North Korean 
behavior in one period before the BMD program began in earnest, and in subsequent 
periods of its development, contributed to the body of knowledge on the effect of Japan’s 
BMD program upon North Korean behavior using this mixed-method design. 
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Design criteria also considered ideas in Designing and Conducting Mixed 
Methods Research (Creswell & Clark, 2007).
281
 For example, the timing of the research 
was sequential; in this case qualitative research was conducted first, then quantitative 
research. Second, weighting was ascribed to the quantitative data only. Third, research 
was mixed through “connecting” the qualitative and quantitative data, both in the 
quantitative analysis (Chapter Seven) and the final analysis (Chapter Eight). In this case, 
qualitative data was used both to provide contextual understanding of the adversary as 
well as explanatory analysis of quantitative data, thus strengthening the accuracy of the 
analyses and overall validity of the framework. 
In using a mixed-methods approach, the dissertation used the strengths of each 
approach to compliment the other. The Strategic Profile provided essential background, 
helped with deductive inference and forming hypotheses, and provided information for 
comparison with the quantitative analysis. The empirical data in the quantitative chapter 
provided a means of statistical analysis based upon the hypotheses informed in part by 
the Strategic Profile. This helped to affirm the analysis from the Strategic Profile, 
strengthen some judgments or conclusions, and offer ideas for new data requirements or 
further empirical research.  
Data Timelines 
 Japan’s BMD was explored in the dissertation across a 22-year period, starting 
approximately with the end of the Cold War and ending when Kim Jong-Il (KJI) died. 
Japan’s BMD program spanned about the last 13 and one-half years of the 22-year 
period. For the purposes of analysis, Japan’s BMD program was divided into four BMD-
related decision points or meaningful periods of Japanese BMD development (described 
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below). The period was purposely structured to provide a baseline period prior to the four 
periods of significant BMD program activity as a means of comparison in keeping with a 
mixed-methods design, as well as to capture meaningful (but non-BMD-related) events 
and interaction in the baseline period. The BMD periods, combined with the baseline 
period preceding Japan’s BMD program initiative, provided missile defense-related 
coverage to complement the dyadic Japanese and North Korean behavioral data in the 22-
year dataset. Thus, all of the variables were expressed and analyzed in a time-series 
methodology, both in the qualitative and quantitative sections of the dissertation. 
The period of time from January, 1990 to August, 1998 was included in the 
design to provide a baseline of Japan-North Korean dyadic behavioral interaction. This 
period provided a setting when Japan was not engaged actively in missile defense 
capability development despite aggressive North Korean ballistic missile growth and 
when missile defenses were proving of value elsewhere, such as in the Persian Gulf War. 
The first period of Japan’s BMD examined (September, 1998 to November, 2003) 
explored North Korean behavior in the early stages of Japan’s R&D efforts on missile 
defense. This activity was taken in response to the 1998 North Korean launch of a TD-1 
long-range ballistic missile that flew directly over Japanese territory and surprised, even 
scared Japan’s populace. The second period (December, 2003 to February, 2007) 
followed Japan’s decision to actually acquire missile defenses of its own as opposed to an 
initial commitment limited to helping develop missile defense technologies in 
cooperation with the United States. This period included Japanese commitment of 
significant fiscal resources toward Japanese BMD acquisition. The third period of Japan’s 
BMD program (March, 2007 to December, 2011) explored the period marking Japan’s 
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first BMD operational deployment. The fourth period (February, 2009 to December, 
2011) evaluated North Korean behavior during and following Japan’s first field-
deployment of BMD within Japan. This deployment included a stated intent of shooting 
down a North Korean TD-2 long-range missile in April, 2009 under certain 
circumstances. These four periods also served as the principal independent variables 
included in the statistical analysis. 
Qualitative Methods 
The design employed qualitative research in three basic ways in the dissertation. 
The first was the research of the Japan-North Korea relationship generally through 
exploration of their long-term historical interaction. The second way qualitative research 
was employed was in drawing final analytic judgments in combination with missile 
defense-deterrence theoretic arguments and statistical analysis (see Chapter Eight: 
Conclusions). Third, and requiring the most significant research effort, was an in-depth 
study of North Korea and its leadership since the behavior of North Korea as deterree 
was what mattered as the principal effect to Japan’s BMD. The general goal in 
deterrence, as suggested by the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2006), is to influence an adversary to decide to restrain from 
taking undesirable or egregious action against the one deterring or their interests in some 
way. In this case, Japan sought to use its BMD to deter North Korean coercive behavior 
toward Japan by countering the principal source of North Korean coercive power and 
strategy—its ballistic missiles. As stated above, North Korean behavior would not be 
expected to be either completely conflictual or cooperative. Instead, it moved in gradients 
of intensity over time. To understand the relationship of Japan’s BMD and North Korean 
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behavior, it was important to understand the characteristics of North Korean leadership, 
their motivations and other decision-making factors, and how contextual circumstances 
and change, including development of Japan’s BMD program over time, might affect 
their perceptions and, therefore, their actions (Payne K. B., The Fallacies of Cold War 
Deterrence and a New Direction, 2001).
282
 Because of its length and construct, a more 
detailed description of the Strategic Profile is provided below. 
North Korea Strategic Profile 
A strategic profile provides an overview of a state from a deterrence perspective. 
It structures one’s understanding of an adversary, its leadership, and the factors that 
matter in its national security-related decisions in keeping with the deterrence-related 
literature. Specific to the dissertation, the strategic profile was intended to aid in drawing 
some general conclusions about the Japan-North Korea relationship, but more 
specifically the effects of Japan’s missile defenses on North Korean leadership decision-
making and behavior. 
 A strategic profile provides a qualitative perspective of a deterree, though views 
vary over its precise contents.
283
 Constructed, in part, upon Keith Payne’s empirically-
based approach (Payne K. B., The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New 
Direction, 2001),
284
 and incorporating many of the theoretically-based ideas of others 
(i.e., McVicar, Mendelsohn, Post, Huth and Russett), the dissertation’s strategic profile 
provided more than just a review of North Korean military capabilities or personal quarks 
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of its leader.
285
 Payne emphasized the need to consider certain adversary characteristics, 
such as their rationality, motivations, goals, value and risk structure, regional security 
context, and sources of power, among others. Huth and Russett employed an approach 
based upon levels of analysis and incorporated various internal and external 
environmental factors of an adversary state (Huth & Russett, General Deterrence between 
Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models, 1993).
286
 Post emphasized various 
psychological factors that complimented, if not expanded upon, considerations of the 
personal aspects of an adversary leader described by Payne and Huth and Russett (Post J. 
M., 2003).
287
 Most of these factors were addressed in the profile, along with other 
information and other categories provided by other sources. 
Emphasis in the strategic profile was on those areas in which national security-
related beliefs and perceptions of North Korea’s leader emerged in its state-level 
behavior—interaction that might be relevant in context of the North Korean political 
strategy of coercion and the emergence of Japan’s BMD program. Substantive sections of 
the strategic profile were organized as follows: a review of the identity and cultural 
factors of North Korea’s people, providing historical insights to their national values and 
how those values might inform the security-related political culture of North Korea’s top 
leaders; the cognitive and psychological factors that informed Kim Jong-Il (KJI) as the 
primary decision-maker in North Korea in the period explored in the dissertation;
288
 and, 
key internal and external environmental factors of the North Korean state and how KJI 
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may have interpreted those factors in his decision-making. The leader, ultimately, then, 
was the focus of understanding for deterrence purposes since: he was the top decision-
maker for national security-related decisions; he was the one whose personal 
psychological factors might play upon state decisions; he was the one who reflected the 
national identity and culture of the people; and, he was the one who ultimately interpreted 
changes in environmental factors, such as changes in Japan’s BMD program over time.289 
The North’s relations with Japan were also revisited to address the strategy of North 
Korea toward Japan and political rapprochement. KJI’s interface with internal and 
external environmental factors was consistent with his personal and national identity and 
cultural factors. Because of the length of the material presented the Profile was divided 
into two chapters: the first two substantive sections (Identity & Cultural Factors, and Kim 
Jong-Il Personal Factors) comprised Chapter Five: Strategic Profile – Part I; the third 
substantive section (Environmental Factors) comprised Chapter Six: Strategic Profile – 
Part II.  
Qualitative Analysis 
 A strategic profile requires a great deal of information dealing with a potential 
adversary. Without access to primary sources in their original language, such as private 
conversations between Kim Jong-Il and his advisors in Korean, one might suggest 
insufficient information was available to research and analyze North Korea. However, 
research found that a great deal of information about North Korea, its capabilities, 
intentions, and leadership sentiments was available in a wide array of other sources, such 
as: U.S. and allied government reports; legislative research reports; third-party 
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governmental reports or diplomatic statements; North Korean official news media; North 
Korean communities and related media outlets in Japan; reports from visitors to North 
Korea, such as members of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
foreign dignitaries, and private citizens; reports from government and private research 
entities, such as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs); 
information provided by scholars and analysts who have studied North Korea over time; 
or, accounts from North Korean defectors.  
Further, the notion of insufficient public-domain information is not strong when 
one considers the role of information technologies in making vast amounts of information 
available today, including reports translated into English using automated software tools, 
providing significant insights into a potential adversary through information available in 
the public domain. The strength of public-domain, or “open-source,” information was 
acknowledged by U.S. Intelligence Community leaders. For example, in 2007, Mr. James 
Clapper, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in describing his years of 
experience in the U.S. Intelligence Community said, “And many times, the most 
important insight, the most important and relevant information, is not in the secret 
material; it’s open-source” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007).290 
More recently, Dan Butler, Assistant Deputy Director for Open Source, at the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, said, “Open source is research. It’s good research. 
It’s rigorous and disciplined research. And I could give you a lot of good examples of 
how our intelligence community back in the 1940s and 1950s was built on a very solid 
foundation of what today we call open source intelligence, or open source exploitation. 
Back then we called it research” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
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2010).
291
 Research to support development of the dissertation’s strategic profile was 
informed by several inputs from the deterrence theoretic arguments on understanding 
adversaries (such as Keith Payne’s framework) and research stemming from 
approximately 200 books, a number of academic articles, and other material available in 
the public domain described above. As voiced by leaders of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community, extensive information of use for national security-related research and 
analysis was available in the public domain. Research for the dissertation found extensive 
information on North Korea that fit into the areas of the strategic profile. 
Quantitative Methods 
Acquired Dataset 
The dataset acquired for the dissertation was provided by Dr. Doug Bond and 
Virtual Research Associates, Inc. (VRA®) at the request of the author. Doing so provided 
a single dataset that used the same data sources and tagging methodologies, substantially 
increasing data reliability.
292
 The dataset was titled “Events Data 1990-2011.”293 Data 
represented monthly summaries of daily IR-related events and interactions and were 
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gathered through automated software capabilities and derived from either Reuters or AFP 
(Agence France-Presse) news sources. VRA used Reuters news articles for data 
encompassing the entire dataset period (1990-2011) and AFP was added to supplement 
Reuters data from 2002-2011. The dataset provided both monadic and dyadic content. 
Monadic data reflected IR events or actions originating from one state and were not 
specifically tagged to any other state. Dyadic data were IR events between two states and 
tagged as directional in nature, such as Japan made a public statement directed at North 
Korea. Monthly data were collected from news reports scanned using VRA software for 
the period 1/1/1990 through 12/31/2011 (22 years). Each event or action in the dataset 
was derived through automated content analysis of daily newswire reports using a scoring 
process called Integrated Data for Event Analysis (Bond, Bond, Oh, Jenkins, & Taylor, 
2003).
294
 IDEA built on the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) and its behavioral 
scoring methodology originally developed by Charles McClelland (McClelland, 1999). 
This methodology relied on a “who did what to whom, when and where” approach to 
international interactions. Each event was assigned a weight based on the level of 
behavioral cooperation or conflict inherent in the action or statement. IDEA incorporated 
nearly all events covered through the original WEIS coding while adding fidelity. 
Aggregates for each month (by each state) were compiled for IDEA event form codes 1-
22, inclusive. These codes included both cooperative (cue categories 1 to 10) and 
conflictual (cue categories 11 to 22) events (see the section below entitled “Behavioral 
Scale” for a description of these categories and the weighting scheme used).295 The 
dataset also included data for subcategories, monthly averages, and cumulative scores 
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 Pages 733–45. 
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 See Appendix 1: Methodology Historical Background, page 337, for development of this methodology. 
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(totaling 72 different categories). The geographic scope of the data, chosen by the author, 
included 10 countries: Australia, China, Iran, Japan, Libya, North Korea, Russia, South 
Korea, Syria, and the United States (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
296
 Six of these states 
(Japan, North Korea, South Korea, China, the United States, and Russia) represented six 
regional powers commonly engaged in negotiations with North Korea regarding its 
nuclear weapons program (i.e., the Six Party Talks) and which had a history of 
interaction, including conflict, in the region. Australia was selected as another important 
regional actor that also interacted with all of the other six regional actors, including some 
interaction with Japan with regard to BMD issues (The National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2008).
297
 Three other countries (Iran, Syria, and Libya) are states with which 
North Korea had proliferant relations including ballistic missiles and nuclear 
technologies.
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 See the worksheets labeled “Monad Notes” and “Monadic Monthlies.” 
297
 See page 11 where BMD, including joint exercises, is described as a common goal for the U.S., Japan, 
and Australia within the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue. See also: (Frühling & Schreer, 2012). These authors, 
senior lecturers at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, argue, for 
example, in this opinion piece, “What should Australia do? As a start, the government should reinforce its 
political support for international missile defence co-operation—not only through words but through 
practical exercises with the US and its regional allies, especially Japan.” 
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 Research of the quantitative design first considered use of data from the Gary King Dataverse for North 
Korean and Japanese activity for the early periods to be researched (King & Lowe, 10 Million International 
Dyadic Events, 2003). This dataset, produced by Dr. Doug Bond and Virtual Research Associates, Inc. 
(VRA®), represented monthly summaries of daily IR-related interactions between Japan and North Korea 
taken from Reuters news reports from 1990-2004. These data were organized around various Country 
Dyads and provided information well-suited for the dissertation. See also Ross Miller, et al, for a recent 
application of dyadic behavioral variables in the case of the U.S. and South Korea (Miller, Bowdish, & Kim, 
2012). This dataset, however, did not capture more recent events of interest to the dissertation given 
significant development of Japan’s BMD program after 2004. As a result, either supplemental data or an 
entirely different dataset would be required for the dissertation. To capture data from January, 2005 to 
December, 2011 one option was to access a single news source in order to be consistent with the use of a 
single news source (Reuters) used in Gary King’s “Dataverse” for the preceding research period of the 
dissertation (1990-2004). Data were considered from one of the news service electronic archives with 
daily archives available (and searchable) online through the UNL “America’s Newspapers” database of 
Primary Sources, or the “LexisNexis Academic” database of electronic news sources. Hand-coding would 
have been required of these articles. Overall reliability would have been challenging, though it could have 
been maintained since hand-coding would have been taken from a single well-established, news source 
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Monadic Data. 
Monadic data reflected IR events related to one of the 10 state actors regardless of 
whether those events were correlated to another actor irrespective of whether that actor is 
one of the 10 principal states. The dataset included 2,640 months of summaries of 
monadic event data among the 10 states. The information for these summaries was very 
detailed but not directional toward any specific country. There were a total of 6,121,511 
events represented by these 2,640 months of event summaries in the monadic data.  
Dyadic Data. 
The second set of data was dyadic, where the unit of analysis was monthly dyadic 
scores for cooperative and conflictual behavior between two states.
299
 Data were also 
collected from 1/1/1990 through 12/31/2011 (22 years) and included the same 10 
countries as in the monadic data. Dyadic data reflected directional behavior from one of 
the 10 states toward another of the 10 states. Directional data included a numeric count of 
events and a cumulative score for each month (on the Goldstein scale); the numeric 
counts and cumulative scores provided both cooperative and conflictual directional 
behavior. These types of data were recorded for each state against the other nine states. 
The weighted sums accentuate high intensity actions (Virtual Research Associates, Inc. 
(VRA), 2012).
300
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
and required of only one case (Japan-North Korea) and in a limited timeframe (2005-2011). However, this 
would have taken considerable time. 
299
 A sample of dyadic data from the dataset is seen in Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis (Figure 3). 
Unlike the monadic data, with 72 different categories and subcategories, dyadic data included eight 
categories for each entry: the name of the source state (SrcName); the name of the target state, or state-
level object of the source-state’s behavior (TgtName); the year of the entry (Year); the month of entry 
(Month); the Goldstein Positive Case numeric count (GPCount); the Goldstein Positive Cumulative 
weighted score (GPCum); the Goldstein Negative Case numeric count (GNCount); and, the Goldstein 
Negative Cumulative weighted score (GNCum). 
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 See the worksheets labeled “Dyad Notes” and “Dyadic Monthlies (Non-Null).” Some months had no 
data as there were no reports in those months for this dyad. In these cases, to facilitate regression 
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There were 60,789 months of event summaries in the dyadic events data for the 
10 state actors. These events included both cooperative, positive directional dyadic data 
as well as conflictual, negative dyadic data. There were some months in some dyads that 
had no events identified, and there are many months with multiple events. There were a 
total of 237,759 dyadic events in the dataset: 167,763 cooperative, positive events within 
the monthly summaries; and, 69,996 total conflictual, negative events recorded. In the 
dyad of key interest for the dissertation (Japan and North Korean dyadic interaction) 
there were a total of 1,932 dyadic events across the 22-year dataset: 1,181 events of 
Japanese behavior toward North Korea (713 cooperative, positive events and 468 
conflictual, negative events); and, 751 events of North Korean behavior toward Japan 
(443 cooperative, positive events and 308 conflictual, negative events). 
BMD Events. 
A third set of data provided in the VRA dataset was comprised of specific news 
reports in the 22-year period that searched out specific terms in the Japan-North Korea 
dyadic relationship in order to ensure all reports were accounted for that dealt with 
Japan’s BMD. These data also provided summaries of the contents of the news reports 
themselves, a valuable feature not available in the monadic and dyadic data. Since the 
methodology used by VRA to identify reports of dyadic significance used the scanning of 
only the first two sentences of all available reports, it was possible some data containing 
largely BMD-specific references were omitted if that term was not used in the first two 
sentences of the report. Therefore, a supplemental data search was conducted to avoid 
                                                                                                                                                                             
analysis, new worksheets were created by copying the dyadic sheet and manually adding months to the 
data. A zero (0) was added to any monthly record created having no original data. Thus, a complete time-
series set of data was available with all months represented across the 22-year dataset period—a 
prerequisite for meaningful regression analyses. Figure 3 reflects the original dataset plus some months 
with 0s added to complete the year. 
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this gap.
301
 These data strengthened the reliability of the dyadic interaction and were used 
to construct a variable (described below) to aid in statistical analysis.  
Behavioral Scale 
Description. 
As a standard for identifying the cooperative and conflictual behavior and 
measuring such behavior intensity on a scale of action or restraint conducive to 
deterrence, quantitative data in the dissertation used the categories of political events and 
interactions identified in the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) framework 
(Bond, Bond, Oh, Jenkins, & Taylor, 2003) which built on the World Event Interaction 
Survey (WEIS) (McClelland, 1999). Broad event categories (a total of 22) ranged from 
cooperative, positive categories of interaction (i.e., yield, comment, consult, approve, 
promise, grant, reward, agree, request, and propose) to conflictual, negative event 
categories that were increasingly negative until they reached pre-war conditions (i.e., 
reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relations, 
expel, seize, and force). There were more specific events (100+) under most of these 
broad event headings. Each category was assigned a weight according to the Goldstein 
scale. 
The Goldstein scale was developed to provide placement of international events 
that were categorized by Charles McClelland in the World Event/Interaction Survey 
(WEIS) onto a negative/conflictual-positive/cooperation scale. This scale has a numeric 
value range from -10.0 (conflictual interaction bordering/starting war) to +8.3 
(cooperative interaction associated with close partnerships or alliances). While the WEIS 
categories provided a meaningful “ladder” of international dyadic interaction, the 
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Goldstein scale adds intensity weights that capture the direction and levels of interaction 
more appropriately and with greater utility in making comparisons (Goldstein, 1992).
302
 
A summary of Goldstein’s application of weights to WEIS events is provided in Table 8 
at the end of Chapter Seven. 
 According to VRA, the weighted sums of the events in the dataset accentuated 
high intensity actions while the counts assumed all actions were equal. VRA suggested 
using the weighted sums on both positive and negative polarities, which was done for 
data used in the regression models. Averaging the positive and negative polarities 
together was discouraged as positive and negative actions were not necessarily inversely 
related (i.e., a +3 was not necessarily the same level of positive behavioral intensity that a 
-3 was of negative behavioral intensity). Some averaging was done in Chapter Seven: 
Quantitative Analysis, however, among groups of positive events and, separately, groups 
of negative events. This was done to further analyze one particular month’s events of the 
same polarity, for example, rather than comparing cumulative weighted scores since 
these varied widely in month to month comparison. This method complied with VRA’s 
theoretic structure for utilizing the data provided in the dataset. 
Variables 
Dependent Variables. 
Two dependent variables were used: one for positive, cooperative North Korean 
behavior toward Japan and one for negative, conflictual North Korean behavior toward 
Japan. These dependent variables account for the “effect” of Japan’s BMD “program” as 
described above in the mixed-method design description. There were several advantages 
to this approach. First, there existed technologies through VRA, for example, that could 
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search, sort, and assemble structured datasets with both monadic and dyadic features. The 
interaction between two states, such as Japan and North Korea, created a relatively large 
number of media-reported events identified by VRA. The data were expressed both in a 
directional form (i.e., the event was behavior from Japan toward North Korea), but also 
typed as either cooperative, positive behavior or conflictual, negative behavior. Further, 
VRA’s processes assessed a weight, or level of intensity for each event, using the 
Goldstein scale described above, indicating just how cooperative or conflictual the event 
was on a scale.  
The dependent variables were also chosen in order to provide direction of 
behavior (cooperative, positive and conflictual, negative behavior) as a measure of the 
deterring effects of Japan’s BMD. In this way, criteria for deterrence effectiveness were 
identified as follows: increases in cooperative, positive North Korean behavior toward 
Japan during a specific BMD period indicated Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence; 
decreases in conflictual, negative North Korean behavior toward Japan indicated Japan’s 
BMD strengthened deterrence during that BMD period; decreases in cooperative, positive 
North Korean behavior toward Japan during a specific BMD period indicated Japan’s 
BMD undermined deterrence; increases in conflictual, negative North Korean behavior 
toward Japan indicated Japan’s BMD undermined deterrence during that BMD period; 
and, no statistically significant changes in North Korean behavior toward Japan during a 
specific BMD period indicated Japan’s BMD had no deterrent effect during that BMD 
period. Analysis of these data using these criteria indicated the deterrent effects of 
Japan’s BMD program over time; however, the inferences drawn from these analyses 
cannot prove decisively that Japan’s BMD caused certain deterrent changes in North 
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Korean behavior. However, the methods and results used in this design provided 
improvement in better understanding how BMD may have affected North Korean 
thinking and behavior, as well as methodological advancement in addressing general 
deterrence challenges in a time-series framework. 
Independent Variables. 
 The primary statistical models included those variables specific to Japan and its 
BMD program. This set of variables was applied to all but one initial model in the 
regression analyses. Applying these variables to the other variables allowed analytic 
comparison with other, non-BMD-related independent variables. The first variables 
included cooperative and conflictual Japanese behavior toward North Korea. As with the 
dependent variable, the Japanese behavioral variables used the Goldstein weighting scale 
described above and reflected the cumulative monthly intensity of all interactions that 
month. Including both components of Japan’s interaction with North Korea in a single 
regression model was an essential step in providing a statistical foundation upon which to 
add the BMD-related variables of Japan’s interaction with North Korea. As with the 
dependent variable, data for these dyadic behavioral variables come from the VRA-
provided database (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
303
  
A variable was also included in the primary regression models reflecting the 
supplemental BMD-related data provided in the VRA dataset (see the section “BMD 
Events” above). This dichotomous variable did not reflect positive or negative behavioral 
direction, nor the cumulative weighting on the Goldstein scale, as the dyadic cooperative-
conflictual behavioral variables did. The months in which these terms appeared in the 
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data across the 22-year dataset were tagged to create a variable ensuring all Japanese 
BMD activity in the data was captured within the statistical analyses.  
Lastly, as mentioned above, there were four dichotomous independent variables 
that reflected the emergence of Japan’s BMD program over time. One variable was 
created for each of the four periods of Japan’s BMD program. The first BMD variable 
represented the time period of September, 1998 through November, 2003—the period 
immediately following the 31 August, 1998 TD-1 missile launch that overflew Japan. 
The second BMD variable represented the time period of December, 2003 through 
February, 2007—beginning with Japan’s choices and commitments relating to acquisition 
and deployment of its own BMD system. The third BMD variable represented the time 
period of March, 2007 through December, 2011—the first deployment of operational 
BMD that occurred in Japan (March, 2007) and extending to the end of the timeframe 
considered since Japan’ BMD deployment did not cease. The fourth BMD variable 
represented the time period of March, 2009 through December, 2011—the first time 
Japan placed operational BMD assets on a ready alert status in preparation to engage 
(shoot down) a North Korean ballistic missile; North Korea warned UN civil aviation and 
maritime agencies of the impending launch which occurred on 5 April, 2009 (a modified 
TD-2 missile).  
Control Variables. 
In evaluating the effect of Japan’s missile defenses on North Korean behavior, the 
research employed various models that controlled for rival explanations in the statistical 
analysis. This provided data dealing with Japan-North Korea interaction for statistical 
analysis, but isolated from other variables. These control variables included: cooperative 
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and conflictual U.S. behavior toward North Korea; cooperative and conflictual South 
Korean behavior toward North Korea; cooperative and conflictual Chinese behavior 
toward North Korea; two periods of political rapprochement between Japan and North 
Korea (in the early 1990s, and again in the early 2000s); and the political parties of Japan, 
South Korea, and the United States. The cooperative and conflictual behavioral variables 
used the Goldstein weighting scale described above. These variables addressed the 
potential impact of other key actors in the region, changes in their political parties that 
could result in policy changes toward North Korea, and the dynamic of significant 
interaction between Japan and North Korea through political normalization talks. These 
variables were controlled statistically in regression models evaluating both dependent 
variables as well as the BMD-specific independent variables. As a result, they aided in 
isolating the influence of Japan’s BMD over time in effecting North Korean cooperative 
and conflictual behavior toward Japan. In all cases, North Korean cooperative and 
conflictual behavior toward Japan remained the dependent variables. Qualitative data 
were then incorporated to provide further analysis of the statistical results or support 
explanations of the quantitative data.
304
 
 Data constructed with the Goldstein directional and weighting scale scheme 
(Goldstein, 1992) were particularly useful in addressing dyadic relationships under 
general deterrence conditions as they provided “gradients” of behavioral change. Further, 
these data could be collected and assembled within datasets on a monthly basis to enable 
added granularity in behavioral interaction. Detailed, monthly cooperative-conflictual 
behavioral interaction in a dyadic relationship, such as the Japan-North Korea 
relationship, especially in a time-series study, served as a very good baseline of 
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independent and dependent variables from which statistical analysis was supplemented 
by other independent variables of high interest—such as Japan’s BMD. Adding BMD 
variables—while controlling for other influences (i.e., the control variables)—permitted 
the effects of Japan’s BMD program to be measured by changes in the cooperative and 
conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan. This also provided statistical analysis of 
each period of BMD development so that the direction of North Korean cooperative and 
conflictual behavior toward Japan was analyzed for deterrence effects. The results of 
each period were analyzed further with qualitative data and then compared one with 
another. 
Quantitative Analysis 
The purpose was to evaluate the effect of Japan’s missile defenses on North 
Korean behavior. To do this, a 22-year database was compiled and regression analysis 
conducted using publically-available statistical software for all months from 1990-2011. 
These data were crafted into discrete models reflecting Japanese cooperative and 
conflictual behavior toward North Korea and Japan’s BMD variables reflecting the four 
periods of BMD development. The control variables were then analyzed in separate 
regression models. All data results were displayed in activity tables for comparison. 
Analysis provided the following results: which BMD variables were statistically 
significant in correlation with North Korean behavior toward Japan in each period; 
whether it was cooperative or conflictual North Korean behavior that changed; and, the 
direction of behavioral change indicated in the statistical analysis inferred by Japan’s 
BMD. Statistical analysis was an important component of the dissertation’s goal of trying 
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to understand the effects of Japan’s BMD upon North Korean behavior in general 
deterrence conditions. 
Analytic Tool. 
The regression and other statistical analyses were performed using the gretl 
software package, available online (Cottrell & Lucchetti, 2012). This software interfaces 
with a variety of data spreadsheets including Microsoft Excel—the format in which the 
dissertation’s database was constructed. All regression analyses and related statistical 
tests, such as tests for serial correlation, for example, were conducted using gretl 
software. 
Alternative View. 
An alternative perspective on Japan-North Korea relations may be that the Japan-
North Korea relationship could not be analyzed in isolation or as a stand-alone case. 
Perhaps KJI focused only on the U.S. and saw Japan and South Korea only as mere U.S. 
puppets. In this construct, North Korean behavior would have been driven by U.S. 
behavior and KJI’s belief that he needed ballistic missiles solely as a means to make a 
credible nuclear deterrent against aggressive U.S. action.  
This proposition may have been stronger in the Cold War era. However, things 
have changed politically and militarily in the region, including: North Korea’s loss of the 
Soviet Union as a dominant political, military, and economic sponsor; the rise of Japan as 
a world economic power; the significant rise of ROK conventional capabilities; the 
decline of U.S. relative position in the region indicated by removal of its tactical nuclear 
forces from the region in the 1990s and the near-term plan to transition operational 
control of combined military forces on the peninsula to the ROK government; and, 
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Japan’s substantial growth in BMD investment, technology, and deployed capabilities. 
Since the 1990s, of necessity the North Korean strategy was no longer a U.S.-only 
approach. Instead, it was multi-dimensional, emphasizing political coercion of regional 
actors with ballistic missiles, and the U.S. strategy component focused most intensely on 
North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons to deter U.S. attack and regime change. 
Further, U.S. extended deterrence security guarantees, since they are neither expressly 
nor incidentally intended to deter North Korean behavior in periods short of war 
(Takahashi, Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military Transformation, 
2012),
305
 are likely perceived in North Korea in the same way—that is, germane in 
wartime conditions. As such, North Korea’s coercion strategy was aimed at interaction 
with regional actors below the threshold of armed conflict. Lastly, if the U.S.-only thesis 
had been the case, then there would either have been no effect of Japan’s BMD on North 
Korean behavior, or there would have been a high correlation in the statistical analysis of 
U.S. behavior as a control variable for Japan’s BMD. However, the statistical analysis 
indicated Japan’s BMD were important variables in effecting both cooperative and 
conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, while the U.S. behavioral control 
variable was not a statistically significant factor in the effects of Japan’s BMD. 
Analytic Integration 
Statistical findings and qualitative contextual analysis from the strategic profile 
case study were considered with various missile defense-deterrence arguments from the 
Literature Review. This was done to explore further insights into possible explanations 
for North Korean cooperative or conflictual behavior short of war in light of Japan’s 
decisions and activities with its missile defense program. This involved comparing 
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qualitative analyses of North Korean characteristics found in the strategic profile, coupled 
with additional qualitative data as necessary on North Korean activity as characterized in 
missile defense-deterrence theoretic arguments, with quantitative statistical analysis data 
in order to better understand Japan-North Korea dyadic interaction. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: STRATEGIC PROFILE  
PART I—IDENTITY & CULTURE AND PERSONAL FACTORS 
Executive Summary 
A strategic profile, unlike a general country study that provides a geographical 
overview of a state, seeks to provide a meaningful order to understanding an adversary, 
its leadership, and the factors that matter in their national security-related decisions. For 
the dissertation, the strategic profile, in keeping with the deterrence-related literature, is 
intended to aid in making judgments about the Japan-North Korea political relationship 
generally and the effects of Japan’s missile defenses on North Korean leadership 
decision-making and related behavior specifically.
306
 
 Research of the North Korea leadership strategic profile found a leadership 
regime that was pragmatic and rational, but acted through a decision-making lens that 
ascribed to a value system consistent with its history, culture, and ideology. This value 
system, though very different from that in recent experience in the U.S., permitted North 
Korean leaders to treat its people and neighbors in an instrumental and sometimes violent 
way. In a return of Korea’s royal legacy, the Kim dynasty of North Korea sought to avoid 
reruns of intervention, invasion, and occupation, whatever the cost, including unaided 
advancement of the nation, though large amounts of aid is precisely what was needed in 
some cases. This view of security placed a premium upon the military instrument for 
defense and plans of forced Korean reunification and, more recently, the development of 
ballistic missiles and WMD to threaten and coerce its opponents in their own heartlands. 
The personal traits of the Kim leaders facilitated this interpretation of domestic and 
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external security environments, using cooperative and conflictual behavior, consistent 
with the North Korean revolutionary past, to create an image of a nationalistic, even 
dangerous, state. This image perpetuated North Korean security goals with regional 
actors and helped placate domestic audiences, though it may not be discernible when this 
image reflected genuine emotions or was simply being orchestrated. Personal pride, 
intermingled with national honor, however, occasionally led North Korea’s leaders to 
take actions probably motivated more by desires to save face and avoid inconsistencies 
than to achieve strategic political or economic goals. Personally, KJI may have been 
malleable to environmental influences—at least in his relations with Japan—including 
the deterring effect of Japan’s BMD. 
 Japanese decisions on BMD came as a result of North Korean patterns of 
behavior with its missiles and other instruments of power. However, while North Korean 
intentions for developing missiles that could threaten Japan may have been intended, in 
part, to strike U.S. forces throughout Japan in context of general war on the peninsula, the 
residual problem was that U.S. extended deterrent actions and capabilities did not address 
North Korea’s new strategy of political coercion that paralleled its rapid development and 
deployment of its longer-range ballistic missiles that could range Japan. This meant 
Japan’s BMD, while adding to the defensive suit of capabilities needed in general 
regional war, also appear to have been the greatest variable affecting North Korean 
political coercion behavior toward Japan in the context of relations short of war. The 
elements of the strategic profile reflect various qualitative data that suggests North Korea 
could, and perhaps did, modify its perceptions of coercive or conflictual behavior toward 
Japan over time. 
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More specifically, Japan’s BMD directly undermined North Korea’s ballistic 
missile capability—a core value central to North Korea’s post-Cold War deterrent 
security strategy and capacity to coerce others. However, KJI did not view Japan’s BMD 
in the same fashion as offensive strike forces, such as those possessed by the U.S., that 
could preemptively decapitate KJI’s regime, inflict personal harm upon him and his 
family, and destabilize if not threaten the survival of the North Korean state as it existed 
under KJI. Further, KJI had much to gain from the prospects of normalization of relations 
with Japan—rather than the result of coercion—including substantial amounts of direct 
monetary infusion and investment. Japan’s BMD did not deny KJI the option of building 
and using a new missile test facility in which it could still advance its space and ballistic 
missile technologies by flying southerly trajectories. Further, KJI’s perceptions regarding 
Japan’s BMD included considerations of China, the U.S., and various other effects of the 
development of BMD in Japan over the course of several years. Some of these effects 
included: an extension to North Korea’s ballistic missile test moratorium; substantive 
normalization talks; fears of a Japanese offensive arms buildup; complications to North 
Korean missile-related activities or war plans; use of surprise tactics; Japan’s defenses 
were not aggressive or ambiguous; North Korea could simply build or use more ballistic 
missiles, go around defenses, or use alternative means of delivery, coercion, or attack; 
and, failures to deter North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile tests. 
Background and Contents 
 A strategic profile provides a qualitative perspective of a deterree. There are a 
number of views as to its contents, though it is less debated as to whether the deterrer 
should research and develop an adversary profile. In an effort to provide a more 
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empirically-based approach and reduce uncertainties in deterrence analysis and strategy-
building, Payne suggested a two stage methodology of (1) developing a detailed 
understanding of the adversary; and then (2) orienting the deterrer’s capabilities and 
deterrence-oriented actions to influence the factors known about the adversary and his 
decision-making. Payne argued for identifying those elements critical to the adversary 
leader’s decision-making, including: leaders’ motivations; decision-making processes; 
sources of regional friction; contextual lessons of history; how they view others in the 
region; and national capabilities (Payne K. B., The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and 
a New Direction, 2001).
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 Pages 102-14. According to Payne, other specific elements of adversary characteristics needed as part 
of a deterrence strategy include: assessment of a leader’s rationality or predictability (i.e., perhaps based 
upon past history, domestic political pressures, or ideological factors; also involves senior leader physical 
or mental health, drug addictions, or other psychological factors limiting or distorting perceptions of 
reality and rational behavior); leadership (i.e., key decision-makers, their personal will or determination, 
motivations, constraints on behavior); familiarity and focus (i.e., are they aware of and do they 
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provocation is better than conciliation); and, deterrer regrets and policy options (i.e., how North Korea 
perceives deterrer options if North Korea is conflictual; how conflictual behavior might affect North 
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psychobiographic information, including cultural and historical background; his personality traits, 
including such things as cognitive complexity, emotional reactions, and motives of leadership; his 
worldview, such as ideology and sense of nationalism; and, his style (Post, The Psychological Assessment 
of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, 2003); in his chapter, “Assessing 
Leaders at a Distance: The Political Personality Profile,” pages 102-4. Also see another Post book that 
expands these ideas further (Post J. M., 2003); pages 102-4. These sources provide details helpful in any 
North Korean leader profile. Some information needed in a North Korean strategic profile may not be 
available or may be of questionable confidence. As such, it cannot, nor can any other adversary leader 
strategic profile, be used to ensure deterrence success. Understanding an adversary is crucial to a 
deterrence strategy, but in no way does it, or any assembly of robust military capabilities, guarantee an 
adversary will be willing to acquiesce to a deterrer’s efforts. Measures taken to prepare for deterrence 
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In addition to Payne’s outline, others provide valuable insights also needed to 
create a more complete picture and profile. For example, deterrence analyst Michael 
McVicar provides an excellent synopsis of the rationale and ingredients of modern 
deterrence-focused adversary leadership “strategic profile” information. In his qualitative 
approach, McVicar provides six broad categories of information essential to adversary 
leadership strategic profiles, including: historical, ideological, and cultural influences; 
conditions and beliefs; leadership characteristics; decision-making structures and 
processes; strategy and doctrine; and, key uncertainties (McVicar, 2011).
308
 Mendelsohn 
brings further specificity to a profile outline by suggesting deterrence also consider the 
opponent’s: military and economic power; geostrategic position; type of regime; internal 
dynamics such as level of cohesion; cultural-social characteristics; and, how national 
identity affects top leader decision-making (Mendelsohn, 2003).
309
 Further, the 
framework used by Paul Huth and Bruce Russett in understanding deterrence 
relationships importantly considered an opponent’s environmental levels of analysis that 
informed their leadership’s decision-making. These were comprised of traditional balance 
of power indicators emphasizing the military component of power, along with internal or 
                                                                                                                                                                             
failure, therefore, are prudent despite the development of an empirically-based method of adversary 
understanding, such as this type of profile. Page 110. 
308
 Pages 6-8. McVicar argues profiling is essential to more detailed adversary decision calculus 
assessments which, in turn, serve as the focus for a defending state’s “tailored” deterrence planning. 
Profiles aim to capture, with the material available, the “key factors” that inform how an adversary might 
value or weigh such factors and calculate decisions to act or refrain from doing so. He includes statements 
made by the adversary and cultural features to help alleviate “mirror-imaging” assessment of the 
adversary by ascribing to him the defender’s values or, on the other hand, concluding he is so different he 
cannot be understood at all and deterrence efforts hopeless. 
309
 Pages 84-8 and 96-7. 
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domestic factors, and relationships with other actors externally (Huth & Russett, General 
Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models, 1993).
310
  
Emphasis in this chapter is on those areas in which national security-related 
beliefs and perceptions of North Korea’s leader emerge in its state-level behavior. 
Substantive sections of the chapter will be organized as follows: a review of the identity 
and cultural factors of North Korea’s people, providing historical insights to their 
national values and how those value might inform the strategic, the security-related 
political culture of North Korea’s top leaders; the cognitive and psychological factors that 
informed Kim Jong-Il (KJI) as the primary decision-maker in North Korea in the period 
explored in the dissertation; and, key internal and external environmental factors of the 
North Korean state and how KJI may have interpreted those factors in his decision-
making. The leader, ultimately, then, is the focus of understanding for deterrence 
purposes since he is the top decision-maker for national security-related decisions; he is 
the one who’s personal psychological factors might play upon his decisions; he is the one 
who reflects the national identity and culture of the people; and, he is the one who will 
ultimately interpret changes in environmental factors, such as changes in Japan’s BMD 
program over time.
311
 As Jeffrey Record argued, in his examination of Japan’s WWII 
decision to wage war, “there is no substitute for knowledge of a potential adversary’s 
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 Pages 61 and 64. These analytic levels, combined with other considerations by Huth and Russett and 
others, form a broad conceptual framework used in the dissertation, including: the adversary nation’s 
identity; factors that exist in the adversary’s internal and external environment; and, the individual 
leader’s personal factors. Identity envisions such things as historical and cultural values. Internal 
environmental factors can include such things as the state’s political apparatus, economy, military forces, 
and social issues including unrest or violence. External environmental factors can include trade or political 
and diplomatic interaction with other states or organizations. Personal factors of the leader can include 
his risk-propensities, emotive psychological factors, and cognitive processes at work. 
311
 For more on the role of the leader as a reflection of national values, an interpreter of the environment, 
and focus of psychological factors in deterrence-oriented profile research, see the author’s article, “Can 
Tailored Deterrence and Smart Power Succeed against the Long-Term Nuclear Proliferation Challenge?” 
(Lowther, 2012). 
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history and culture” (Record, 2009).312 This sentiment is shared by Paige and modern 
scholars so the dissertation also takes this approach and seeks to understand, albeit in an 
abbreviated level of depth, the North Korean actor as Japan’s deterrence-based adversary 
(Suh & Lee, 1976).
313
 These characteristics are useful in the development of a North 
Korea strategic profile and support broader theoretic arguments that deterrence is more 
likely to be effective with improved understanding of one’s adversary. The outline that 
follows in this chapter incorporates the background information provided above. 
Identity & Cultural Factors 
 The North Korean national identity and psyche are heavily influenced by Korea’s 
history, including ancient history and more modern occupation by Japan.
314
 Along with 
other cultural factors, this informs North Korean leadership decision-making, and is 
summarized below. Motivations from the past led to what could be described as a 
distinctive North Korean national identity and the rise and national embrace of Kim Il-
sung (KIS) and the Kim family dynasty. This section of the Profile includes: lessons from 
history, describing the long Korean history and the conflictual and cooperative interaction 
with Japan; the social contract, which connects the past to the modern Kim dynastic rule 
and gives Kim a powerful position regarding national security and relations with 
outsiders including Japan; and, national cultural values, such as nationalism and 
admiration of the military, which strengthen North Korea and help explain its internal and 
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 Page 52. 
313
 In his chapter entitled, “Toward a Political Leadership Profile for a Changing Society.” Pages 240-1. 
There are several ideas from scholars on the approach one could take to a strategic profile and the 
contents therein. For example, Glenn Paige identifies 11 different types of political leadership profiles that 
reflect the difficulty in supporting or crafting a single, authoritative deterrence-oriented strategic profile. 
These 11 include: conceptualizing studies; operational code studies; political biography studies; role 
studies; leadership institution studies; elite studies; follower studies; community power studies; value 
studies; problem-solving studies; and, area studies (Suh & Lee, 1976). 
314
 North Koreans claim a history of Korean people dating back 5,000 years, though this is typically 
connected with legend or myth. See, for example, David Rees (Rees, 2001); page 1. 
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external behavior. These identity and cultural factors are the foundational components 
through which the other two major sections of the Profile orient themselves: KJI’s 
personal factors, in large part a reflection of the national psyche described in the identity 
and cultural factors section; and, the internal and external environmental factors, 
describing KJI’s interaction, as leader of North Korea, with external actors. 
Lessons from History 
Korean history is a long one, marked by depth in culture, a relatively high level of 
sophistication, and deep traditions including dynastic rule. Geographically situated as a 
peninsula, however, meant Korea’s interaction with the world was less inclined toward 
global relations, like China’s, for example, and more toward regional contacts, 
particularly with China and Japan.
315
 And for two millennia Korea was content with this 
situation, earning it the label “hermit kingdom,” though this characterization is inaccurate 
in many ways. However, the Korean people, and their provincial—and later, central—
leaders were exceedingly proud of their culture and independence, and when outside 
invasions occurred over the centuries, Korea found this exceptionally offensive, criminal, 
wrong, and disrespectful to its position as an advanced culture. These memories are deep 
on both sides of the current political divide, and combine in modern North Korea with 
other factors, such as personal characteristics of its leaders, Communist influence, and 
ideology to orient much of North Korean state behavior. 
                                                          
315
 New archaeological discoveries, lending to modern development of the landscape, are offering new 
insights into ancient Korean culture and the roles of China and Japan in their cultural development and 
history. North Korean perspectives, however, are aimed at interpreting archaeology to support their 
notions of centrality and primacy of their position in Korean culture, if not to propagate a myth it was the 
source of all human civilization (Byington, 2008); in Hyun Sook Kang’s chapter, “New Perspectives of 
Koguryo Archaeological Data,” page 24. 
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Earliest Korean historical records were established with the Three Kingdoms 
period (57 BC to 668 AD). Koguryo was a kingdom to the North that also stretched into 
large parts of Manchuria (it occupied what is now North Korea and more); Silla was to 
the southeast; while the Paekche kingdom was to the southwest. Of particular note from 
this period was the effort by Koguryo, a “warrior” kingdom that was the land-based 
gateway to the rest of the peninsula, to fight off the many attacks including China. A 
“Golden Age,” which lasted for 300 years, followed in which Koguryo itself was 
conquered by China and the Korean kingdom of Silla in the south. Chinese culture, 
including Buddhism, also moved south and eventually to Japan as a result. But the 
lengthy Koryo period that followed (935-1392), with a new capital in the peninsula’s 
center, was turbulent: the peninsula came under Mongol control by invasion; and, 
“Korea” (as it was first called in this period) helped the Mongols attack Japan 
(unsuccessfully) and fight Japanese pirates. In 1392, Korean General Yi T’aejo took 
control of Korea and moved the capital to the area of what is today the South Korean 
capital of Seoul (McCune, 1950).
316
 
The Yi dynasty (also called the Choson dynasty) lasted over 500 years, until the 
1910 Japanese annexation of Korea in its imperial period. This period is remarkable for 
many reasons. First, the Koreans again were faced with invasions, both by Japan in 1592 
and later by the Manchus.
317
 This period was also known for Korea’s isolationist 
approach and the nickname of “hermit kingdom,” though trade and other contact with 
Japan remained active from the early 1600s. Internal strife also emerged, with revolts in 
1882 and 1884, ultimately climaxing with Japan’s forceful control of the region that it 
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 Pages 10-13. 
317
 Such was the devastation during the various invasions that little of the reportedly vast and brilliant art 
and pottery has survived (Vos, 1997); page 8. 
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had already begun to control economically (McCune, 1950).
318
 Combined with other 
cultural, environmental, and personal leader factors, these forces are potent decision 
variables in scenarios like the recent period of Japan-North Korea relations and its 
broader regional context.
319
 This view of the real possibility of externally-based 
existential threats was reinforced during Japan’s imperial occupation and still dominates 
the North Korean psyche. 
During the Japanese imperial period (which included Japan’s murder of Korean 
Queen Min),
320
 Korea experienced social upheaval and economic plundering at the hand 
of the Japanese. Socially, Japanese colonial practices represented exceedingly foreign 
(European) ideals contrary to Korean cultural norms (Woodside, 2006).
321
 Kang spoke of 
the rules imposed by Governor-General Minami Jiro, from 1936-42, in his quest to unify 
Korea with Japan, including: reciting the Pledge of Imperial Subjects; speaking only 
Japanese; worshiping at Shinto shrines; and, changing their Korean names to Japanese 
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 Pages 12-16. One internal revolt in the later Choson period was the Hong Kyongnae Rebellion in 1812, 
an action by elites and peasants in the northwestern Pyongan Province. Starting small, the rebellion 
sought to uproot systematically the dynasty. Put down within months, the rebellion showed some 
weakness to the dynasty’s central government to address the issues of regional groups (Kim S. J., 2007); 
pages 3-10. Tae-jin Yi argues the “hermit kingdom” is an unfair one since Korea was actually trying to 
modernize and join international society, despite its military weakness, though this effort was not until 
the late 1800s (Yi, 2007); pages 340-50. The common picture of Japan forcibly opening up Korea to the 
world and modernization, Yi argues, is a misplaced one. Importantly, McCune summarizes these historical 
periods as ingraining three “forces” of modern Korean thought: nationalism; social and political 
conservatism; and ties to China. These forces have endured in North Korea especially, despite years of 
Japanese occupation, division, conflict, and Communist influence. Pages 12-16. Korea, however, had 
become very weak in its late dynastic period as other regional powers grew, leaving it but a “pawn” to the 
stronger (Grayson, 2002); page 150. Nationalism, it should be noted, is also a hallmark of South Korean 
culture (Breen, 1998); page 18. 
319
 So deep an impression were these long-ago invasions by the Japanese and others that they 
“overturned fundamental assumptions concerning national security” in the minds of Koreans (Haboush & 
Deuchler, 1999); page 51. 
320
 The Japanese murder of Queen Min was not simply an effort to quell dynastic rule in Korea: it was an 
effort to quell dissention if not rebellion since the queen was in “the vanguard of the opposition” to 
Japanese reforms (Rees, 2001); page 97. 
321
 Pages 40 and 88. 
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names (Kang, 2001).
322
 Humiliation for Koreans began immediately: it forced all Korean 
men to receive haircuts, removing their top-knot, the very symbol of manhood. 
According to McKenzie, this single legal act did more to “alienate the affection of every 
Korean” (McKenzie, 1908).323 Kim Il Sung, in a speech given to inspire support for 
guerilla warfare against the Japanese in 1931, claimed, among other things, that Japan 
was arresting, imprisoning, and murdering innocent people everywhere in Korea and 
through its laws deprived Koreans of freedoms of speech, press, and assembly (Kim I. S., 
1977).
324
 Economically, Japan loosely divided Korea into economic production regions, 
with the south being developed for its agricultural strengths and the north being 
developed in heavy industry, capturing the vast minerals and other resources in that 
region (Clark, 2000).
325
 This industrial development in the north by Japan is what 
significantly helped North Korea rise to such industrial heights in the first twenty five 
years of the postwar period (Kang M.-G. , 2005).
326
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 Page 111. Changing names was considered “the ultimate indignity.” 
323
 Pages 46-8. 
324
 Speech delivered at the Meeting of Party and Young Communist League Cadres at Mingyuehkou, 
Yenchi County, December 16, 1931. Pages 15-8. Kim Il Sung is often also rendered Kim Il-Sung. In addition 
to Japanese occupation and the Korean War, James Grayson argued the presence and growth of 
Protestant Christianity to be another significant influence on Korean history since the end of the Choson 
Dynasty. This religious factor not only brought ideas of modernization from the west but also ideas of 
working to care for needy people. Missionaries from the U.S., Canada and Australia organized the entire 
peninsula into sectors for growth, expanding the churches to becoming “thriving institutions.” Later, 
Japan suppressed these organizations, which came to symbolize, if not side with, anti-Japanese nationalist 
movements. Likewise, in the aftermath of the postwar period when Korea was initially divided, Christian 
entities were far stronger in the north but were designated anti-Communist by the Soviet side 
consolidating power with Kim Il-Sung in the north. Many fled south, others who remained were executed 
or went into hiding (Grayson, 2002); pages 155-63. Some religious elements in the north survived, 
however, at least into the 1980s and 1990s. Religion, especially that stemming from outside powers, was 
suspicious and its influence, and that of other religion, was to be replaced with Juche ideology. 
325
 Page 7. He cites, for example, Arab references to gold in the Silla kingdom east of China and, later, 
European and American miners working gold veins in Korea’s north in the 1890s. 
326
 Pages 140-1. Mineral exploitation by Japan during its colonial period in Korea was staggering, with 
Japan acquiring outright ownership of 80% of all mines and production. WWII wartime production 
increased, particularly in gold mining, where the bulk of the gold mined in Korea was sent to Japan to fund 
its war efforts. In addition to gold, Korean mines provided Japan with high production in silver, iron, 
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The North Korean identity continued to be formed after the close of WWII 
including its influence by Communism and the Korean War.
327
 In the postwar period 
prior to the Korean War, the Communist revolts in the South were supported by North 
Korea and Kim Il-Sung (Kim, 1977).
328
 In the period leading up to the Korean War, 
North Korea maintained it was “the only lawfully elected people’s government” in 
Korea. It clarified Pyongyang (the current capital of North Korea) to be its 
“revolutionary” capital only; Seoul remained the true capital of all Korea (Kim, 1977).329 
Kim Il-Sung, the father of KJI and the modern North Korean state, served as an anti-
Japanese guerilla and, upon conclusion of WWII, KIS collaborated with Soviet forces to 
become the Korean leader in the North. His role as a popular nationalist (disputed by 
some in the West) not only helped propel him to lead the country, but to shape the 
country and its ideological companion to nationalism and recreate a type to totalitarian 
dynasty for his son, KJI, to inherit. The personal role of KIS and North Korean 
                                                                                                                                                                             
tungsten, and graphite, considered “particularly essential to national defense” needs in Japan. Trade in 
Japan’s imperial era rose quickly, with Korea being active through its brokers for agricultural products at 
first (predominantly rice) but later in industrial production to support the war efforts (McNamara, 1996); 
pages 27-35. 
327
 Influence of Communism did not, however, mean North Korea could be identified simply as a 
Communist state. Hyun Ok Park argues that many wrongly interpret North Korea’s anti-colonial struggle 
as part of the broader Communist movement in earlier years of the twentieth century. Communist 
ideology, Park emphasized, was trumped by ethnic nationalism from the very beginning, with China 
purging ethnic Koreans from its party ranks (Park, 2005); pages 22-3. On the idea of North Korea being 
more nationalist than Communist, see Robert Oppenheim (2008), page 47 including note 11. In fact, both 
North Korea and China would prove more nationalist than Communist as time went on. 
328
 Pages 78-80. This not only failed to spark the desired surge of Communist sympathy and rebellion, the 
South outlawed Communism and strengthened anti-Communist ideology and U.S. involvement. These 
revolts, occurring in Cheju Island, Taegu, and Sunchon, among others, were very violent with many 
innocent people getting killed. During the five-year UN trustee period of Korea, Communist connections 
strengthened in the North. While it is difficult to assess, Lee suggests that, had the UN trusteeship of 
Korea succeeded in creating a unified Korea, such a state would have eventually landed within the Soviet 
orbit of influence, not the West’s, due to common borders with Communist states (China and the Soviet 
Union) and the likelihood of their influence with sympathizers in Korea (Lee, 2006); pages 156-7. 
329
 Page 77. 
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nationalism during and after the Korean War were important factors in shaping the 
identity of the people and their state.
330
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 North Korean nationalism, however, is generally overshadowed in many historical accounts at that 
time by the Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Valois writes, for example, how Truman, 
after the North Korean invasion into the South in 1950, warned that Soviet expansion, if unchecked, 
would continue through Asia, the Near East, and could continue through Europe. Soviet Communism in 
Korea was akin to the beginnings of Hitler’s campaign—an intolerable situation to Truman (Valois, 1997); 
page 8. According to U.S. war reporter John Dille (and many others at the time), the U.S. intended the 
Korean War to provide it (along with Japan) a second anti-Communist base in Asia; for the Soviets, it was 
simply a test of U.S. resolve and an effort to wear it down (Nishi, 2003). In John Dille’s article, “Saving 
Ourselves for the Big Battle against Communism.” Pages 106-14. According to the footnote, the original 
source was John Dille, Substitute for Victory, 1954. Part of the reason many ascribe the Korean War’s 
trigger to the greater Communist struggle, was the role of Stalin and the Soviet Union with, if perhaps 
over, Kim Il-Sung and North Korea in the early postwar period. Graeme Mount argues Stalin’s interest at 
the time was access to obtain ice-free ports on the Pacific coast, an option it simply did not have within its 
territory. A deal with Chiang Kai Shek granted Soviet access to the port of Lushun, but with Mao’s success 
in China’s civil war, that prospect was gone. The ports in Inchon and Pusan interested Stalin as 
alternatives should conflict on the peninsula emerge. He supported KIS and was willing to provide him 
military arms (Mount, 2004); page 24. Ironically, use of the 38th parallel to divide Korea, as was done in 
the Korean War, was not a new idea to peninsula occupiers in the postwar period. It was Japan which 
suggested that dividing line with Russia in 1896 in its negotiations over carving up interests there and in 
Manchuria. Disputes between the two led to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5, with Japan prevailing 
(Kim D. K., 2005); page 119. Unlike North Korea, which incurred devastation and over a million military 
and civilian casualties, Japan, as a base for U.S. operations in the Korean War, received nearly $3 billion 
from the U.S. to aid in facilitating the U.S. military activities from there, allowing Japan’s economy to 
significantly rebound in the postwar period (Kim S. S., 2006); page 172. While the idea of nationalism can 
be found in both North and South Korea, key differences to the people of the south lie in political choices 
across the divide. Decades of purposeful cultural inculcation in the North, however, may have developed 
very different views by the people of the north though this cannot be confirmed either way. For example, 
although he acknowledged a great historical “interdependence” between Korea, China, and Japan, 
Syngman Rhee (South Korea’s first president) was clearly a voice for independence for Korea in his day—a 
necessity for its survival (Rhee, 2001); pages 253-80. According to Rhee, the three peoples were part of a 
single Mongolian race; pages 80-1. His six principles for Korean independence included: being open to the 
outside world; adopting new methods for security; mastering diplomacy; respecting sovereign rights; 
honoring moral obligations; and, respecting the right of freedom. In addition to common ideas of 
nationalism, recent studies suggest the people of the south recognize a strong connection with North 
Koreans with respect to their common blood line and ancestry (Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: 
Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy, 2006); pages 195-8, including tables 10.3 – 10.7. Defector accounts are 
mixed in that they reflect a desire, at least by some, to reunite with family, on the one hand, and a 
completely different view of their individual and national identity on the other. Perhaps a simple view of 
Korean national identity is that it reflects a proud independence built upon early historical consolidation 
and rule of Korean groups on the peninsula, but one which was tempered by past recurrences of invasion 
and resulting suffering following. Keith Pratt, for example, says “Modern Koreans are inclined to speak of 
their special shaping as a people by the psychological and physical suffering their nation has endured” 
(Pratt, 2006); page 304. On a personal level, Sunny Che, speaks of growing up and life as a “Cho-sen jin” 
(Korean immigrant living in Japan): ostracized, never feeling welcome, and always feeling he was an 
outsider (Che, 2000). Che’s mother was a relative of the Queen of the Korean Yi Dynasty. See pages 3-5. 
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Given this historical backdrop to the modern North Korean state, one would 
expect a general pattern of relations with its neighbors to be marked by opposition, 
confrontation, power-politics, self-help, and violent provocation from North Korea’s 
leaders. This is the consistent trend. While it is the military forces of ROK and the U.S. 
that directly threaten North Korean sovereignty and regime survival, given the history of 
Korean interaction with Japan one would expect the North Korean relationship with 
Japan to also be confrontational or violent. However, at least since the end of the Cold 
War a less violent framework has existed in its relations with Japan, at least when 
compared to the North’s interactions with the U.S. or ROK. One may also expect direct 
confrontation over Japan’s pursuit of a BMD program since it undermined North Korea’s 
means of coercion. However, this has generally not been the case. 
Social Contract 
The historical and cultural component of Korea’s past, coupled with a shared 
popular nationalism after WWII, permitted KIS to embark upon a totalitarian regime, 
fostered by Communist ideas of the era, without a great deal of resistance. This became 
solidified after the Korean War. Leadership, even national “fatherhood,” was provided 
for the North Korean people. The Japanese occupation may have strengthened North 
Korean nationalism, but the people of the North came to possess a “fixation” on KIS 
exceeding even the passions of nationalism (Shin & Robinson, 1999).
331
 The people 
received certain entitlements from the state in exchange for support of, and submission 
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 In Carter J. Eckert’s chapter, “Exorcising Hegel’s Ghosts: Toward a Postnationalist Historiography of 
Korea.” Page 370. Robert stresses the importance of the adversary leader’s role or position over the 
people, regime, or state. The strategic role taken by the leader in his environment regionally and 
historically can, in large measure, inform and explain his decisions, perhaps more than personality 
(Roberts, 1988); pages 160-4. 
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to, its leaders, including education, employment, and health care (Robinson, 2007).
332
 
Such cultural perceptions can be powerful motivations for political behavior toward 
Japan. Chang and Lee argue the people of the North are part of a collective, unlike the 
people in the democratic South who are characterized by their individuality (Chang & 
Lee, 2006).
333
 It is this collective to which the people belong and which KJI controlled 
and provided. 
North Korea’s predominant ideology is juche, a framework of self-reliance begun 
under KIS. Juche, at its core, reflects the struggles and occupations of the past, marking 
the ideology as essentially nationalism walled by a deep distrust of others (Belke, 
1999).
334
 But juche must be conceptualized as more than a notion of independent-minded 
nationalism or resistance to outside help. Rather, it is a stubborn duty to do things in the 
North Korean way, regardless of whether that way is efficient, effective, or the best 
alternative available. Juche is an imperative that motivated KJI toward decision-making 
that helped make KJI appear reckless, risky, uninformed, or heartless. Juche, then, was 
part of the social contract in which the state, through the regime and its leader, provided 
essential needs of the people, particularly national security needs, and they in turn would 
cede decision-making rights to national leaders. This approach not only led North Korea 
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 Page 150. However, Robins and Post speak of the paranoia of North Korea internally in which its 
people, either willingly or under compulsion from fear, subordinate themselves slavishly to their leader 
(Robins & Post, 1997); page 87. 
333
 Page 222. However, control of the people began immediately upon the end of the Japanese colonial 
rule. Since North Korea emerged, the state, with Soviet help, established a “regime of surveillance” that 
included spying on its population, social controls, and mental and physical self-criticism. Ever fearful of 
external dangers, such as from South Korea, North Korea’s national security was dependent upon control 
and, with this view in mind, pushed its surveillance regime down to the village level, but linked all 
information links to its central government (Armstrong, 2003); pages 191-214. Self-criticism involved 
disciplining the mind and body so as to be in unison with the state—a process westerners called 
brainwashing. According to Armstrong, a highly-efficient program of near-total control took decades. 
334
 Page 197. Juche, like Confucian thought, describes the value of humans only in terms of their existence 
within society, though juche emphasizes the communal aspects of society (Baker, 2008); page 147. 
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to embark on a path of military strength and violence to secure regime and national 
survival, but one of authoritarian rule. The consequences of employing juche within the 
social contract, however, were mixed. For example, military discipline has seen fissures 
including the possible naval provocation in June 2002 off the west coast that was not 
directed by KJI but conducted by disgruntled military officers (Schneider & Post, 
2002).
335
 
Cultural Values 
 In addition to a powerful sense of independence and recognition of North Korea’s 
leader as benefactor, certain qualities, also related to its past, might also be described as 
North Korean cultural values of which North Korea’s leader KJI shared. These values 
appear to have strengthened North Korea in ways that temper the need for economic 
relief, for example, that outsiders have ascribed to periods of North Korean plight. In 
such cases, the North Korean strategy of coercion, including interaction with Japan, 
should, therefore, not be presumed to reflect a willingness to acquire external funding or 
aid at all political or military cost. North Korean cultural values include admiration of the 
military, filial community, nationalism, honor, and pride in culture including resiliency 
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 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Pages 109 and 116-8. Others included: high levels of military investment despite extreme 
economic challenges; a social culture of dependency and population passivity; an attempt at total state 
control where no real opportunities for political or religious opposition or independence are possible; 
soaring corruption in which illegal economic activities occur even with the aid of government officials. 
Intended as a national policy path, juche grew out of a xenophobic view based on past historical invasions 
of North Korea, but especially Japan’s more recent colonial occupation period in which KIS earned 
veneration as a guerilla fighter against Japan. According to a western diplomat who served in North Korea, 
juche simply meant relying upon one’s own resources, and doing so in a non-capitalist but non-dogmatic 
way. The North Korean’s viewed it of particular value to developing countries of the world where 
emerging states could skip the capitalism step in traditional Marxism-Leninism and go straight to 
socialism. It led to pride, in his view, but also overconfidence resulting in lack of value in international 
cooperation, and elites living in luxury while the vast numbers of people experienced starvation and 
destitution (Cornell, 2002); pages 42-5. Cornell was the Swedish Charge d’Affaires to North Korea from 
1975-77. The Embassy of Sweden in Pyongyang was for many years the only western embassy there. 
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and technological achievement.
336
 Dependence upon the military for protection may also 
stem from experiences during the Korean War not unlike some peoples and cities during 
WWII. Springer makes the case, for example, that the North Korean people endured great 
suffering during prolonged aerial bombings of the cities of Pyongyang, Hungnam, 
Wonsan, and Kanggye—an experience that shook their psyche (Springer, 2010).337 In 
providing defense and “liberation,” the military and its personnel are highly regarded in 
North Korea by its people. 
Long-held beliefs, stemming in part from Confucian connections, help form the 
core of Korean, and North Korean, cultural identity, chiefly the idea of filial deference 
and loyalty (Chang & Lee, 2006).
338
 In a collective state such as North Korea, this helps 
binds people with leader and is another feature of ancient Korean history intertwined with 
modern experience. 
 Anti-Japanese sentiment continues in North Korea at the center of its nationalism 
and spans from the central government down to ordinary citizens. Bruce Cumings, for 
example, describes life in North Korea as if the country is “still fighting the Japanese,” 
with government-run press near-daily flogging Japan for wartime atrocities (Cumings, 
2005).
339
 Nationalism in the North is not only important, it is viewed as superior (Chang 
& Lee, 2006).
340
 
                                                          
336
 There are diverse views on the division between north and south. For now, many voices ascribe to 
North Korea a different culture, or at least differing emphases upon cultural aspects. Others, such as Roy 
Grinker, argue the differences have become deeper, and the two now more heterogeneous than not 
(Grinker, 1998); pages 225-7. He states, “North Koreans will never be replicas of south Koreans,” citing the 
difficulties defectors face in integration after making their ways to South Korea. 
337
 Page 11. 
338
 Page 224. 
339
 Pages 406-7. Cumings also says North Korean youth take camping trips to retrace the steps of anti-
Japanese guerillas during their struggle. 
340
 Pages 254 and 278-9. Neither the North nor the South dispels the idea of being nationalist. However, 
many in the North argue the nationalism of the North is “purer” than that of the South, the latter having 
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Technological development is an important historical phenomenon globally, and 
has merit in Korea’s history as well, its people also reflecting ingenuity and 
accomplishment. Korean pride today flows, in part, from the period of the Yi dynasty 
when, for example, in the late 16
th
 Century they invented and employed iron-clad ships to 
defeat the Japanese naval ships during its invasion. Korea also penned its first written 
language and invented “movable metal type” for its language perhaps decades before 
such an apparatus was invented in the west (McCune, 1950).
341
 
 Pride in its self-sufficiency, often reflected in its resiliency, is a psychological 
factor that exists at both the societal and individual leader (KJI) levels. Resiliency was 
tested particularly in the 1990s where the state had lost a great deal of support from the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries following the Soviet collapse. It was in this 
period when consecutive years of flooding and drought left 18% of North Korean 
farmland utterly destroyed (agriculture accounts for 30% of its entire economy); and, 
perhaps 10% of its population (two million people) died of starvation or related illness 
(Kim S. H., 2003).
342
 Hwang argues the idea of a strong central government in North 
                                                                                                                                                                             
retained a measure of occupation and willing adoption to Western tendencies. On the other hand, the 
South portrays itself as better nationalist victors, having beaten both the Japanese and Communists. As 
others have described, Korean nationalism was, and is, a very strong factor in its thinking on security. In 
addition to the other accounts cited in this chapter, Schmid described the great many violations that 
occurred along the border with China in the late 1880s leading to a feeling of “siege” and heightened 
Korean sensitivity regarding its territory, contributing to the emergence of an enduring Korean 
nationalism (Schmid, 2002); pages 199 and 202. 
341
 Pages 12-16. When compared with other peoples, however, Seong-Rae Park suggests Korean 
contributions were historically modest (Park S.-R., 2005); pages 1-5. 
342
 Pages 135-6. It was during this challenging time South Korea’s leadership adopted the “sunshine 
policy” which sought to pursue humanitarian issues with the North separate from political ones. The rise 
and influx of dozens of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) resulted from this policy. Pages 136-7. 
These NGOs worked in four functional areas: public service, unification, religion, and vocational support. It 
should also be noted that the desire for humanitarian support from the south toward the north may stem 
from both the desire to aid fellow ethnic Koreans, but also as a reflection of the strong Christian influence 
in the south that spread in the postwar period with anti-Communism. From a different perspective, 
Pollack suggests fear of outside economic influence is a consequence of its ideology and culture. North 
Korea denounces such influence as “ideological and cultural infiltration,” an age-old strategy used by an 
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Korea can be ascribed to the influence of Confucian thought while the “sacrifice” stems 
from Buddhist influence upon North Korean society (Hwang, A History of Korea: An 
Episodic Narrative, 2010).
343
 Together, these may help explain the resiliency of the 
people in the most trying times, such as famines of the 1990s, but happened in such a 
way that the sovereignty of the KJI regime was never stressed through uprising in 
response to government failures.
344
 
KJI Personal Factors 
 Kim Jong-Il, only the second person in the North’s dynastic continuity, was a 
reflection of national identity and culture and the nation’s clear dominant leader in its 
relations with external actors including Japan. KJI’s personal factors were, therefore, knit 
into the fabric of the nation-state, the ruling regime, and interaction with the outside 
world. While KJI lived in the shadow of his father KIS, it must be remembered that in the 
development of North Korea’s strategic culture of national independence, political 
sovereignty, and regime survival, its leader, KJI, was the regime and the regime was the 
nation. Independence and sovereignty depended upon the regime to succeed and survive, 
but the regime depended upon KJI personally. This is part of the North’s unique cultural 
and dynastic legacy, but also a reflection of the practicalities of modern totalitarian rule. 
As explained previously, the period of dissertation focus is 1990-2011. This period is 
principally one dominated by the leadership of KJI (he began to take over prominent 
                                                                                                                                                                             
aggressor before violent attack (Pollack, 2004); in Nicholas Eberstadt’s chapter, “Why Hasn’t the DPRK 
Collapsed?” Page 157. This fear may explain the resilience, if not stubbornness, of North Korea to be 
unwilling to include outside participation in solving its economic woes, instead of merely exploiting their 
resources through coercion. 
343
 Pages 33-40. 
344
 North Korean resilience is difficult with which to argue and claims of impending collapse are a regular 
occurrence. One interesting claim was by a group of experts at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
who claimed in 1997 the North would collapse within five years (Ford, 2008); page 152. 
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positions from his father at the beginning of this period and died at its end). Thus, he is 
the focus of this section of the strategic profile.
345
 This major section of the Profile 
includes: KJI’s ascendency to power, including his long-term service in, if not control of, 
the activities of government rather than being a casual bystander; KJI’s personality and 
approach to decision-making regarding national security issues; and, KJI’s psychological 
factors—his rationality and predictability, motivations and goals, cognitive processes, 
risk tolerance, health, and emotive factors—affecting national security decision-making 
including decisions involving ballistic missiles and relations with Japan. Thus, KJI’s 
personal factors reflect, in part, the national identity and culture of North Korea, and can 
be seen in his interaction with internal domestic audiences and relations with external 
actors including Japan. 
Ascendency to Power 
KJI was not a disinterested member of royalty, ascending to a throne at an 
appointed time to serve as a figure head. Rather, his ascendency was purposeful and 
perhaps strenuous, ultimately leading to not only to the ultimate position of national 
power but command of government and national security policy, including relations with 
Japan. The process of KJI’s succession and takeover of power was gradual through rising 
positions in government. For example, in 1974 KJI gained operational control of the 
Workers’ Party; by 1980 his measures were seen in the party Congress; and, he was later 
named head of the party’s secretariat, essentially making him the second most powerful 
                                                          
345
 KJI died 19 December, 2011, and upon his death his son, Kim Jong-Un (KJU) assumed power of North 
Korea including Supreme Commander of the military December 30th. In April 2012 KJU took over the KWP 
as its First Secretary and control of the NDC by becoming its First Chairman (Defense of Japan 2012, 
2012); pages 20-1. KJU thus consolidated power, at least officially. 
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person and effectively running the government (Jung, 1998).
346
 KJI was named successor 
in 1980 (Grayson, 2002).
347
 KJI’s public stature and path to succession emerged in 1980 
when he was elected to senior Party positions at the October Party Congress. In 1982 he 
received the title “Hero of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” and published On 
the Juche Idea, the latter making him the “definitive interpreter of his father’s ideology.” 
Further, state press began to speak more of KJI and by 1983, according to Adrian Buzo, 
he’d been “endowed with the same personal and political genius-leader attributes of his 
father.” Outside speculation was KJI would represent a new, younger generation with 
new ideas. However, as KJI produced more ideological papers it became clear he was 
aiming for all generations of North Korans to continue on the guerilla revolution of his 
father—no significant change was coming in the person of KJI (Buzo, 1999).348 
While KJI did not officially take over leadership of North Korea until 1994 when 
his father died, he had been groomed for succession for many years and his control 
effectively began closer to 1990. Handover of power was incremental and, according to 
Oh and Hassig, KJI exercised near-total control of the state before his father died (Oh & 
Hassig, 2000).
349
 For example, according to Baird, KJI became the first deputy chairman 
                                                          
346
 Page 340. When KJI was head secretary of the Party’s Organization Department (essentially running 
the government) he managed the various bureaus with meticulous control and efficiency. For example, he 
required every bureau department to submit reports weekly and he personally read and responded to 
every report. He kept his father informed, later using a tape recorder for him so it would be easier to 
grasp what was happening as KJI orchestrated it all. Further, all instructions, no matter how small, coming 
from KIS went through KJI before going to any bureau. KIS was a charismatic leader; KJI was in his comfort 
zone as a detail-oriented manager (Becker, 2005); pages 124-6 and 129. This process of KJI control and 
keeping information from his father may also have led to fighting between father and son over internal 
conditions, though this is unconfirmed. 
347
 Page 151. 
348
 Pages 105-6. In keeping with Korean tradition of myth surrounding its great leaders, so, too, is the 
story of KJI’s birth: born on sacred Mount Paekdu, triggering a new star in the sky, rainbows, and lights in 
the sky. Most North Koreans likely understand the story to be the allegory of Kim’s special purpose it was 
intended to portray (French, 2007); pages 57-8. 
349
 Page 91. 
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of the powerful National Defense Commission in early 1990 (full chairman in April 
1993), the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Supreme Commander in December 1991, and 
awarded the military rank of marshal in April 1992. He did not assume leadership of the 
Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) until three years after KIS died and never assumed KIS’s 
political title of president (Schneider & Post, 2002).
350
 Thus, after 20 years of such 
management processes, KJI was able to maintain his tight government control upon his 
father’s death.  
KJI took over North Korea in every respect when his father died in 1994.
351
 KJI’s 
succession of his father and founder of the state was not automatic, nor was KJI’s grasp 
of power. KJI was well-prepared, adapted as necessary, and took measures to buy loyalty 
where necessary. These, and other reasons, explain KJI’s success in garnering and 
retaining power (Lynn, 2007).
352
 While North Korea does not today control its people 
quite to the extent it once did, KJI sought to control what he could of what his people did 
and thought (Scobell, Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System, 
                                                          
350
 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Page 111-2. Further, KJI was the one who met with Soviet officials in 1990 when they informed 
the North it would be losing considerable Soviet aid (Cha, 2012). 
351
 Two significant political activities were already underway that summer: negotiations with the U.S. over 
North Korea’s nuclear program and an upcoming, and first-ever, North-South summit (Jung, 1998); page 
342. He navigated both, though neither led to North Korean abandonment of its nuclear program nor 
political reconciliation with South Korea. To ascribe “generalship” upon himself is not that far removed 
from ancient Korean history when, for example, Koryo royal kings partnered with “royal” military leaders 
in the same capital city (Shultz E. J., 2000); page 175. This was unlike Japanese shoguns who were more 
autonomous and geographically separate. Eugene Park expands on this and argued Korean military 
influence expanded through the rise of a distinctively military aristocracy that allowed a better military 
cadre through use of an examination system, as well as improved access across the social strata by elites 
and non-elites alike (Park E. Y., 2007); pages 179-80. 
352
 Pages 110-6. According to Lynn, the reasons include: (1) 25 years of preparation, governmental service, 
and personal power consolidation; (2) replacement of old generation loyalists; (3) adaptation of juche 
ideology to undergird a new “military first policy,” solidifying loyalty of the military behind him; (4) 
tightening his grip of control through information management; (5) buying loyalty from elites and party 
members through material perks; (6) fostering a siege mentality among the people; and, (7) conducting 
limited economic reforms in 2002 to help manage a growing black market. According to Lynn, public 
executions continue as a tool of psychological control of the people. 
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2006).
353
 Interestingly, B.R. Myers argues North Korean provocations of recent years are 
intended to demonstrate legitimacy to the domestic audiences of North Korea—
legitimacy being a growing problem and a potential source of future crisis in North Korea 
(Myers, 2010).
354
  
Personality 
Worldview, Style, & Image. 
KJI followed in his father’s footsteps in many ways, though KJI departed from his 
father in some ways as well as circumstances warranted. His personality also affected 
how KJI interacted with Japan through ballistic missile-back coercion, on the one hand, 
and political normalization actions on the other, having implications for how he may have 
responded to Japan’s BMD program. KJI was heavily influenced by his father, KIS, who 
founded North Korea and began the Kim dynasty, now stretching over 60 years and three 
generations. Jerrold Post argued KJI’s father cast a long shadow, placing increased 
pressure upon KJI to perform and leading to narcissistic behavioral patterns (Post J. M., 
2004).
355
 The cult of personality pursued by KJI followed that of his father. But it cannot 
be presumed that the people, or the elites, ever warmly accepted this strategy, or that KJI 
believed they did. Rather, KJI wrapped himself in it and the people complied (Lankov, 
2005).
356
 Neither did KJI depart from the North Korean autonomous idealism espoused 
by KIS—a disastrous choice, in Jung’s view (Jung, 1998).357 
                                                          
353
 Pages 2-4. 
354
 Page 17. As such, they are not attempts to threaten and blackmail external actors, such as Japan, the 
U.S. or ROK. 
355
 Pages 239-41, 254, and 258. Post offered a passage about KIS to consider from an official website of 
the North Korean government. A few of the words from this passage, referring to KJI’s father, include: 
great man; praised; legendary hero; liberated; defeated; led; patriot; repulsed; dignity; historic; gifted; 
invincible; immortal; peerless; and unprecedented. 
356
 Pages 5, 97-8, 130-1, 146, 150, and 171. According to Andrei Lankov, Kim Il-Sung was challenged 
openly by other senior leaders in 1956, for example, on his aggressive campaign of self-adulation and for 
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The Kim dynasty is viewed in North Korea as “fatherly” leaders, starting with 
KIS. According to Martin, this otherwise emotive and culturally filial connection is an 
historical one. For example, scores of North Korean children were left fatherless or 
orphans as direct consequence of the Korean War which left 25% of North Korea’s 10 
million people dead. The state took charge of their welfare after the war and they were 
taught that its new leader, Kim Il-Sung, was their new father (Martin, 2004).
358
 Unlike 
the cult of personality forced upon the nation, KJI viewed himself—and presumed the 
masses willingly view him in the same way—as a continuation of this “fatherly” filial 
                                                                                                                                                                             
mistreatment of the people, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with the regime. It failed, all 
conspirators were executed or jailed, purges by KIS followed, and the central lesson learned by all was 
that “nobody should dare challenge the Great Leader and hope to get away with it.” Lankov, using newly 
available information from former Soviet primary sources, described the challenge as a legal one made 
during the party’s August Plenum meeting August 30, 1956. Lankov places the challenge in context of 
other Communist challenges, such as the 1956 uprising in Hungary, and a wider Communist “thaw” that 
allowed others to be more open about domestic problems. KIS endured none of this. See also pages 2-4, 
77, 89, and 121. Of note, so close is the ideology of juche to KIS that it is also referred to as 
“Kimilsungism” (Kim D. K., 2005); page 165. 
357
 Page 343. The personality cult tactic first begun by KIS gave him the opportunity to solidify his rule, set 
aside the image of being a Communist puppet, and instill his personal “brand” of leadership style and 
ideology without opposition. The personality cult is the same style adopted and followed by KJI. Neither 
did KJI seek to reduce or dismiss the deification of his father through a complete “de-Kimification” 
campaign similar to what was seen in China regarding Mao or the Soviet Union with Stalin. The people, 
including defectors, according to Scobell, continue personal reverence for Kim Il-Sung. All of these things 
suggest to Scobell that North Korea is at best an “eroding totalitarian regime,” and has not yet begun 
transformation toward authoritarian rule. Under these circumstances, dissent emerges, while other things 
wane such as rigid ideology, party control, terror practices upon the people (though the means of 
coercion remain), information control, and central economic planning (Scobell, Kim Jong Il and North 
Korea: The Leader and the System, 2006); pages 3-4, including Figure 1. Scobell also suggested KJI’s 
successor would not likely be able to sustain a totalitarian regime. See page 39. KJI did in 2004 take 
measures to soften the personality cult aspect of his leadership style, removing some portraits of himself 
and dropping some references as “Dear Leader.” The reasons were unclear, though some speculated it 
was an effort to help garner foreign aid or to draw attention from the North Korean people (Mystery as 
Kim Title, Posters Go, 2004); originally an Associated Press source. 
358
 Pages 1-3. Kyung Moon Hwang argues KJI, like his father, merely reflects the revival of the ancient 
Korean kingship, a structure with which the people are comfortable given its familial orientation and 
succession and its sense of national stability (Hwang, A History of Korea: An Episodic Narrative, 2010). 
Page 256. This type of a structure, given its history, “made perfect sense.” Hwang argues it would be 
wrong to think the North Korean state and society was illegitimate or the political or cultural aberration; 
both simply followed a relatively logical path given their shared past but modern position across the 
dividing line (page 260). 
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theme. KJI also used Juche like his father, though KJI took it to a different level of 
engagement with the masses (Buswell, 2007).
359
 
 As absolute ruler, and surrounded by his own cult of personality, KJI had few 
restraints in feeding his ego. From a variety of first-hand and secondary accounts, Oh and 
Hassig suggest KJI was independent if not arrogant and disrespectful. They also believe 
his behavior was beyond decisive toward impulsive or reckless. At times KJI yelled or 
displayed a violent temper; allegedly, KJI ordered the killing of his former agriculture 
minister and personally executed the assistant to his brother-in-law, Chang Song-taek, as 
a warning to Chang for his arrogant behavior. This also appears in keeping with Kim’s 
lack of trust for most people, retaining mostly family members, including his sister and 
her husband, as his closest associates or advisors. A hard worker, he expected the same of 
others in his name (Oh & Hassig, 2000).
360
 Kim lived in complete luxury as leader, with 
an abundance of every personal preference available to him (French, 2007).
361
 His 
independence also took on a more pragmatic side since KJI appeared confident as leader, 
one who used crisis as a tool, and whose decisions were informed in most respects to 
official information.
362
  
                                                          
359
 In Eun Hee Shin’s chapter, “The Sociopolitical Organism: The Religious Dimensions of Juche 
Philosophy.” Pages 517-22. Juche, according to Eun Hee Shin, has undergone transformation in its 
application in North Korea. Beginning as an anti-imperialist ideology, its founder, Kim Il-Sung, created and 
used juche as a nationalist instrument through the Worker’s Party and government organs to help win 
sovereignty. It was interpreted later (in the 1970s and 80s) in a humanistic way to apply to social 
interactions. Lastly, under KJI, it was transformed into a state religion to be followed by faith with KJI as 
the religion’s priest. Shin says “serving the people” was a mantra of KJI. Juche should be thought of as a 
philosophy of “sovereign autonomy” among other similar linguistic definitions. 
360
 Pages 91-5, including note 25. 
361
 Page 62. These preferences included money, cars, clothes, palaces, alcohol, and women. 
362
 Roberts identifies elements of decision-making style possibly germane to North Korean leaders. These 
include: their cognitive style (who and what informs their decision-making); confidence in decision-
making; and, whether they are a conflict-seeker or avoider (Roberts, 1988); page 175. 
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At the center of KJI’s personality was the need to be in control, not only to dispel 
any notions that he did not live up to his father’s persona, but also as a practical method 
of managing the state domestically and internationally. KJI was also comfortable being in 
control; external arrangements that sought to constrain him were contrary to his personal 
style. For example, KJI was willing to breach an agreement to forego developing nuclear 
weapons when he felt it was no longer in North Korea’s interests to do so. He also sought 
to circumvent sanctions on proliferation, including missile or nuclear related technologies 
that turned up later in places such as Syria. Further, he did not agree with the 
interpretation of UNSC resolutions banning North Korean ballistic missile launches, 
activities North Korea felt were space-related. It is difficult, therefore, to suggest North 
Korea to be anything but noncompliant in some key security related agreements. 
However, this should be understood to be a reflection of KJI’s personality and need to be 
in control. KJI needed control of all events and was a micromanager in his style and 
approach as leader (Schneider & Post, 2002).
363
 This suggests he was personally involved 
in all decisions and state behavior regarding interaction with, and responses to, external 
actors, including Japan and its BMD. 
 KJI’s personality was reflected in domestic affairs such as directing, or at least 
permitting, harsh treatment of North Koreans even when dire circumstances already 
existed (Martin, 2004).
364
 KJI’s personal qualities were characteristic of most dictators: 
                                                          
363
 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Page 112. He did not, however, like public appearances or giving speeches. 
364
 Page 679, including notes 62 and 63. Analytic differences exist on this point, though they appear to be 
questions of the order of magnitude of KJI’s cruelty. For example, while KJI had been identified as a 
“malignant narcissist” without any capacity to empathize with his people by Dr. Jerrold Post, one of the 
foremost political psychologists in the U.S., Martin questions this analysis as an exaggeration. Martin 
himself, however, cites as evidence of KJI’s empathy words in a 1996 speech and words he shared with 
visitors in 1998, both during horrendous domestic suffering; Martin also took issue with Post’s claim KJI 
ordered systematic infanticide in political prison camps, though he acknowledged the infanticide as 
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he dominated others principally by fear; he did not care if others cared about him; he used 
bribes and privilege on the one hand, and humiliation or threat of execution on the other; 
he viewed people, decisions, and behavior from a utilitarian view; he welcomed new 
ways of getting foreign currency; and, he lived an indulgent lifestyle (Schneider & Post, 
2002).
365
 Lynn claims KJI maintained systematic thought control over the people (Lynn, 
2007).
366
 
KJI’s control in foreign relations was complex and included both a personal 
charm and command of details when necessary. On the one hand, in seeking to control 
foreign relations, KJI resorted to the use of brinkmanship and threats as his primary tools 
when relating with foreign leaders, hoping to advance his objectives through bluster 
(Schneider & Post, 2002).
367
 Brinkmanship was also conducted with violence, allegedly 
under KJI’s direction (French, 2007).368 Hwang Jang-yop, KJI’s former advisor said Kim 
was “strong willed, short-tempered and ruthless.” To diplomats, on the other hand, he 
                                                                                                                                                                             
factual—it was merely whether KJI had personally ordered the action. It seems plausible, given KJI’s 
attention to details and desire for total control, that he had ordered the infanticide. Further, Martin 
admits KJI returned to military matters during the devastation in his country despite his public statements 
of empathy. 
365
 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Pages 113-4. 
366
 Page 95. Central control by KJI over economic affairs was a weak point in KJI’s pursuit of control. 
367
 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Page 109. According to Jerrold Post, Stephen Walker, and David Winter, KJI’s personality and 
need for control was important in North Korea’s foreign policy (Post, The Psychological Assessment of 
Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, 2003); in their chapter entitled, 
“Profiling Political Leaders: An Introduction.” Page 2. The personality of a political leader matters more 
under certain conditions and under these conditions reflect most in foreign relations with their 
opponents. Some of these conditions include: when there are no clear precedents, routines, or 
established norms of acceptable behavior; when the leader occupies a strategic position; when the leader 
is charismatic; when the external environment is unclear; or, in crisis. While not an exhaustive list of 
conditions provided by the authors, many of those cited above appear to apply to KJI, North Korea’s 
leader, implying his personality played a prominent role in North Korea’s foreign policy including relations 
with Japan and reactions to its BMD. 
368
 For example, some claim KJI ordered a bombing in 1983 in Rangoon, Burma, that killed 17 South 
Korean officials, including cabinet members, presidential advisors and an ambassador. Pages 59 and 194. 
KJI did not favor large public appearances or interaction with common people but preferred small groups 
since he was lacking in charisma. 
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was charming personally, commonsensical, and smart. On one occasion, when Madeleine 
Albright met with Kim in Pyongyang in 2000, Kim personally answered most of the 14 
missile-related technical questions the U.S. team presented, rather than delegating such 
details to others (French, 2007).
369
 This, and other events, showed KJI to be aware of the 
issues, including technical ones, pragmatic, rational, and calculating. 
 Control also led KJI to seek to manage perceptions of others, including foreign 
audiences. Some authors argue that the North Korean threats, even the very images of 
North Korea internally, are Confucian deceptive practices to merely give the illusion of a 
happy state domestically, but a dangerous one to the world. This approach built upon 
KJI’s experience in the North Korean cinema industry and was affirmed by admittedly 
weak intelligence capabilities to discern the realities of the North Korean threat (Kracht, 
Munz, & Nikol, 2007).
370
 Events, such as provocations, may also have been measured 
events used by KJI simply to “keep people off balance about his next move,” or as Kim 
supposedly described that strategy, creating an environmental “fog” to hinder his 
enemies. As such, Scobell viewed KJI as wanting to appear dangerous without actually 
possessing personality traits of self-destructiveness on the order of Hitler is his final 
throws (Scobell, 2006).
371
 
On big issues, however, it appears KJI’s personality was also very pragmatic, 
defaulting to the influence of strategic culture—namely, personal, regime, and national 
survival needs. For example, in 2002, a crisis over North Korean revelations of expansion 
                                                          
369
 Pages 62-3. As the unquestioned leader of a regional state holding a key strategic position, the foreign 
policy and behavior of the state reflected KJI’s personality. For example, Hwang Jang Yop, the highest 
ranking defector from North Korea and the intellectual architect of the juche idea, argued KJI was the only 
person in North Korea with any real power; other faces known to the outside world, such as diplomats, 
were merely his instruments of policy but had no power (Oh & Hassig, 2000); page 91. 
370
 Pages 12-5. 
371
 Pages 13-4. 
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to its nuclear program derailed rapprochement efforts with Japan (Schneider & Post, 
2002).
372
 On the other hand, Baird argued Kim Jong-Il was intrigued by change, much 
more so than his father, Kim Il-Sung (Schneider & Post, 2002).
373
 If so, then KJI may 
also have been susceptible to the changing influence of external environmental factors, 
including deterrence activities (and Japan’s BMD), and behavior patterns would be 
expected, perhaps with the change in missile flight test directions, even originating 
launch facility. 
Psychological Factors 
 In addition to KJI’s personality, key psychological factors were also present that 
appear to have affected his national security decision-making in some cases, including his 
relations with Japan and he may have interpreted Japan’s BMD in relation to the North’s 
overall strategy of coercion versus long-term political goals in the region. 
Rationality and Predictability. 
 In the post-Cold War era KJI generally showed consistent patterns of coercive 
actions, undergirded by a deterrent posture, with threats of ballistic missile use that could 
escalate as high as use of WMD. KJI was also rational and calculating in his decision-
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 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Pages 132 and 134-5. In September 2002 KJI and Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi signed an 
agreement setting the stage for establishment of diplomatic relations and political rapprochement. Japan 
was poised to send North Korea several billion dollars of aid. However, in October 2002 North Korea 
confessed it had been working on a clandestine uranium enrichment program, its second path to making 
nuclear weapons. Such a program was a breach of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Baird argued this type of 
calculating underscored the great fear North Korea maintained of outside intervention and the high value 
North Korea placed on possession and manipulation of WMD capabilities. The 2002 crisis offered KJI 
opportunities and he seemed willing to lose the political progress with Japan, and the very significant 
financial dividends flowing from it, in exchange for coercive security achieved through crisis itself and 
markers of deterrence success through his WMD. While the dissertation suggests KJI’s decision-making 
reflected North Korean strategic culture, Baird suggests that, at least from the view of the U.S., KJI’s 
decision-making reflected miscalculation.  
373
 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Page 109. 
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making, though he sought to manipulate the perceptions of foreign audiences to enhance 
his deterrent security position. For example, Rex Kiziah points to analysis by Richard 
Fisher of the Heritage Foundation that suggests the 31 August 1998 TD-1 launch was a 
coercive act to extort $500 million annually from the U.S., a request made to U.S. 
congressional staffers earlier in August (Kiziah, 2000).
374
 In addition to the predictable 
pattern of political coercion described above, some suggest North Korea sought to 
maximize the probability of coercion’s success by appearing dangerous if not 
unpredictable. For example, Derek Smith argued that North Korea manipulated U.S. and 
allied fears of North Korea’s “rogue” state irrationality and impacted U.S. behavior 
(Smith, 2006).
375
 
Motivations and Goals. 
 KJI was motivated by both external factors relating to North Korean security and 
internal factors pertaining to national pride and regarding his position as leader. 
Generally, Glenn Snyder creates a distinction in a leader’s types of motivations, useful in 
the dissertation when examining North Korea’s leadership. He describes, for example, 
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 Page 6. Kiziah described alternative perspectives concerning decisions and actions of KJI. On the one 
hand, behavior surrounding ballistic missiles and WMD were thought to reflect “irrationality” in his 
decision-making. On the other hand, Kiziah said some, such as Kim Tae-woo of the ROK Policy Research 
Office, considered KJI not only rational but in Kim’s words, “dangerously calculative,” influenced by 
regime survival and severe economic conditions. 
375
 Pages 68 and 71-4. In the late spring of 1994, North Korea used tense rhetoric against allies, creating 
an impression in the U.S. that North Korea was unpredictable. The outcome was, Smith argues, a quite 
rational outcome, from the North’s strategy perspective, whereby the U.S. was deterred by North Korea 
and U.S. credibility diminished not only with North Korea but elsewhere including disarmament policy. 
Smith blamed the outcomes on poor U.S. understanding of North Korean leadership. This example 
occurred just weeks before the death of KIS; though he was still leader of the North Korean regime, KJI 
was certainly involved in the discussions and final decision-making on the North Korean course of action 
taken in this crisis. The U.S. took North Korean statements seriously including it would turn Seoul into a 
“sea of flames.” Christoph Bluth argues KJI is not suicidal nor irrational, but suggests North Korean leaders 
want other countries to believe the North’s leaders “as being capable of anything and afraid of nothing,” a 
psychological strategy to deter foreign attack. An otherwise simple and successful strategy, Bluth cautions 
it carries risks of someone miscalculating (leading to war) or events simply spiraling out of the North’s 
control (Bluth, 2008); page 141. 
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“in-order-to” and “because-of” motives (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001).376 Perhaps a 
better way is to describe such motivations regarding North Korea’s security is 
temporally, where because-of motives relate to past experiences or event-sensitive values, 
interests, or emotions and in-order-to motives are intentions, goals, and objectives yet to 
be realized in the future. KJI, for example, behaved toward Japan in ways motivated by 
the emotive past occupation of Korea by Japan in its colonial period preceding World 
War II to punish Japan and extort from it as much political and material compensation as 
possible. He may also have behaved toward Japan in ways motivated by an intention to 
strengthen North Korea’s balance of power position and become the future, undisputed 
regional hegemonic power in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, KJI probably believed 
political normalization with Japan would have provided North Korea with leverage in 
Japanese decisions regarding U.S. forces based inside Japan as well as providing political 
and economic victories to boost KJI’s standing at home and in the region. For these 
reasons, among KJI’s priorities for preserving his regime and, therefore, national 
survival, was positive progress in relations with Japan. However, the issue of North 
Korean abductions of Japanese citizens damaged relations and stymied progress (Bechtol, 
2007).
377
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 Page 559. 
377
 Pages 139-40. Domestically, KJI also seemed genuinely motivated by his position as leader of the 
masses and not simply by the perks that position afforded, though he certainly took advantage of those 
perks. The social contract, for example, is a theme he spoke of early to which he came back to frequently 
over time. In a paper on socialism in 1991, he spoke of the uniqueness of North Korea’s course, claiming 
their socialism “derives its unconquerable might from the masses’ support for it and their confidence in 
it.” He went on to say the people “entrust their destiny” to it, the Party, and, of course, the leader—juche 
was actually the desire of the masses that (first) Kim Il-Sung captured for them and to which he, too, was 
guiding (Kim J. I., 2003); pages 1-2 and 45. This source document states it was a “talk” given by KJI, though 
it is hard to imagine he narrated the entire 46 pages of material; perhaps he presented a shorter version 
or simply made the paper available to Party members present at the 5 May 1991 meeting. 
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 While KJI was pragmatic, he was also influenced by national and personal pride. 
For example, prior to North Korean multiple missile launches in July 2006, international 
pressure against North Korea was sufficiently marshaled to appear “unanimous,” an 
otherwise positive diplomatic feat against North Korea. However, the problem was that 
this left KJI without a “face-saving way to back down” (Pritchard, 2007).378 This, then, 
became a challenge to KJI’s personal honor and to North Korean national pride: KJI 
chose to launch the missiles and incur UNSC condemnation. 
Cognitive Processes.
379
 
While KJI traveled occasionally to Russia and China, and to Eastern European 
countries in the 1950s, his cognitive processes concerning interpreting external 
environmental factors through firsthand experiences and informational exposure to the 
outside world was limited or “bounded” (Scobell, 2006).380 Further, information coming 
to KJI was designed by Kim himself reflecting a preference of official information. He 
utilized the Three Revolution Team Movement concept in which party workers at the 
lowest and most distant districts obtained information of possible use in state operations 
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 Pages 146-8. 
379
 Understanding of an adversary’s cognitive dimension is critical. In general, environmental factors exist 
that are reflected in adversary knowledge of events and changes across his state’s internal landscape as 
well as events within the region and across the globe. The cognitive factor is how that leader perceives or 
interprets those events or changes to the environment and how he includes those perceptions in his 
decision-making, including decisions one might seek to deter. For example, as a leader is considering 
taking action one would consider egregious, that leader’s cognitive mechanism might connect 
environmental factors to perceived consequences of his decision to act or, alternatively, decision to 
restrain from acting at that time. The cognitively constructed, but environmentally informed, 
consequences (i.e., perceived costs and benefits of acting, and perceived costs and benefits of restraint) 
are what others, especially in recent writings, refer to as elements of an adversary’s decision “calculus.” 
Michael Santacroce, in describing the role of the “cognitive dimension” in his guide for U.S. operational 
military planning against adversaries, suggests that in this dimension “people think, perceive, visualize, 
understand, and decide” (Santacroce, 2011); page 191. Decisions of these leaders may be influenced by 
their personal psychological characteristics, motivations, emotion, state of mind, perceptions, or rumors, 
among other factors. 
380
 Page 11. Scobell suggests his perceptions, or misperceptions, of other countries is probably limited to 
what he observes in movies, the internet, and satellite TV. 
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and passed it up through a reporting system directly to Kim’s personal office. Reports 
prepared for Kim needed to arrive within three days, regardless of the Party, 
governmental, or security service source; urgent matters were to be phoned in 
immediately (Oh & Hassig, 2000).
381
 
Opinion differs on how well KJI was informed, however. Baird, for example, 
argues that KJI was well-informed, receiving not only official government reports but 
also getting information from foreign press, television, and the internet (Schneider & 
Post, 2002).
382
 On the other hand, Oh and Hassig suggest KJI’s subordinates lied to him 
regularly at least about domestic conditions, though propaganda appeared to suggest 
awareness of economic or social problems (Oh & Hassig, 2000).
383
 In foreign affairs, 
limited information may have meant KJI was vulnerable to misinterpreting the intentions 
of his opponents (Schneider & Post, 2002).
384
 KJI’s need of being, if not appearing to be, 
in control, or in cases where information conflicted, may also have led him to shortcuts in 
his decision-making, resorting to those things with which he was comfortable and 
informed by those ideas with high and historic value. 
Risk Tolerance. 
KJI was likely willing to accept increased risk if necessary, but did not take risk 
blindly. For example, Baird stated KJI was a self-centered man who possessed a ruthless 
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 Page 98. 
382
 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Page 112. He was reportedly personally adept at monitoring all types of foreign media and using 
the Internet (French, 2007); page 62. 
383
 Pages 95-6. Individual and governmental self-interest was a particular concern in North Korea and 
something KJI spoke of in the confidence of private conversations (revealed later). However, as Oh and 
Hassig disparage, if KJI thought reform the remedy, that would have become apparent through new 
policy; to the contrary, Kim seemed to think greater and more frequent ideological indoctrination was the 
answer, apparently believing the ideology useful for the masses though he himself never lived a life of 
sacrifice. 
384
 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Page 109. 
190 
 
personality, willing to escalate in crisis or use WMD, but only if the situation warranted 
(Schneider & Post, 2002).
385
 Opinions vary on this topic. At one extreme, some, such as 
Richard Betts, saw KJI’s actions as “reckless provocations” reflecting a high risk 
tolerance that could have led him to “to do wild and crazy things” with their nuclear 
weapons. Such an assessment was common in the post-Cold War era (Cha & Kang, 
2003).
386
 Less extreme were the views of Cha and Kang who argued that, after years of 
unattained hopes, he became increasingly risk-acceptant (Cha & Kang, 2003).
387
 While 
this may explain KJI’s willingness to accept higher risk as needed (as Baird suggested), 
prospects of political normalization and stability with Japan, coupled with Japan’s 
significant strengthening of its deterrent capability through its BMD program, may have 
tempered KJI’s risk-propensity, at least with Japan. More likely, KJI used the illusion of 
unpredictability and high risk tolerance to create fear in the U.S. of extreme North 
Korean actions. This was a logical strategy for KJI to achieve his objectives given his 
values, but was generally misunderstood in the West as irrational and “crazy.”  
Most probably, KJI’s risk tolerance changed as North Korea’s general strategy 
changed. Baird and others, suggest KJI calculated carefully in cases regarding national 
security, reflecting the significant environmental changes with which North Korea 
needed to adapt. The new strategy was oriented around political coercion to achieve its 
objectives, but always with an implied threat of punishment or escalation (Schneider & 
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 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Page 109. 
386
 Page 42. 
387
 Pages 25-33. Citing prospect theory, they described KJI as in a “losses” frame of mind, where the risk-
propensity of his decision-making was organized around continued prospects of losing what his country 
had, more than trying to gain new benefits. These losses might include: the inability of juche to attract 
and change either South Korea or Japan as KIS predicted; loss of Communist aid and political 
undergirding; economic and military decline; and international isolation. 
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Post, 2002).
388
 This may actually reflect a lower risk tolerance overall since national 
survival now relied on deterrence, while coercion was used to affect North Korea’s 
relative position and well-being. Likewise, North Korean behavior regarding Japan’s 
BMD development reflected a move from more risk tolerance in the period of the North’s 
strategy of confrontation to risk aversion in the period of ballistic missile-dominated 
coercion, the latter of which paralleled the maturing of Japan’s BMD deployed in 2007 
and postured against North Korea’s missile test in 2009. Despite the challenging nature of 
Japan’s BMD program, or perhaps because of it, KJI’s risk tolerance toward Japan in his 
overall coercive strategy was lower than that toward ROK since a more violent course of 
action was taken against ROK. KJI chose less overt responses to Japan’s challenge to the 
North’s ballistic missiles with its BMD program. He did not, however, abandon his 
ballistic missile program and, in fact, expanded ballistic missile deployment. 
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 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Pages 129-30. According to Baird, dramatic changes of “strategic decline,” most evident since 
the end of the Cold War period, reflected two broad and different North Korean perspectives on security-
related risk. Regardless of period, however, Baird argued North Korean leaders always engaged in careful 
risk assessment and decision calculation (the end of the Cold War era is comparable to the beginning of 
the dissertation research period). The key factors shaping North Korea’s new calculus of its national 
security included: it was now diplomatically weak; its economy was in perpetual decline; its population 
was shrinking; its military manpower was declining; its conventional weaponry was old and inferior; and, 
it continued to lose control over the people. The earlier risk “calculus” was closely associated with a 
decision to reunify the peninsula through war as described above, even should China and the Soviet Union 
be unwilling to fight alongside North Korea. When the Cold War ended, along with substantive support 
from a broader community of like-minded Communist states, North Korea’s risk calculus changed to one 
oriented around decisions to take coercive action. Examples of North Korea’s shift to a new security 
calculus can be seen in the 1990s. In April 1993 North Korea announced its intent to withdraw from the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and deny international inspectors access to its nuclear program. North 
Korea was unsure what actions the West might take, but given its new security calculus it sought to make 
as many gains as possible without giving up much. In October 1994 North Korea signed the Agreed 
Framework regarding controls on future nuclear-related activities in exchange for light water power 
reactors and oil. Japan contributed to the financing of the reactors. North Korea maintained control of the 
plutonium it had already reprocessed, however, providing it the means of deterrence through nuclear 
weapons. Such threatening capabilities enabled North Korea to create a climate of instability in exchange 
for international aid, essentially keeping the country, and the regime and its leadership, afloat. Pages 130-
1 and 139. For example, the August 1998 missile test that overflew Japan was a “nuanced” method of 
pressure or coercion, implying the threat of worse action in the future if regional actors did not provide 
North Korea needed concessions. 
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Health. 
Health is a legitimate factor that could affect a decision-maker’s cognitive 
processes and, therefore, his perceptions and decisions (Roberts, 1988).
389
 KJI was not 
immune to health struggles. For example, despite rumors to the contrary in the 1990s, KJI 
appeared healthy to those foreigners who actually engaged with him (Oh & Hassig, 
2000).
390
 However, he suffered a stroke in August 2008, appearing later as frail and 
raising questions of leadership succession. But the effects the stroke had on KJI’s 
decision-making capacities was not known for certain (Seth, 2010).
391
 The patterns of 
North Korean decisions and behavior, however, did not seem to change in any substantial 
way owing to KJI’s health struggles near the end of his life.  
Emotive Factors. 
Though a careful decision-maker, KJI may have also been influenced by 
emotional stimuli affecting his decisions, though none of these appear to be extreme or 
without any consideration of consequence. For example, KJI allegedly ordered the 
bombing of a ROK airliner in 1987 out of “frustration” that North Korea had been unable 
to stop the Olympics from occurring in Seoul the following year (Eberstadt & Ellings, 
2001).
392
 
KJI was also influenced by respect toward him, or lack of it, coming from foreign 
leaders. For example, in the Bush administration, U.S. leaders used disparaging terms for 
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 Pages 181-3. Roberts suggested physical and mental health can also be significant factors in the 
decision-making of leaders in crisis. 
390
 Pages 91-5, including note 25. 
391
 Page 218. 
392
 In Chuck Downs chapter, “Discerning North Korea’s Intentions.” Pages 99-100. According to the one 
surviving perpetrator (the other committed suicide in custody), it was KJI who ordered and directed the 
placement of a bomb onto Korean Airlines flight 858 on November 29 1987, killing all 115 onboard when 
the bomb detonated inflight en route to Seoul. 
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KJI, leading to North Korean anger and difficulties in diplomacy. The North told South 
Korean diplomats in 2005 that arms control discussions might move forward if the North 
“gets appropriate respect from the United States” (Herman, 2005).393 That same year, 
North Korean media praised President Bush when he called KJI “Mister” in a news 
conference (Kelley, 2005).
394
 Another KJI favorable response to Bush came in 2007 after 
Bush sent a private letter to KJI regarding the North’s nuclear program and addressed the 
letter “Dear Chairman” (N. Korea's Kim Responds Favorably to Bush Overture, 2007).395 
  KJI possessed a high confidence as leader and was greatly influenced by personal 
and national honor and pride. However, such confidence in extremis can skew rationality 
and discount caution with respect to risk. For example, Keith Payne provided three 
historical cases in which otherwise sane and rational adversary leaders demonstrated 
“blinding chutzpah,” or supreme self-confidence if not gall, in the name of honor or 
mission resulting in deterrence failure. Payne argues from these cases that deterrence can 
and will fail with regional actors like North Korea, not because a leader is “irrational” – 
in fact, he argues “rogue leaders may well be fully rational.” Rather, deterrence can fail 
because those seeking to deter them may not understand how they calculated, including 
their emotive and other factors (Payne, The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record 
Straight, 2005).
396
 Chutzpah may have been part of the psychological makeup in KJI’s 
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 Original source is the Associated Press. 
394
 Vice President Cheney, for example, referred to KJI as “irresponsible” and “oppressive.” Original source 
is the Associated Press. 
395
 The Bush letter was dated 1 December 2007. 
396
 Pages 139-40. These cases included Japan’s war minister in 1945 arguing in the name of honor to 
continue fighting after the U.S. dropped the first atomic weapon; Cuban leaders in 1962 advocating 
nuclear war to aid socialism’s triumph; and, Argentine’s military leader in 1982 choosing to occupy the 
Falkland Islands under the presumption the geographically distant United Kingdom would not respond 
militarily. 
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decision-making and behavior—an assessment comparable to others provided above in 
terms of his confidence and sense of honor as North Korea’s leader. 
Given North Korea’s history of invasion, intervention, or occupation, KJI was 
sensitive to perceptions of foreign encroachment. In a study done for the DoD, it was 
argued the psychological effects of military maneuver, including encirclement or 
equipment loss, were significant, accounting for 60 percent of the reason the opponent 
altered course (Hasslinger, et al., 2002).
397
 This process of influence is the deterrence 
process of how Japan’s BMD could affect North Korean leaders psychologically. In this 
case, Japan’s BMD would not “encircle” North Korea but would shape KJI’s views of 
losses he’d incur with his ballistic missile force if he tried to attack Japan with a ballistic 
missile raid—a higher number owing to Japan’s BMD. 
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 Pages 21-2. The study argued the way to alter an opponent’s will to act or behave in a certain way is to 
affect his underlying beliefs that inform his decision-making. The goal is to play upon his reason and 
cognitive processes to alter his perceptions of various consequences of his decisions, such as losses and 
hopelessness.  
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CHAPTER SIX: STRATEGIC PROFILE  
PART II—ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
General 
 As leader of North Korea, KJI’s national security strategic culture reflected the 
nation’s identity and culture described in the Profile’s Part I, and emphasized 
independence, sovereignty, and survival. Shaped by this identity, he was also informed in 
his national-security related strategy and decision-making by important internal and 
external environmental factors in existence during his reign as leader. Internal factors 
included: formal and informal political organizations and processes, reflecting KJI’s 
position, power, and control over affairs; North Korea’s military power, a relatively vast 
set of capabilities considering North Korea’s size, population, and GDP; the nation’s 
economy as an instrument of supporting military needs; and, issues of internal social 
well-being and unrest that may inform, or detract from, KJI’s national security strategy. 
Such internal factors not only informed KJI’s decision-making but were also included 
among his tools of policy as he acted, behaved, and related with other actors in the region 
and international system. External environmental factors include: diplomacy and 
communication, consistent with North Korea’s state-level strategy of coercion, if not 
extortion; and North Korea’s relations and interactions with others, including the U.S., 
ROK, Russia, China, and Japan. The North’s relations with Japan are revisited to address 
the historical context and strategy of North Korea toward Japan and political 
rapprochement and related issues. KJI’s interface with internal and external 
environmental factors was consistent with his personal and national identity and cultural 
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factors. Part II of the Profile begins with a description of the internal environmental 
factors. 
Internal Environmental Factors 
Political 
The political processes and organizations through which KJI led were significant 
factors in his national-security related decision-making. These political features also 
demonstrate his sole position as leader of the state and executive of its security and 
foreign policies, including the North’s conflictual and cooperative interaction with 
regional actors such as Japan. KJI organized the political processes and advisors to suit 
his personal style and notion of effectiveness. These included military and party channels 
and a limited number of trusted interlocutors to ensure control of strategy and message. 
Choy and Kim argued KJI used a conflict-oriented decision-making process that can have 
its political arm dealing cooperatively while its military arm can be engaged in 
conflictual activities, as was the case in 1999 when KJI and the Korean Workers Party 
(KWP) engaged in reconciliation with South Korea while North Korean military attacked 
ROK naval assets (Choy & Kim, 2011).
398
 While he was not informed of every analytic 
detail of policy issues, KJI’s decision-making was characterized by close control of the 
people who interacted with him personally and those who carried out his decisions. He 
orchestrated all promotions to power and individuals or organizations permitted open 
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 Pages 12-4. They describe alternative decision-making styles that could exist in North Korea, such as 
the monolithic system whereby KJI was in total control of every detail of policy, from analysis to decision, 
execution and monitoring, for example. They also considered a highly competitive style in which more 
lively debate and discussion occurred at multiple levels. They set aside both of these as too extreme and 
unlikely. This type of decision-making process is also more closely related to KJI’s brinkmanship style and 
use of provocations. Lastly, they argued KJI was in fact sensitive to the condition of the people, perhaps 
less so from an emotive response, but at least from the view that it could endanger his regime’s survival if 
he did not pay attention. 
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opinion. KJI’s decision-making was facilitated by two groups of advisors. The first 
group, a smaller inner circle, was comprised of close relatives, such as his sister and 
brother-in-law, and long-time family allies. These individuals held senior posts in key 
institutions of power and formed a kleptocracy to acquire and manage large amounts of 
foreign currency for KJI and his interactions with others. A second group, or outer circle, 
furthered KJI’s control of power and was dominated by KPA officials (Schneider & Post, 
2002).
399
 
Military-related decisions flowed from KJI through two chains of command, both 
of which were directly under his personal control. The first was a combination of Korean 
Worker’s Party (KWP) and Korean People’s Army (KPA), where the KWP’s Central 
Military Committee provided party leadership over the military and the KPA’s General 
Political Bureau. The second chain was the National Defense Commission (NDC), 
comprised of senior military, security, and military industry leaders. Unlike the U.S. 
National Security Council, the NDC did not have representatives from the economy nor 
foreign affairs (Schneider & Post, 2002).
400
 North Korea boasts of its military 
capabilities, including its ballistic missile program, to all domestic groups. For example, 
in 1998 it tested its Taepodong missile just days prior to a key legislative session, 
presumably to satisfy domestic needs for protection and, more practically, continued 
governmental support and funding for North Korea’s military first policy and missile 
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 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Pages 114-5. 
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 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Pages 115-6. Such was the control of KJI that in 2000 he reportedly engaged U.S. Secretary of 
State Albright with technical details regarding ballistic missiles without the aid of any advisors or time to 
study the matter. 
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forces (Pollack, 2004).
401
 Domestic support notwithstanding, changes to North Korea’s 
ballistic missile testing program include flying test missile profiles in new, more 
compliant ways and flight testing from a new facility further away from Japan. Such 
changes may be sufficient to placate domestic audiences while responding to deterrent 
pressures from Japan. 
Military Power 
 One of the core instruments of power and source of KJI decision-making 
regarding national security, including his ballistic missile-backed coercive strategy with 
regional actors like Japan, was his access to the nation’s military capabilities. Though a 
small nation in terms of population and economic strength, North Korea’s military has for 
decades earned respect as a potent force among domestic and foreign audiences. KJI 
oversaw the decline in combat effectiveness since the end of the Cold War and, at the 
same time, emergence of a nuclear weapons program and increasingly capable ballistic 
missile force. These capabilities were sources of domestic pride but instrumental in North 
Korea’s strategy of confrontation and, in a shift during the past two decades, one of 
coercion. North Korea’s military power is discussed below beginning with KJI’s 
oversight and a summary of the policy, doctrine, and strategy. 
Political Oversight. 
 Organization and Spending 
The entirety of North Korea’s armed forces was directed by KJI as North Korea’s 
Supreme Commander of the Army and in his capacity as Chairman of the National 
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 One month prior to the August 1998 Taepo Dong missile test, North Korea elected its new parliament. 
Its first parliamentary meeting was held just five days after the TD-1 launch. Such activities are used to 
solicit calls for support for its “military first” policy. In Narushige Michishita’s chapter, “North Korea’s 
Military-Diplomatic Campaign Strategies: Continuity versus Change.” Page 70.  
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Defense Commission (French, 2007).
402
 As North Korea’s missile forces grew in 
numbers and range, KJI reorganized them more along the lines of those found in Russia 
and China. According to official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and South 
Korean media sources, North Korea renamed its missile forces the “Strategic Rocket 
Force Command” (Pollack J. , 2012).403 Doing so not only provided KJI perhaps an 
improved organizational and command structure, but may have been intended to portray 
a more formidable coercive and strike capacity on par with larger states like Russia, 
China, or the United States, adding to the strategy of fear and intimidation of others while 
strengthening personal and national pride. North Korea’s nuclear program is operated by 
its Atomic Energy Industry, though all policy decisions originated from KJI through his 
leadership in the NDC (Medalia, 2009).
404
 North Korea invests a considerable amount of 
its total energy and budget upon military power. Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
cites North Korean government sources officially stating its defense spending was 15.8% 
of GDP, though the Japanese MOD believes it to be higher (Defense of Japan 2012, 
2012).
405
 According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, it spends upwards of 
40% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on its military, with most funding devoted to 
strategic systems including WMD and ballistic missile capabilities (Hildreth, 2009).
406
  
 Policy, Doctrine, & Strategy 
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 Page 222. Upon KJI’s death in December 2011, his son, Kim Jong-Un, took over leadership of North 
Korea, including title of Supreme Commander, presumably giving him command and control of North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons (Gopalakrishnan, 2011); citing Daniel Pinkston. 
403
 See also TheJournal.ie report (North Korea says its rockets can hit the US, analysts say it’s bluster, 
2012). 
404
 See the Summary page (unnumbered) and page 6. However, upon KJI’s stroke in August 2008, nuclear-
related policy decisions were made in the NDC through a more collective group under the leadership of 
KJI’s brother-in-law, Chang song-taek. 
405
 Page 15. 
406
 Page 3. 
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North Korean military doctrine and strategy reflects a blend of Chinese, Soviet, 
and North Korean thought and experiences that morphed into the North’s strategy to face 
its unique position in the modern era. Early on, KIS was heavily influenced by 
experiences fighting the Japanese and close interaction with Chinese and Soviet 
Communist leaders; early North Korea strategy was largely a reflection of Soviet 
thinking with large armies in conventional warfare postures. However, the Korean War 
provided North Korea with other experiences that, combined with the decision by KIS to 
secure North Korea in a more politically independent position from the Soviet Union, led 
to significant shifts doctrinally. Operationally, the North adopted mobility of its forces 
including “lightning” strikes, the ability to provide firepower at all ranges and levels of 
conflict to include “deep strikes,” and strong command and control from the top (Savada, 
1994).
407
 Until the late 1980s much of the North Korean planning for war centered on 
conditions suitable for violent reunification, taking advantage of ROK political and 
military vulnerabilities and devastating attacks on Seoul, just across the DMZ (Schneider 
& Post, 2002).
408
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 Pages 246-9. One shift was in 1962 when KIS sought to “fortify the entire country.” In practice, this 
embraced more of a Maoist strategy of being prepared for protracted war, and greater encroachment of 
military and technological needs upon the nation’s economic capacity. These ideas were also adopted into 
the constitution in 1992. The warrior attitude in Korea’s northern kingdom notwithstanding, Hwang 
argued the military in Korean history was consistently subordinate to civil elites, both to organize and to 
rule (Hwang, 2004); pages 323-8. The modern prominence of military elites, then, is likely more a function 
of ancient Korean history, Japanese imperialism and the exigencies of the Korean and Cold Wars. 
According to Pinkston, North Korea’s leaders, starting with KIS, were very sensitive to the vulnerabilities 
of Korea in the past—a position that could have prevented foreign attacks and imperial conquests 
through a strong military (Pinkston, 2008); page 3. KIS also developed four primary guidelines regarding 
the military, effectively militarizing the country even before KJI took power: equipping all the people with 
arms; transforming the whole country into an impregnable fortress; converting the whole army into an 
army of cadres; and, modernizing the military establishment (Pollack J. D., Korea: The East Asian Pivot, 
2004); in Seung Joo Baek’s chapter, “North Korea’s Military Buildup and Strategic Outlook,” page 201. 
408
 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Pages 125-8 and 130. North Korea also required an assessment the U.S. military would not likely 
wage war on behalf of ROK, a condition also dependent upon U.S. basing access of its forces in Japan. 
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KJI transformed the center of ruling power in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
around his “military first” policy (“songun chongchi”), formalized as policy in 1998. A 
military related policy, Kim placed its centrality, along with economic and other key 
responsibilities, within the NDC and relegated ideology to the now weaker Party. In 
2003, the policy and all essential power brokers, including younger confidants of KJI, 
were appointed to the NDC by the Eleventh Supreme People’s Assembly (Kihl & Kim, 
2006).
409
 The military first policy was also promoted with the reminder to people that 
even KIS created the army before the party. 
North Korea also embraces deception, “cunning,” surprise, and provocation and 
deterrence in the use of its military capabilities.
410
 It used surprise frequently including 
the 1998 Taepo Dong missile test. North Korean leaders calculate surprise into their 
decision-making, seeking to catch their opponents off balance and perhaps more willing 
to cede to North Korean political goals (Pollack, 2004).
411
 More generally, given the 
changes in regional military and economic balance of power over the past 25 years, North 
Korea chose to press provocative behavior to get what it needs to stop the bleeding in the 
imbalance, and chose to do so through a deterrent foundation. According to Taik-young 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Quick victory would yield substantial material gains from the South, offsetting potentially high losses in 
the North. 
409
 Pages 64-5. This move helped consolidate KJI’s power by effectively sidelining some of the older 
leaders of his father’s generation, people who may not have been as loyal to KJI. The intention was to 
protect the nation from yet another invasion, since without such a policy North Korea would be 
“swallowed by outside forces” (French, 2007); pages 218-9. North Korea’s military has remained 
conservative as a community. For example, its elite have maintained a traditional, hardline stance in its 
opposition to external threats (Jung, 1998); page 343. 
410
 Minnich suggests North Korean ideas of warfare center on deception, a Sun Tzu idea, and involve 
various types of military action reflecting an overall “cunning” principle of war, including: demonstrations; 
feints; raids; and inciting fratricide or attrition (Minnich, 2005); page 76. 
411
 In Narushige Michishita’s chapter, “North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaign Strategies: Continuity 
versus Change.” Page 64. 
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Hamm, the primary means of this psychological strategy were its asymmetric WMD 
capabilities (Yun & Shin, 2006).
412
 
Capabilities. 
 North Korea possesses a wide variety of military capabilities that undergirded 
KJI’s political strategy and informed his decision-making. The section below addresses 
the overall posture and readiness of these forces and then specifics of the capabilities 
emphasizing those most threatening to Japan.  
 Posture/Readiness 
 For years a regional conventional military power, since the end of the Cold War 
(and on KJI’s watch) North Korean conventional forces have trended downward while its 
nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities have trended upwards in numbers and, in some 
ways, technology such as increasingly longer-range missiles. Cucullu suggests most 
functional areas now lag sufficiently behind that North Korea could not prevail against 
South Korea, even if the U.S. provided no conventional military support. Lagging areas 
include: artillery, armor, air, infantry weapons, communications, logistical, 
transportation, and support capabilities (Cucullu, 2004).
413
 Military exercises are down 
50% due to costs and availability of fuel (French, 2007).
414
 Decline in military readiness 
can be seen in reductions in training, maintenance, and fuel availability—all essential 
warfighting capabilities (Bluth, 2008).
415
 In terms of personnel, while maintaining an 
army of one million soldiers, successive reports since the mid-1990s reflect 
malnourishment, disaffection among troops, stunted growth, hunger, and changes to 
                                                          
412
 In his chapter, “North Korea: Economic Foundations of Military Capability and the Inter-Korean 
Balance.” Page 184. 
413
 Page 268. 
414
 Pages 221-2. 
415
 Page 145. 
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minimum height requirements for Korean People’s Army (KPA) recruits down to 4 feet, 
11 inches (the lowest in the world) (French, 2007).
416
 
An overall defensive posture now exists and likely reflects realities in balance of 
power estimates as North Korean leaders survey the military landscape in the region, 
though this posture pertains principally to notions of military conquest of the Korean 
Peninsula. No longer the strongest conventional power on the peninsula, North Korea 
emphasizes deterring external attack principally through its nuclear weapons. Reliance on 
nuclear weapons has permitted North Korea to displace its reliance on its aging 
conventional armies and compensate for its inability to compete technologically on a 
modern battlefield (though it has increased its technological endeavors in nuclear and 
ballistic missile technology). Further, the North uses its nuclear weapons program and 
ballistic missile capabilities to extort foreign aid, gain recognition, and strengthen its 
diplomatic position (French, 2007).
417
 The North’s strategy of political coercion of its 
neighbors stems, therefore, from a stronger, not weaker, position as it senses less 
likelihood of external attack to topple its regime and greater freedom of action, such as 
provocations and missile launches, in conditions short of war. 
 Conventional 
Militarily, North Korea is the world’s most militarized state, with the highest 
proportion of population either on active duty or in reserve status. Most of its formidable 
ground forces were located in proximity of the ROK border, close to the Demilitarized 
Zone (DMZ), and deployed for peninsular combat if needed. North Korea also possessed 
substantial naval and air assets, though most of these general purpose forces are of older 
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 Pages 221-2. 
417
 Pages 223-4 and 228. 
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Soviet design (Schneider & Post, 2002).
418
 As mentioned above, the conventional forces 
of the North have experienced a considerable qualitative decline, though some suggest 
this in part reflects leadership choices to rely increasingly upon ballistic missiles and 
WMD and a strategy more of political coercion over confrontation between large 
standing armies across the divide. 
 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
The North Korean WMD threat is of significant concern to Japan, ROK, the U.S., 
and others. North Korea had an infrastructure since the 1960s to produce biological 
weapons and maintained large stockpiles of chemical warfare agents. Despite internal 
hardships, according to both Japanese and U.S. officials, North Korea presented a 
significant threat: ballistic missiles armed with conventional high-explosive, biological, 
or chemical warheads. Several factories in North Korea were reportedly producing “toxic 
gas and germs,” according to the Japanese Defense Agency (Kiziah, 2000).419 Biological 
agents, including anthrax, smallpox, and cholera, could be used to disrupt U.S. forces in 
conflict on the peninsula or as strategic terror weapons via missile against Japan (Scobell 
& Sanford, North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, 2007).
420
  
North Korea possesses a variety of WMD means of delivery, including special 
operations military forces, aircraft, artillery and rockets, and anti-ship cruise missiles. 
However, the most dangerous means of delivery is North Korea’s large stockpile of 
ballistic missiles (discussed in more detail below). While it has had technical assistance 
                                                          
418
 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Pages 122-3. 
419
 Pages 4-5. 
420
 Pages 107-10. 
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for years from Russia, for example, North Korea is self-sufficient in ballistic missile 
development and production and, as the world’s greatest ballistic missile proliferator, 
used ballistic missile sales to finance its missile program (Schneider & Post, 2002).
421
 
Nuclear Weapons 
The North Korean nuclear weapons program reportedly began in the mid-1960s. 
North Korean motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons are debated among analysts and 
scholars. Generally, Scott Sagan suggests modern nuclear proliferant states are motivated 
by three basic patterns: basic national security (or, self-help); to please domestic 
audiences; or for changing their national identities before the international community. 
North Korea, he argued, likely fit into the basic security model (Sagan, 1996-1997).
422
 
All three elements probably resonated as motivations for North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons, though self-help was likely the most significant factor. More specifically, Bruce 
Cumings points to U.S. decisions regarding threatening regime change of regional actors 
following the 1991 Gulf War as instilling deep North Korean fears and contributing to 
their decision to acquire nuclear weapons (Cumings, North Korea: Another Country, 
2004).
423
 This also explains the highly survivable manner in which they have built their 
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 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Pages 123-4. 
422
 Page 85. 
423
 Pages 53-8. Cumings refers to the U.S. stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, from the 
late 1950s through early 1990s, designed to be used within an hour of North Korean attacks southward to 
contaminate the battlefield and halt their movements. To North Korea, this amounted to nuclear 
blackmail. The effectiveness of Gulf War conventional combat technologies changed U.S. perspectives 
and, on 27 September 1991, President Bush directed the withdrawal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, 
including about 60 still at Kunsan airbase in South Korea to be used by F-16 aircraft in wartime. The U.S. 
“Operational Plan 5027” was then revised so that the wartime effort would rely on ground forces pushing 
all the way to Pyongyang and conducting regime change without resort to use of nuclear weapons. These 
raised great fears in North Korea and the primary responses from North Korean leadership, especially 
when their economy and energy sources also began to dwindle in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was to 
pursue nuclear energy that would provide both electricity and a nuclear weapons capability of its own. 
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, beginning in January 1958, were deliverable in a variety of 
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overall program with sites being widely dispersed and hidden among a complex web of 
locations making its destruction from aerial bombardment all but impossible (French, 
2007).
424
 The security motivation, coupled with its ballistic missile force, could also be 
divided further into deterring and coercing others, and guaranteeing one’s survival 
(Wilkening & Watman, 1995).
425
 
North Korea possesses two paths for acquisition of fissile material for nuclear 
weapons: a plutonium path, recovered from spent fuel rods at the Yongbyon reactor 
facility in the capital of Pyongyang; and a uranium enrichment program started later. The 
plutonium route produced a small number of nuclear weapons; however, it is not known 
if uranium enrichment has produced enough material to produce any nuclear weapons 
(Schneider & Post, 2002).
426
 North Korea’s nuclear weapons inventory is difficult to 
assess, though analysts currently judge it to possess perhaps six plutonium-based 
                                                                                                                                                                             
means, including at least the following: 280 mm cannons; Honest John missiles; Matador cruise missiles; 
F-4 fighter aircraft; atomic demolition mines (ADMs) carried in Jeeps, man-portable backpacks, and 
helicopters; and F-16s. Most were deployed very close to the DMZ with the concept of routine use in the 
event of war, especially under fear that if they did not use them early they could fall into North Korean 
military hands. While emphasis is placed on the North’s development of nuclear weapons, it cannot be 
forgotten that ROK also began a secret nuclear weapons development program in the 1970s with the aid 
of France. The goal was to create a capable nuclear weapons and missile program to demonstrate self-
sufficiency for its security, lacking confidence in the U.S. commitment to its defense. The U.S. opposition 
eventually swayed ROK to abandon the effort (Oberdorfer, 2001); pages 68-73. 
424
 Pages 278-9. The program is comprised of various parts including research and development, fuel and 
its processing and storage, weapons technology, production, means of delivery, and command and 
control. One estimate from a senior U.S. intelligence official put the aerial sortie total as high as 240,000 
strikes over 60 days. 
425
 Page 32. According to Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman, regional adversaries including North 
Korea acquire nuclear weapons for three primary purposes: to deter the U.S. from intervening in conflict 
in their region; to intimidate or coerce U.S. allies in that region; and, to provide a guarantee of the 
adversary’s survival. 
426
 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Pages 123-4. According to Jonathan Pollack, just as North Korea’s link between the Yongbyon 
nuclear reactor and a stated goal of producing electricity rather than nuclear weapons is suspect (its 25-
year output yielded the equivalent of only 23 days’ worth of electricity from a modern light water 
reactor), so, too, is North Korea’s claim that a newer uranium enrichment capability will feed a light water 
reactor now under construction suspect. Both are likely for nuclear weapons production and North Korea 
will not likely walk away from its nuclear weapons capability (Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear 
Weapons and International Security, 2011); pages 184-6. 
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weapons (Gopalakrishnan, 2011).
427
 Others put the number between 6-12 weapons 
(Samore, 2004).
428
 Analysts at the Arms Control Association think the number is closer 
to 10 weapons (Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance, 2012).
429
  
Today, with a limited number of weapons, North Korea’s goals are thought to be 
intrinsically political through possession of these weapons: (1) obtain guarantees of North 
Korean state survival (i.e., promises particularly from the U.S. to never attack); (2) 
normalization of relations; and, (3) aid in economic stability (Bluth, 2008).
430
 More 
specific nuclear employment or targeting doctrine is not known. As a result, some 
suggest North Korea simply maintains a policy of nuclear “ambiguity,” similar to that 
found in the early years of Chinese nuclear deployment, or that of Israel. As to targeting, 
in part due to limited accuracy of the missile delivery systems, North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons may only be more “terror” weapons used against cities. Another possibility was 
that KJI guarded the secret, perhaps leaving it unwritten or unspoken at all (Scobell & 
Sanford, North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, 2007).
431
 North Korean nuclear and ballistic 
missile capabilities also combine to potentially give it the capability to produce 
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects by launching a missile high into the atmosphere and 
exploding the weapon (National Security and Electromagnetic Pulse, 2006).
432
 This could 
be employed in an effort to disrupt Japan’s BMD capabilities. 
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 The article does not specify a source for the number of weapons. 
428
 Page 48. 
429
 See “States of Immediate Proliferation Concern.” 
430
 Pages 148 and 155. 
431
 Pages 87-93. 
432
 Pages H6352-H6354. Not only has the North restrained from discussing this, making such an 
assessment is complicated by the fact that the exact nature of its ability to deliver nuclear weapons and 
how many weapons it may have are also not known with certainty. The effects could be widespread 
disruption of communications and electrical circuits and infrastructure. Militarily, this could aid the North 
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 Ballistic Missiles 
 North Korea’s current and emerging ballistic missile programs started with joint 
projects with China in the mid-1970s that included delivery of a Scud B for “reverse 
engineering” purposes in 1981. This led to North Korean development of its own missile 
(tested in 1984), the Scud C version (tested in 1990), development of the Nodong missile 
in 1989 (tested in 1991 and 1993), and the Taepodong missile family (first observed in 
1994 and tested in 1998) (Ranger, 1998).
433
 North Korea has also conducted preliminary 
research of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Of the various North Korean 
ballistic missiles, those that can potentially range Japan are of the most interest here and 
include: the Nodong MRBM; Musudan IRBM; Taepodong IRBM; and the SLBM. Both 
the Nodong and Musudan are operationally deployed and direct threats to all of Japan 
proper. Each of these is addressed below, followed by North Korea’s ballistic missile 
targeting and missile production factors. 
A newer North Korean missile of interest to Japan is the Nodong (also called 
Rodong) missile, tested in May 1993 from the Musudan-ri test site and landing to the east 
into the Sea of Japan. With a range of 1300 kilometers and an accuracy of perhaps 2 
kilometers, the Nodong can reach all of Japan’s territory and strike soft military targets 
(such as airfields) or be used as a political weapon against cities such as Tokyo. Bluth 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in battle on the peninsula. Reportedly, North Korea has received scientific assistance from Russia, China, 
and Pakistan possibly to include help in developing an EMP weapon for North Korea. 
433
 Pages 37-42. Lennox described the threat perceptions of North Korea as political perceptions, believing 
North Korea’s pursuit of asymmetric capabilities (ballistic missiles and WMD) would dissuade Western 
powers from intervening so easily in the region. This logic placed considerable pressure upon Japan to act, 
which is precisely what it chose to do with joint missile defense development with the United States and 
deployment of its own BMD system. In this same volume, Dr. William Schneider claimed the Nodong 
began series production in 1993, following only one test (not two), and subsequently underwent 
operational deployment. See page 110. 
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argues the Nodong’s strategic purpose is just that: Japan (Bluth, 2008).434 Nodong 
deployment began in 1995 and by 1997 at least 10 Nodong missiles were operationally 
deployed (Pinkston, 2008).
435
 The number of deployed Nodong varies, perhaps reflecting 
increased production and deployment over time. According to Japan’s Ministry of 
Defense, North Korea had about 200 Nodong missiles deployed (Hildreth, 2009).
436
 
Others suggest 240 (Samore, 2004),
437
 still others argue North Korea could have as many 
as 320 Nodongs deployed (Samson, 2010).
438
 The Nodong missiles are road-mobile 
systems, making them very difficult if not impossible to find and destroy before they 
were launched. This provides Nodong a high level of survivability and could allow North 
Korea to use them in surprise attacks on Japan (Pinkston, 2008).
439
 
 Another missile, the Musudan (also called Nodong B), is an entirely new road-
mobile IRBM under development, though it has not been flight tested and possibly not 
deployed (Pinkston, 2008).
440
 However, others believe Musudan missiles have been 
deployed in limited numbers—perhaps fewer than 50 (North Korea: Missile, 2012).441 
According to Joseph Bermudez, however, the number of deployed Musudan is higher, 
between 75 and 150 missiles (Bermudez, 2011). The Musudan has longer range than 
Nodong, extending it a capability as far as perhaps Guam (Ballistic Missile Defense 
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 Pages 161-2. Three more Nodongs were tested in July 2006 (Scobell & Sanford, North Korea's Military 
Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, 2007); 
page 116. 
435
 Page 20. 
436
 Page 4. Bluth also suggests 200 Nodong are operationally deployed (Bluth, 2008); pages 161-2. 
437
 Pages 67, 71-4, and 105. 
438
 Page 11. Larry Niksch of the Congressional Research Service and other analysts also suggest 320 
Nodong (Gopalakrishnan, 2011); they also suggest North Korea could, within two years, have the 
capability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead on the Nodong. 
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 Page 47. 
440
 Pages vii and 23. 
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 Introductory paragraph. 
210 
 
Review Report, 2010).
442
 The Musudan and Nodong missiles could, therefore, combine 
to threaten Japan with nearly as many as 470 offensive ballistic missiles. The size of the 
North Korean ballistic missile threat capable of striking, even aimed at, Japan has 
continued to increase, possibly as a response to Japan’s BMD.443 
Deployment levels of Nodong are somewhat difficult to assess since Nodong is 
also used as the first stage of the larger Taepodong-1 IRBM missile (which overflew 
Japan in a 1998 flight test). It is unknown if, or how many, Taepodong may actually be 
operationally deployed since some assess TD-1 may only be for technological 
development (Pinkston, 2008).
444
 Bermudez, however, does not assess Taepodong to be 
deployed at all (Bermudez, 2011). The ICBM-class Taepodong-2/3 are also not assessed 
to be deployed as a weapon; however, if or when they deploy, their range inherently 
makes them more of a threat to the U.S. not Japan. 
North Korea is also developing a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM). 
The SLBM, though an unlikely technological accomplishment anytime soon, is based on 
Russian technology and North Korea continues to receive Russian technical assistance on 
its development. Should North Korea be able to deploy an SLBM it would potentially be 
able to threaten the U.S. and regional actors in new ways, also complicating the BMD 
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 Page 5 including the map of North Korea. 
443
 Increasing the size of potential missile “raids” is one of three broad types of responses a regional 
adversary could employ to friendly BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 2010); see page 8. The 
other two responses include use of solid fuels and deploying technical countermeasures on the ballistic 
missiles. According to Martin Sieff, solid fuel technology allows the missile to be set up and launched 
much more quickly and reliably than liquid fuel missiles, possibly denying warning time to those with 
BMD. North Korea has developed a solid-fuel short-range ballistic missile that demonstrates the North has 
the technological expertise to develop responses to BMD including use of solid-fuel missiles (Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review Report, 2010); page 5. As mentioned in chapter two of this dissertation, Japan 
could potentially defend against 165 (of North Korea’s 470 that can range Japan) incoming ballistic 
missiles, leaving North Korea with potentially over 300 missiles with which to strike an undefended Japan. 
444
 Page 23 and Table 2 on pages 50-1. 
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postures of Japan and the U.S. (Hildreth, 2009).
445
 But the claim alone of working on an 
SLBM is clearly a source of North Korean pride regardless of the missile’s status. 
 Depth of potential North Korean targeting capacity with its ballistic missiles 
includes those that can strike targets in four rings: in South Korea (including the Scud-
based Hwasong-5 and -6 and Scud-D); in Japan (Nodong and Musudan); U.S. targets 
throughout the Pacific, such as Hawaii and Alaska (Taepodong 1); and, targets in the 
continental U.S. (Taepodong 2) (Scobell & Sanford, North Korea's Military Threat: 
Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, 
2007).
446
 North Korean targeting is also affected by the potential employment tactic used 
and countermeasures to BMD. One such tactic is a “raid” using multiple ballistic 
missiles, a threat demonstrated by North Korea with multiple ballistic missile launches in 
several tests (The Threat, 2012).
447
 Another way North Korea could enhance the targeting 
capability of its offensive ballistic missile force is through development and deployment 
of various countermeasures on the missile to defeat an opponent’s BMD system. While 
doing so involves costs, such countermeasures may pale in cost to deploying a much 
larger number of BMD interceptors, new or enhanced radar systems, or developing new 
interceptors altogether. Some analysts, including senior U.S. intelligence officials, 
suggest North Korea has in fact developed some countermeasures (Ghoshroy & Neuneck, 
2010).
448
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 Pages 115 and 124, including Figure 9. 
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 See paragraphs five and six. 
448
 In Philip E. Coyle’s chapter, “Challenges toward Building an Effective Operational BMD System,” pages 
47-8. The authors cite, for example, a 1999 report for congressional testimony by Robert Walpole, U.S. 
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, who stated North Korea, by the time it 
flight-tested its ballistic missiles, could already have developed various countermeasures, “including 
separating RVs, spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar absorbing material (RAM), booster 
212 
 
While North Korea possesses hundreds of ballistic missiles, only a portion of 
them (perhaps as many as 470) can reach Japan. It is not known how many of these 
would be used against Japan in wartime scenarios. Pinkston, for example, provides a list 
of 24 total potential missile deployment sites in North Korea, 15 of which have the 
capability to deliver munitions onto “probable targets” inside Japan proper but also 
including its distant island of Okinawa to the south (Pinkston, 2008).
449
 The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies assessed the Nodong was intended to be a military and 
political strategic weapon able to reach Japan, but also to do so with chemical, biological, 
and nuclear weapons, in addition to a conventional blast munition. Operational 
deployment occurred in North Korea at two locations in the north and east, ideally suited 
for striking targets in Japan. Deployment is on mobile launchers that use underground 
tunnel networks to aid in surviving preemptive attack. Of note, the Nodong’s lack of 
precision makes it ill-suited for attacking U.S. military forces in Japan with any degree of 
confidence, effectiveness, or credibility; therefore, assessment is that Nodong is intended 
as a political weapon against Japan, not as a military instrument against the U.S. or its 
forces in Japan (Samore, 2004).
450
 Others assess North Korea uses Nodong against Japan 
simply as a “terror” weapon threatening an indiscriminate pattern of destruction and 
death against Japan’s major cities (Samore, 2004).451 Further, North Korea reportedly has 
ballistic missiles specifically aimed at Tokyo, including nuclear power plants located 
                                                                                                                                                                             
fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) decoys—to develop penetration aids and 
countermeasures.” 
449
 Pages 50-1, Table 2. 
450
 Pages 67, 71-4, and 105. The missile is simply a larger, single stage, liquid-fueled Scud, designed and 
produced indigenously by North Korea, though some Russian technical advising possibly occurred. Despite 
limited flight testing, North Korea also produced and exported perhaps hundreds of Nodongs to Pakistan 
and Iran which also successfully tested the missile and likely shared testing data with North Korea. 
451
 See page 73 for the idea of Nodong as a “terror weapon.” The Nodong would do so by potentially 
holding Japan’s major cities hostage with missiles that can deliver conventional, chemical, biological, and 
perhaps nuclear weapons with an inaccurate missile making destruction indiscriminate. 
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there, as part of a campaign to terrorize Japan’s citizens.452 If so, this would directly 
threaten Japan’s domestic population, not only in wartime scenarios involving general 
war on the Korean Peninsula and U.S. forces in Japan used in such a war, but also in 
limited contingencies or small-raid attacks on Japan completely separate from peninsular 
war scenarios. This threat, stated or otherwise, is a tactic of political intimidation in day-
to-day, crisis, and prewar conditions not lost on Japan in its pursuit of BMD. 
 North Korean strategy may include use of its Special Operations Forces (SOF) in 
general war with Japan, but also as part of a missile “raid” scenario below the threshold 
of general war and direct U.S. involvement. Under these circumstances, SOF forces 
would secretly enter Japan to attack Japan’s BMD assets, command and control, 
intelligence units, or U.S. assets at Japanese bases (Scobell & Sanford, North Korea's 
Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and 
Ballistic Missiles, 2007).
453
 
North Korean ballistic missile production and domestic deployment levels is an 
important feature of the North’s strategic threat, but may also offer insights into the 
impact of Japan’s BMD upon North Korean value in its ballistic missiles. Disparity of 
analysis exists, however, over production and deployment levels. At the very least, 
missile exports have trended downward for several years (Pollack J. , Ballistic Trajectory: 
                                                          
452
 For example, Narushige Michishita argued North Korea, possibly fearing a U.S. preemptive strike 
following U.S. doctrinal change in 2002 reflecting preemption, had the capacity to respond with the use of 
large numbers of Nodong ballistic missiles to take Tokyo hostage. In his chapter, “North Korea’s Military-
Diplomatic Campaign Strategies: Continuity versus Change.” Page 69. According to Kim Myung Chol, KJI’s 
wartime scenario would include the launching of “long-range missiles loaded with highly effective 
warheads to Japanese and American strategic targets, such as nuclear power plants” (Pollack, 2004); in 
Seung Joo Baek’s chapter, “North Korea’s Military Buildup and Strategic Outlook,” page 212. 
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 Pages 45-6 and 58. Getting SOF to Japan may be more difficult than before as North Korean air force 
capabilities have been allowed to decline in part because of its growing ballistic missile threat capability. 
North Korean naval assets could still likely accomplish this mission, however. 
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The Evolution of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Market, 2011).454 North Korean value 
in ballistic missiles is likely still very high and sufficient missiles for operational, 
coercive and wartime purposes already exist in North Korea’s inventory to preclude 
further production and deployment. Further, missile production has not ceased and, for 
some missiles like Nodong, production has apparently continued in recent years in order 
to expand the numbers deployed.
455
 
North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities are well-suited to serve the North’s 
political coercion strategy against ROK, the U.S., and Japan. To be sure, North Korea 
possesses a large inventory of ballistic missiles capable of striking targets in Japan, and 
the North could do so in wartime. However, only one or a small number would be needed 
for coercion purposes in day-to-day conditions or pre-war scenarios. Short of direct 
missile attack, flight tests overflying Japan would also be expected as they serve the 
North’s coercion strategy. This is what occurred in 1998 with the TD-1 flight over Japan. 
However, that ballistic missile flight appeared to be the seminal missile event that altered 
the equation in Japan-North Korea relations and how the North approached Japan, 
especially with the use of ballistic missiles. While North Korean missile tests occurred on 
later occasions, there has not been, to date, another surprise missile flight over Japan in 
the same manner as the 1998 test: later tests either flew with full advance announcements 
through the UN for safety purposes; North Korea tested shorter-range missiles; or, the 
North flew missiles in southerly trajectories using its new test launch facility. The key 
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 Pollack provides a variety of reasons to explain this, including international pressures, lower demand, 
and presence of regional BMD. 
455
 While missile production is imprecise at best, Pinkston argues missile production has not been immune 
to general industrial capacity decline stemming from severe economic conditions the past two decades 
(Pinkston, 2008); pages 44-5. 
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difference from 1998 to date has been the assertive pursuit of BMD by Japan to address 
North Korean ballistic missiles. 
 Space 
North Korea used its Taepodong missiles to support its efforts to place a satellite 
in space and become a space-faring nation, joining an elite international club and 
demonstrating technological advancement with which it can garner national honor and 
pride.
456
 After five past failures beginning in the 1990s, North Korea successfully placed 
a satellite into orbit on 12 September 2012 using a Taepodong (also called “Unha”) 
rocket, though the mission of the satellite is unknown. According to press accounts, the 
West condemned the launch as “provocative.” The North maintained it had the right to a 
civilian space program and said the new satellite would provide scientific data. North 
Korean people celebrated the launch (Associated Press in Pyongyang, 2012).
457
 North 
Korea’s new leader Kim Jong-Un, son of KJI, in an address to the people, spoke of the 
December 2012 satellite launch as having “conquered space” but also how such an 
accomplishment should inspire the people toward hard work in improving the economy 
(New Year Address Made by Kim Jong Un, 2013).
458
 
The December 2012 space launch came from the Sohae Satellite Launching 
Station in northwest North Korea. North Korea began construction of the Sohae facility 
in 2001 and first used it in April 2012 to launch a Taepodong (also “Unha”) missile, also 
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 North Korea reminds the South regularly that this is a technological area in which the ROK has failed. 
457
 Koreans were filled with “pride over the scientific advancement” and rushed into snowy Pyongyang 
streets and toasted the event at local pubs upon its announcement. North Korea may face yet another 
round of international sanctions as a result of the use of dual-use technology. Further, Iran, receiving its 
ballistic missile technology and assistance principally from North Korea, used the Nodong it received from 
North Korea to develop the longer-range Shahab-3 missile, and from this missile, a space launch vehicle 
(SLV) (Burns, 2010); pages 108-9. If Iran can do this with North Korean assistance, the prospects for 
continued North Korean ballistic missile and SLV technological improvement seem reasonably good. 
458
 The reference to the space achievement was mentioned multiple times in the leader’s speech. 
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an attempt to place a satellite into orbit; it failed. One significant change, and key 
advantage, is the ability to launch southward from Sohae and avoid overflying Japan and 
ROK. This is unlike North Korea’s other site, the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground 
near Musudan-ri, used to launch a Taepodong eastward over Japan in 1998 (Sohae 
Satellite Launching Station, 2012).
459
 Both the April and December 2012 launches from 
Sohae flew south. 
The missile technology to conduct the North’s space ventures are to be sure dual-
use and can be used for the testing and development of long-range offensive ballistic 
missiles intended to carry warheads of comparable weight to a satellite. The threatening 
aspect of these launches has been the political position of Western nations where protests 
to the North’s actions were carried out in the UN producing, for example, UNSC 
resolutions 1718 and 1874. More practical measures included strengthening the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) around North Korea intended to deny it meaningful 
trade in weapons with the outside world. PSI was an international partnership of 
information-sharing on North Korean missile and WMD proliferation activities and more 
robust activities including a greater naval presence in Northeast Asia and the actual 
boarding of ships by force (Cha V. , 2012).
460
 While some changes in pattern exist, North 
Korea continued Taepodong/Unha flights for what it called its space program. 
 Cyber 
 The use of computer networks to gather information, disrupt, or attack one’s 
opponent has emerged in recent years, providing would-be users a capability to inflict 
pain in a variety of ways in distant territory and at high speed. According to General 
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 Another advantage with the Sohae facility is the hindering of observation by foreign air and sea 
reconnaissance platforms. 
460
 Page 273. ROK joined the PSI in 2009. 
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James Thurman, North Korea’s cyber warfare capability is a “significant” one and 
complements the 60,000 special operations troops, WMD, and ballistic missiles 
comprising North Korea’s asymmetric warfare capabilities. He stated, “North Korea 
employs sophisticated computer hackers trained to launch cyber infiltration and cyber 
attacks.” He also stated, “Such attacks are ideal for North Korea” because they can be 
done anonymously, and they “have been increasingly employed against a variety of 
targets including military, governmental, educational and commercial institutions” 
(Capaccio, 2012).
461
 Further, according to U.S. Congressional testimony, North Korea 
was the likely source of a 2009 cyber attack on the U.S. and ROK involving “the 
malicious use of more than 100,000 computers” (SECURING THE MODERN 
ELECTRIC GRID FROM PHYSICAL AND CYBER ATTACKS, 2009).
462
 More 
recently, North Korea allegedly used its cyber capabilities to attack a South Korean 
financial institution in April 2011 (Breen, Kim Jong-il: North Korea's Dear Leader, 
2012).
463
 Still an emerging technology for North Korea, it provides its leadership another, 
though far less overt, means of political coercion. 
Patterns of Behavior. 
Three broad patterns are addressed below: technological advances; political 
provocation, often involving the military; and, proliferation of military technologies, 
particularly ballistic missiles. In terms of technology, as mentioned above, certain key 
aspects of the North’s military have fallen into deep decline at the expense of 
advancements in nuclear and ballistic missiles. Generally, Korean pride in scientific 
accomplishment is strong. For example, it boasts it invented the world’s first ironclad 
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 General Thurman was commander of U.S. forces in South Korea at the time. 
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 Page 114. 
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 Pages xi-xii. 
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battleship in 1441 (Korean Overseas Information Service, 2003).
464
 Japan and the West 
have been surprised on occasion by North Korean technological advances, such as the 
Taepodong missile flight over Japan in 1998 that used multiple stages. New ballistic 
missile technologies that can threaten Japan and the West also include use of mobile 
missile launchers and a committed advancement toward an indigenous capability to place 
satellites into space. In addition to their military and political utility, ballistic missiles are 
particularly valuable to North Korea for their domestic value as a “symbol of scientific 
advancement” (Pinkston, 2008).465 Pinkston also points out that, from 1987-92, North 
Korea rapidly developed the Scud-C, Nodong, the Musudan, Taepodong-1, and the 
Taepodong-2 missiles. Though not without technical problems, Pinkston characterizes 
this technological pace as “remarkable and historically unprecedented for a small 
developing country” (Pinkston, 2008).466 
North Korea has a long record of provocations that most agree were conducted at 
the direction or approval of either KIS or KJI. Earlier, political intimidation actions were 
part of the North’s strategy of confrontation and conducted to wreak havoc in South 
Korea and facilitate the needed conditions assumed for forcible reunification. These 
actions included: the unsuccessful 1968 commando raid on the South Korean Blue House 
to kill the ROK president; the 1983 commando attack in Rangoon which killed 17 ROK 
cabinet members and other officials but not the main target, the president; and, the 1987 
bombing of KAL Flight 858 which killed 115. Both KJI and KIS were likely directly 
involved in the latter two attacks, but it was not known what role KJI played in the 1968 
attack. North Korea has not reportedly conducted any state-sponsored terrorism since 
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these events and was eventually removed from the U.S. official list of state sponsors of 
terrorism. Additionally, North Korea in this period seized the USS Pueblo in 1968, shot 
down a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft in 1969, and murdered U.S. servicemen at 
Panmunjom in 1976 (Schneider & Post, 2002).
467
  
North Korean violence toward ROK is markedly higher than toward others, 
reflecting a cultural hostility toward the political leadership of ROK for being “lackeys” 
of the U.S. and misleading the South Korean masses. North Korea views itself as the 
legitimate center of Korean culture and leadership of the Korean people. North Korean 
actions in recent years toward the South have been noticeably more provocative. 
According to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND), these actions 
included: a naval engagement near Daecheong Island in November, 2009; the North’s 
torpedo attack on the ROK Cheonon on 26 March, 2010, killing all 46 ROK sailors; and, 
the North’s shelling with 170 artillery shells on 23 November, 2010, of a ROK Marine 
detachment on Yeonpyeong Island, killing four (including two nearby civilians) and 
wounding dozens of Marines and civilians (2010 Defense White Paper, 2010).
468
 
North Korea selectively employs transparency of military capabilities or 
intentions (e.g., publically-announced and internationally-observed missile launches). For 
example, the 2009 and 2012 Taepodong missile launches were announced publicly and 
included providing specific information as to launch time windows and missile booster 
splashdown areas to the United Nations in advance. But these actions are rare. On the 
other hand, it denied sinking the Cheonon and other past aberrant behavior. 
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 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Pages 125-8 and 130. North Korea deems deployment of military assets close to its border as 
provocative and has acted very aggressively against such assets. KJI supposedly oversaw the terrorist 
attacks in 1983 and 1987. 
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 Page 25. The ROK responded to the artillery attack by launching several rockets back into North Korea. 
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In terms of external proliferation, North Korea has been a leader in exporting 
ballistic missiles, though this has tapered off in recent years. For example, U.S. and 
Spanish naval forces jointly intercepted a North Korean ship delivering Scud missiles and 
conventional warheads to Yemen in December 2003. The ship and cargo continued on, 
however, since the U.S. saw no immediate threat to it of the missiles and did not believe 
it had legal authority to take the cargo (Kerr, 2003).
469
 But the point was made to North 
Korean leadership: others are tracking your missile activities and can and will disrupt 
them. 
Economic 
 The development, organization, and condition of North Korea’s economy reflect 
the choices of its leaders including KJI. These choices of KJI were informed by the need 
to support the military as a top priority, use the military to coerce effectively, show 
himself and North Korea as formidable domestically (as part of the social contract) and 
abroad, and, to foster his personal image. The net effects have been severe stress upon the 
small economy, and North Korea’s people, to fuel one of the world’s largest military. But 
the importance of the North’s economy is the broader national security and regional 
political context cannot be understated.
470
 
Economically, North Korea in modern times has been a disaster. The 
ideologically and culturally driven need for military spending to shore up survival fears, 
yet compete with, if not dominate, regional peers like ROK and Japan, has led to 
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 The U.S. was also reportedly working with Yemen at the time to win its agreement to cease purchasing 
North Korean missiles. 
470
 As early as the late 1990s, for example, a report sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations on the 
prospects for peaceful political solutions in Northeast Asia concluded, “The Most important fact is the 
continuing deterioration of the North Korean economy” (Abramowitz & Laney, 1998); pages 9 and 11. The 
situation was reportedly including, at that time, discontent among elites and purging of economic 
officials. 
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underdevelopment of other sectors of the North Korean economy such as energy and 
industrial infrastructure and agricultural modernization. To be sure, years of flooding and 
drought, gross mismanagement, and loss of Soviet and Chinese economic support in the 
early 1990s, were all genuine complicating factors to choices made by North Korean 
leaders.
471
 The results in North Korea were years of negative growth, unemployment, and 
crop failures. For example, North Korea imported nearly twice what it exported. Mass 
starvation occurred as well, killing as many as 2.5 million people, or 10% of North 
Korea’s population. KJI departed somewhat from the old Stalinist model, authorizing for 
example a special economic zone (SEZ) near the Tumen River to try to garner foreign 
investment. On the whole, however, KJI continued his strategy of seeking high payoffs 
with minimal risk or costs (Schneider & Post, 2002).
472
 
The economy of North Korea is divided into three main sectors: agriculture, 
mining, and industry; defense; and, an independent sector dubbed the “court economy.” 
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 It is possible North Korea exaggerated the scale of its agricultural disasters in order to get more aid 
(Wolf & Akramov, 2005); page 11. This is based on a reference KJI made about exaggerations of African 
nations of their plights. The authors merely infer that if KJI overtly recognized they did it, he, too, may 
have done the same thing. 
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 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Pages 118-20. North Korea was not always an economic basket case. For example, in 1970 its 
per capita exports were comparable to ROK’s. By 1990, however, North Korea was in the lower quarter of 
the world’s countries in exports, and by 2000 it was ranked near the bottom. This reflects an exceedingly 
sharp reversal and decline (Pollack, 2004); in Nicholas Eberstadt’s chapter, “Why Hasn’t the DPRK 
Collapsed?” Pages 155-6. The North Korean sense of comfort with its autarkical economic approach, 
according to Bruce Cumings, stems not only from its ancient past of invasions but also economic abuses 
from Japan during its colonial period. Cumings calls its self-reliant policy a “response to a prolonged 
twentieth-century crisis in their country,” intended to maintain its historical insulation from connection to 
the outside world and the travails that come with it. North Korea, he argues, recognizes the need to 
change, highlighting comments made by a KIS relative that the North’s economy should follow 
Singapore’s model of free enterprise with strong central control (Cumings, 2005); pages 407, 430, and 
436-7. Emphasis upon heavy industry was a Communist emphasis as well but really had its roots with 
Japanese industrial development in the prewar period. The period of the early 1990s in North Korea was 
catastrophic. According to Eberstadt, the severe food shortage stemming from years of flooding and 
drought was “the first and only mass famine ever to befall a literate and urbanized society during 
peacetime” (Eberstadt, Policy and Economic Performance in Divided Korea during the Cold War Era: 1945-
91, 2010); page 2. According to one estimate, the entire food shortage in North Korea could be remedied 
by new policy reflecting a 5% reduction in its $2 billion defense budget (French, 2007); pages 229-30. 
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The court economy is an exclusive chain of goods and services for members of the 
nation’s political, military, and technical elite class, with access to state resources but 
without transparent accounting. As many as three million people have access to the 
transparent court economy, a process used primarily to buy control of the entire state in 
exchange for loyalty from its recipients (Wolf & Akramov, 2005).
473
 On the other hand, 
with the state-run markets remaining entrenched, it is clear a black market has emerged in 
North Korea in response to inefficiencies in the socialist system to meet basic survival 
needs of its people (Connor, 2009).
474
 
To support its industry, economy, and population, North Korea has stressed 
avoidance of dependence on petroleum and development of its electrical energy capacity. 
This has involved the use of some hydroelectric plants and those powered by coal; the 
former were expensive to build, and more attention was given to coal-based plants, owing 
also to the abundance of coal in North Korea and accommodating its juche self-reliant 
ideology. Nevertheless, coal mining technology has been limited in North Korea, driving 
it to nuclear power as a source of electricity and the building of facilities at Yongbyon 
and Taechon. Reactors, however, were capable of both high electricity output but also 
production of plutonium for the construction of nuclear weapons. The 1994 Agreed 
Framework with the U.S. and others was intended to replace the existing North Korean 
reactors with non-threatening light-water reactors; the political process broke down 
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 Pages 12-3 and 18. At least some, perhaps $1 billion annually, of this court economy is fueled by legally 
forbidden international dealings in drugs, counterfeiting, and missile and WMD technologies with 
Pakistan, Iran, and others. The attraction by China in modern days of North Korean minerals is not a new 
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 Page 191. As a result, Connor argues it is not likely a middle class will emerge as others suggest. 
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before much progress was ever made (Connor, 2009).
475
 So, while development and 
possession of nuclear weapons clearly suited North Korean security needs as part of its 
post-Cold War strategy, North Korea was also driven to nuclear power (the industrial 
foundation for nuclear weapons) owing to its domestic energy needs and technical 
limitations with coal, for example. 
One of the casualties of North Korea’s overemphasis upon a culture of continuous 
revolution, centralized state planning, and juche ideology of self-reliance is the 
“stagnation of knowledge” and its consequences on the economy including, for example, 
technology and agriculture (Kim S. C., 2006).
476
 By the late 1990s, KJI was searching for 
technology to become the “key link” for the nation’s economy, the same notion his father 
had 25 years earlier. By the 2000s, the Zainichi community (Koreans living in Japan) had 
indeed grown to become a major source of technology, and North Korea had increased its 
skills in computer software engineering and development, including fingerprint and voice 
recognition technologies. But years of neglect, compounded by international (including 
Japanese) sanctions on technologies with potential military applications, have left North 
Korea behind. 
Despite having a large military, the economy of the North is very small. North 
Korean Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been anemic since 1990 and the end of the 
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 Pages 180-90. Kim argues the development of North Korea’s intellectual class began erosion in the 
1970s and, in parallel with the expansion of juche by KJI, the North also experienced a decline in academic 
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Cold War period, essentially experiencing no real growth (Wolf & Akramov, 2005).
477
 
By the year 2000, its GDP was a mere $22 billion, compared to $765 billion in ROK 
(Schneider & Post, 2002).
478
 This disparity has continued, with others estimating the 
(GDP) of South Korea to be 40-50 times higher than North Korea’s (comparable to the 
2000 estimate), though this is difficult to estimate. Most agree, however, the military 
sector of North Korea’s economy accounts for much of the total North Korean 
investment, possibly 25-30% of GDP or more (Wolf & Akramov, 2005).
479
 
North Korea’s KJI faced a stagnant GDP since the late 1980s, complicated by 
trade deficits, loss of Communist support, floods and drought, and then sanctioning 
penalties for aberrant behavior. These pressures, atop a “military first policy” of 
continued defense spending, drove the North to new sources of revenue, illegal activity, 
and reluctant reception of foreign aid. Arms sales, including decades of North Korean 
leadership as the world’s top seller of missiles, accounted for much of the external 
funding. Missile sales alone accounted for $500 million annually, with ballistic missiles 
being sold to Iran, Syria, Libya, Pakistan, Yemen, Vietnam, Egypt, Iraq, and Ukraine 
(Wallace, 2007).
480
 North Korea maintained in the mid-1990s that sales of ballistic 
missiles and their components and related technologies provided it with significant 
revenue and balked, even under threat of economic sanctions, at U.S. requests to curtail 
such transactions. Smacking of political extortion, in July 2000 North Korea demanded 
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 Pages 10 and 13. Despite an anemic start in the postwar period, the ROK economy has grown rapidly in 
recent years towering in comparison to the North’s. South Korean General Paik, following the Korean 
War, explained how the ROK economy began to surge in the 1960s in large part due to the role former 
military personnel, full of leadership and management experience from the war, played in the economic 
sector (Paik, 2000); page 253. 
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 Pages 22-31. While foreign sales have fallen off in past years, the North can still produce, for example, 
4-8 Scud missiles per month. 
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$1 billion in annual compensation for ending foreign missile sales and also stated the 
need for others to launch its satellites if it were to cease developing long-range missiles 
(Burns, 2010).
481
 
The strong need for revenue and economic aid to sustain the North Korean regime 
was a powerful motivation for the use of ballistic missile tests or similar forms of 
coercion. The alternative might have been radical internal economic reform efforts, but 
these were problematic for KJI’s calculus. On the one hand, reforms could undermine his 
control over the people. On the other hand, adverse effects of reform could trigger violent 
challenges to the regime. The top priority was the security of KJI and his regime—but 
economic reforms seemed risky, at least compared to missile-based coercion. This is 
would be the expected strategy for North Korea given their internal conditions and view 
of others, including Japan. Alternatively, political engagement with Japan, for example, 
and the economic benefits involved with that course of action, may involve an opening 
up that could lead to external exploitation—an historical path that, especially given its 
history with Japan, also appeared difficult for North Korea (Pollack, 2004).
482
 North 
Korean interaction with Japan did include coercion; however, periods of interaction 
discussing political rapprochement also occurred. Despite great economic disparities, 
North Korea did not escalate to patterns of violence with Japan even when 
rapprochement negotiations failed. 
Journalist and consultant Michael Breen claims the private arm of KJI’s regime 
funding was through an enterprise of the Korean Workers’ Party called Division 39. 
Formed as early as the mid-1970s, this organization had two functional arms: legitimate 
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business through the Daesong Group and its Daesong Bank and Golden Star Bank in 
Vienna; and, arms dealing and illegal activities. Legitimate efforts and trade were done 
by North Korean officials who trained and studied abroad and included such things as 
exportation of ginseng, seafood, and minerals including gold, silver, and magnesium. 
Illegal work included counterfeiting and drug dealing including sale of heroin and 
methamphetamines to Japan, South Korea, Russia, China, and Taiwan (Breen, Kim Jong-
Il: North Korea's Dear Leader, 2004).
483
 Buying loyalty in this way is arguably akin to 
pursuing regime survival from within (Wallace, 2007).
484
 
The ROK government could also be a source of significant financial resources for 
North Korea. According to Marcus Noland, some in South Korea considered 
“reconciliation transfers” to North Korea as a means of creating peninsular stability. Such 
transfers would have amounted to 1% of the ROK’s GDP, or billions of dollars per year 
as “survival rations” for KJI and his regime (Pollack, 2004).485 However, the economic 
arrangements in North Korea are so divergent from the South’s, in terms of markets, 
military expenditures, and industry, that the potential costs for reunification could exceed 
$600 billion (Wolf & Akramov, 2005).
486
 
Social Well-Being and Unrest 
 Other than the suffering experienced during the 1990s and consequences of 
domestic economic policy reflected by people leaving or defecting, the exact status of the 
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 Pages 166-8. Breen cites as examples the Australian military seizure of 125 kilograms of heroin aboard 
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well-being of the people or their sentiments toward their leaders is difficult to know with 
precision or confidence. However, from the analyses of others, it appears there is no 
means of non-violent political redress; political prisoner camps exist and executions and 
repatriation occur; people take risks to leave the country or acquire ROK or Western 
goods; there is a general lack of fertilizer and electricity; and, there have been famines, 
disease, drought, and starvation. Despite, or perhaps because of, this situation there has 
not existed any significant civil strife, organized resistance, or insurrection against the 
KJI regime. There was, however, a short period of small public protests over currency 
reform in November and December, 2009 (BBC, 2013).
487
 
 After the Korean War, KIS reordered society into a new hierarchy that echoed 
Confucian and ancient Choson dynasty ideas. He identified three classes that not only 
reflected his view of socialism but, more importantly, his remedy for the recent past. 
These classes included: the core class; the wavering class; and, the hostile class. 
Everyone was investigated thoroughly and placed into a class based upon loyalty to the 
Kim regime as well as family connections. The core class includes regime and elite 
family members, KWP members, and high-ranking officials. It also includes family 
members of soldiers killed in the Korean War and those who were anti-Japanese before 
the end of WWII. The wavering class includes families with connections in South Korea 
or whose families were merchants and farmers before the end of WWII. Members of this 
class might be won over through political education, but are far removed from the 
opportunities of the core class. The hostile class includes families of those who have been 
critical of the Kim regime or whose families were wealthy or religious before the end of 
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WWII. Members of the hostile class live in rural North Korea as outcasts and doomed to 
poverty or a concentration camp (Connor, 2009).
488
 
The overall picture of civil liberties inside North Korea is neither good nor 
surprising. According to Freedom House, North Korea receives the worst rating for 
freedom (7.0), based upon a wide variety of factors, including: lack of open elections; 
endemic government corruption; state control of the media; no real freedom of religion, 
movement, or assembly; lack of an independent judiciary; social discrimination based 
upon designated classes; human trafficking; and forced abortions and infanticide 
(Freedom in the World 2012: North Korea, 2012).
489
 According to Walter Sharp, North 
Korea was ranked in the bottom eight countries by Freedom House for internal protection 
of political rights and civil liberties, as well as one of the most repressive regimes in the 
world (Sharp, 2008).
490
 This situation, while theoretically part of a social contract, clearly 
reflects the goal of maintaining the Kim family regime in power through totalitarian 
control. The masses generally seem to reluctantly accept the social order, though there is 
no evidence of mass happiness for it. 
 Years of control, however, have left North Korea’s leaders in a predicament. 
Generally, Scobell argues North Korea probably subscribes to some blend of the 
following strategic intentions: (1) merely survive as a regime; (2) become a strong and 
vibrant state; and, (3) reunify the peninsula on its terms. Its leaders are likely more 
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confident in their position than fatalistically thinking the regime is doomed or that 
survival is all it can expect to achieve. However, one of the greatest challenges facing 
North Korea is its internal “dilemma” that impacts other strategic goals: the fear among 
its leaders that domestic reforms will undermine their positions of control, but without it, 
regime failure also appears on the horizon. The fear of the regime not surviving due to 
reforms is higher, according to Scobell, leading its leaders to gamble on modest changes 
to the status quo (Scobell, North Korea's Strategic Intentions, 2005).
491
 
 KJI reportedly stated recently, “I will do everything to let our people live a 
content life by improving their lives in the shortest period possible” (Pollack, No Exit: 
North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security, 2011).
492
 However, some 
suggest KJI had no remorse for the suffering of North Korean people in the 1990s at the 
height of their suffering, at times depriving them of internal and international aid. He 
demonstrated willingness for brutality, such as during famines in 1997 and 1999 the 
ordering of hundreds of thousands of people into camps where few could survive and the 
killing of the babies of political prisoners (Schneider & Post, 2002).
493
 Others have 
described the plight of the North Korean people as more than a policy failure and nothing 
less than a neglect of their government, or perhaps as an instrumental abuse. The choice 
of KJI was to continue a “military first” program at the expense of his people, 80% of 
whom lived beyond the reach of the Party or military distribution networks. The result 
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was chronic undernourishment of the people and increased reliance upon the international 
community for food (Buzo, The Making of Modern Korea, 2007).
494
 
External Environmental Factors 
 This section reviews the key external relationships of North Korea and the 
diplomatic style employed by KJI in these relationships. This not only provides insights 
into KJI’s priorities but helps better understand the political context in which Japan 
interacted with North Korea and how its BMD program fits within that context. The U.S. 
Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) report in 2010 provided broad linkages for 
missile defenses to national security and deterrence. According to the report, the top 
priority is near-term regional threats, including North Korea, which seek to exploit 
ballistic missiles and WMD capabilities not only for operational purposes in conflict but 
to “undergird efforts to coerce” others, including those near to them, in times of relative 
peace (Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 2010).
495
 Political coercion is the 
strategy pursued by North Korea in it relations and diplomacy and the “peacetime” 
scenario is the setting in which the dissertation explores.  
Diplomacy and Communication 
 Snyder suggests those who have had high-level interactions with North Koreans 
claim a “crisis diplomacy” style, given the position of North Korea in the post-Cold War 
era. This crisis orientation came across regularly, such as in discussions on the nuclear 
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issue (Snyder, 1999).
496
 An alternative description—and one with wide currency—is a 
style of coercion or extortion. According to Narushige Michishita, North Korean broad 
political objectives had not changed much in recent years and, therefore, its military and 
diplomatic patterns of behavior, as it sought to relate to Japan, ROK, and the U.S., would 
remain essentially consistent. Since the 1990s, North Korean objectives have been 
dominated by diplomatic coercion activities more than military confrontation. This 
change from military confrontation to missile-backed diplomatic coercion was supported 
by a larger share of resources going into ballistic missile development and WMD 
(Pollack, 2004).
497
 
Becker argues, despite all the domestic strife and external environmental changes, 
there has been “no change of heart” for the North Korean regime. It continues to engage 
in various activities, such as interaction with NGOs, cultural events, or searching for 
Korean War era missing-in-action (MIA) remains. However, all these engagements were 
purchased with some sort of payoff. The only change for North Korea, according to 
Becker, is the lethality of military weapons the North acquires to facilitate its extortion of 
others (Becker, 2005).
498
 As seen with the 1998 Taepodong launch, even a test flight can 
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have profound effects upon the domestic psyche and significant security-related 
consequences in states like Japan and the United States. 
Relations and Interactions with Others 
General. 
Kiyosaki portrays North Korea in the 1970s as politically frustrated with the 
entire notion of reunification or breaking out entirely as an independent, if not 
predominant, player in Northeast Asian geopolitical affairs. This frustration was due to 
four impediments: (1) a period of superpower détente; (2) disunity between China and the 
Soviet Union; (3) the presence of U.S. forces and, more importantly, U.S. tactical nuclear 
weapons, in South Korea; and, (4) a more unified ROK army and society (Kiyosaki, 
1976).
499
 Kim Il-Sung feared being sidelined. By the early 1990s, with the end of Soviet 
Communism, international fear increased over North Korea as circumstances were 
considered “volatile” (Hall & Kemp, 1994).500 Some described the problem as North 
Korea’s “daunting” challenge to cope with others (Kim S. S., North Korean Foreign 
Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, 1998).
501
 However, as time would reveal, external 
actors, too, struggled with a way to deal with North Korea in the post-Cold War world.  
The very real challenges North Korea faced internally and externally also lend 
themselves to theoretic international relations approaches (described by Samuel Kim in 
the next paragraph). For example, according to Stephen Walt and Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff, realism attempts to explain the problems in the world through acceptance of 
state-level propensities toward conflict. This view suggests leaders are, therefore, worried 
over survival, security, and self-help measures, driving them to acquire more and new 
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measures of power. Though a common view, realism offers little aid in predicting 
international change. Liberalism emphasizes remedies or mitigation to conflict through 
democracy, interdependence, and cooperative institutions. It perhaps underestimates the 
importance of power to state leaders and also does not predict significant changes well, 
such as the end of the Cold War. Finally, modern constructivism explores social factors 
such as a nation’s identity and culture in order to understand and explain state behavior. 
Walt suggests these theories actually complement one another, while Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff describe modern theory as more of a synthesis of multiple theories (Dougherty 
& Pfaltzgraff, 2001).
502
 
By the early 2000s, it seemed to outsiders that North Korea was simply coping to 
survive, having endured the death and devastation of floods and drought in the late 1990s. 
It could not even provide electricity for lighting at night, except in Pyongyang. Survival, 
however, could last no further than 2015 according to intelligence estimates. To Samuel 
Kim, realists simply framed North Korea’s situation in broader balance of power 
realities: U.S. hegemonic retreat; Russian decline; Japanese stagnation; and the rise of 
China as clear regional hegemon. Liberals relied on regional institutions—such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO), and Tumen River Area Development Programme 
(TRADP)—for solutions, which usually disappointed. Constructivism offered aid in 
understanding, through study of the disparate cultures and identities of the various actors 
with a stake in the Northeast Asia region. But this, too, he argued, while showing distrust 
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of each for understandable historical reasons, did not offer security-related solutions for 
the region in general or North Korea specifically (Kim & Lee, North Korea and Northeast 
Asia, 2002).
503
 
Despite the presence of great powers, North Korea likely embraces more of a 
regional perspective in its security and foreign policies. This is due to the centuries of 
security-related interaction with close regional actors like Japan, China and, more 
recently, South Korea.
504
 Further, in conjunction with its change in strategy from 
confrontation to coercion at the end of the Cold War, North Korea may also see the role 
or impact of the U.S. in Korean affairs as much reduced. For example, according to 
Michael Mazarr and James Goodby, one of the key characteristics of the new 
international security environment is a “United States politically exhausted and fiscally 
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and militarily broke” (Shultz, Drell, & Goodby, 2011).505 If so, North Korea and Japan 
may both sense less U.S. credibility to deter or manage North Korean aberrant behavior. 
As a result, North Korea has been more provocative, and Japan proactive in its own 
national defense including acquisition of a BMD program. North Korea may also be more 
willing to pursue or accept political bargains with regional actors such as Japan. 
Generally, North Korean leadership has not related well politically with its 
opponents. It has difficulty, for example, interpreting their intentions, due in part to 
greater (though not “total”) reliance upon conflictual over cooperative means. It is also 
highly sensitive to perceptions of external interference in its domestic affairs (Schneider 
& Post, 2002).
506
 One example could be the way Russia chose to abandon North Korea 
when the Cold War ended in which Russia sided economically and politically instead 
with ROK. Another example would be the sense of suspicion of Japan given the Japanese 
occupation of Korea, perhaps inhibiting more positive political relations when those seem 
to have been possible. 
North Korea’s coercion strategy to seek economic accommodation or political and 
security objectives relies in large part upon use of ballistic missiles. Doing so seems to 
have cost North Korea little, or little in terms of what matters to North Korea. Sanctions 
were not of significant effect on its ballistic missile programs, at least in the sense North 
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Korea did not conduct extensive ballistic missile testing to achieve operational training 
and technical data needed as part of most Western quality assurance programs for 
deployed systems. Missile production capabilities are also sustainable in North Korea. 
However, economic losses incurred if North Korea needed modifications to its missiles to 
counter defenses would be detrimental to sustained use of ballistic missiles to coerce. On 
the other hand, North Korea has also employed cooperative tools on occasion, such as 
KJI agreeing in 2000 to a moratorium on missile testing, reflecting a more cooperative 
element in his approach (Schneider & Post, 2002).
507
 
Relations with Regional Actors. 
United States 
The North Korean psyche of defending the land from invader certainly precedes 
Japan’s imperialist conquest or North Korean complaints of U.S. occupation of South 
Korea. There is, however, an interesting twist on the connection to the U.S. in the family 
lineage of North Korea’s modern leaders that dates back to 1866. In that year, Korea sank 
the USS General Sherman in the Taedong River near Pyongyang in a dramatic response 
to U.S. attempts to pressure Korea into trade relations (i.e., “gunboat diplomacy”). The 
leader of the Korean troops who defeated the invaders was reportedly Kim Il-Sung’s 
great-grandfather (Snyder, 1999).
508
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Beyond resilient, Samuel Kim suggests North Korea’s sovereignty today is more 
secure than ever through use of its nuclear weapons capability. These capabilities 
undergird a North Korean nuclear brinkmanship style of relations with regional actors, 
playing its “collapse card” as needed to get attention. The U.S. response has generally 
been a hardline one, with Japan supporting the U.S. more than China, Russia, or South 
Korea (Kim S. S., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War World, 2007).
509
 
With uncertain aid from China and Russia, and improved ties between China and South 
Korea, Kim also argues the North has found itself needing to work with the U.S.; 
however, since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has principally chosen coercive, not 
positive instruments of interaction to resolve problems, making the vision of U.S.-North 
Korea normalization a distant one (Kim S. S., North Korean Foreign Relations in the 
Post-Cold War World, 2007).
510
 
Republic of Korea 
While the Korean War is technically still unsettled and in a state of ceasefire, 
North Korea, through its constitution, continues to call for the overthrow of South Korea 
and the unification of the Korean peninsula. However, large-scale land invasion as part of 
North Korea’s former strategy of armed confrontation seems unlikely, having moved 
more toward a strategy of political coercion, including pressures to provide various forms 
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of aid and assistance. Violence and hostility toward the South have risen in the past few 
years, in part due to a resumption of tough-line policies in the South, but giving terrible 
reminders of past North Korean behavior toward the South: a ROK frigate was sunk, 
allegedly by North Korea, in 2010, killing 46 sailors; in 2010, North Korea shelled a 
ROK island with artillery, killing four people; and, a computer-based cyber attack, 
blamed on North Korea, caused a South Korean financial institution to crash in April 
2011 (Breen, Kim Jong-il: North Korea's Dear Leader, 2012).
511
 
In the past several years, South Korean policy has alternated between a tougher 
line and accommodation, generally in line with whatever political party is in power. For 
example, Key-young Son suggests ROK’s Sunshine Policy, during a 10-year period of 
accommodation, was aimed at alleviating the North’s internal security dilemmas with 
aid—internal issues which ROK believed drove KJI to provocative behavior outside the 
bounds of international norms (Son, 2006).
512
 A common criticism was such aid was 
diverted to North Korea’s military, creating a tradeoff of more moderate North Korean 
behavior at the expense of helping their military. 
Russia 
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To KIS, the Soviet role in WWII on the Korean Peninsula was another “invasion” 
that, while it liberated North Koreans, was nevertheless a breach of Korean sovereignty 
(Szalontai, 2005).
513
 This was part of what led KIS to mistrust the Soviet Union from the 
beginning. With the end of the Korean War, and the death of Joseph Stalin, 
disagreements between the two began to rise. Soviet de-Stalinization and other structural 
reform led North Korea’s leaders to greater autonomy from the Soviet Union and the 
North Korean branding of its own ideology, different from Soviet, Chinese, or European 
Communism—a style that would actually lead it the other direction, toward a stronger, 
not weaker, personality cult in North Korea (Szalontai, 2005).
514
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the two states has 
reflected periods of cooperation, but the severe drop in assistance from the Soviet Union 
at the end of the Cold War has kept the relationship less than ideal for North Korea. KJI, 
for example, traveled to Russia as part of this relationship, but never achieved Russia’s 
forgiveness of the multi-billion dollar North Korean debt. There has also been interaction 
regarding military capabilities, such as Russian scientific and technical assistance in 
North Korea with its ballistic missile program and, perhaps, development of EMP 
capabilities with its missiles. Other important activities have included reinvigorating 
economic ties with Russia. For example, North Korea signed a Defense Industry 
Cooperation Agreement with Russia in April 2001 to build a rail line through North 
Korea, linking Russia to ROK, potentially bringing much needed revenue to North Korea 
as a result (Schneider & Post, 2002).
515
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China 
North Korea’s relationship with China changed when the Cold War ended along 
with Soviet aid. The problem was that China (and Russia) both acted quickly to establish 
relations with South Korea, frustrating North Korean regional policy. For China, the 
relationship with both Koreas gave it a unique opportunity to help shape the situation to 
its favor; however, since the first nuclear crisis in the 1990s, China’s primary goal has 
been to foster stability in Northeast Asia through avoiding North Korean collapse and 
border consequences that could follow (Snyder, China's Rise and the Two Koreas: 
Politics, Economics, Security, 2009).
516
 According to Snyder, China is North Korea’s 
major source of exchange, providing approximately 40% of all North Korean trade 
including grain, petroleum, and coal. However, whether through aid in the post-flooding 
situation in the 1990s or the Six-Party talks to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue, 
China’s response was begrudging and modest (Snyder, China's Rise and the Two Koreas: 
Politics, Economics, Security, 2009).
517
 Only China retained consistent and “meaningful” 
ties with North Korea, though China’s influence over KJI was likely limited (Pollack, No 
Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security, 2011).
518
 China did, 
however, pursue recurring high-level ties with North Korea including direct contact with 
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KJI since 2003 (Snyder, China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security, 
2009).
519
  
Relations with Japan Revisited. 
Many of the essential factors involving the relationship between North Korea and 
Japan have already been addressed or mentioned elsewhere in the dissertation. This 
section adds additional detail in the interaction between these two actors including 
broader historical context, North Korea’s overall strategy, and various issues affecting 
political rapprochement such as North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missiles, the abduction 
issue, and Japan’s BMD. It is interesting to note that, while North Korea transitioned to a 
coercive strategy with its neighbors, including Japan, the development of BMD 
capabilities in Japan that challenged North Korea’s means of political coercion (i.e., its 
ballistic missile program) and the rise of Japan generally in terms of economic and 
military autonomy, have not resulted in more confrontation and violence from North 
Korea. In fact, the opposite response was displayed, at least in terms of the North’s 
coercive strategy with Japan in conditions short of war. 
Historical Context & Strategy 
During the 500-year period of the Choson Dynasty in Korea until the Japanese 
Meiji Restoration (1392-1868), with one conflictual exception in the Imjin War (1592-
98), Korea maintained a relationship toward Japan regulated by the “Kyorin order,” 
where Korea chose to deal with Japan as a “neighbor” (unlike Korea’s servitude 
relationship toward China during this period). However, Japan changed its domestic 
position, including use of strong new titles, which was reflected in diplomatic exchanges 
with Korea at the outset of the Meiji government. These changes, which Japan considered 
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in keeping with Western or international law and standards, included: consolidation of 
Japanese representation to Korea now coming from the “emperor” in Tokyo, a title used 
only of China’s leader, intentionally placing Korea in an inferior if not servitude 
relationship with Japan; and, declaring only Japan to be the sole protector of Korea and 
preventing invasion from Russia or others. Korea was appalled (Kim Y. , 2006).
520
 This 
relationship preceded Japan’s harsh imperial period and was followed by conflict in 
WWII and the Korean War—two wars which spanned a very brief time in the overall 
relationship between Japan and Korea. This is why it is difficult for North Korea—and 
Koreans generally—to consider recent political interaction in isolation of their very 
lengthy past interaction. Koreans tend to remember the historical issues openly; Japan is 
criticized for wanting to set them aside.
521
 
An effect of superpower détente was that it permitted an increase in political and 
economic contact and exchanges between North Korea and Japan through the 1970s with 
periodic hints of normalization.
522
 Into the 1980s, North Korean relations with Japan 
appeared to offer promise as North Korea sought joint ventures to stimulate economic 
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without sense of obligation to Communist powers China or the Soviet Union. This was evidenced by the 
quick return of a Japan Airlines aircraft after it had been hijacked to Pyongyang in April (Kiyosaki, 1976); 
page 90. 
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development; the North-South dialogue seemed to be easing; and, both China and the 
Soviet Union were more cooperative with Japan and the U.S. (Park, Koh, & Kwak, 
1987).
523
 However, this opportunity was balanced as North Korea, as part of its broad 
strategy, showed a proclivity toward politically fracturing if not splitting regional actors, 
such as Japan, from their partnerships and alliances with the United States. It did so 
through various political and military activities under past general deterrence conditions, 
and could do so explicitly as part of its wartime strategy against multiple parties in a 
broader peninsular war. North Korea uses this strategy of reducing a regional actor’s 
commitment in order to isolate it and improve the prospects North Korea will achieve its 
aims or advance its position.
524
  
Rapprochement & Related Issues 
The prospects for rapprochement broke down significantly in the mid-1990s when 
Japan raised the abduction issue and North Korea placed heavy financial demands on 
Japan. The abduction issue again impeded progress in talks in 1997-98, just prior to the 
North Korean Taepodong missile test that flew directly over Japan (Hoare & Pares, 
2005).
525
 Inference can be drawn from this as coercion by North Korea for financial 
compensation without having to give on abductions. By the time of the Koizumi summit 
with KJI in Pyongyang in September 2002, KJI caved in on abductions and admitted to 
wrongdoing by elements of his government. However, this did not play out well 
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 In Jung Hyun Shin’s chapter, “North Korea’s Policy toward Japan: Perceptions, Goals, Trends.” Pages 
275-7. 
524
 While there are clearly economic considerations for Japan’s foreign policy generally, national security is 
the primary factor in its relations with North Korea. The good news for Japan is that, contrary to popular 
belief, North Korea behaves in a logical and understandable way, consistent with its strategic culture of 
national survival (Hagstrom & Soderberg, 2006); pages 6-8. 
525
 Pages 134-5. From the Japanese perspective, North Korea did not develop into villain status until after 
the Cold War and several informal and formal meetings between the two. Hoare and Pares suggest the 
people of Japan actually held North Korea in higher regard than the South for most of the postwar period. 
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politically among Japan’s population. Pritchard suggests Japan perhaps overplayed the 
abduction issue to the detriment of positive diplomatic relations (Pritchard, 2007).
526
 The 
abduction issue not only made progress difficult, but resulted in reduced, not increased, 
Japanese economic interaction with North Korea (Bechtol, 2007).
527
 Regardless, 
sentiments of the ethnic Korean Zainichi population in Japan are still raw on both sides 
(Ryang & Lie, 2009).
528
 
North Korea has much to be gained in its influence over Japan by remaining a 
nuclear power while Japan’s position is to be conventionally-armed only. North Korea is 
currently in a dominant position over Japan, which has maintained a generally defensive-
oriented posture. According to Jeffrey Kawada, North Korean opposition to Japan is not 
much more than branding Japan as a threat and Japan’s BMD part of a regional arms 
buildup or a “plan of future aggression” (Kawada, 2004).529 But North Korea may 
actually fear Japan’s militarization as part of its overall rise in autonomy (Takesada, 
                                                          
526
 Pages 86-9. For example, Japan sought to have North Korea retained on the U.S. terrorism list because 
of its abductions of Japanese. The U.S. not only did not want to do that because it was not the cause for 
North Korea’s placement on the U.S. list, but Japanese steady prioritization of the abduction issue was 
jeopardizing multilateral progress on North Korea’s nuclear program through the Six Party Talks. 
527
 Pages 139-40. Japan, for example, along with others provided North Korea with substantial aid in the 
1990s, though North Korea felt this was simply part of what Japan “owed” it as part of Japan’s colonial 
abuses. In 2001, when revelations of North Korean abductions gained traction in Japan, humanitarian aid 
to North Korea was stopped and by 2005 formal trade was at a 25-year low: $190 million in 2005, most of 
which were North Korean exports to Japan. 
528
 In Sonia Ryang’s chapter, “Visible and Vulnerable: The Predicament of Koreans in Japan;” pages 62-3. 
For example, following media announcements 17 September 2002 that North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il 
admitted his agents abducted 13 Japanese citizens, Zainichi Koreans received death threats and Korean 
children were spat on and harassed in public. She contrasts Japanese public sentiment toward North 
Korea (including North Korean sympathizers in the Zainichi community) with that of South Korea, where 
“Japan has seen a boom in South Korean cultural products in recent years.” According to Lie, the once 
two-million strong Korean diaspora, or Zainichi population, living in Japan after WWII as a consequence of 
Japan’s imperial period, remains a reminder of the past and of unsettled business between the two states. 
Zainichi, even older ethnic Japanese citizens, Lie argues, respected Kim Il-Sung though KJI was not well 
thought of in Japan (Lie, 2008); pages 30-1. Such Koreans still abide by an “ideology of return.” 
529
 Pages 25-6. 
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2001).
530
 North Korea would likely feel very threatened by Japan should it build 
offensive strike capabilities, or a nuclear weapons program—capabilities that might push 
North Korea to consider preemptive military action against Japan under some scenarios 
for which Japan’s current defensive posture does not provide adequate autonomous 
protection or retaliatory capacity.
531
 The North Korean decision to resume work on 
nuclear weapons, and their admission to such in diplomatic meetings in late 2002, was a 
setback to North Korea-Japan relations and possible rapprochement (Schneider & Post, 
2002).
532
 The second Koizumi summit with KJI occurred in early 2004. It did not yield 
any breakthroughs and essentially ended the robust period of rapprochement dialogue. 
Ballistic missiles, either directly or indirectly, serve a valuable coercive purpose 
for North Korea against Japan. Coercing Japan likely brought several political, tangible, 
                                                          
530
 See the section entitled, “CHINA’S AND NORTH KOREA’S OPPOSITION.” According to Takesada, China’s 
interaction with North Korea’s leadership caused North Korean criticism to stiffen. Part of Japan’s rise in 
autonomy has involved an increase in its freedom of action. This is characterized militarily by increased 
capabilities, longer and further deployments, and more assertive operations including engagement with 
North Korean ships. But it is also shown in greater flexing politically, such as pursuit of a UNSC permanent 
seat. Japan also has a missile program to support its space program—a capability that could be used to 
sharpen Japan’s overall technological capacity or edge. This edge in technology could also aid in 
continuing its advancement of credible, effective BMD components and help it acquire the needed skills 
for converting its missiles into offensive ballistic missiles should it deem it necessary to do so. 
531
 Interestingly, George Quester suggests Japan (along with Sweden, Argentina, Australia, and Brazil) at 
one time possessed scientists and political or military leaders who welcomed the prospect of developing 
and acquiring nuclear weapons of their own for personal, if not national, power and glory (Manwaring, 
2001); page 41. 
532
 In Merrily Baird’s chapter, “Kim Chong-il’s Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea’s Strategic 
Culture.” Page 109-10. Samuel Kim argues Japan sees value in normalizing relations with North Korea (Kim 
S. S., 2006); pages 185-6. Normalization is valued by Japan for three reasons: (1) to finally clear its WWII 
political slate; (2) to position itself for more effective economic competition, recognizing Russia and China, 
for example, have formal relations with both North and South Korea; and, (3) North Korea collapse 
scenarios are all problematic for Japan. However, without an immediate crisis at hand driving Japan and 
North Korea to diplomatic engagement, there may be little incentive for Japan to overreach its positive 
engagement and appear “soft,” perhaps inciting North Korean threats (Yun & Shin, 2006). In Robert 
Carlin’s chapter, “Talk to Me, Later.” Page 20. While Japan has no embassy in North Korea, the General 
Association of Korean Residents in Japan (also commonly called either “Chongryun” or “Chosen Soren”), 
formed in Japan in 1955 as an organization aligned with the interests of North Korea, has served in some 
cases as a “de facto embassy for Pyongyang” (Kim S. S., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold 
War World, 2007); page 34. 
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and psychologically emotive benefits to KJI, though he did not act independent of the 
influence of other factors. However, given Japan’s deterrence strategy, one dilemma in 
North Korean decision-making was that to deny Japan success in deterring North Korea 
was to stoke the fires inside Japan that it might need offensive conventional strike, and 
possibly nuclear, capabilities to sufficiently deter North Korea—an unwelcome prospect 
inside North Korea.
533
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 Detailed analysis of possible effects of Japan’s BMD upon North Korean perceptions, decisions, and 
behavior, stemming from this chapter will be provided in Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Overview 
The analyses in this chapter attempt to capture the effect of BMD on Japan’s 
overall relationship with North Korea, controlling for other environmental factors in the 
Northeast Asia regional security situation. The central question is whether Japan’s BMD 
program in any period of its development had a deterrent effect toward North Korea. To 
unpack the role of Japan’s missile defenses on North Korean behavior, the chapter 
explores quantitative data presented in dyadic form between the two countries in the 
exclusive period 1990-2011. This period is bookended approximately by the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War at one end and the death of North Korea’s 
second leader at the other. The first bookend is important since it created a rapid and 
significant withdrawal of Soviet power, including marked reduction in political, military, 
and financial aid to North Korea. The second bookend is important because Kim Jong-Il, 
North Korea’s second leader, ruled North Korea de facto or de jure for essentially the 
entire period until his death, making deductive analysis about North Korea’s decision-
making and behavior in this period centrally focused and more reliable. 
Certain other actors and factors may impact the influence of Japan’s BMD on 
North Korean behavior toward Japan: the U.S., as a dominant actor and historical 
antagonist; the PRC, as a key North Korean ally; ROK, as a cultural and military 
opponent on peninsula; possible periods of intense political interaction between Japan 
and North Korea, such as rapprochement discussions; and, the politics of North Korea’s 
regional opponents whose policies ebb and flow with opposing parties in power. These 
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factors may affect the potential influence of Japan’s BMD as a deterring instrument in 
general deterrence conditions.  
Key Findings 
The analyses below lend support to the idea that Japan’s BMD provides deterrent 
effects, but these can be both reinforcing and undermining effects that occur at different 
times of the BMD program’s cycle of emergence before, during, and after its deployment. 
This was seen in three ways in the time-series analysis of the Japan-North Korea case: 1) 
Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence by increasing cooperative North Korean behavior 
toward Japan early in the BMD R&D phase, prior to any deployment commitments; 2) 
Japan’s BMD undermined deterrence by increasing conflictual North Korean behavior 
toward Japan when BMD was first deployed; and, 3) Japan’s BMD strengthened 
deterrence by decreasing conflictual North Korean behavior much later in BMD 
employment under provocative conditions.  
Organization of the Chapter 
Following the present introduction, the chapter is organized into four subsequent 
parts: a theoretical considerations section, which briefly revisits key deterrence issues and 
the basic hypotheses considered in this chapter; a design and data section, describing the 
general design of the statistical analysis approach, the dataset used for the various 
regression models, and a description of the dependent and independent variables; an 
empirical analysis section, which assesses the models, variables and hypotheses; and 
conclusions. 
Theoretical Considerations
534
 
                                                          
534
 The significant body of theoretic arguments on deterrence and the role of missile defenses to support 
or undermine deterrence is taken up in Chapter Three: Literature Review.  
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General vs. Immediate Deterrence 
As described in more detail in Chapter Three: Literature Review, scholars have 
for decades recognized a conceptual separation of deterrence activities distinguished by 
time and circumstance most often described as “general” and “immediate” deterrence. 
General deterrence refers to the purposeful security-oriented management of a 
relationship with a potential adversary under the relatively stable, peacetime conditions of 
day-to-day circumstances. General deterrence is that period of interaction short of 
conflict, though relational disturbances or provocations between opponents are certainly 
within the boundaries of general deterrence. Immediate deterrence implies a significant 
transition into crisis that could lead to war (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001).
535
 
Quackenbush describes general deterrence in broad terms, recognizing the complexities 
associated with relations short of war—when most interaction occurs (Quackenbush, 
Understanding General Deterrence: Theory and Application, 2011).
536
  
What is recognized generally is that the perceptions of political leaders change 
over time as circumstances change, thus altering their cooperative and conflictual 
behavior. But these behavioral dynamics are not limited to simply moving from 
peacetime to crisis and from crisis to conflict—there exist many gradients in between. 
Japan’s BMD program has emerged within and across these gradients under general 
deterrence conditions and is recognized by Japan as an integral component of its overall 
deterrence strategy. One key question is whether its BMD has had any deterrent effect or, 
more precisely, whether there have been deterrent effects across the spectrum of the 
Japanese BMD program’s development over time.  
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 Pages 372-3. 
536
 Page 4.  
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One way to explore such possibilities is to break up Japan’s BMD program into 
meaningful parts for more refined statistical analysis. Analyzing North Korea’s 
cooperative and conflictual behavior toward Japan provides one way to measure their 
overall satisfaction with their relationship with Japan, including possible effects of 
Japan’s BMD upon the North’s behavior. This approach is similar to that taken by A. 
Cooper Drury and Stephen Quackenbush in their analysis of U.S. national missile 
defenses in other deterrence relationships (Drury & Quackenbush, 2007).
537
 Such 
gradients of interaction also suggest that deterrence should not be conceptualized as 
strictly an act-restraint, zero-sum dynamic. Rather, deterrence success can exist in general 
deterrence conditions in terms of acceptable “direction” where success can be seen in the 
following ways: 1) increased cooperative adversary behavior toward the deterrer; and, 2) 
decreased conflictual adversary behavior toward the deterrer. This is to say that under 
general deterrence conditions, deterrence success does not demand absolute cooperative 
behavior from the adversary and absolute omission of conflictual behavior; this is 
unrealistic. Improvements in the direction of behaviors, however, could be considered 
acceptable measures of deterrence success. When considering gradients of interaction, 
one can also explore deterrence value and outcomes created through the mitigation of 
conditions such that they do not get worse: 3) no decreased cooperative adversary 
behavior toward the deterrer; and, 4) no increased conflictual adversary behavior toward 
the deterrer. The first two conditions indicate measurable change in adversary behavior 
and in a certain direction; that is, one direction can strengthen deterrence and the other 
undermine it. They provide two measurable ways to quantity deterrence success. The 
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 Pages 9 and 13-4. 
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latter two conditions do not measure deterrence success, but may provide indications that 
it is not failing. 
BMD in General Deterrence. 
 No single theory of the role or effect of missile defenses in general deterrence 
exists within the literature. Further, much of the BMD-related research focuses upon the 
U.S. national missile defense system and potential attacks on the U.S. Homeland, or how 
BMD might protect or deter in the midst of a regional conflict usually involving U.S. 
conventional forces in combat. There are, however, some arguments concerning its 
possible deterrent efficacy under general deterrence conditions, some of which could 
apply to the Japan-North Korea relationship.
538
 
 Theoretically, BMD could, under some circumstances, support or undermine 
deterrence. BMD could also operate in both directions at the same time, influencing one 
perceptual part of an adversary’s calculus in one way, and another part of calculus in the 
other. In the adversary’s thinking, BMD might deny benefits, impose costs, provide 
benefits of restraint, or mitigate costs of restraint. For example, BMD could enhance 
deterrence if perceived by North Korea as imposing costs by demonstrating Japan’s 
commitment to defend its population, and signaling North Korea its stake in their security 
relationship such that Japan would not only commit significant resources to address a 
perceived North Korean threat but would accept increased risk in fielding the capabilities 
resulting from that financial commitment. A demonstrated Japanese willingness to 
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 Further analysis of these arguments in context of both the qualitative analysis from the dissertation’s 
Strategic Profile and empirical analysis from this current chapter will be evaluated in Chapter Eight: 
Conclusions. Some of the missile defense-deterrence arguments are, however, summarized here to help 
better understand the statistical analyses later in this chapter. A table of the various missile defense-
deterrence arguments identified in the dissertation’s research is found in Table 1 at the conclusion of 
Chapter Three: Literature Review. 
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employ its BMD to engage a North Korean missile under general deterrence conditions 
would likely signal similar resolve during times of dire crisis or conflict, raising the costs 
to North Korea and thus strengthening the deterrence of such crises from ever occurring. 
North Koreas costs of continuing with its coercive strategy against Japan could also 
include needing to build more ballistic missiles or developing BMD countermeasures. 
Such Japanese demonstrations with its BMD under general deterrence conditions could 
also deny North Korean benefits by reducing the political coercive power of North 
Korea’s ballistic missiles over Japanese policy more broadly. Further, Japan’s BMD 
program could help North Korea’s leadership recognize attractive benefits of restraint by 
influencing them to seek a long-term political bargain with Japan earlier rather than later 
when North Korea’s militarily position was stronger. Another perceived benefit of 
restraint could be dealing with Japan disincentivized to pursue its own nuclear weapons 
program—a prospect that could change without North Korean restraint in its ballistic 
missile-backed coercion strategy. Japan’s BMD could also mitigate North Korea’s 
perceived costs of restraint in proceeding with an active coercive strategy against Japan 
by demonstrating to North Korea the defensive nature of Japan’s BMD and Japan’s 
resistance to committing new defense spending on offensive capabilities instead. On the 
other hand, Japan’s BMD deployment might push North Korea to become more 
provocative, coercive, or conflictual generally by, for example, developing or actually 
employing some other means of coercion for which Japan is not yet prepared to defend 
itself. Each of these types of activities can emerge in general deterrence conditions and in 
different periods of Japan’s BMD program development. 
253 
 
 Japan, in many ways, followed the same basic pattern of BMD development over 
time as did the United States, progressing from minimal research and studies, to 
extensive research and development (R&D), to decisions to acquire or produce, then 
deployment and operational employment (Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: 
Technology in Search of a Mission (Revised and Updated Edition), 2002).539 These 
factors in many ways mirror those of Japan’s leaders regarding development and 
acquisition of BMD. Burns also offers several important dates across Japan’s BMD 
program (Burns, 2010).540 In this chapter, Japan’s BMD program has been divided for 
analytic purposes into the following timeframes: BMD-related R&D and investment 
following the North Korean TD-1 missile test; actually deciding to acquire BMD; 
deploying BMD; and, readiness to employ BMD against a North Korean TD-1 missile.541 
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 Page 3. For example, in his revised volume, Yanarella offers an historical reflection of key early 
decisions relating to ABM in the United States. These decisions included: in 1958, McElroy granting the 
U.S. Army exclusive rights to developing ABM capabilities; in 1961, McNamara deferring production and 
deployment of Nike-Zeus; in 1963, McNamara initiating R&D of Nike-X over Nike-Zeus; in 1967, Johnson 
deploying Sentinel; and, in 1969, Nixon deploying Safeguard over Sentinel. These decisions, he suggests, 
were shaped by strategic, technological, political, organizational, and economic factors.  
540
 Pages 101-2. Burns summarizes key periods and Japanese decision points as follows: 1980s, increased 
awareness of a growing North Korean threat and decision to “study” the threat and role of missile 
defenses; 1993, Nodong-1 test; late 1998 decision to reinvigorate missile defense research following the 
TD-1 test; late 2003 decision point to expand missile defense capabilities independent of a U.S. national or 
global system; May 2004, decision to purchase SM-3 interceptors for 2007 deployment on a Japanese 
Aegis destroyer; March 2008, replacement of six PAC-2 missile batteries with deployment of PAC-3 
missiles; September 2008, successful test of two Japanese PAC-3 interceptors, using JASDF personnel, at 
White Sands Missile Range in the U.S.; and, 17 December 2008, Japan conducted its first actual intercept 
of a ballistic missile target using Japan’s JS Kongo destroyer hitting a target launched from Hawaii. 
O’Donogue also recaps Japan’s interest and decision points regarding development of a missile defense 
program (O'Donogue, 2000); pages 5-6. 
541
 Historically, three Japanese governmental agencies stood up to support Japan’s growing BMD 
activities. The first agency was the TMD Working Group (TMD WG), a joint U.S.-Japan organization 
subordinate to the Security Subcommittee, Security Consultative Committee (SSC-SCC). This agency stood 
up in December 1993 after North Korea launched a Nodong missile into the Sea of Japan in May 1993 and 
has addressed primarily technical issues. Participants in the TMD WG represent DoD’s Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), BMDO, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and its JDA. The second 
agency was the JDA’s Office of Ballistic Missile Defense Research (BMDR), created in April 1995 to assess, 
in partnership with the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and DoD’s Pacific Command in 
Hawaii, the threat from North Korea’s Nodong-1 missile. The third organization was the Study Group on 
the Defense Technology Base, established in August 2000 by the JDA and Japan’s Ministry of Economy, 
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Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Japan’s BMD will result in increased conflictual North Korean 
behavior toward Japan. Generally, one would expect Japan’s BMD to create both 
cooperative and conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, consistent with the 
wide range of arguments presented in the missile defense-deterrence literature. BMD 
does not provide Japan a “solution” to all negative, conflictual North Korean behavior. 
More specifically, however, one would expect a higher level of negative, conflictual 
interaction between North Korea and Japan given their history of conflict, Japanese 
domination during the imperial period, and Japan’s support for U.S. forces in the region 
especially during the bloody Korean War. Further, as North Korea developed ballistic 
missiles and used these as primary instruments of their strategy of coercion, one would 
expect Japan’s decision to research, development, and then acquire and deploy BMD to 
significantly degrade the North Korea-Japan relationship, undermining deterrence. Given 
these expectations, it is hypothesized that the North Korea-Japan relationship would 
reflect a steady decline in cooperative relations and behavior. It is further hypothesized 
that Japan’s BMD would amplify the otherwise conflictual North Korea-Japan 
relationship, making interaction worse over time, especially when BMD became 
operationally deployed.  
Hypothesis 2: The dominance of the U.S. over Japan will significantly affect 
North Korean behavior toward Japan. One might also expect a strong, even 
overpowering effect of U.S. interaction with North Korea, since the U.S. retained an 
essentially dominant position in its relationship with its ally, Japan, during the period of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Trade and Industry (METI). This agency, while not designed to address BMD issues, evaluated costs of 
BMD system components such as electronics and communications capabilities (Swaine, Swanger, & 
Kawakami, 2001); pages 32-3. 
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the dissertation’s research. As Japan’s principal ally, and enemy of North Korea, one 
would expect the U.S. to try to protect Japan through positive reciprocity with North 
Korea or reducing conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan through pressure. As 
such, it is expected that across the stages of Japan’s BMD program conflictual U.S. 
behavior toward North Korea would increase North Korean conflictual behavior toward 
Japan, undermining deterrence; and cooperative U.S. behavior to increase the cooperative 
North Korean behavior toward Japan, strengthening deterrence. 
Hypothesis 3: The dominance of China over North Korea will significantly affect 
North Korean behavior toward Japan. As North Korea’s principal ally, one would expect 
China to protect North Korea in some ways, though not at the expense of China’s own 
security interests including those interests vis-à-vis Japan where China may view itself 
disadvantaged by a stronger, more militant Japan. Therefore, it is expected that China 
would employ more cooperative behavior toward North Korea as its ally and, as a strong 
ally, would increase North Korean cooperative behavior toward Japan, strengthening or 
not undermining deterrence. 
Design and Data  
The regression and other statistical analyses were performed using the gretl 
software package, available online (Cottrell & Lucchetti, 2012). This software interfaces 
with a variety of data spreadsheets including Microsoft Excel—the format in which the 
dissertation’s database was constructed. All regression analyses and related statistical 
tests, such as tests for serial correlation, for example, were conducted using gretl 
software. 
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Two dependent variables are used: one for positive, cooperative North Korean 
behavior toward Japan and one for negative, conflictual North Korean behavior toward 
Japan. The models used for cooperative and conflictual North Korean behavior include 
the same independent variables and are organized the same way.  
Dataset Description 
The dataset was provided by Dr. Doug Bond and Virtual Research Associates, 
Inc. (VRA®). The dataset was titled “Events Data 1990-2011.”542 Data were gathered 
through automated software capabilities and derived from either Reuters or AFP (Agence 
France-Presse) news sources. Data were provided in Microsoft Excel spreadsheet form in 
three basic sets of information: monadic; dyadic; and, BMD terms. The first set of data 
was monadic and addressed a wide variety of information pertaining to a set list of states, 
one state at a time. The state-month, therefore, was the unit of analysis. Monthly data 
were collected from news reports scanned using VRA software for the period 1/1/1990 
through 12/31/2011 (22 years). Aggregates for each month (by each state) were compiled 
for IDEA event form codes 1-22, inclusive. These codes include both cooperative (cue 
categories 1 to 10) and conflictual (cue categories 11 to 22) events. The dataset also 
included data for subcategories, monthly averages, and cumulative scores (totaling 72 
different categories). The geographic scope of the monadic data included 10 countries: 
Australia, China, Iran, Japan, Libya, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, Syria, and the 
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 The dataset was derived using VRA® Reader v. 3.11.0., a proprietary software capability used to search 
large amounts of digital news reporting. Further information on the company is found at 
http://www.vranet.com. Further information on the dataset and its description can be found in Chapter 
Four: Research Design. 
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United States. A total of 2,640 monthly records were provided across the 72 different 
categories in the monadic data (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
543
 
 
The second set of data was dyadic, where the unit of analysis was monthly dyadic 
scores for cooperative and conflictual behavior between two states. A sample of dyadic 
data from the dataset is seen in Figure 3. Data were also collected from 1/1/1990 through 
12/31/2011 (22 years) and included the same 10 countries as monadic data. Dyadic data 
reflect directional behavior from one of the 10 states toward another of the 10 states. 
Directional data include a numeric count of events and a cumulative score for each month 
(on the Goldstein scale); the numeric counts and cumulative scores provide both 
cooperative and conflictual directional behavior. These types of data are recorded for 
each state against the other nine states. Unlike the monadic data, with 72 different 
categories and subcategories, dyadic data included eight categories for each entry: the 
name of the source state (SrcName); the name of the target state, or state-level object of 
the source-state’s behavior (TgtName); the year of the entry (Year); the month of entry 
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 See the worksheets labeled “Monad Notes” and “Monadic Monthlies.” 
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(Month); the Goldstein Positive Case numeric count (GPCount); the Goldstein Positive 
Cumulative weighted score (GPCum); the Goldstein Negative Case numeric count 
(GNCount); and, the Goldstein Negative Cumulative weighted score (GNCum). The 
weighted sums accentuate high intensity actions (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
544
 The 
Goldstein scale was developed to provide placement of international events that were 
categorized by Charles McClelland in the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) onto a 
negative/conflictual-positive/cooperation scale. This scale has a numeric value range 
from -10.0 (conflictual interaction bordering/starting war) to +8.3 (cooperative 
interaction associated with close partnerships or alliances). While the WEIS categories 
provided a meaningful “ladder” of international dyadic interaction, the Goldstein scale 
adds intensity weights that capture the direction and levels of interaction more 
appropriately and with greater utility in making comparisons (Goldstein, 1992).
545
 A 
summary of Goldstein’s application of weights to WEIS events is provided in Table 8 
below. 
The third set of data provided in the VRA dataset was accumulations of specific 
news reports that searched out specific terms in the Japan-North Korea dyadic 
relationship in order to ensure all reports dealing with Japan’s BMD were accounted for 
and to provide a summary of the contents of the news reports themselves.
546
 Since the 
methodology used by VRA to identify reports of dyadic significance used the scanning of 
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 See the worksheets labeled “Dyad Notes” and “Dyadic Monthlies (Non-Null).” Some months had no 
data as there were no reports in those months for this dyad. In these cases, to facilitate regression 
analysis, new worksheets were created by copying the dyadic sheet and manually adding months to the 
data. A zero (0) was added to any monthly record created having no original data. Thus, a complete time-
series set of data was available with all months represented across the 22-year dataset period—a 
prerequisite for meaningful regression analyses. Figure 3 reflects the original dataset plus some months 
with 0s added to complete the year. 
545
 See pages 376-7. See McClelland (1999) for the original 1978 article describing WEIS. 
546
 The full contents of the news reports are proprietary; only summaries of key articles could be provided.  
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only the first two sentences of all available reports, it was possible some data containing 
largely BMD-specific references were omitted if that term was not used in the first two 
sentences of the report. Therefore, a supplemental data search was conducted to avoid 
this gap. These data were then used to create the “BMD Terms” independent variable 
(described below) and aid in the analysis of the regression modeling results. Reports 
identified an identity tag for the news report, the date of the report, and a summary of the 
news item. One worksheet (“JPN>PRK”) captured the dates and summaries of BMD-
related articles in context of the overall Japan-toward-North Korea dyadic relationship 
using key terms related to Japan’s BMD program provided by the author.547 These data 
yielded 479 total records across the 22-year scope of the dataset. The second worksheet 
(“PRK>JPN”) captured dates and summaries of ballistic missile-related articles within 
the North Korea-toward-Japan dyadic relationship using key terms related to North 
Korea’s ballistic missile program provided by the author. These data yielded 244 total 
records across the 22-year dataset.
548
 
Variable Descriptions 
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 The list of terms requested by the author for use in the VRA supplemental data search included: IMD, 
TMD, GPALS, Global Protection System, Patriot, PAC-2, PAC-3, ERINT, THAAD, Standard Missile, SM I, SM 
II, SM1, SM2, SM3, SM-1, SM-2, SM-3, MEADS, Navy Theater Wide, Navy Area Defense, Interceptor, Aegis, 
and AWS. This list was reduced since some terms did not reveal results in the specific Japan-toward-North 
Korea dyadic reporting, or terms were generating considerable false reports. The following terms used in 
the search by VRA for BMD articles in the Japan>North Korea dyad generated accurate reporting results: 
using the term missile “or” rocket “and” one of the following—GPALS, Patriot, PAC, ERINT, THAAD, SM, 
MEADS, Aegis, LEAP, BADGE, Hawk, and AWS. This type of search would have accounted for various forms 
of PAC missiles (i.e., PAC-2, PAC-3, SM-2) and removed false reports of “PAC” or “SM” that had nothing to 
do with BMD.  
548
 The list of terms requested by the author for use in the VRA supplemental data search included: Scud, 
Nodong, Paektusan, Hwasong, Musudan, Missile, Rocket, Weapons of mass destruction, WMD, Deterrent, 
Deterrence, KN-02, TD-1, TPD 1, TD-2, TPD 2, Taepodong, Taepo-dong, Taepo Dong, SS-N-6, Hawsong, No 
Dong, Ro Dong, and Rodong. This list was modified to remove terms reflecting broader common usage 
(i.e., “deterrence”) and terms without dyadic results. The North Korea>Japan ballistic missile-related 
dataset was not used in statistical analysis as the focus of the research was upon correlation of Japan’s 
BMD to all North Korean behavior. 
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Dependent Variables: North Korean Cooperative and Conflictual Behavior toward Japan. 
 There are two dependent variables in the models: one for positive, cooperative 
North Korean behavior toward Japan, and one for negative, conflictual North Korean 
behavior toward Japan. This recognizes that a capability or an action associated with 
deterrence, such as Japan’s BMD, can be correlated with more than a military or 
aggressive North Korean response. Rather, North Korea can respond in a variety of 
military, political, and economic ways and across a spectrum of positive and negative 
behavior. For this reason, the dataset provided by VRA was chosen: it provides data 
separation between cooperative and conflictual dyadic behavior toward Japan, and can 
give some measure of ordinal strength to the behavior by using a weighting system. Thus, 
North Korean behavior toward Japan is broken out in the regression models based upon 
positive, cooperative behavior or negative, conflictual behavior toward Japan.  
While there is interaction between North Korea and Japan reported in most 
months of the 22-year dataset, some months have many more reports than others. In 
September, 2002, for example, there were 22 positive data records of North Korean 
interaction toward Japan though, on average, there were only about two such cooperative 
reports per month. Across the 22-year dataset, there were 443 news reports indicating 
cooperative North Korean behavior toward Japan and 308 negative reports.
549
 More 
important than the number of monthly reports, however, are the strength or intensity of 
any single report and the cumulative strength of reports each month. Using the 
September, 2002 example, these reports reflect a cumulative weighted positive score of 
91.3; the average positive cumulative score was 5.1 per month. For comparative 
examples, a +5.1 on the Goldstein scale represents providing another actor policy or 
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 See the worksheet “Dyadic Monthlies (Non-Null).” 
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material support; a smaller level, such as a +2.0, indicates an apology; whereas a higher 
level, such as +7.4, reflects extending another actor economic aid (see Table 8). Such 
ordinal weighting allows relative comparisons among data and results, and offers some 
insight into the energy behind the positive interaction. The average positive value of each 
monthly datum in September, 2002, for example, is 4.15 on the Goldstein scale, 
indicating very positive interaction since zero (0) equals neutral interaction and 8.3 
represents the maximum possible positive interaction. In the end, a deterrence strategy is 
an intentional activity to influence an opponent’s security calculus, decisions and, 
ultimately, his reciprocal behavior—Japan’s BMD is no exception. Therefore, North 
Korea’s behavior toward Japan is the best choice for dependent variable. Data for these 
behavioral variables come from the VRA-provided database (Events Data 1990-2011, 
2012).
550
 
Independent Variables. 
 Positive & Negative Japanese Behavior toward North Korea 
 The positive and negative Japanese behavior variables reflect the in-depth dyadic 
behavioral interaction from Japan toward North Korea. Japanese behavior reflects both a 
“positive” and “negative” variable, representing Japan’s cooperative and conflictual 
behavior toward North Korea. For example, the variable of Japanese cooperative 
behavior toward North Korea is labeled “Positive J>NK” while conflictual behavior is 
labeled “Negative J>NK.” As with the dependent variable, the Japanese behavioral 
variables reflect the cumulative monthly intensity of all interactions that month. For 
comparison with North Korean behavior toward Japan, across the 22-year dataset there 
were 713 news reports indicating cooperative Japanese behavior toward North Korea and 
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468 negative reports.
551
 Including both components of Japan’s interaction with North 
Korea in a single regression model accounts for the fact that one component (positive or 
negative) of an actor’s behavior toward another state does not occur, nor is it interpreted 
by an opponent, in isolation of the other component. Since the dependent  
variable is a reflection of North Korea’s cooperative and conflictual behavior toward 
Japan, models addressing aspects of Japanese influence with North Korea (i.e., Japan’s 
BMD program) ideally include Japan’s cooperative and conflictual behavior toward 
North Korea in order to capture the best balanced dyadic interaction across the models. 
Including these variables is an essential step in providing a statistical foundation upon 
which to add the BMD-related variables of Japan’s interaction with North Korea. As with 
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the dependent variable, data for these behavioral variables come from the VRA-provided 
database (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
552
 
 BMD Terms 
This variable stems from the dissertation’s dataset, which includes a supplemental 
data search of Japanese behavior toward North Korea during the 22-year period, but with 
an exclusive set of BMD-related terms found within the research for other chapters of the 
dissertation, including the strategic profile, historical development, and missile defense-
deterrence literature review. The months in which these terms appeared in the data across 
the 22-year dataset were tagged to create a dichotomous independent variable to 
complement the two Japanese behavioral variables that reflected cooperative or 
conflictual behavior toward North Korea. The purpose of the supplemental data search 
was to ensure that all Japanese BMD activity in the data was captured within the 
statistical analyses.
553
 
The “BMD Terms” variable does not reflect positive or negative behavioral 
direction nor the cumulative weighting on the Goldstein scale, as the dyadic cooperative-
conflictual behavioral variables do. However, like the “Positive J>NK” and “Negative 
J>NK” variables, the “BMD Terms” variable does reflect behavior from Japan toward 
North Korea, only that behavior that makes specific reference to Japan’s BMD program, 
components, or use. For this reason, it is added into the model with the two Japanese 
behavioral dyadic variables that are specified as Japan-toward-North Korea directional 
behavioral variables.  
Taepodong-1 
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 See the worksheet “Dyadic Monthlies (Non-Null).” 
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 See the description of the dataset above for more details. 
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 There are four dichotomous independent variables that reflect the emergence of 
Japan’s BMD program over time.554 This set of variables is applied to all but Model 1 in 
each of the positive (Table 3) and negative (Table 4) regression analyses and, with the +/- 
Japanese behavioral variables, encompasses the entire period of the 22-year dataset. 
Applying these variables to the other variables allows analytic comparison with other, 
non-BMD-related independent variables. The “TD-1” variable represents the time period 
of September, 1998 through November, 2003, and is coded one (1) for all months within 
this period and zero (0) otherwise This period represents the period immediately 
following the 31 August, 1998 TD-1 missile launch that overflew Japan, surprising Japan 
and the U.S. in many ways and threatening Japan physically with debris or impact of a 
missile failure. It also was a clear political threat to Japan as it responded September 21
st
 
with reinvigorated discussions on BMD (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
555
 Research 
projects following the 1998 Taepodong-1 missile test included both internal and the 
initiation of substantial cooperative projects with the United States. Internally, Japan 
decided in October 1998 it needed to produce and deploy its own optical reconnaissance 
satellites in response to public criticism that the Japanese slow response after the launch 
was due, in part, to slow information-sharing from the United States. Indigenous satellites 
would enable Japan to reduce dependence upon the U.S. for threat and missile tracking 
data. Japan also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. in August 
1999 for joint research and production of BMD components specifically relating to the 
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 These variables are represented in the models by placing a 1 in those months represented by that 
variable’s time period and a 0 in all other months. No variable was created for the baseline period as an 
important feature of the modeling framework to avoid multicollinearity. See Lewis-Beck (1980), pages 67-
8. During the “baseline” period (January, 1990 through August, 1998), Japan began regular “consultations 
with the U.S. on BMD” in December, 1993, and in December, 1995 “commenced BMD study” including 
“possible BMD architecture, cost estimation, other issues” (Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), 2010). Page 6. 
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 See the year group “1998.” 
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Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block II interceptor missile (Swaine, Swanger, & Kawakami, 
2001).556 The TD-1 period ends with Japan’s choices relating to acquisition and 
deployment of its own BMD system. 
 Japan Decides 
According to Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, Japan’s leadership on 19 
December, 2003 “…decided ‘On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and 
Other Measures’ at the Security Council and the Cabinet Council today.” These decisions 
included the near-term introduction in Japan of Aegis and PAC-3 BMD capabilities 
(Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, 2003).
557
 This variable - “J Decides” is coded 
as a one (1) from December, 2003 through February 2007, and zero (0) for remaining 
months. Significant research, development, budgetary demands, improved command and 
control architectures, and military planning occurred during the December 2003-February 
2007 period. The July, 2006 multiple launches of ballistic missiles by North Korea 
prompted Japan to “front-load” and expedite deployment of Aegis and/or PAC-3 systems 
(Kaneda, Tajima, Kobayashi, & Tosaki, 2007), the next variable intended to capture the 
Japanese BMD process.
558
   
 Japan Deploys 
                                                          
556
 Pages 34-5. This MOU obligated Japan only to prototype production of: the SM-3 nose cone; the 
propulsion system of the SM-3’s second stage; the infrared seeker; and, the new kinetic warhead. Japan 
decided in November 1998 to develop its first-ever satellite reconnaissance capability (two radar, two 
electro-optical satellites) at a cost of around $2 billion, providing a technological basis for developing 
space-based early warning systems if Japan chose to do so (see pages 36-9). Japan’s space-based 
reconnaissance satellites, having no infrared sensors, cannot detect enemy ballistic missile launches. They 
are also multi-purpose systems under civilian, not military control, and are not formally linked to BMD 
cooperation with the United States. In December, 1998 the Japan-US Cooperative Research Project was 
approved by Japan’s Security Council and Cabinet (Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), 2010); page 6. 
557
 See paragraph numbers 1 and 2. 
558
 Page 7. 
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The first deployment of operational BMD occurred in Japan in March, 2007 
(Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), 2010).
559
 This marks the beginning of the “J Deploys” 
variable (coded as a one [1]). By the time of the 2009 TD-2 missile test, Japan had a 
portion of its BMD architecture operationally deployed, including PAC-3 land-based 
interceptors and the Aegis naval vessels carrying SM-3 interceptors. As it is understood 
that Japan’s BMD was a permanent deployment, this variable is coded as 1 through the 
end of the dataset in December, 2011, and zero (0) for months prior to March 2007. 
 Taepodong-2 
The final period of BMD dichotomous variables is the “TD-2” which represents 
the first time Japan placed operational BMD assets on a ready alert status in preparation 
to engage (shoot down) a North Korean ballistic missile. The modified TD-2 missile (also 
referred to as an Unha-2) launched on 5 April, 2009, though North Korea had warned UN 
civil aviation and maritime agencies of the impending launch and associated risks from 
debris on 11 March. Japan indicated on 18 March it was preparing its BMD for the event 
(Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
560
 On March 27
th, Japan’s Ministry of Defense, in 
according with the Emergency-Response Procedures Concerning Measures to Destroy 
Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects, issued the order to “destroy” the TD-2 if needed 
(Order for Operation of the Self-Defense Forces Concerning Measures to Destroy 
Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects, 2009). Aegis BMD assets with SM-3 missiles and 
PAC-3 batteries were field-deployed and comprised a “BMD Joint Task Force.” While 
BMD assets were deployed as early as March, 2007, this was the first overt 
demonstration by Japan to use their BMD to shoot down another state’s ballistic missile, 
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 The PAC-3 deployed at Iruma Air Base, representing “Japan’s first interceptor in history.” See page 6. 
560
 See the year group “2009.” 
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and represented a political and military departure, both in terms of political resolve and 
military capability, from simply having BMD “available.” For these reasons, the 
timeframe for Japan’s BMD from this event to the end of the dataset (December, 2011) is 
isolated to capture this departure, and is coded as one (1); other months are coded as zero 
(0). 
 Positive & Negative United States (U.S.), Chinese (PRC), and South Korean 
(ROK) Behavior toward North Korea 
 The next three groups of variables represent detailed dyadic behavioral interaction 
from three dominant actors with North Korea in Northeast Asia: the U.S.; South Korea; 
and, China. Each actor has both a “positive” and “negative” variable, representing that 
actor’s cooperative and conflictual behavior toward North Korea. For the U.S., for 
example, the variable of cooperative behavior toward North Korea is labeled “Positive 
US>NK” while conflictual behavior is labeled “Negative US>NK.” An identical 
approach is taken for ROK and PRC variables. As with the dependent variable, the 
behavioral variables of these three countries reflect the cumulative monthly intensity of 
all interactions that month. For comparison with Japanese behavior toward North Korea 
mentioned above, across the 22-year dataset there were: 2,097 news reports indicating 
cooperative U.S. behavior toward North Korea and 1,376 conflictual reports; 661 positive 
PRC toward North Korea and 246 negative; and, 1,404 positive ROK toward North 
Korea and 930 negative.
561
 Including both components of an actor’s interaction with 
North Korea in a single regression model is needed to account for the realities of dyadic 
interaction. The idea with these variables is that each actor’s interaction with North Korea 
may affect North Korea’s behavior toward Japan. These variables acknowledge those 
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dynamics and are intended as statistical controls to help isolate the effect of Japan’s 
BMD. Data for these behavioral variables come from the VRA-provided database 
(Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
562
  
The variable addressing the role or impact of U.S. cooperative and conflictual 
behavior toward North Korea upon North Korea’s behavior toward Japan sought to 
address whether the dominant position of the U.S. over Japan was correlated to how 
North Korea interacted with Japan in light of the presence of its BMD. The U.S. variables 
were included since the U.S. is Japan’s principal ally in the region and has been since 
World War II. A dominant player in the region and leader of the Cold War strategy to 
contain Communism by armed defense and conflict on the peninsula during the Korean 
War, the U.S. remains a central actor in North Korean relations, including its behavior 
toward U.S. allies in the region. China also influences North Korea as its closest ally. 
Views differ on the strength of China’s influence over North Korean national security 
decision-making, though most agree it exists. China also shares Japan as a common 
historical enemy with North Korea. However, China’s emergence as a global power 
creates periodic friction with North Korea as their regional—and at least on the part of 
China—global, interests diverge. China would be expected to have the greatest 
mollifying effect upon North Korea’s provocative activities. Finally, the ROK variables 
acknowledge the cultural, political, and military proximity of the two Koreas on the 
peninsula. ROK policies, such as the Sunshine policy of the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
affect North Korean behavior, if but for a time. South Korea’s interaction with the North 
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might affect North Korea’s behavior toward Japan given Japan’s security position as a 
common ally of the United States.
563
 
 Political Rapprochement 
 Japan and North Korea conducted perhaps two meaningful periods of political 
interaction that could be characterized as serious discussions that could have led to 
normalization of relations. The first was in the early period of the dataset beginning with 
the ending of the Cold War and North Korea’s loss of patronage from the defunct Soviet 
Union. Though not as promising possibly as the second timeframe, this early timeframe 
included a summit in Pyongyang with a legislative delegation from Japan’s LDP party, as 
well as follow up discussions ending approximately November, 1992 when prospects for 
overcoming differences and gaining national buy-in for normalization across Japan did 
not materialize.  
The second rapprochement period began in December, 1999 when diplomatic 
talks began in earnest, including discussions in Japan on 9 December, 1999 of lifting all 
sanctions against North Korea (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
564
 Other meetings and 
discussions occurred, but the highlight was clearly the historic summit between Prime 
Minister Koizumi and KJI in Pyongyang on 17 September, 2002. But rapprochement 
quickly faced the reality of old differences, and the prospects for normalization dipped: 
on September 18
th, Japanese press questioned North Korea’s sincerity; on September 
22
nd
, Japan was contemplating demands upon North Korea for monetary compensation 
for the abductees taken to the North in previous years; and, by 14 October, Japan’s prime 
minister called North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens “unpardonable” (Events 
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 For more information on the backgrounds of the dynamics and history of each of these actors in the 
region, see Chapter Two: History and Chapters Five and Six (Strategic Profile Parts I and II). 
564
 See the year group “1999.” 
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Data 1990-2011, 2012).
565
 There were both cooperative and conflictual activities that 
occurred in the next one to two years, reaching another peak in May, 2004 with the 
second Koizumi summit meeting. In July, 2004 it was reported talks may resume, but 
talks broke down after that, effectively ending the prospects for any serious 
rapprochement, at least for the time being. While there were other meetings and 
discussions that followed, including meetings in 2006 and 2008, the abduction issue 
proved a stubborn issue in Japanese politics, and North Korea’s coercive strategy had not 
been abandoned, making 2004 possibly the last period when normalization was actually 
within sight for the two parties.
566
 
 Political Parties 
 The role of political parties can also affect national security policies, activities, 
budgets, and other behavior, including interaction with North Korea or U.S. allies. The 
cluster of party-related variables includes: Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (“J LDP”); 
the ROK Grand National Party (“ROK GNP”); and, the U.S. Grand Old Party (“US 
GOP”). All three parties were generally described as conservative and often shared 
common, sometimes hardline, security values and policies. For example, U.S. President 
Bush and Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi expressed a common, hardline position on 
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 See the year group “2002.” 
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 The number one (1) was placed in those months identified as part of the rapprochement period; all 
other months were identified by a zero (0). While the first Koizumi summit with KJI was an historic event, 
the second summit was essentially an effort to see if any way forward was possible in the near term. 
While Figure 4 depicts a very high cumulative score for the month of Koizumi’s second summit with KJI 
(May, 2004), the number of reports in that month is exceptionally high, helping to generate such a high 
overall score. While a high cumulative score usually, and accurately, indicates high intensity, in this 
particular case, the sheer volume of positive reports that month (64) portrayed perhaps more intensity 
than what was really there: the average intensity of the reports that month is +2.54 on the Goldstein 
scale, somewhat higher intensity then the average positive score for the 22-year dataset (+1.74), but not a 
remarkably high average. Further, the North Korean volume and intensity was a third that of Japan’s, 
indicating more modest North Korean expectations for the 2004 summit. 
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North Korea at a summit on June 29, 2006 (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
567
 Because 
North Korea reacted differently to policy (e.g., favorably toward the ROK’s Sunshine 
Policy of President Kim Dae-jung’s Democratic Party, which included an historic summit 
meeting in Pyongyang), the role of political parties presenting a relatively common 
security policy toward North Korea was appropriate.
568
  
Analysis 
General 
 Interpretation of the statistically significant coefficient estimates can be illustrated 
by describing the interpretation of one of the independent variables. For example, in 
Table 4, the variable “TD-2” reflects a coefficient estimate in Model 2 of -4.31 and an 
indicator of “**” following the value. This value (-4.31**) denotes the direction of the 
effect of the TD-2 variable on North Korean behavior, in this case (Table 4) negative 
behavior. For this variable in Model 2, since the sign is a negative (-), and the coefficient 
estimate in the regression equation is a multiplier for the independent variable, the 
negative effect indicated (-4.31) upon conflictual North Korean behavior denotes a 
positive direction. That is, “TD-2” lessens conflictual North Korean behavior toward 
Japan. The “**” indicates statistical significance at the <.05 level. 
Two tables summarize the results of the regression analyses and are arranged to 
allow one to gauge the sensitivity of the coefficient estimates to different model 
specifications. Table 3 provides results for positive, cooperative North Korean behavior 
toward Japan; Table 4 lists the results for negative, conflictual North Korean behavior 
toward Japan. The models are arranged in identical fashion in the two tables. Model 1 
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 See the worksheet entitled “JPN>PRK.” 
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 The number 1 was placed in those months identified as part of the period when each party was in 
power; all other months were identified by a zero (0). 
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includes the cooperative and conflictual Japanese behavior toward North Korea taken 
from dyadic interaction provided in the 22-year database along with the "BMD Terms" 
variable as it was closely associated with these two Japanese-to-North Korea variables.
569
 
For Model 2, the variables dealing with various time periods of Japan’s development of 
its BMD program were added. This provides the baseline from which to view the results 
of other independent variables (Models 3, 4, and 5 capture the behavioral variables using 
the dyadic data provided in the dissertation’s 22-year database; Model 6 considers the 
periods of Japan-North Korea rapprochement interaction; and, Model 7 considers 
political parties).
570
 
Analysis of Independent Variables 
Positive & Negative Japanese Behavior toward North Korea. 
There exists a relatively strong correlation between Japanese cooperative behavior 
toward North Korea and cooperative North Korean behavior in return (see Table 3). The 
“Positive J>NK” variable was statistically significant in all of the positive models, with 
nearly identical (though modest) positive coefficient estimates ranging from 0.48*** to 
0.50*** across models. The stability of the coefficient values across models provides 
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 This model was used as a starting point to illustrate the basic interaction between Japan and North 
Korea and to provide comparison with the time-series BMD related variables in the subsequent model. 
570
 See Lewis-Beck’s description of dichotomous, ordinal, and nominal variables. Pages 66-7. The 
“Rapprochement” variables are nominal dummy variables. As opposed to ordinal variables, such as 
attitudes measured in some order of amount, these nominal variables have no particular order or ranking 
within their data. In the case of rapprochement, these variables merely acknowledge time periods of 
purposeful or intense political interaction between Japan and North Korea expressly aimed at furthering 
the dialogue for political normalization of relations between the two states. The political party variables 
(“J LDP,” “ROK GNP,” and “US GOP”) are also nominal dummy variables. As opposed to ordinal variables, 
these nominal variables have no particular order or ranking within their data. In the case of political 
parties, these variables capture the time periods when Japan’s LDP, South Korea’s GNP, and the U.S. GOP 
parties were in power. These actors tend to incur more frequent and/or higher levels of conflictual North 
Korean behavior toward them when these parties are in power, perhaps owing to their portrayals of 
North Korea as a threat more than their political opponents do, or perhaps because of the easing of 
economic interaction consistent with their political opponents (e.g., ROK’s “Sunshine Policy” during the 
2000s while the GNP was not in power). 
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some additional confidence in the robustness of the estimates; that is, the other variables, 
including specific BMD-related variables added to the core set of models, considered 
across the models did not alter the coefficients of the Japanese behavioral variables. 
Conflictual Japanese behavior did not statistically correlate to any increase in cooperative 
North Korean behavior toward Japan, but this was expected.  
 On the other hand, both of the Japanese behavioral variables (reflecting Japan's 
cooperative and conflictual behavior) toward North Korea were correlated with negative 
North Korean behavior toward Japan (see Table 4). For example, Japan’s conflictual 
behavior toward North Korea (“Negative J>NK”) was statistically significant in all 
models and with slightly more effect than the Japanese behavior in the positive models 
(Table 3). Coefficient estimates for conflictual Japanese behavior ranged from +0.33*** 
to +0.40*** across models. The positive sign indicates an increase in negative, 
conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, which is to be expected. Cooperative 
Japanese behavior toward North Korea (“Positive J>NK”) was statistically significant in 
all models. Coefficient estimates ranged from -0.12*** to -0.14*** across models. The 
negative sign indicates a decrease in negative, conflictual North Korean behavior toward 
Japan, which is also to be expected. The low coefficient values indicate conflictual 
Japanese behavior may have resonated more with North Korea’s leadership than 
cooperative behavior. Coefficient estimates were nearly identical for both variables in all 
models. As with the Japanese behavioral variables in the positive models, the stability of 
the coefficient values across these negative models provides some strength to their 
estimates; that is, the other variables considered across the models, including specific 
BMD-related variables added to the core set of models, did not alter the coefficients of 
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the Japanese behavioral variables. The coefficient estimates for Japanese dyadic 
behavioral variables, however, are both relatively low compared to two of the BMD 
variables (discussed below). The “J Deploys” and “TD-2” variables were both 
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statistically significant in all but one model with coefficients from 4.1 to 7.0 in absolute 
values. 
BMD Terms. 
 The BMD Terms variable was not statistically significant in any of the models in 
either table reflecting cooperative or conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan. 
The purpose of this variable was to supplement the cooperative and conflictual Japanese 
behavioral variables above in the dyadic relationship with North Korea by highlighting 
those months in the dyadic variables that specified BMD in the interaction from Japan 
toward North Korea. For this reason, it was not expected to result in statistically 
significant results in the regression analyses. Further, the relative stability of the 
coefficient values across models (ranging from -1.40 to -2.20*) suggests the other 
variables considered did not alter the coefficients of this variable. 
Taepodong-1. 
 The TD-1 variable was statistically significant with cooperative North Korea 
behavior toward Japan in several of the models where it was present (+2.49** in Model 
2; +2.52** in Model 3; and, +2.39** in Model 5).
571
 Japan’s BMD activity in this period 
followed the surprising 1998 TD-1 missile launch over Japan, creating alarm across 
Japan, and possibly generating a reaction within Japan (including heavy BMD 
commitments) that North Korea’s leadership did not anticipate. The positive effect of the 
TD-1 variable in the regression models also corresponds to a period of intense 
cooperative interaction between Japan and North Korea (see Figure 4) as, starting in 
December, 1999 they met regularly and discussed normalization, culminating in a 
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 However, after further testing, Model 6 also indicated statistical significance. See “Multicollinearity” 
below. 
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summit meeting in Pyongyang in September, 2002, and a second summit in May, 2004 
(Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
572
 It is possible that Japan felt it was in a stronger 
political position having made significant strides in BMD R&D and gained considerable 
public and legislative backing. North Korea may have calculated that Japan’s BMD 
undercut North Korea’s ballistic missile-backed strategy of coercion and that a period of 
political “warming” may stifle support among Japan’s public and legislature for large 
investments in BMD, ultimately helping North Korea achieve better outcomes from 
Japan.
573
 Interestingly, the Sohae Satellite Launching Station began construction in 2001 
(Sohae Satellite Launching Station, 2012),
574
 during the TD-1 period, as North Korea 
was clearly looking for a way to test missiles in other direction; this facility was used to 
launch long-range missiles in 2012 that flew in a southerly trajectory and did not fly over 
Japan’s main island of Honshu which includes Tokyo. The positive effect of the TD-1 
variable seems to support this period of high-level cooperative Japan-North Korea 
political interaction and may have contributed to North Korea’s decision to seek an 
alternative missile test facility. The effect of Japan’s BMD in the TD-1 period seems to 
indicate that Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence against North Korea. 
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 For example, North Korea provided advance notice to Japan of its anti-ship missile tests into the Sea of 
Japan 24 February, 2003 (Nanto, 2003); page 25. Also, the early 2004 summit meeting may have been 
North Korea’s last serious attempt to positively affect Japan’s decisions regarding BMD, though in the 
months preceding the second summit Japan had already indicated decisions in going forward with BMD. 
574
 See paragraph one. 
277 
 
 However, other independent variables appear to affect the TD-1 variable in some 
models. This does not appear in any of the negative models for the TD-1 variable (Table 
4). In these models, the relative stability of the coefficient values across models (ranging 
from -1.32 to -1.77) suggests the other variables considered across the models did not 
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alter the coefficients of this variable. On the other hand, in the positive models (Table 3), 
the statistical significance of the TD-1 variable was reduced: in two models (Models 4 
and 7), the coefficients dropped below the <.05** p-value standard (though they 
indicated p-values at the <.10* level); the third (Model 6) lost all statistical significance 
(this was reversed in further testing).
575
 In Model 4, the additional independent variable 
was cooperative and conflictual PRC behavior toward North Korea, with the “Positive 
PRC>NK” variable statistically significant (+0.09**). This suggests the positive 
influence of China upon North Korea contributed to the cooperative North Korean 
behavior toward Japan. This effect is a very modest one, however, considering: the very 
low (.09) coefficient for the PRC variable; and, the fact that the p-value for the TD-1 
variable was .06—very close to making the statistically significant threshold. In Model 6, 
the Rapprochement variables had a more noticeable effect upon the TD-1 variable 
estimates, moving, for example, from 2.39** in Model 5 to 0.86 in Model 6. This could 
be explained, in part, by the positive effect of the normalization talks in the early 2000s, 
for example, but if this were the case one would expect the “Rapprochement 2000” 
variable to have yielded a statistically significant coefficient. But this was not the case. 
As already indicated, further testing suggests TD-1 is statistically significant in Model 6. 
The rapprochement variables did not have any significant effect upon other variables. 
The political parties variables (Model 7) also effected the TD-1 variable estimates (p-
value moved to .09) with the “US GOP” variable indicating a statistically significant 
+2.03** coefficient. In this case, however, the Constant moved to a negative sign, the 
only model having such a direction, possibly indicating greater U.S. interaction with 
North Korea, though positive in direction, decreased the North’s cooperative behavior 
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toward Japan. Since Model 7 contains the highest number of variables (11) it is possible 
the number of variables also created some unreliable values among some coefficients.  
Japan Decides. 
 On 19 December, 2003 Japan announced it was partnering with the U.S. in co-
development of new, more capable BMD missile technologies (Events Data 1990-2011, 
2012).
576
 Later it would decide to acquire and field its own BMD capabilities rather than 
rely on the U.S. or others for defense of Japan against ballistic missiles. This was 
especially important given the coercive, pressuring nature of the North Korean ballistic 
missile activity in the past. Japan was not only worried about wartime contingencies with 
North Korean ballistic missiles possibly armed with WMD; it needed to field a direct 
counter to the North’s strategy of coercion against Japan in general deterrence, sub-
conflict scenarios. The coefficient values across models were not significantly affected 
(i.e., neither lost nor gained statistical significance) suggests the other variables 
considered across the models did not alter the coefficients of this variable. 
While the “J Decides” variable did not produce statistically significant coefficient 
estimates in any model, during this period positive talks between Japan and North Korea 
occurred again with Prime Minister Koizumi’s summit with KJI in Pyongyang on 5 May, 
2004 (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
577
 This meeting achieved by far the highest 
cumulative score of cooperative interaction by Japan toward North Korea in any single 
month in the 22-year dataset, occurring just five months after Japan made formal 
commitments to go beyond BMD R&D efforts. In fact, this was the highest scored month 
on either the positive or negative scale in the entire dataset (see Figure 4). Positive talks 
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continued in February, 2006 (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
578
 As Japan began to 
assemble BMD components late in this period, North Korean behavior turned conflictual: 
on July 4 and 5, 2006, it test launched seven ballistic missiles, including a Nodong, 
several Scuds, and a TD-2 which failed one minute into powered flight; and, on October 
9, 2006 North Korea carried out its first test of a nuclear device (Events Data 1990-2011, 
2012).
579
 The North Korean ballistic missile launches occurred prior to Japan fielding any 
operational BMD systems capable of shooting down North Korean ballistic missiles. 
North Korea may have calculated it was better positioned to conduct such missile tests 
prior to Japan’s BMD deployment. Either way, it seems that the relative proximate 
timing of the North Korean multiple-salvo ballistic missile tests with the nuclear test was 
intended to be understood as parts of a single whole: North Korea could threaten its 
neighbors with WMD-armed ballistic missiles. 
Japan Deploys. 
 Japan fielded its first operational BMD capability in March, 2007. Perhaps not 
coincidentally, that same month the political dialogue between Japan and North Korea 
once again stalled over the abduction issue and failure to resolve core issues between the 
two parties (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
580
 Further, and not surprisingly, the “J 
Deploys” variable did not prove statistically significant with North Korea’s cooperative 
behavior toward Japan (see Table 3); that is, it did not yield any measurable improvement 
in the Japan-North Korea relationship. This variable did, however, prove statistically 
significant in all of the models addressing negative North Korean behavior toward Japan 
(ranging from +4.19** in Model 4 to +5.29** in Model 7). The positive coefficient sign 
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suggests the new deployment of Japan’s BMD systems was correlated with increased 
conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan—Japan’s BMD undermined deterrence 
against North Korea. If North Korea’s coercion strategy is in fact undergirded by its 
ballistic missile force, it appears its leaders were frustrated if not angry by the actual 
operational deployment of a reliable countermeasure. Their behavior toward Japan 
reflected such sentiments. Further, the coefficient values across models were relatively 
stable (ranging from 1.62 to 2.45 in Table 3 and 4.19** to 5.29** in Table 4) suggesting 
the other variables considered across the models did not alter the coefficients of this 
variable. 
Taepodong-2. 
As mentioned above, Japan expedited BMD deployment, a decision that may 
have contributed to a negative correlation. With the Sohae facility in western North 
Korea not yet complete (Kimball & Davenport, 2013),
581
 and part of Japan’s BMD 
capability operationally deployed, it is possible North Korea’s frustration with its new 
position vis-à-vis Japan coupled with an enduring need to demonstrate its resolve, led KJI 
to modify his decision calculus in several ways concerning the next two North Korean 
ballistic missile tests. First, rather than launch a long-range ballistic missile over Japan as 
it had done in 1998, North Korea opted to launch shorter-range missiles again in April 
and May, 2008 (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
582
 Perhaps surprisingly, these events 
hardly registered for either state in the dyadic Japanese or North Korean conflictual 
behavioral interaction captured in the database (see Figure 4). Prepared to defend itself 
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with BMD if necessary, Japan did not appear to be flustered by ballistic missile launches, 
especially short-range missiles. The lack of Japanese reaction is noteworthy.  
More interestingly, however, the second way KJI may have changed his decision 
calculus regarding ballistic missile use under general deterrence conditions occurred 
during the next and last period of Japanese BMD development (“TD-2”). This BMD 
variable was not statistically significant in the positive models (Table 3) but was in all of 
the models analyzing conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan except Model 4. 
Coefficients ranged from -4.19** in Model 6 to -7.06** in Model 7; the coefficient was -
3.70* for Model 4. The coefficient values across positive models were not significantly 
affected (i.e., neither lost nor gained statistical significance) which suggests the other 
variables considered across those models did not alter the coefficients of this variable in 
the positive models. The coefficient values across negative models were not significantly 
affected (i.e., neither lost nor gained statistical significance) with the exception of Model 
4, suggesting the other variables considered across the models did not alter the 
coefficients of this variable except in Model 4. In this case, variables reflecting Chinese 
behavior toward North Korea affected the TD-2 variable (p-value changed to 0.08), 
losing its statistical significance at the <.05** level. Neither of the PRC behavioral 
variables, however, was statistically significant and did not significantly affect any other 
variables. Unlike the positive (+) sign indicated in the “J Deploys” variable in the same 
models discussed above, the negative (-) signs indicate a reduction in conflictual North 
Korean behavior toward Japan. This suggests that, at least in this last period, Japan’s 
BMD capabilities had a restraining, deterring, effect upon North Korean decision-making 
and behavior.  
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The change in North Korean behavior centers on the April, 2009 flight test of its 
long-range TD-2 missile. It was clear North Korean behavior associated with this test was 
markedly different as this test was carried out with different observable patterns. First, 
the missile possibly flew a less threatening flight path, such as a higher altitude over 
Japan and/or a more northerly trajectory over the northern most tip of Japan’s Honshu 
Island away from densely-populated areas (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2009).
583
 Second, 
North Korea announced the anticipated launch weeks in advance and with pre-
notifications to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO), agencies of the United Nations (Kimball & Davenport, 
2013).
584
 This was the first time North Korea had ever placed itself in compliance with 
providing this type of information to UN agencies (Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 
2010).
585
 These changes not only complied with rules for air and naval safety purposes 
(MacBurnie, 2006)
586
 but also quelled notions of North Korea surprise or ill-intent to 
Japan and others. But on 18 March, 2009, nearly three weeks prior to the 5 April launch, 
Japan gave orders to deploy its BMD and shoot down the TD-2 under certain 
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circumstances. By 27 March, 2009 Japan’s BMD was ready to shoot (Events Data 1990-
2011, 2012).
587
  
While North Korea may not have known the exact conditions under which 
Japan’s BMD would have engaged the TD-2, it was public knowledge of the BMD’s 
preparedness and readiness. Thus, the ballistic missile activity of North Korean behavior 
in this period was, in fact, more restrained than in previous actions, demonstrating a 
consistent pattern of North Korean calculation and action with the correlation of “TD-2” 
indicated in the regression models. The significant North Korean ballistic missile activity 
in 2012 (past the cutoff for the dissertation’s dataset) was also consistent with this 
analysis, if not more pronounced: multi-stage long-range missiles were launched on 13 
April and 12 December, 2012 from the new Sohae facility, flying southerly trajectories 
and avoiding Japan’s main island of Honshu (Sohae Satellite Launching Station, 
2012).
588
 The December event was North Korea’s first successful attempt to place a 
satellite into orbit. This could suggest North Korea was intent on avoiding engagement of 
its missiles by Japan’s BMD simply by flying the missiles away from Japan and its BMD. 
Unfortunately, North Korea also conducted its second nuclear test in the TD-2 period 
(Events Data 1990-2011, 2012),
589
 though it did not reflect the level of negative 
cumulative Japanese or North Korean behavior as did the TD-2 event (see Figure 4). 
Positive & Negative United States (U.S.) Behavior toward North Korea. 
 Surprisingly, neither the cooperative nor the conflictual U.S. behavior toward 
North Korea proved statistically significant in the positive or negative models of North 
Korean behavior toward Japan. Though there is a significant volume of U.S. interaction 
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with North Korea across the 22-year dataset (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012),
590
 
coefficient estimates for U.S. behavior were negligible (for example, -0.003 for “Positive 
US>NK” in Table 3). Neither was there any indication that these variables had much 
effect (i.e., neither lost nor gained statistical significance) in altering the strength either 
way of any of the BMD variables in the cooperative or conflictual models. If the U.S. and 
Japan were always aligned in terms of policy and behavior, this would be even more 
surprising; however, they often are not. For example, when President Bush characterized 
North Korea as part of an “axis of evil,” Japan strongly differed (Events Data 1990-2011, 
2012).
591
 Further, Japan held secret meetings with North Korea in the period leading up 
to the 2002 summit meeting between KJI and Koizumi in Pyongyang.
592
 The U.S. was 
purposely kept in the dark about these secret negotiations (Haruki, 2012).
593
 
Positive & Negative Chinese (PRC) Behavior toward North Korea. 
 The role of China emerged in the model analyzing cooperative North Korean 
behavior toward Japan (see Model 4, Table 3). The coefficient estimate was statistically 
significant (+0.09**) for cooperative Chinese interaction toward North Korea (the 
“Positive PRC>NK” variable). This positive coefficient for cooperative Chinese behavior 
suggests that, in this model, China’s positive role tends to increase North Korea’s 
cooperative interaction toward Japan. Perhaps China sought to alleviate pressure on 
North Korea to antagonize their mutual historical rival Japan so that Japan did not 
become more militaristic. This is to be expected in some regards since China is opposed 
to Japan’s BMD generally, and because it could provide added protection from Chinese 
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ballistic missile attack against Taiwan (Swaine, Swanger, & Kawakami, 2001).
594
 There 
also exists economic competition between China and Japan, as well as territorial disputes 
that include significant energy reserves. So, there seems to be ample support to explain 
the statistically significant positive PRC behavior toward North Korea. However, the 
coefficient estimate is very modest, suggesting a small effect on North Korean behavior 
toward Japan. As described above, PRC behavior affected the statistical significance of 
the TD-1 BMD variable in the positive model; all other BMD variables remained 
unchanged (i.e., neither lost nor gained statistical significance) in the remaining models. 
Positive & Negative South Korean (ROK) Behavior toward North Korea. 
 It was difficult to predict the effect of the ROK variables upon North Korean 
behavior toward Japan since ROK and Japan have not had a close relationship despite 
sharing a common ally (U.S.). But neither the cultural connections between South and 
North, nor cooperative policies toward the North, such as the Sunshine policy had any 
statistical significant effects upon North Korean behavior toward Japan in either model 
(Table 3 or 4). It appears the dyadic interaction between the two Koreas may not 
contribute to any North Korean behavior to Japan. ROK behavior did not have any 
significant effect on any of the BMD variables (i.e., neither lost nor gained statistical 
significance) in any of the positive or negative models. 
Political Rapprochement. 
 Despite the heightened cooperative interaction in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
the rapprochement variable that overlapped specific BMD-related periods 
(“Rapprochement 2000”) did not have a statistically significant effect on cooperative 
North Korean behavior. It did, however, work to decrease conflictual North Korean 
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behavior toward Japan (-4.43**), as seen in Table 4 (Model 6). As described in the 
discussion above (TD-1 variable), rapprochement appeared to affect the statistical 
significance of the TD-1 BMD variable in the cooperative model (further tests indicate 
TD-1 was statistically significant);
595
 all other BMD variables remained unchanged (i.e., 
neither lost nor gained statistical significance) in the remaining models. So, while it was 
expected that the rapprochement dynamic would have an effect on North Korean 
behavior, it was not known the direction (+/- sign) the behavior would take or its 
intensity. In this case, the interesting result of the analyses is not the lack of additional 
cooperative behavior (statistically) but the reduction of North Korean conflictual 
behavior, suggesting it did more to mollify the North from its coercive strategy, at least to 
some extent and for a period of time. The political rapprochement opportunities were 
seriously set back, however, when Japanese domestic and governmental reactions to 
North Korea’s admission to a wider array of Japanese abductions were negative (Events 
Data 1990-2011, 2012).
596
 As with the 1998 TD-1 launch, this admission may have 
represented another miscalculation by North Korea’s leadership in underestimating the 
domestic sensitivities of these issues within Japan.  
Further, between the two summits, North Korea in rapid succession displayed 
significant conflictual behavior toward Japan and others: on 10 January, 2003 it 
announced the state’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (commonly referred to as the NPT); in February, and again in March, 2003 it 
conducted short-range ballistic missile tests, with the missiles impacting into the Sea of 
Japan; and, on 19 March, 2003, North Korea’s leadership indicated the state may no 
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longer adhere to a long-range ballistic missile test moratorium (Events Data 1990-2011, 
2012).
597
 These were very troubling indicators for Japan, especially having experienced 
over two years of cooperative interaction with North Korea. This period included a 
positive note with the first round of the Six-Party Talks in late August, 2003 (Events Data 
1990-2011, 2012),
598
 a political process in which Japan formally participated in order to 
address the North Korean threat (especially its emerging nuclear weapons capability, 
though the abduction issue was never far from Japan’s interests). 
Political Parties. 
The role of political party did not tend to make much of a difference. In fact, the 
periods of rapprochement between Japan and North Korea occurred while Japan’s more 
conservative party, the LDP, was in power. Though in power for many years, the LDP 
was considered to be very cautious in terms of Japan’s national security interests. It is 
possible that part of the drive for interaction with North Korea had more to do with Prime 
Minister Koizumi’s personal approach, perhaps seeking a solution with North Korea at a 
time when Japan’s ability to absorb the financial compensatory costs would be less 
painful, or possibly even for reasons of personal image or legacy. The “US GOP” 
variable’s coefficient estimate as statistically significant (+2.03**) is more difficult to 
explain. It would appear to be anomalous to the other two political parties (which did not 
prove statistically significant) as well as the cooperative U.S. dyadic behavior toward 
North Korea (“Positive US>NK”) which one would expect to share results if either was 
statistically significant. But these were not the case. It is possible that because the GOP 
period overlapped Japan’s rapprochement activities in the 2000s some partnering 
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between the U.S. and Japan in relations with North Korea help explain the statistical 
significance. However, in comparing the U.S. and Japanese cooperative and conflictual 
behavior toward North Korea during this period, it appears their interests occasionally 
diverged. Also, as described in the discussion above (TD-1 variable), the political parties 
affected the statistical significance of the TD-1 BMD variable in the cooperative model; 
all other BMD variables remained unchanged (i.e., neither lost nor gained statistical 
significance) in the remaining models. 
Tests and Diagnostics 
 All of the variables in both Table 3 and Table 4 assessed to be significant with 
their respective coefficient estimates were supported with significance testing both 
through proving statistically significant at the .05, two-tailed level and having t-ratios 
above 2.0 in value.
599
 Further tests for autocorrelation and multicollinearity were also 
conducted. 
Autocorrelation. 
Of the 14 regression models, all had Durban-Watson statistical values 
approximately 2.0, the value used for identifying potential serial correlation 
(autocorrelation). Autocorrelation problems within the dependent variable of the 
regression models can arise, especially models using time-series data like the dissertation 
database. The dependent variable may produce a lagging effect captured in other data 
related to the dependent variable later in the data. Time-series models, therefore, can be 
more susceptible to autocorrelation and distort analysis. Since about half of the models 
had Durban-Watson values slightly less than 2.0 (ranging from 1.89 to 1.95), further 
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testing was conducted to analyze serial correlation of the dependent variable in the 
models. All but one of the models with Durban-Watson values less than 2.0 were within 
the models analyzing positive North Korean behavior toward Japan—models which also 
had higher R
2
 values than the models which analyzed conflictual North Korean behavior 
toward Japan. The possibility existed that part of the explanation for higher R
2
 results for 
the cooperative models was a serially correlated dependent variable emerging in the 
regression analyses.  
 
To test for autocorrelation one can either use Durban-Watson and “critical values” 
comparative testing, or conduct separate, lagging-variable regression. For the 
dissertation’s models used, the test for autocorrelation was done by using “critical 
values” provided for Durban-Watson testing. Critical values are two figures which 
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provide statistical indications whether serial correlation of the dependent variable may 
exist. These testing values are derived using the sample size for time-series analysis and 
the number of regressor variables used in each model. The sample size for this testing 
was determined to be 264, which corresponded to the number of months (12 months X 22 
years) in which data were provided in the database. The critical values used for the 
Durbin-Watson statistical tests were obtained from within the gretl software, and also 
cross-checked using formal critical values tables provided by Stanford University among 
their statistical analysis online resources (Stanford University). One critical value is a 
lower “dL” figure; the other is an upper “dU” figure. The regression model’s Durban-
Watson statistical score is compared to the critical values: if the Durban-Watson score is 
higher than the dU value, then no serial correlation is present; if it is below the dL figure, 
then there exists a good possibility that serial correlation is present, warranting further 
testing, such as inclusion of a lagged dependent variable; if the Durban-Watson score is 
between the two critical values, then the results are not conclusive. The results are seen in 
Table 5, reflecting no serial correlation of the dependent variable in any of the models. 
Multicollinearity. 
Tests were also conducted for multicollinearity for some models, where a high 
correlation among independent variables was possible. In such cases, the overall models 
are likely accurate, though the validity of the predictive power of statistically significant 
independent variables may be reduced. The most common error that could create 
conditions of multicollinearity is the improper use of dichotomous independent variables 
for coverage of particular time periods in time-series analyses. In this case, dichotomous 
variables are created that cover the entirety of the periods in the database sample size 
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(i.e., 264 months in the case of the dissertation’s database), thus creating a condition in 
which no period is excluded for statistical comparison. Models 2 through 7 used in both 
cooperative and conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan (Tables 3 and 4) used 
time-based dichotomous variables pertaining to key Japanese decision points or behavior 
periods relating to their BMD program; however, all models excluded the period January, 
1990, through August, 1998, of the database sample (a period of minimal Japanese BMD 
related activity). This exclusion was purposely designed to avoid risks of 
multicollinearity in the various regression model analyses. However, statistically 
significant coefficient estimates resulted in model analyses for three dichotomous 
independent variables, so further testing was done to address possible multicollinearity in 
the models, especially those variables with significant coefficient estimates.  
This further testing was done where models analyzing cooperative North Korean 
behavior (Table 3) reflected consistently higher R
2
 values (though independent variable 
coefficients were generally not significant), and models analyzing conflictual North 
Korean behavior (Table 4) reflected significant independent variable coefficients that 
were significant but in opposite directions (one positive, one negative). Both of these 
conditions indicate possible multicollinearity among independent variables.  
For example, multicollinearity could have been present in negative models where 
the dichotomous variable dealing with the start of operational deployment of Japan’s 
BMD system (“J Deploys”) consistently has a positive (+) and statistically significant 
coefficient estimate while the variable indicating the period when for the first time Japan 
actually fielded BMD prior, and in response, to North Korean preparations in early 2009 
to launch a Taepodong missile (“TD-2”) consistently has a negative (-) and statistically 
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significant coefficient estimate. As mentioned above, the variables did not wrongly 
include time variables for the entire data sample, so further tests were conducted in gretl 
for the statistically significant variables. In this case, gretl uses a Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF) test where dichotomous independent variable values >10.0 indicate a 
collinearity problem. However, both the “J Deploys” and “TD-2” variables were well 
below 10.0 (both scored 2.187), indicating no problem existed with these variables.  
Secondly, this same test was conducted in gretl against the statistically significant 
variables in the cooperative models. This test included the dyadic interaction variable 
capturing cooperative Japanese behavior toward North Korea (“Positive J>NK”) and the 
dichotomous variable representing Japan’s significant decisions regarding BMD research 
and investment in late 1998 following North Korea’s Taepodong missile test that 
surprisingly flew directly over Japan (“TD-1”). These two variables indicated very low 
VIF scores of 1.015, indicating no problems of variable collinearity. Overall 
multicollinearity testing was conducted also since the positive models achieved higher R
2
 
values than the negative models (see Table 6). When testing was done with a much larger 
model (adding five more variables including two more dichotomous variables), 
individual VIF scores likewise remained low (ranging from 1.188 to 2.512) and well 
below the 10.0 VIF values. Further, the two variables with statistically significant 
coefficient estimates in this model scored very low (“Positive J>NK” scored 1.188, “TD-
1” scored 1.541). However, the cumulative VIF score for all variables combined in the 
model was 11.916, exceeding the 10.0 VIF value. This, however, includes eight variables 
(including Constant) and it is possible the large number of variables explains the higher 
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overall VIF at the “model” level. As indicated in Tables 3 and 4, analysis was conducted 
using a reduced set of independent variables to avoid the problem of VIF inflation.  
A second test for multicollinearity was conducted in gretl through construction of 
a correlation matrix of all 18 independent variables. This test included 153 variable 
combinations; only three variable pairs indicated potential for multicollinearity. The three 
combinations included: “TD-2” and “J Deploys;” “Rapprochement 2000” and “TD-1” 
and, “LDP” and “TD-2.”600 The “TD-1” variable was the only one that had a significant 
loss of statistical significance (Table 3, Model 6) among the three pairs identified in the 
correlation matrix with potential multicollinearity (the “Deploy” and “TD-2” variables 
showed consistent coefficient estimates across models in both Tables; no further analyses 
were conducted).
601
 Further regression analysis was conducted to assess the effect upon 
“TD-1” when the “Rapprochement 2000” variable was removed. In this case, “TD-1” 
reflected a statistically significant coefficient estimate comparable to that of Models 2, 3, 
and 5 in Table 3 (2.70** coefficient estimate; 2.27 t-ratio). 
Table 6 provides an overview of R
2
 values for all models used for regression 
analyses. The R
2
, or coefficient of determination, represents the proportion of variance in 
the data explained by, or correlated with, a model. It provides an approximation of how 
well a model fits the data and possibly predicts variance of the dependent variable using a 
given model. 
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Conclusions 
The analyses above seem to indicate that Japan’s BMD created both cooperative 
and conflictual North Korean behaviors toward Japan, consistent with the missile 
defense-deterrence literature. For example, Japan’s BMD program during the TD-1 
period had a positive effect upon North Korean cooperative behavior toward Japan, 
suggesting Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence against North Korea. Japan’s BMD, 
when employed operationally during the TD-2 period reduced North Korean conflictual 
behavior toward Japan, also suggesting Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence against 
North Korea. However, Japan’s BMD during the initial Japan Deploys period increased 
conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, indicating the initial deployment of 
Japan’s BMD undermined deterrence against North Korea. Results, therefore, indicated 
varied BMD deterrence effectiveness.  
The hypothesis of increasingly conflictual interaction between North Korea and 
Japan given their historical interaction, however, was not reflected in the analyses. 
Significant cooperative interaction is revealed in the data and analysis and the patterns of 
interaction do not appear to yield large swings of either reductions to cooperative North 
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Korean behavior toward Japan or increases to conflictual North Korean behavior toward 
Japan. BMD does not appear to be a contributor to any worsening of the Japan-North 
Korea relationship generally. Japan’s BMD did, however, appear to be correlated with 
favorable shifts in provocative and coercive North Korean behavior toward Japan with 
ballistic missiles in the later (TD-2) period.  
The hypothesis that a dominant U.S. would ultimately affect North Korean 
behavior toward Japan did not appear to be supported by the analyses addressing the 
cooperative and conflictual U.S. behavior toward North Korea. None of the models with 
U.S. behavioral variables reflected statistical significance in affecting either cooperative 
or conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, nor did they change any of Japan’s 
BMD-related variables in any significant way. 
Lastly, the hypothesis that China’s influence with North Korea would affect the 
North’s behavior toward Japan seems to be supported with the analyses. This was 
reflected most clearly with cooperative PRC behavior toward North Korea indicating an 
increase in North Korea’s cooperative behavior toward Japan. Cooperative Chinese 
action toward North Korea, possibly including inducements, predictably strengthened 
North Korea’s cooperative interaction with Japan. Such an outcome would generally 
support China’s strategic interests. China’s positive influence also appears to have 
reduced the effect of Japan’s BMD in the TD-1 period. 
Japan’s BMD 
The period immediately following the historic 1998 Taepodong missile launch 
over Japan was statistically significant, and in a positive direction. But while Japan's 
BMD, other than the TD-1 variable, did not correlate in significant positive ways 
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statistically, neither did BMD reflect a reduction in cooperative behavior (i.e., make the 
positive relationship between the two worse). It is an important feature of any aspect of a 
BMD program to correlate to an increase in cooperative behavior from an adversary. The 
implication of Japan’s efforts with BMD in the TD-1 period is that Japan’s BMD 
strengthened deterrence against North Korea. Further, given the expectations of 
significant reductions in political relations, and the fact that one would expect bad 
relations anyway due to their history, it could be noteworthy that the positive relations 
did not deteriorate with the unfolding of Japan's BMD program over time. 
The dyadic-interactive correlation with negative North Korean behavior toward 
Japan (Table 4) also seemed to carry over into Japan's BMD in two ways: the "Deploys" 
variable and the late-timeframe "TD-2" variable. The coefficients for these variables have 
opposing directional signs (+/-). The TD-2 variable addresses the period when Japan not 
only deployed BMD to intercept North Korean missiles in 2009, but also reflects changes 
to North Korean missile testing patterns that were less provocative toward Japan. Since 
"Deploy" occurred prior to the "TD-2" variable, it is possible "Deploy" did correlate to 
early North Korean reactions to Japan's new BMD deployments and North Korea was 
constrained from ballistic missile coercion against Japan by the time of the 2009 missile 
flight test—Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence against North Korea. This is 
consistent with the "-" sign for the TD-2 coefficient, meaning Japan's BMD reduced 
North Korea's conflictual behavior somewhat toward Japan. 
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 Within the “TD-1” variable’s timeframe, much of the political interaction 
between Japan and North Korea regarding rapprochement took place (Figure 4), which 
might have helped explain the cooperative interaction between the two states and the high 
R
2
 for positive models generally. If this were true, then one would also expect the “J 
Decides” variable to reflect positive correlation in the cooperative models, since positive 
political events also occurred during this period, including the second summit in early 
2004. However, the “J Decides” variable did not reflect statistical significance in any 
models. Further, the number of BMD-related reports in the Japan-toward-North Korea 
data (Table 7) was very high during the “TD-1” period, suggesting BMD was highly 
operative even while separate rapprochement talks occurred. 
 It is also be possible that the statistically significant correlation of “J Deploys” to 
conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan (Table 4) across the models was 
partially the result of other economic and political interaction. These include: the stalling 
of Japan-North Korea bilateral talks in March, 2007; Japanese anger on 15 October, 2008 
over U.S. removal of North Korea from its list of state-sponsors of terrorism; and, 
Japan’s internal public debates in April, 2009 over adding new sanctions against North 
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Korea (Events Data 1990-2011, 2012).
602
 On the other hand, cooperative interactions also 
occurred: resumption of talks between Japan and North Korea on 6 June, 2008; and, 
several reports of Japan’s decision to lift some sanctions against North Korea in June, 
2008. As a result, it appears unlikely these interactions explain the statistical correlation 
of the “J Deploys” variable with conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan. 
Additionally, while the number of reports with BMD terms in this period is lower than 
the previous two BMD-related time periods (see Table 7), it should also be noted that the 
overall number of cooperative and conflictual behavioral dyadic data from Japan toward 
North Korea in their period also dropped by nearly 70% from the previous period (“J 
Decides”). 
 Lastly, the “TD-2” variable, which was statistically significant in reducing 
conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan in five of six models, could also be 
explained should there be other significant reductions in negative activity or significant 
cooperative interactions during this period. However, there is no evidence of either types 
of interaction in the data in this period. The TD-2 launch occurred on 5 April and North 
Korea conducted a second nuclear test on 25 May, 2009. While Japan reacted publicly to 
the TD-2 launch in a negative way, the number and intensity for the TD-2 and nuclear 
tests were noticeably lower than previous events—about 80% lower than the 2006 
multiple ballistic missile launches and first nuclear test. At the same time, however, the 
number of BMD-related reports increased from the previous period (see Table 7). 
Further, none of the other independent variables analyzed in the negative models, which 
could offer some alternative explanation, had statistically significant coefficient estimates 
(Table 4). 
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Surprisingly, the role of the U.S. was not significant statistically in any of the 
models. This was not expected due to the historically dominant role of the U.S. in 
Northeast Asia regional affairs. However, it is also possible that greater autonomy on the 
part of both North Korea and Japan played a role in weakening the potential impact of 
U.S. behavior. For North Korea, autonomy describes its loss of tether from the Soviet 
Union when the Cold War ended; its need to act independently—often against the 
intentions of the international community; sometimes against the wishes of its closest 
ally, China—in part explains its hardened positions, whether ideologically or militarily. 
The North’s pursuit of an extensive ballistic missile capability, strengthened by a WMD 
capability, has diminished somewhat the influence of the U.S. and others. Japan, too, has 
become increasingly autonomous from the U.S., possibly explaining the gap in 
statistically significant U.S. effect, at least in these BMD-related models. 
 In summary, some of the BMD variables were affected in some of the models by 
the other independent variables: the TD-1 variable lost statistical significance in two
603
 of 
six positive models (no statistical change in negative models); the Japan Decides variable 
saw no statistical change in any of the models; likewise, the Japan Deploys variable saw 
no statistical change in any of the models; and, the TD-2 variable lost statistical 
significance in one conflictual model (no statistical change in cooperative models). So, 
for the 48 total BMD-related models, 94% were not statistically affected (i.e., neither lost 
nor gained statistical significance) by any of the other independent variables considered 
in the cooperative and conflictual models. This suggests relative strength of the BMD-
related variables in the models considered.  
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“Multicollinearity”) indicated “TD-1” was statistically significant in regression modeling when the 
“Rapprochement 2000” variable was removed. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
In conducting the research concerning whether Japan’s BMD deterred North 
Korean behavior, analytic results and insights were gleaned not only pertaining to the 
primary question under consideration, but also pertaining to (1) the implications of the 
Japan-North Korea deterrence relationship for the future; and (2) insights into deterrence-
related theoretic issues. Details of the BMD-specific findings, using the mixed-methods 
approach, can be found in Chapter Seven: Quantitative Analysis. However, considerable 
qualitative data was also incorporated to understand those findings. Having provided 
those analytic details in Chapter Seven, the emphasis in this chapter will be upon 
potential challenges in Japan’s future security environment and revisiting a few of the 
theoretic issues. Appendix 2 is also provided to further the theoretic discussion. It applies 
the findings of the dissertation’s central question to the various missile defense-
deterrence theoretic arguments identified in Chapter Three.
604
 
Japan’s BMD: Effects & Motivations 
The qualitative and quantitative analyses suggested Japan’s BMD influenced 
North Korean cooperative and conflictual behavior toward Japan in some periods. None 
of these analyses demonstrate decisively that Japan’s BMD caused change in North 
Korean behavior, but suggest it is possible Japan’s BMD had deterrent effects in some 
cases. Further, the level, or amount, or intensity of deterrent behavioral effects under 
general deterrence conditions were most likely modest effects. However, even modest 
effects could help in widening the difference between general deterrence and crisis in the 
Japan-North Korea relationship. Deterrence effectiveness analysis, especially within 
general deterrence conditions, can only meet modest expectations; it cannot prove an 
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adversary was influenced by certain variables with certainty. This is problematic, 
however, even in operationalizing failures to deter war unless the adversary leader 
explains his calculus openly after the act; few do.
605
 Instead, deterrence analysis permits 
inferences using, for example, the mixed-methods approach described in the dissertation. 
These methods did, however, offer ways to approach deterrence analysis under general 
deterrence conditions, in context of the Japan-North Korea regional relationship that is 
often forgotten, and regarding a capability (BMD) that has deterrence effects that require 
better understanding.  
Throughout the BMD program’s development over time, the commitment, or 
stake of Japan’s leadership progressed from an emphasis on the technical aspects of 
effective BMD in the early TD-1 phase, to the commitment to be one of the world’s few 
nations with a national BMD system in the Decide period, to the organization and 
equipping of its military arm with operational BMD interceptors in the Deploy period 
and, finally, to its political willingness to use its operational BMD system if needed 
during the TD-2 event period. Each step along the way, each decision point, involved 
political risk for Japan’s leaders, both domestically and in the region. However, if there 
was any sort of a “peace dividend” in which Japan could share following the end of the 
Cold War, that began to fade during the 1990s as North Korea showed itself to be a 
continuing threat and it completely evaporated with the 1998 TD-1 launch over Japan. In 
addition, Japan’s stake in providing for its own defense was shaped by other factors that 
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interrogators he had “miscalculated” in 2003, believing the U.S. would not invade. See: (CNN, 2008). 
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solidified Japan’s strategic choices for a good, formidable BMD program as it considered 
the totality of its security position.
606
 
 First, Japan has steadily grown more autonomous from the U.S. since the end of 
the Cold War.
607
 The alliance with the U.S. remains, but Japan has become more 
politically independent with regard to North Korea, in part due to Japan’s stronger 
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 Using various modeling techniques of various North Korean ballistic missile attack scenarios, Douglas 
Diehl created a prioritized defended asset list (DAL). The criteria he used (including criticality, 
vulnerability, reconstitutability, and threat) are those used in air defense planning and ascribe value to 
U.S. and allied targets based on “their obvious political or military significance.” He then applied various 
defending strategies using THAAD, Patriot, and Aegis interceptors to simulate through computer modeling 
North Korean ballistic missile attacks on valued targets. Attacks on Japan included Scud-C attacks on 
Sasebo and Nodong-1 attacks on Okinawa, Tokyo, Yokosuka, Atsugi, and Misawa military and political 
locations. Diehl’s most pressing insight was the value of secrecy in the deployment locations of BMD – 
reducing expected damage to U.S. and allied high-value targets to 0.93 (e.g., a probability that about 
1/10th of a missile “leaking” through the defensive network), or roughly a six-fold improvement over 
similar attacks with missile defense locations transparent to the attacker (Diehl, 2004). See pages 20-4 
and 31-6. The result is that North Korea, with perfect knowledge of BMD systems and locations would be 
significantly thwarted from achieving operational objectives, but even political objectives could be denied 
if BMD locations were withheld from the North Korean leadership. In both cases, North Korean outcomes 
would be affected which could influence, perhaps decisively, their decisions to conduct attacks against 
defended targets in the first place. See also: Joshua Epstein (Epstein, 1985), pages 1, 14, and 21-2; and, 
(Risk Management: Concepts and Guidance, 1989), pages 4-9. 
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 In his excellent review of Japan’s emerging policy toward North Korea in approximately the first decade 
following the end of the Cold War, David Fouse argues friction between Japan and the U.S. in the post-
Cold War era was a contributor to Japanese autonomy in its relations with North Korea. This friction 
began as early as 1990 with the surprise “Three-Party Declaration” signed in Pyongyang on 28 September, 
1990 among Japanese and North Korean legislative groups. The meetings were not a surprise, but calling 
for diplomatic relations to be established, a Japanese apology to be issues, and plans for financial 
compensation for 81 years of Japanese-caused sufferings upon the North Korean people were far more 
than the Japanese executive had expected. This also surprised the U.S. and South Korean governments 
who were particularly concerned over the level and timing of potential Japanese reparations—estimated 
in the billions of dollars. More serious, Fouse argued, was the 1994 nuclear stand-off with North Korea 
which included U.S. requests for basing access for military action being planned against North Korea, as 
well as U.S. requests for Japanese armed participation in a proposed naval blockade. Japan was simply 
unprepared for such a short-notice request upon its rather rigid postwar constitutional system and, 
ultimately, could not support the U.S. contingency planning. Further, “diverging perceptions” regarding 
the threat from North Korea, coupled with the 1998 TD-1 launch over Japan which strengthened public 
support for greater Japanese regional activism, helped push Japan into greater autonomy (Fouse, 2004); 
see pages 3-4 and 12. Greater Japanese autonomy does not infer independence from U.S. policy; it does, 
however, suggest acceptance of increased responsibilities for its own defense and, perhaps, a measure of 
Japanese pride. In addition, these disparities in Japan-U.S. policy and the resulting Japanese autonomy 
relate the assumption in the dissertation that Japan’s relationship with North Korea, though certainly not 
insulated from interaction with other regional actors, can and should be analyzed on its own bilateral 
political merits, including the role of BMD as part of the security dimension of that overall political 
relationship. 
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position economically, as well as its improved military capabilities and willingness to use 
them. Japanese apologies for decades-old imperial sins have increasingly been 
complimented with incremental changes to Japan’s postwar pacifist constitution, 
including changes with regard to its BMD program. Second, the overall threat from North 
Korea and its ballistic missiles, potentially armed with WMD, has risen. This was 
punctuated by the 1998 TD-1 flight over Japan, but other events, too. Third, Japan’s 
confidence in the U.S. as its security sponsor and wartime guarantor has eroded. This was 
most likely the result of repeated U.S. failures to deter North Korean development of 
nuclear weapons, but also U.S. nuclear force reductions over the past two decades, 
including tactical nuclear weapon removal from South Korean territory and deep cuts in 
strategic nuclear weapons. Fourth, North Korean coercive strategies aimed at regional 
actors, including Japan, are based upon North Korea’s ballistic missiles and exist below 
the threshold of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees, creating a significant void for 
Japanese security under general deterrence or sub-conflict conditions. Lastly, while the 
“clear and present danger” in Japanese threat perceptions stem from North Korea, longer-
term challenges are seen on the horizon with China. A clash is possible, sparked perhaps 
by economic competition and disputes over energy-rich islands. Japan is well aware that 
China’s ballistic missile capability is steadily growing in number, advanced technology, 
and range. This security concern and others are addressed in the next section. 
Outlook for the Future 
North Korea 
 The near-term security concern for Japan continues to the threats from North 
Korea and how those threats might evolve under a new leadership. North Korean strategy 
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changed since the end of the Cold War from one of confrontation over final victory of the 
Korean War to one of deterrence and coercion to support long-term political goals. This 
change was reflected in policy choices to place the massive conventional arm in a more 
defensive posture, to decline and allow its benefit-denial deterrent effect, though still 
formidable, also to diminish. As the conventional arm of the strategy of confrontation 
declined the nuclear and ballistic missile arm grew in numbers with modest technological 
growth as well. Still reflecting an overall deterrence posture, the role of ballistic missiles 
in particular also served to replace confrontation with a coercive strategy to pressure 
external actors, including Japan, to cooperate with North Korean wishes and, at the very 
least, to respect its independence and sovereignty. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether the North will remain on this path to buy time and hedge against political 
uncertainties or pursue a divergent one.  
 On the peninsula, the conventional military balance of power is changing. The 
ROK military is now the seventh largest in the world (the North’s is ranked sixth largest) 
and is equipped with modern armaments, high technologies, and highly-trained and 
educated personnel (Lee & Hamre, 2011).
608
 Further, South Korea announced the 
creation of a missile defense command to address the North Korean ballistic missile 
threat (Agence France-Presse, 2006).
609
 One conclusion might be that the North Korean 
threats particularly to ROK through violent provocations in the past 2-3 years are due to 
North Korean perceptions of declining value of their missiles to coerce and threaten ROK 
in light of ROK’s decisions to pursue advanced BMD systems capable of engaging 
shorter-range missiles. Such BMD, including Iron Dome-like systems employed by the 
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 But the South did not respond with such vigor until after the 2006 North Korean ballistic missile tests, 
whereas Japan began in late 1998. 
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Israelis, might be pushing North Korea to push with increasingly violent actions to 
achieve political and military objectives before ROK can more effectively defend itself 
against North Korean short and medium-range missiles. While the ballistic missile threat 
to South Korea, given its proximity to the North—especially the South Korean capital of 
Seoul—is different from Japan’s there may be lessons from the Japan-North Korea BMD 
case applicable to South Korea, though this is perhaps a topic for future study. 
 Regime collapse in North Korea could occur with little warning, as has happened 
in other states in modern history. To date, however, North Korea has defied the 
projections of most who venture into future predictions. Victor Cha, for example, argued 
10 years ago that North Korea was preoccupied with avoiding collapse, inferring even the 
North Korean leaders knew collapse was at hand. Others, such as Andrew Scobell, 
thought the North was more self-confident than that (Scobell, North Korea's Strategic 
Intentions, 2005).
610
 Time appears to prove Scobell correct, which underscores the 
resiliency of the North Korean leadership, the regime, and the state. Scobell built upon 
his earlier position and, in his book on alternative futures of North Korea and prospects 
for collapse, suggested that, while there have been significant external and internal 
changes reflecting negative trends, others, more broadly, could be interpreted in a 
positive way (from the North Korean perspective). These positive factors (from the 
North’s perspectives), suggesting immediate collapse would not happen as some predict 
(if not wish), included: priority upon diplomatic efforts to normalize relations with 
various parties; economic reform efforts in 2002; military strengthening at the strategic 
level, including ballistic missile and nuclear device tests; and positive demographic 
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trends, including a rise in national life expectancy and population growth since 2003 
(Scobell, Projecting Pyongyang: The Future of North Korea's Kim Jong Il Regime, 
2008).
611
 These may have been interpreted by KJI as factors that tempered the other, 
more “desperate” indicators (i.e., famine, military decline, and economic stagnation) 
many analysts cite to infer KJI had all but lost control and the collapse of his regime in 
North Korea imminent. KJI may simply not have viewed his circumstances that way. 
Kim Jong-Un does not appear to be in fear of imminent regime collapse either and, 
having presided over missile and nuclear tests already, the prospects seem unchanged 
regarding North Korea and its overall strategy of coercion. 
 North Korean aberrant behavior and coercive use of ballistic missiles likely has 
had many audiences: internally, there were the elites of society, the military, the 
governmental organizations, and the people; externally, missile development and tests 
were aimed at all regional actors and to a lesser extent the UN. This approach satisfied 
many of the identity and cultural, internal and external environmental and personal 
psychological factors of value to North Korean leader decision-making. However, 
Japan’s sudden and significant press for BMD arguably affected KJI’s calculus, reflected 
in political cooperative engagement with Japan, such as summits on rapprochement and, 
later, changes in testing patterns, such as less threatening flight paths and construction of 
an entirely new missile test launch facility to fire missiles away from Japan proper. To be 
sure, North Korea could still satisfy many of his important decision-making factors 
through the use of this alternative test facility—the U.S. and ROK are still endangered by 
missile shots that skirt the western periphery of South Korean territory and U.S. forces 
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located therein. Japan, however, is one important voice that is arguably in a different 
position and receiving fundamentally different North Korean activities of ballistic 
missile-supported coercion. It remains to be seen whether this North Korean strategy to 
cooperate with or acquiesce to Japan will continue to be both politically stable and less 
conflictual or violent, unlike more recent patterns of violence with South Korea. 
Regardless, it is possible Japan, through its BMD program, has succeeded in its 
deterrence strategy vis-à-vis North Korea in both a practical, operational way and in 
terms of permitting it to addressing longer-term considerations: political settlement with 
North Korea and adapting to the larger regional threat it faces with China. 
Implications for Japan 
General. 
 Japan’s security position is shaped by many factors and forces, such as domestic 
politics and the strength of its economy. These are not uncommon considerations for 
democracies. Externally, however, Japan’s position appears to be delicate, not only in 
terms of its relationship with North Korea, but China as well. Certainly Japan’s 
relationship with the U.S. will remain important for Japan and how it views national 
security in the near-term and into the future. Japan’s cooperative activities in BMD have 
strengthened its alliance with the U.S., for example. However, Hagstrom and Soderberg 
argue U.S. power has shown weakness since the 1990s—namely in its activities with 
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—undermining the assumption of U.S. dominance in 
Northeast Asia to the point independent analysis of the Japan-North Korea relationship 
was not possible (Hagstrom & Soderberg, 2006).
612
 Unless U.S. policy toward North 
Korea moves significantly then the U.S. will matter much less in the North Korean 
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calculus toward Japan. Victor Cha characterized it this way: "Strategic patience, strategic 
coma, whatever it is called, has allowed North Korea to patiently develop nuclear and 
missile programs” (Yonhap News Agency, 2013).613 More generally, Michael Mazarr 
warns the recent and ongoing U.S. “pivot to Asia” could be “an unsustainable U.S. 
regional position.” Instead, given the ongoing “post-primacy” position of the U.S. 
globally, he advocates the U.S. readjust its regional priorities and commitments in order 
to avoid triggering an inevitable “decline in perceived credibility of threats and promises” 
(Mazarr, 2012).
614
 This illustrates the problem of expecting much, perhaps too much, 
from the U.S. under general deterrence conditions. To partially compensate, Japan 
appears to be strengthening its bilateral relations with key regional partners, including 
Australia, India, and South Korea.
615
  
 The historical legacy of Japan’s imperial occupation of Korea, and sustained 
distrust of Japan, persist and has political and significant security implications. 
Politically, this was seen recently in South Korean sentiments, and politics; not just those 
in North Korea. For example, an intelligence-sharing agreement, to be signed by leaders 
of the two countries, was cancelled only minutes prior being signed due to South Korean 
public outcry stemming from anti-Japanese sentiments over wartime treatment of 
Koreans (Herman, 2012). But fear and distrust run both ways. Japanese fears look ahead 
to the prospects of Korean unification. As Kaplan and Denmark maintain, Japan is well 
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 Ralph Cossa favored a “virtual alliance” between the U.S., Japan, and a yet-future reunited state of 
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aware of the deep historical sentiments across the region owing to its imperial legacy. 
They submit, “Indeed, Japan could be a big loser if Korea were to reunify. It is the 
prospect of a united Korean peninsula, as much as the growing might of China, which 
could lead to a strengthened and normalized Japanese military” (Kaplan & Denmark, 
2011). 
Japan-North Korea Relations. 
 With its BMD, Japan experienced some success in deterring North Korea’s 
coercive strategy against Japan that North Korea pursued through its underlying ballistic 
missile capability. This was the case not only theoretically but in practical North Korean 
behavior as well. What this essentially meant was that North Korean coercion toward 
Japan—to gain some sort of benefit from Japan or pressure Japan toward some new 
course of action—would need to rely upon some other instrument of coercion to be 
effective. But under general deterrence conditions or periods of provocation, what 
instrument could North Korea employ? Geographical distance favored use of ballistic 
missiles; however, some alternative is required for Japan to bend. North Korea’s 
conventional forces do not appear suited for this, although aggressive naval engagements 
could provide a means to influence Japan. But this, too, may no longer be effective as 
Japan’s anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare technologies and capabilities have 
improved. Cyber warfare could also be effective in an asymmetric way to pressure 
Japan.
616
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 This could have utility for a North Korean coercive strategy against Japan; however, one of the main 
benefits of cyberwarfare is anonymity of the source of a cyber attack. If North Korea developed such 
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What are the prospects for future Japan-North Korea relations? One conclusion 
could be drawn simply by pointing to their long and divisive history. On the other hand, 
the post-Cold War period has not proven as bad as it could have been for Japan. 
Rapprochement still appears possible if conditions are right on both sides. But Japan’s 
decision to acquire its own BMD in 2003 happened in the midst of a high level of 
rapprochement activity—and between the only two executive summits between Koizumi 
and KJI. If the climate for rapprochement worsened at the time of Japan’s decision to 
acquire BMD, it rebounded in time for the second summit meeting in 2004. If the period 
of the 2009 TD-2 launch and following offers insights for the future it could be a greater 
North Korean willingness to refrain more from coercive activities against Japan and 
negotiate with Japan as it did in the early 2000s. If Japan’s domestic political climate—
and KJU, as the new leader in North Korea—are equally amenable to normalization then 
a period of cooperative interaction could follow. This would seem possible given the 
events of late 2012 and 2013: Unha-3 SLV satellite launch and third nuclear test (North 
Korea may feel it has demonstrated its strength with external audiences to increase the 
prospects of getting a deal. For the Japan-North Korea relationship, this would mean 
possibly a large monetary settlement with North Korea to compensate for Japan’s 
imperial past. But should Japan seek mutual security guarantees of some sort, North 
Korea’s willingness may require a broader settlement including formal conclusion of the 
Korean War and inclusion of other wartime participants such as the U.S., ROK, China, 
and Russia. Whether Japan can foster these conditions is questionable, increasing the 
possibility North Korea could up the coercive pressure on Japan for at least the war 
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reparations settlement. BMD will, under these conditions, most likely prove invaluable to 
Japan to strengthen its position, strengthen deterrence, or defend itself if necessary. 
 One could ask what the implications for deterrence would be should North Korea 
test launch another ballistic missile directly over Japan and its heavily populated areas 
including Tokyo. Would this be considered a failure of deterrence and undercut the value 
of Japan’s BMD? Yes, it would, at least partially, but it needs qualification and will 
depend upon Japan’s response, including how it employs its BMD in that situation. A 
North Korean launch in this manner is certainly more provocative than one flown south 
from Sohae. Such a launch may occur in an attempt to coerce Japan in some way, so part 
of the qualification is whether Japan chooses to use its BMD to shoot down the North 
Korean missile and whether Japan capitulates in some measurable way to the North 
Koreans. Engaging the missile would carry certain risks, including operational and 
domestic political fallout in Japan should the BMD system fail to do its job. Should this 
happen, North Korean resolve for future acts of coercion would be strengthened, not 
weakened. Successful engagement, but even trying to engage the North’s missile, can 
have positive implications, too, such as a Japanese match of resolve and increasing 
confidence in future diplomatic negotiations or military activities beyond Japan’s shores. 
It can also stem North Korean tendencies toward more or more dangerous future 
provocations over the long term and reinstate a preferable norm of bilateral stability. 
Conceptually, this alludes to the notion that how one defines deterrence, including what 
constitutes success or failure, is highly dependent upon the situation and the perspectives 
of the deterrer and the deterred. Existing narrow definitions, or clinging to those of the 
past, are ultimately less helpful to deterrence policy and planning than acknowledging the 
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realities of situation and perceptual nuance. This is particularly true of general deterrence 
conditions as the Japan-North Korea case demonstrates. This does not mean, however, 
that deterrence is unhelpful or unachievable, but only that one must manage expectations 
of it. The tendency toward overly simplistic deterrence-centric policy leads to seemingly 
obvious solutions which, in the case of deterrence, have a mixed track record and 
unintended consequences. 
Japan-China Relations. 
While North Korea remains the near-term security concern for Japan, China is 
emerging as not just an economic competitor but a military threat to Japan. According to 
J. Michael Cole, Japan’s 2013 defense budget was predicated on five potential crisis or 
wartime scenarios. More importantly, “three of five scenarios explored by the defense 
ministry recently involve the Self-Defense Forces squaring off against the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA)”  (Cole, 2013).617 The scenarios with China included the 
disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea and Chinese conflict with 
Taiwan. Further, it is interesting to note that in China’s 2010 official defense paper more 
references were made to Japan than the United States and Taiwan combined (Full text: 
China's National Defense in 2010, 2011).
618
 These security issues not only have 
implications for Japan’s BMD but how Japan’s thinking may be shaped regarding future 
military capabilities. 
 Even as Japan began its BMD research and development in earnest in the late 
1990s, China, O’Donogue argued, perceived Japanese missile defenses to be highly 
destabilizing with respect to Taiwan. To China, the greatest threat is a legal or de facto 
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“freeze” of the territorial status quo of Taiwan, a political situation that could deny China 
its objective of reclaiming Taiwan. Since China’s primary instrument of coercion, like 
that of North Korea, is its large numbers of offensive ballistic missiles, Japanese 
partnership with Taiwan through the sale or transfer of BMD capabilities to Taiwan 
would be viewed as destabilizing if not threatening to China as such a significant change 
in the status quo could embolden Taiwan officials toward independence. Conflict 
between China and Taiwan could, therefore, pull in Japan and possibly the United States. 
Further, confidence in Taiwan could potentially trigger cascading effects in Tibet and 
Xinjiang toward autonomy and threatening the Chinese Communist Party itself 
(O'Donogue, 2000).
619
 Finally, China continues to develop a wide variety of BMD 
countermeasures (Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 2013).
620
 
 The ballistic missile threat to Japan from China was not imminent just 6-7 years 
ago (Kaneda, Tajima, Kobayashi, & Tosaki, 2007).
621
 However, that has changed with 
implications for the future. China retains a vast ballistic missile arsenal (over 1,000) used 
for coercing Taiwan, but also possesses intermediate-range missiles capable of reaching 
Japan (Twomey, 2011).
622
 With regard to the hundreds of Chinese ballistic missiles 
facing Taiwan, “Military analysts fear that the Second Artillery could retarget the 
missiles, putting Japan at risk, as well as America's Asian bases” (The Economist, 2010). 
According to Japan’s 2012 annual defense report, China’s DF-21, DF-3, and DF-4 all 
have sufficient range to threaten all or part of Japanese territory (Defense of Japan 2012, 
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2012).
623
 According to the George C. Marshall Center, China has approximately 14-18 
CSS-2 (DF-3) intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and 19-23 CSS-5 (DF-21) 
medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in its inventory “capable of striking Japan,” 
though it was suggested these missiles were more likely “targeted principally against 
Russian cities and military targets, to deter Russian interference in whatever China might 
want to do in the Pacific Rim” (The Chinese Scenario, 2012).624 In addition to the 
wartime threat from China, the general deterrence coercion threat from China, through 
use of its ballistic missiles, is also present. The future security environment does not look 
easier for Japan. 
 In 2012, the U.S. National Intelligence Council predicted that by 2030 a great 
diffusion of power will have occurred, and a multipolar world will dominate. However, a 
potential “game-changer” in their prediction was whether rapid shifts in global power 
would spark more conflict (National Intelligence Council, 2012).
625
 The document 
predicts China (and India) will rise high and rapidly, and both Japan and the U.S. will 
decline in relative strength. Could Japan’s future be one of regional conflict, allied 
perhaps with India and other Asian democracies against China? If so, Japan’s BMD, its 
political and military posture in the next several years, and its relationship with the U.S. 
and others will become increasingly pronounced elements in its national security. 
Further, pressures to acquire offensive strike forces, including nuclear weapons and 
means of delivery, may rise to address these challenges. 
Potential Japanese Military Choices. 
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 Japan’s BMD provides it a capability to defend and deter North Korean ballistic 
missile threats and related political coercion. This capability is particularly important in 
day-to-day and crisis scenarios, including missile tests and small-scale missile attack 
raids, short of general war and below the threshold of U.S. extended deterrence punitive 
options. Japan’s BMD will also improve in the future with deployment of the new SM-3 
missile around 2018 giving it advanced engagement capabilities including the potential to 
engage enemy ballistic missiles early in the missiles powered flight “boost phase.” One 
key advantage to boost-phase intercept is overcoming any countermeasures, such as 
warhead decoys deployed on the enemy ballistic missile, since boost-phase intercept 
destroys the missile before such countermeasures have a chance to deploy (later in flight), 
thus making the prospects of successful intercept higher (Wilkening, Keeping National 
Missile Defense in Perspective, 2001).
626
 This type of capability may also decrease the 
challenge of defending against mobile ballistic missiles in North Korea. Japanese air and 
naval forces, likewise, provide it defense and deterrence capacity against limited North 
Korean attacks. For example, as part of Japan’s military upgrade, and with an eye on both 
North Korea and China, it selected a purchase of 42 F-35 stealth fighters from the U.S., a 
capability described by the Pentagon as a strategic conventional deterrent in the region 
(Takenaka, 2011). 
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The one basic military capability Japan lacks, though its strategists and scholars 
had discussed it, is the ability to provide indigenous punitive offensive forces that could 
reach North Korea (and beyond), using either longer-range aircraft, naval assets, or 
ballistic missiles. For example, one of the consequences from the 1998 TD-1 launch over 
Japan was a formal call for science and technology research into developing an offensive 
ballistic missile, with a range of several hundred kilometers, capable of attacking targets 
including enemy ballistic missile sites ('Peace constitution?' Japan plans precision missile 
program, 2004). In 2006, after the July North Korean ballistic missile tests, Japan’s Prime 
Minister Abe suggested “there was need for debate on whether Japan should develop a 
preemptive strike capability” (Hiyama, 2006). After North Korea’s 2009 TD-2 missile 
test, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) defence policy committee said Japan should 
develop the capability to launch a pre-emptive strike against North Korea if needed to 
prevent a missile attack (Japan's LDP backs pre-emptive strike capability against North 
Korea, 2009).
627
 While Japan does not possess an offensive ballistic missile capability, 
some argue it is already significantly advanced toward that possibility. For example, the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative reports Japan’s “space program includes a number of 
technologies that could potentially be adapted to serve as long-range missiles” (Nuclear 
Threat Initiative (NTI), 2013).
628
 Japan also gains ballistic missile technology from its 
BMD expertise. 
The prospects of Japan “going nuclear” do not seem to be high at the present. On 
the one hand, according to Lars Abmann, a former Japanese Liberal Party leader told a 
senior Chinese military official over 10 years ago that Japan could build upwards of 
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4,000 nuclear warheads within months if a political decision was made to do so 
(Abmann, 2007).
629
 But on the other hand, going nuclear would require a large nuclear 
force to deter potential adversaries (North Korea, China, or Russia) and would also need 
to be effectively hidden from enemy strike. Japan’s net security would, arguably, be 
lower with nuclear weapons (Abmann, 2007).
630
 Some things could, however, change 
Japan’s calculus. One way to consider how Japanese perceptions could change is to 
consider the dynamics in play in the perceptions of Taiwanese and South Korean 
calculations when they “rolled back” their fledgling nuclear weapons programs. This is 
the analysis conducted by Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters. Their analysis indicated 
the key decision-making perceptions revolved around three factors: their strategic 
relationship with the U.S., internal domestic factors, and their perceptions of the security 
environment and implications of security-related changes (Hersman & Peters, 2006).
631
 
For Japan, such factors could work in reverse over time. For years, Japan has recognized 
increasing threats, and its threat perceptions have diverged occasionally from those of the 
United States. Further, U.S. credibility has declined in Japan’s perspective and U.S. 
relative power polarity is also expected to decline. On the other hand, Japanese domestic 
dynamics may support acceptance of greater political and military responsibilities for its 
own security. These circumstances could combine to create the conditions under which 
Japan becomes a nuclear weapons power. Possession of a robust BMD capability would 
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complement offensive capabilities, but raise concerns in China and a greater Korea of 
Japanese preemption.
632
 
 BMD, offensive ballistic missiles, capable strike aircraft, and the potential nuclear 
capability Japan could foster, together provide Japan a hedging strategy to become a 
more formidable offensive military power in the region to counter emerging dangers 
stemming principally from China. Even without a nuclear weapons capability, an 
indigenous capacity to deliver punitive, even possibly preemptive, conventional strikes 
would give Japan significant options to deal with future scenarios.
633
 Development or 
acquisition of such capabilities would be costly, however, and without question add 
additional risk to Japan in crisis or conflict. For example, developing offensive strike 
capabilities can create a spiral of negative reciprocity in which North Korea may respond 
to Japan’s offensive capability option decision with more serious provocations, expanded 
offensive and defensive capabilities against Japan, or both. It could even create 
conditions in which North Korea could, with a large number of ballistic missiles, preempt 
Japan’s actions, though such conditions are difficult to imagine. The security challenges 
regarding China or Russia are also complex and the risks great. But, for Japan, the risks 
of not developing offensive military power at some point may be greater. 
Deterrence Theory 
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  According to the U.S. Department of Defense, “deterrence operations” are 
defined as “integrated, systematic efforts to exercise decisive influence over adversaries’ 
decision-making calculus in peacetime, crisis, and war to achieve deterrence” 
(Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, 2009).
634
 This is a statement that, on 
first appearances, provides a concise, adversary-focused, influence-oriented, and 
purposeful deterrence function. But this definition of deterrence is too narrow and fails to 
delineate general deterrence differences. The conceptual idea of establishing causal 
linkages from deterrent actions intended to be “decisive” in nature (Deterrence 
Operations Joint Operating Concept, 2006) is also inappropriate—this is simply an 
analytic bridge too far. Further, DoD’s efforts at elaborating the deterrence role of BMD, 
particularly in general deterrence conditions, are lacking.
635
 An illustration of the 
continuing challenge to understand the role of missile defenses in deterrence is the report 
by senior Northrop Grumman analysts in a paper entitled “Deterrence and Defense in 
‘The Second Nuclear Age.’” In the report’s executive summary alone, nine times 
deterrence and defense were joined together but in all cases described as separate 
concepts. Deterrence is later defined to mean nuclear deterrence exclusively, though the 
authors recognized the nature of the threats, and how they might be deterred, were 
different than during the Cold War. Defenses were relegated to simply helping protect 
when deterrence fails, but were not recognized it seems for having deterrent value in 
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themselves (Haffa, Hichkad, Johnson, & Pratt, 2009).
636
 Like many other reports, Cold 
War era thinking was still present.
637
 From the broad ideas on deterrence, especially 
traditional ideas on general and immediate deterrence, it can be concluded deterrence-
related activity of some sort and level is present to make deterrence operative—there 
cannot be deterrence effects without activities conducted by one and interpreted by the 
other. Further, deterrence activities need to be conceived and executed on a scale to be 
perceived but not to inadvertently escalate or trigger the behavior being deterred. But the 
traditional view of general deterrence falls short of this concept.  
General Deterrence 
 The traditional views on general and immediate deterrence, such as that presented 
by Huth and Russett, appear to be far too rigid if one is seeking to analyze and understand 
dyadic behavioral interaction over time below the threshold of conflict (Huth & Russett, 
General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models, 1993). 
In the traditional view, both actors are either in a general deterrence status or one actor 
(i.e., the adversary) chooses to act belligerently and create a crisis that has the potential of 
escalating to armed conflict. Because the two states have a history of conflict of some 
sort, their adversarial relationship is presumed to rarely reflect significant or recurring 
cooperative interaction. This traditional view is seen in the top half of Figure 4. Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita and others also focus attention in general deterrence writing in 
adversary choices about going to war and kinetic cost-imposition activities (Bueno de 
Mesquita, Pride of Place: The Origins of German Hegemony, 1990). Further, the analysis 
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by Quackenbush did not explore behavioral interaction over time or the role of BMD 
(Quackenbush, Understanding General Deterrence: Theory and Application, 2011). On 
the other hand, Joshua Goldstein’s scaling of the various WEIS categories, captured in 
the more modern IDEA framework utilized in the dissertation’s dataset, provided an 
ordinal characterization of both cooperative and conflictual dyadic interaction across a 
wider range of behavior that more accurately reflects the realities of dyads under general 
deterrence conditions. This is seen in the bottom half of Figure 4. Using cooperative and 
conflictual empirical data drawing upon this type of scale also reflects the range and 
nuances of potential behavioral interaction suggested in the missile defense-deterrence 
literature. This also permits general deterrence to be better understood with greater 
fidelity of the gradients of behavior, including positive changes in adversary cooperative 
behavior, using a more complete set of criteria for deterrence effectiveness assessment 
under general deterrence conditions. The dissertation research of North Korean behavior 
toward Japan as a general deterrence effect of Japan’s BMD program suggests general 
deterrence could be expanded conceptually to incorporate this level of interaction, 
particularly with a view toward aiding a deterrer establish, or reestablish as necessary, 
norms of acceptable behavior in the dyadic relationship with deterree. 
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Tensions between General & Extended Deterrence 
 While strategies and actions taken in general deterrence conditions can influence 
how an adversary may calculate under immediate deterrence conditions or conflict, 
including scenarios involving a security guarantor like the U.S. providing extended 
deterrence, the presumption that strategies and actions taken for the purposes of wartime 
extended deterrence requirements influence general deterrence coercion and provocative 
behavior is dispelled in the Japan-North Korea case. In context of this relationship, North 
Korea might purposely increase conflictual behavior toward Japan without any intent on 
escalating to conflict and with the capacity to draw back from brinkmanship as necessary. 
This, in part, is why Japan’s BMD, for example, may have had as much effect upon 
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North Korean behavior—Japan was not taking these actions simply to prepare for war; 
rather, they were conducted first to address North Korean coercion under general 
deterrence conditions. This might also explain why activities labeled overtly as 
strengthening extended deterrence only receive strong reaction from the North: they 
undermine North Korean stakes that are much higher than its coercion strategy—they 
bring the U.S., possibly the only actor with the capacity (and history) of conducting 
violent regime change—into the North Korean calculus. 
 The limits of the effectiveness of U.S. threats of nuclear retaliation against North 
Korea can be seen in the North’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program—a program that 
included fuel processing, testing of nuclear devices, and presumably the building of 
warheads. In 2005, for example, when fears existing North Korea would soon conduct its 
first nuclear test, the White House spokesman “warned” North Korea the U.S. had “a 
robust deterrent capability” to deter their nuclear ambitions (Faiola & Sakamaki, 
2005).
638
 The North carried out the test in 2006. This suggests that warfighting 
capabilities, especially nuclear weapons for nuclear conflict, lack the credibility to be an 
effective instrument of general deterrence or even deterring provocative or crisis behavior 
such as pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. That is, this was likely less a case of the 
failure of U.S. nuclear weapons to deter North Korea than it was a failure to recognize the 
limits of nuclear weapons or to “tailor deterrence” with appropriate instruments of power. 
Extended Deterrence 
The practicalities of extended deterrence have also proven more difficult than 
years ago, suggesting BMD and other non-nuclear capabilities can confuse allies while 
providing improved conventional capacity. For example, in his comments following 
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meetings with South Korean military leaders, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
officially and publically defined BMD as a component of the extended deterrence 
security guarantees provided by the U.S. to South Korea. Extended deterrence also 
included U.S. nuclear and conventional strike capabilities (Defense, 2010).
639
 These three 
components also comprise U.S. extended deterrence for Japan. But if extended deterrence 
is a wartime security function, what is the role of missile defenses in general deterrence 
conditions? The policy did not explain. Confusion in Japan could also stem from U.S. 
explanations for how U.S. missile defenses solve the problem. For example, U.S. Air 
Force General Kevin Chilton, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, argued that a 
“North Korean dictator” could deter the U.S. from supporting a regional ally by 
threatening a future U.S. president “by saying, ‘You want to trade Seattle for Seoul?’ He 
can’t do that because of our missile-defense system” (Gertz, 2011). North Korea may not 
be able to deter the U.S. from retaliation in this case but, unfortunately, U.S. missile 
defenses do nothing for the protection of Seoul. Being able to defend the U.S. homeland 
from North Korean nuclear-armed ballistic missiles protects the “Seattle” portion of that 
mix, but the defense of the “Seoul” portion—and just as plausibly, Tokyo—cannot be 
accomplished by the U.S. homeland defenses since they are out of range. This means 
both North and South Korea may pay a great price, but not the United States. As a result, 
the defense of Seattle may be comforting to the U.S., but likely carries little soothing or 
assuring power if one is living in Seoul or Tokyo. Instead, for this equation to hold 
completely together regional allies need their own BMD capabilities.
640
 Perhaps this is 
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why Japan has been “underwhelmed with recent developments” regarding U.S. extended 
deterrence and how new capabilities, including U.S. missile defenses, fit into that policy 
(Murdock, et al., 2009).
641
 According to the “Healey Theorem”—a formulation by Denis 
Healey, the British Minister of Defense in the late 1960s, “it takes only five per cent 
credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five per cent 
credibility to reassure the Europeans” (Murdock, et al., 2009).642 The question is how far 
below ninety-five percent Japan considers itself. 
More recently—and offering some clarity—Sugio Takahashi pointed out U.S. 
extended deterrence commitments with Japan were being updated to be formed by a core 
of “nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities,” as opposed to just 
nuclear capabilities and, in doing so, Japan was now partnering with the U.S. in extended 
deterrence (Takahashi, Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military 
Transformation, 2012).
643
 But as Takahashi pointedly clarified, the only way Japan’s 
BMD can do this is by causing North Korea to launch so many missiles it would trigger 
U.S. retaliation—small numbers of North Korean missile raids (1-2 missiles or more), do 
not cross such a threshold, he argued. So, this type of “cheap-shot strike” by North Korea 
falls inside the range of activities within North Korea’s coercive strategy toward Japan, 
albeit at the higher end of that scale, but below the threshold of extended deterrence. The 
message from this seemed to be that Japan—and only Japan—was responsible for its 
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defense for coercion, provocations, or even small sub-conflict North Korean missile 
raids.  
Working together in general deterrence conditions is preferred, however. Only in 
January, 2013 did it appear that the U.S. and Japan sat down to talk through how they 
could collaborate together on general deterrence types of issues stemming from North 
Korea and China (Talks start with U.S. on new defense plan: Greater SDF role sought as 
China grows more assertive, 2013). The talks, sparked by North Korean missile and 
nuclear tests and aggressive Chinese behavior over the disputed Senkaku Islands, 
stimulated agreement at “strengthening cooperation in intelligence-gathering, 
surveillance and reconnaissance activities under normal circumstances, and to enhance 
deterrence.” The reference to “normal circumstances” was clearly an indication that day-
to-day, status quo general deterrence interaction between the two is not where either party 
prefers and supports analysis in the dissertation that Japan’s security under these 
circumstances has been largely Japan’s to address. However, with the stakes rising, and 
U.S. credibility returning to the fore given its “pivot” to Asia, U.S. and Japanese 
policymakers may be searching for ways to align strategies and capabilities. 
Norms 
In a deterrence or coercive relationship like that of Japan and North Korea, some 
cooperative and conflictual behavior will always be present and, as a result, general 
deterrence in such a case should have a goal of norm-setting and bringing down the level 
of coercion to a lower, manageable, acceptable level. The dissertation’s criteria for 
deterrence effectiveness were helpful in assessing the presence and direction of 
deterrence effectiveness in the Japan-North Korea case and could be applied to aiding in 
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norm-setting, since norms are learned behaviors, as an activity of a deterrence strategy. In 
their discussion of perceptions and deterrence, D. Scott Bennett and Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita observe countries “learn” about each other in their interactions. In doing so, the 
probabilities of decision consequences become sharper and more refined, reducing 
uncertainty in decision-making perceptions. One result can be the strengthening of the 
deterrer’s credibility (Bennett & Bueno de Mescquita, 2003).644  
This idea of learning can possibly work with norms of behavior and show, over 
time, a change in North Korean behavior as it “learned” in its interaction with Japan. For 
example, Japan’s unfaltering commitment to a BMD program in each successive phase 
over time appears to have affected KJI’s perceptions resulting in behavioral shifts 
favorable to deterrence. These behaviors included cooperative engagement with Japan on 
political rapprochement as well as ballistic missile related changes in behavior such as 
less threatening flight paths and construction and use of a new facility for conducting 
missile tests launching south, away from Japan proper. 
 A “dialogue” of action and reaction, described by Thomas Rid in his description 
of the Israeli deterrence perspective (Rid, 2012), is also conceptually similar to that 
presented here. Further, the idea that deterrence is an iterative activity and should not be 
considered a “binary” function where it either succeeds or it does not (as many define it), 
is a central idea of this dissertation. Further, these conceptual ideas provide a different 
perspective of general and immediate deterrence conditions and can help provide 
conceptual ideas useful in understanding the North Korea-Japan case and others. For 
example, rather than general deterrence being a stable relationship between two otherwise 
hostile actors characterized by relative inactivity, and immediate deterrence being an 
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acute crisis possibly preceding war, a single framework of norms, norm-breaking, and 
norm resetting, could describe the relationship between Japan and North Korea, and 
deterrence effectiveness connected to patterns of behavior relative to one’s expectations 
of behavioral norms. This could also be useful in trying to understand general deterrence 
challenges with regard to cyber warfare between opponents or enemies.
645
 
Missile Defense-Deterrence Arguments 
As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Appendix 2 provides another brief 
review of missile defense related theory in light of what has been learned from 
researching the central question in the Japan-North Korea case. In addition to providing 
theoretic background essential in understanding how BMD might strengthen or 
undermine deterrence generally, the function of the missile defense-deterrence arguments 
identified in Chapter Three can themselves be reviewed using the results from the Japan-
North Korea case. The emphasis here is not on further analyzing Japan’s BMD in their 
four periods but, instead, revisits the arguments and their theoretic utility. This 
supplemental review provides one way in which empirically-based findings from one 
case can be used to illumine the many theoretic arguments and represents an area of 
possible future analysis from a strictly theoretic perspective. See Appendix 2.
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Possible Contributions of the Dissertation Research 
 First, access to large amounts of data through use of digitized media files as a 
common practice—coupled with new technologies in automated data storage, access, 
translation, scanning, reading, interpreting, and reporting—permits use of such data for 
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various forms of statistical analysis of state, organization, and individual behavior where 
none existed only a few years ago. Research can progress in many new directions related 
to general deterrence that were simply impractical in the 1990s and early 2000s. One 
possible strength of the dissertation deals with the notion of a repeatable process of 
exploring general deterrence effectiveness and trends using the design presented in the 
dissertation. The components of deterrence and capability theory, dyadic history, 
deterrence-oriented profiling of the adversary, use of empirical data for statistical 
analysis, and establishment of criteria for assessing deterrence effectiveness all appear to 
be necessary elements in drawing inferences regarding deterrence strategies under 
general deterrence or periods of sub-conflict provocative events. Use of datasets, such as 
that provided by VRA for the dissertation, could be a standard approach for research of 
various international relations challenges, providing methodological intersections through 
common data and data measurements. These challenges could include deterrence, allied 
assurance, proliferation, crises, and conflict, within dyadic relations or among several 
actors.  
A second possible strength is the deterrence expectations of a BMD program as it 
evolves over time. The dissertation’s approach may be unique in this regard. For those 
states, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar or United Arab Emirates, contemplating initial 
deployment of their own BMD capabilities, the dissertation suggests defensively-
postured BMD need not be expected to increase only negative, conflictual adversary 
behavior or only result in the undermining of deterrence. The deterrence results varied 
but may, especially with positive political interaction, include periods of increased 
adversary restraint across the years and BMD periods. 
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Third, as suggested by scholars in recent years, understanding the adversary, to 
the degree this can be accomplished, proved necessary in understanding the security 
needs and cultural values of the adversary—not simply the threats posed by his military 
forces—and the potential role, value, and expectations of a BMD program to deter that 
adversary.
647
 James Blackwell adds, “The reality of the growing complexity of deterrence 
means that we have much to gain from deeper understanding of how to apply the 
behavioral approach to deterrence operations” (Blackwell, 2011).648 This is especially 
relevant under general deterrence conditions where changes in behavior are smaller or 
harder to identify. Further, statistical measures of behavior may tell us of behavioral 
changes regarding deterrence but it is also important to delve deep into the research of the 
deterree to help explain such analyses. Payne argued, for example, “there is no substitute 
for understanding opponents to the extent possible” for deterrence strategy development 
(Payne K. B., Maintaining Flexible and Resilient Capabilities for Nuclear Deterrence, 
2011).
649
 The insights from the historical research, literature review including BMD, and 
the strategic profile were all invaluable in working with the quantitative analysis in the 
mixed-method approach to better understand the relationship between Japan’s BMD and 
North Korean behavior. And, lastly, general deterrence may be best understood—and 
                                                          
647
 Information gathering on adversaries has always been difficult. And it is recognized that states like 
North Korea are more daunting than others in trying to glean information needed for analysis. This broad 
idea was acknowledged in the wake of faulty U.S. intelligence about Iraq’s WMD in 2003. In a summary of 
a lengthy report on that issue, the limitations of intelligence collection was the first topic addressed: 
“Intelligence collection has always been difficult against closed, highly secretive, and regimented societies 
that actively seek to conceal their conduct through denial and deception” (Office of the Press Secretary, 
The White House, 2004); see the first section, “Presidential Action.” However, as the dissertation has also 
argued, the proliferation of digitized, public domain information has reduced this challenge. See: (Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence, 2010), and (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007). 
648
 Page 35. 
649
 Page 24. 
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measured—as differences in cooperative and conflictual adversary behavior. This should 
be explored further. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
METHODOLOGY HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
650
 
 According to VRA, the IDEA (Integrated Data for Events Analysis) Event 
Framework evolved from the 1960s McClelland’s WEIS (World Event / Interaction 
Survey) framework which had 22 Cue categories and 63 three-digit subcategories 
creating 81 nominal WEIS event forms.
651
 Goldstein’s weights were added to the 1990s 
WEIS framework providing a uni-dimensional scale (conflict-cooperation) applied to 
nominal event forms with 61 nominal WEIS events made amenable to ordinal analysis 
(see Table 8).
652
 Also in the 1990s PANDA was created (Protocol for the Assessment of 
Nonviolent Direct Action) to provide a nominal framework congruent with WEIS and 
using Goldstein weights for ordinal analysis, but modified to: 1) highlight coercive and 
contentious but nonviolent event forms; 2) de-link events from actors to accommodate 
non-state actors and intra-state events; 3) specify civil society-government derived 
sectors; and, 4) specify the level of actor organization independent of the events, from 
nominal entities, to named individuals to ephemeral entities (e.g. crowds), to groups (e.g. 
ethnic), to organizations (e.g. corporate entities, civil society organizations and States) to 
compound organizations (e.g. intergovernmental organizations). In the 2000s, IDEA 
superseded PANDA while staying congruent with WEIS, expanding its event forms 
beyond the original 22 WEIS “two-digit Cue” categories to 249 events across three 
                                                          
650
 The background information in this section stems from Bond’s worksheet entitled, “Dyad Notes” 
(Virtual Research Associates, Inc. (VRA), 2012). 
651
 In the original 1992 Goldstein study, 61 level-2 plus two level-one events were scored. Therefore, not 
all IDEA events had a one-to-one match with the original WEIS set. For events that were not scored in the 
original WEIS study, VRA took the average score for the events within that cue (Events Data 1990-2011, 
2012). 
652
 Table was constructed from information in Goldstein (1992). 
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levels.
653
 In doing so, IDEA: 1) extended the Goldstein weights (mainly through 
interpolation) to 86 nominal IDEA events amenable to ordinal analysis; and, 2) cross-
mapped all IDEA forms to CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Event Observations), MIDs 
(Militarized Interstate Disputes), and WH (World Handbook of Political and Social 
Indicators). In 2011, IDEA events were refined and the weights extended based on a 
multi-dimensional survey (locus, affect, mechanism, injury and damage) with weights 
applied to approximately 250 nominal IDEA events, of which about 150 were within the 
WEIS 22 Cue Categories.
654
 
 
  
                                                          
653
 These are 2-, 3- and 4-digit forms of increasing detail; typically these low level event forms stem from 
specific research agendas. 
654
 Also, event form tags were added for economic, political and military domains, intended as an interim 
step towards open standard domain tags to support multiple multi-level event and weight frameworks 
across different domains and accommodating event reports data from various sources and languages. The 
dataset acquired from VRA for the dissertation, however, did not have these latter features in the dyadic 
data used for regression analyses. 
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APPENDIX 2: 
INTEGRATION OF MISSILE DEFENSE-DETERRENCE THEORETIC 
ARGUMENTS  
General 
 Table 9 provides an overview of how the mixed-methods analysis of the Japan-
North Korea case in preceding chapters might apply to the various missile defense-
deterrence theoretic arguments identified in the Literature Review. This analytic 
integration is not provided to reevaluate the qualitative or statistical analyses from earlier 
chapters but, rather, to revisit the many missile defense-deterrence theoretic arguments in 
light of analytic inferences from the case of Japan’s BMD deterring North Korea. This 
uses the qualitative and qualitative analyses of the unique Japan-North Korea case to 
review the arguments in order to get a sense of which arguments may be related to the 
Japan-North Korea case. As seen in Table 9, there was some connection to all of the 
arguments. Using this integrated approach suggests some possible ideas, using the 
various theoretic arguments, into how Japan’s BMD may have strengthened or 
undermined deterrence of North Korea. This is not a comprehensive analysis of all 
possible factors relevant to how the theoretic arguments correlated to Japan’s four BMD 
program periods. For example, argument #2 (“Demonstrate stake/commitment to assure 
allies or coalition partners”), under the TD-1 column, includes four qualitative data 
relating to “Environment” factors (“Goal of splitting alliance,” “1998 domestic BMD 
commitment,” “1999 MOU w/U.S.,” and, “No increased NK conflictual behavior toward 
Japan due to U.S. influence”). All four of these data strengthen deterrence and support 
the theoretic argument and the statistical findings in TD-1 that Japan’s BMD 
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strengthened deterrence in that period. However, other theoretic arguments may have 
some qualitative data that goes both ways. For example, in argument #16 (“Deny or 
confound military or political benefits sought by adversary”), factors relating to Japan’s 
technology may strengthen deterrence in the TD-2 period, but North Korea may also 
perceive gains in the TD-2 period, even though the analysis indicates Japan’s BMD 
strengthened deterrence overall in the TD-2 period. A summary of this table is provided 
below. 
 The table reflects the 34 missile defense-deterrence arguments identified in the 
Literature Review that could relate somehow to the Japan-North Korea case. The thick 
black line separates arguments that BMD strengthens deterrence (#1 through #27) from 
those arguments claiming BMD undermines deterrence (#28 through #34). These are 
numbered in the far left column. The four periods of Japan’s BMD program are identified 
in the middle four columns, with the results of the statistical analyses in the heading (i.e., 
Japan’s BMD in the TD-1 period suggested Japan’s BMD strengthened deterrence in that 
period). The column to the far right includes the three broad categories of qualitative data 
contained in the Strategic Profile. Qualitative data from the Profile or elsewhere in the 
dissertation are contained in the various boxes under the four BMD period columns. Data 
entries preceded by a checkmark () reflect data that strengthen deterrence; entries 
preceded by lines () reflect qualitative data that undermine deterrence. 
Profile Factors 
 The qualitative data dealing with KJI’s personal factors are related in many ways 
to his risk-propensity, his expectations, his general approach with external actors, and his 
personal style, such as his interaction with Japan in the rapprochement talks and summit 
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meetings in 2002 and 2004. While not yet deployed, Japan’s BMD program development 
was present in the background of the normalization activities, with Japan’s decision for 
acquire its own BMD coming in 2003. Japan’s BMD did not, however, deny KJI his 
personal needs to portray a strong image at home and abroad including during the 
normalization talks with Japan. Domestically, he presented himself as a strong leader 
when it came to dealing with Japan, having armed the nation with ballistic missiles and 
strengthening his position. In reality, he was personally more even-handed or reasonable 
in his dealings with Japan and interactions with Japan’s leadership. While North Korea 
changed behavioral patterns in its 2009 TD-2 missile test, if Japan would have opted to 
shoot down the missile, it may have changed KJI’s image at home and abroad sufficiently 
to lead him to violent provocation with Japan. Japan’s choice to employ BMD, but 
withhold from shooting the TD-2 down allowed KJI to “save face.” He demonstrated 
strength to the world with the missile test, though he clearly compromised in how he 
carried out that test. Having the missile shot down may have been the worst outcome for 
KJI: being outdone technically (and militarily) by Japan; tarnishing his domestic image 
with all audiences; and, a direct external challenge to his source of sovereign strength, 
demanding a response and possible escalation he most likely did not want. By 2009, 
Japan’s BMD had been operational for two years and North Korea was aware of this fact. 
Early pronouncements of the intended TD-2 flight, and compliance with UN air and 
surface vessel safety agencies, signaled restraint and, quite possibly, deference to Japan’s 
BMD. 
 Regarding factors pertaining to North Korea’s national identity and culture, some 
of the qualitative data reflect the domestic, national emotive and psychological 
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dimensions of North Korea’s ballistic missiles. This includes high technology generally, 
as this is culturally significant to the Korean people from a historical perspective, but also 
missile testing and what these types of capabilities and activities may mean to the people 
collectively. For example, there is a sense of national pride connected to such activities, 
consistent with the identity and cultural values of North Korea and Korea generally, 
suggesting a belief in North Korea’s prestige among nations, and not just regional actors. 
Japan’s BMD did not deny the North Korean people their sense of national satisfaction, 
including emotive hostility toward “imperial” Japan. These identity factors are also 
intertwined with support for the nation’s leader, Kim Jong-Il, the cultural father of the 
nation and orchestrator of national sovereignty and security. 
 In terms of environmental factors, North Korea also gained valued knowledge of 
Japan’s BMD program, command and control, internal politics and risk-tolerance 
regarding BMD, rules of engagement (as publicly announced), and general reactions 
useful for North Korea’s own military planning, including BMD countermeasures and 
alternative missile deployment schema. This is mentioned here to illustrate the 
complexities in deterrence analysis generally or in the Japan-North Korea case 
specifically. While Japan’s BMD program during the TD-2 period indicated a reduction 
of conflictual North Korean behavior toward Japan, suggesting a comparable 
strengthening of deterrence in this period owing to Japan’s BMD, North Korea likely 
achieved some gains in this period as well. Deterrence, therefore, cannot be conceived 
solely as a binary outcome with only one winner and one loser. Note that the North 
Korean gains mentioned above (i.e., gaining knowledge of Japan’s BMD program) are 
essentially passive benefits from launching the TD-2. As a result, North Korean gains and 
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Japanese deterrence success can be achieved at the same time. Another example, and a 
more significant one for the threat to Japan, is the qualitative data regarding North 
Korean ballistic missile exports and domestic deployment trends. While Japan’s BMD 
may have strengthened deterrence in the TD-1 period, and had not statistically significant 
effect in the Decide period, BMD may have had a role in North Korean choices in 
ballistic missile production, sales, and domestic deployment. It appears North Korean 
missile exports declined, according to Joshua Pollack (Pollack J. , Ballistic Trajectory: 
The Evolution of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Market, 2011), in part due to the impact 
of BMD in other regional markets, lowering the potential value of ballistic missiles 
available from North Korea. At the same time, however, North Korea maintained missile 
production to deploy more missiles at home, meaning North Korea incurred greater cost 
to its own missile force by keeping more of its missiles produced. One logical 
explanation is the need to have many more missiles available to overcome Japan’s BMD. 
So, while BMD adds costs (#26) and helps in general deterrence conditions against 
“cheap-shot” raids, in the Japan-North Korea case the tradeoff is that BMD may also 
have meant an increase in North Korea’s ballistic missile deployment (#18, #23 and #33) 
useful to North Korea to overcome Japan’s BMD in wartime conditions. This is discussed 
further below. 
BMD Periods 
 Under the TD-1 BMD period, most qualitative data entries reflect direct or 
indirect support for deterrence being strengthened by Japan’s BMD. For example, while 
part of the North Korean long-term strategy has been to try to divide U.S. alliances with 
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Japan and ROK (argument #2),
655
 Japan’s BMD actually helped strengthen the alliance in 
some ways. Others have also made the case North Korea is aware of Japan’s BMD 
program (#3).
656
 Likewise, Japan could have committed significant defense spending on 
offensive forces, but instead opted for defensive BMD capabilities, clearly reflecting a 
defensive posture in Japan’s case (#4).657 Japan’s BMD also helps Japan shore up 
potential technological lags to North Korean ballistic missile capabilities (#9), as 
evidenced through its missile and, more recently, space-related activities. A recurring 
theme for North Korea is celebrating its technological successes, especially those that 
also guard national sovereignty and security (#11).
658
 BMD not only addresses the North 
                                                          
655
 North Korea has shown a proclivity toward fracturing if not splitting regional actors from their 
partnerships and alliances with the United States. It has done so through various political and military 
activities under past general deterrence conditions, and could do so explicitly as part of its wartime 
strategy against multiple parties in a broader peninsular war. North Korea uses this strategy of reducing a 
regional actor’s commitment in order to isolate it and improve the prospects North Korea will achieve its 
aims or advance its position. Further, use of ballistic missiles for coercive purposes, cost North Korea little: 
it can afford operational training and technical data that is needed as part of most periodic quality 
assurance programs for deployed systems. And missile production capabilities are sustainable in North 
Korea. So, launching the missile is already a useful activity with little associated costs. However, actions by 
others that could raise the costs of missile launches in peacetime, or diminish their effectual use in 
wartime, would be most unwelcome by North Korea. Economic or financial losses, either through 
sanctioning practices, or through North Korean modifications to its missiles needed to counter defenses 
would be detrimental to sustained use of ballistic missiles to coerce. See also: Umemoto Tetsuya (Tetsuya, 
2000); page 135. 
656
 Some capabilities, intentions, or actions can remain ambiguous, both to North Korea and Japan, among 
others. North Korea may, for example, be unsure of ROK or U.S. war aims in a broader conflict on the 
Korean Peninsula. Japan, however, has been relatively unambiguous with respect to the capabilities and 
intentions of its BMD, and North Korea is likely aware of this. Political scientist Bob Switky suggests it is 
reasonable to assume adversaries pay attention to reports about BMD effectiveness. It follows, then, 
according to Boyd and Scouras, that the perceptions of the same adversary can be influenced the other 
direction, toward BMD credibility (Boyd & Scouras, 2009). See page 194 for both Switky’s suggestion and 
comments by Boyd and Scouras. The assumption that North Korea and Japan are generally aware of the 
behavior and capabilities of the other is a necessary one in order for Japan’s missile defenses to have 
influence over North Korean decision-making and, is therefore, an important consideration in the 
dissertation. 
657
 James Lebovic argues BMD will cause an adversary to take preemptive action and use his ballistic 
missiles early before BMD can be forward deployed in crisis (Lebovic, 2002). Pages 460, 463, 469, 474, and 
481. 
658
 Avi Schnurr, Executive Director of the Israeli Missile Defense Agency, argued that missile defenses also 
deny an adversary domestic and political psychological gains sought by using ballistic missiles or 
conducting a missile test. Under some circumstances, an adversary may seek a limited “victory” by testing 
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Korean threat directly with defense-related technologies, but also works to counter 
potential new threats emerging from North Korea (#20).
659
 It also gives Japan the 
capacity to more quickly develop offensive ballistic missiles should it deem that 
necessary (#27).
660
 On a positive side, Japan’s initiatives with BMD also contributed to 
furthering opportunities for political normalization of relations with North Korea, owing 
to the fact BMD would eventually undercut the North’s coercive edge over Japan. As 
seen in the TD-1 column, Japan’s BMD program development was no remedy for 
mitigating all North Korean perceptions or behavior, nor was this expected. More than 
just armament on parade from time to time in Pyongyang’s celebrations, North Korea’s 
ballistic missile program is a powerful instrument for retaining sovereignty—a fact that 
resonates with national pride and prestige and strengthens KJI’s image (#11). Japan’s 
BMD is also limited in denying North Korea domestic political support for its ballistic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
a ballistic missile that goes unchallenged with missile defenses, gaining domestic support while 
intimidating neighbors at the same time. Without missile defenses, he argued, the adversary would have 
free reign with his ballistic missiles, thus undermining all aspects of one’s deterrence (Schnurr, 2010). 
These ideas are part of his formal presentation as the panel’s third speaker. 
659
 North Korea has a tendency for willingness to depart from agreements it feels are unfair or simply do 
not suit its liking or security. For example, it was willing to breach an agreement to forego developing 
nuclear weapons when it felt it was no longer in its interests to do so. It also sought to circumvent 
sanctions on proliferation, including missile or nuclear related technologies that turned up later in places 
such as Syria. KJI is also comfortable being in control; external arrangements that seek to constrain him 
are contrary to his personal style. Further, it did not agree with the interpretation of UNSC resolutions 
banning North Korean ballistic missile launches, activities North Korea felt were space-related. It is 
difficult, therefore, to suggest North Korea to be anything but noncompliant in some key security related 
agreements. In light of the changes made to North Korean ballistic missile testing patterns, it could be 
argued that Japan is in a position to be less susceptible to North Korean coercion. Further, it was with the 
Japanese that North Korea discussed extension of a ballistic missile test moratorium, a sign that it was 
Japan that held sway, at least temporarily, on North Korean missile tests. While North Korean missile tests 
resumed later, in light of Japan’s BMD deployments in 2007, it should be noted that the tests changed in 
pattern. 
660
 Japan, for its part, has a missile program to support its space program—a capability that could be used 
to sharpen Japan’s overall technological capacity or edge. This edge in technology could also aid in 
continuing its advancement of credible, effective BMD components and help it acquire the needed skills 
for converting its missiles into offensive ballistic missiles should it deem it necessary to do so. 
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missile programs (#32).
661
 BMD also has negative consequences for China (#34),
662
 not 
simply as a political supporter of North Korea, but because it challenges China’s ballistic 
missile capability as it does the North’s. 
 There were many positive qualitative data in the Decide BMD period column, 
despite the fact that Japan’s BMD was not a significant factor in the statistical analysis 
for this period. For example, BMD may have been part of Japan’s signaling, supporting 
other interactions with North Korea (#3).
663
 Japan’s decision to acquire a BMD system in 
2003 occurred between the two summit meetings between KJI and Prime Minister 
Koizumi. While no final political breakthroughs were reached, Japan’s defensive BMD 
program (#4) did not disrupt the talks and may have contributed to their continuation in 
2004. During the talks, and this period generally, BMD may have contributed to Japan’s 
                                                          
661
 According to Robert Jervis, cognitive psychology suggests images that shape perceptions change 
slowly. He also states that the one deterring must use instruments of deterrence that matter to the 
adversary’s values and must also realize when the adversary has little choice but to behave egregiously. 
Further, Jervis cautions one’s domestic politics can distort the realities of others (Jervis, 1982-1983). Pages 
9, 13, and 29. For Japan, then, missile defenses might only have the desired effect on North Korean 
behavior over a longer period of time, perhaps years. It further suggests ballistic missile defenses must 
somehow resonate with North Korean values, but without denying them opportunities to maneuver 
politically in ways acceptable to both parties. It can also suggest North Koreans might see Japan in certain 
ways, such as domineering brutes, in order to satisfy domestic audiences. 
662
 North Korea used missile launches, including the 1998 test, possibly as a bargaining tool in its military-
diplomatic campaigns. If so, the North Korean calculus of using missile launches seemed to have changed, 
however, as they prompted Japanese and U.S. BMD deployments resulting in negative perceptions in 
China. Such developments indicated North Korea would likely change its behavior with ballistic missile 
tests in the future (Pollack, 2004). In Narushige Michishita’s chapter, “North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic 
Campaign Strategies: Continuity versus Change.” Page 71. 
663
 Uzi Rubin argues defenses and offenses should combine in strategy to maximize the deterrent effect 
upon an adversary’s calculus before he acts. While he argues from the perspective of missile defenses 
strengthening Israel’s retaliatory response capability against an attacking Iran, importantly he suggests it 
is missile defenses that provide the most “visible” measure of communication or signaling in influencing 
the adversary’s decision calculus (Rubin, 2008). Pages 66-7. Visible communication from a defender to an 
opponent with missile defenses plays a central role in the Japan-North Korea case, particularly as 
Japanese leaders made strategic decisions over the years in increasing the program and especially since 
Japan operationally deployed its missile defenses. 
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stronger position (#16 and #25)
664
 and KJI’s sense of reasonableness though there were 
limits to how far he would go (#11). It should also be noted that during this period North 
Korean ballistic missile production appears to have continued unabated, despite a 
reduction in exports, resulting in the steady fielding of ballistic missiles (#18).
665
 This 
would be in keeping with the admission of U.S. deterrence failures against North Korea 
(#21).
666
 Deploying a large share of missiles produced (rather than selling them) also 
raised costs for North Korea (#26).
667
 This, however, seemed to work contrary to the 
longstanding theory that BMD stymies ballistic missile proliferation (#23).
668
 North 
                                                          
664
 David Yost suggests fewer policy analysts in Europe buy into the notion of deterrence by denial where 
an adversary is deterred by perceiving his operational objectives are not achievable (Yost, 2004). Pages 
727-8. 
665
 One key unknown is the impact of Japan’s BMD upon North Korean value in its ballistic missiles, at 
least as measured by North Korean ballistic missile production and domestic deployment levels. Disparity 
of analysts exists over production and deployment levels. At the very least, missile exports have trended 
downward for several years, though this may be explained by a variety of reasons. Value in ballistic 
missiles is likely still very high and sufficient missiles for operational, coercive and wartime purposes 
already exist in North Korea’s inventory to preclude further production and deployment. A downward 
trend in production and deployment would suggest a partial loss of value. 
666
 Burns argues BMD in the U.S. was focused on defending against North Korean and Iranian missile 
threats and, therefore, dissuading them from ballistic missile proliferation. However, this strategy failed 
with North Korea as it continued to pursue a nuclear weapons capability and missile technology did not 
abate, possibly fearing regime change. North Korean nuclear and missile tests ensued, leading to Japanese 
choices on BMD (Burns, 2010). Pages 95-6. To avoid the same outcome as North Korea, U.S. missile 
defense strategy in Europe, therefore, would need to present the U.S., through NATO, as a “bigger” 
defensive influence over Iran’s emerging nuclear and ballistic missile threats. In other words, Japan was 
not afraid of U.S. extended deterrence failure, per se, but of aggressive U.S. actions toward North Korea in 
its new post-Cold War power projection role that could lead to more aggressive North Korea choices and 
embroil Japan as a potential target of North Korean ballistic missiles. 
667
 Missile defenses would contribute to deterrence by helping deny the benefits an adversary would have 
in ballistic missile attack and raising the costs to an adversary by increasing his level of effort for any 
attack to be effective (Kartchner, 2002). Pages 2-4. Ashton Carter states it is important to understand the 
role of BMD when evaluating its utility in strategy. One goal is to raise the price of attack, or the price of 
preparing for attack, meaning the attacker’s costs to launch the attack go up in numbers of ballistic 
missiles to types of accompanying technologies needed (Carter & Schwartz, 1984). Pages 102-3. 
668
 President Bush’s security framework envisioned missile defenses specifically to “strengthen deterrence 
by reducing the incentive for proliferation” (Dudley, 2003). Page 11. See also: (Gompert & Arnhold, 2001); 
page 9. If North Korean ballistic missile production levels have trended downward in recent years, it could 
reflect the idea that it was not worth the costs associated with operational needs of attempting to 
overcome Japan’s BMD system. This could also be suggested should North Korean ballistic missile sales 
decrease substantially. In this case, according to Joshua Pollack, they have, indicating, at least in part, that 
ballistic missiles are less appealing to prospective buyers without significant numbers that can overcome 
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Korea’s ballistic missiles were also used in this period, though without overflying Japan, 
to strengthen KJI’s foreign and domestic image (#32). China was also very concerned 
over Japan’s choice to deploy BMD (#34)669 and, because of its alliance with North 
Korea, potentially weakening the deterrent efficacy of Japan’s BMD in KJI’s perceptions. 
 By the time of Japan’s operational deployment of its BMD system (Deploy 
column), the prospects for normalization with North Korea had diminished significantly 
and KJI’s position on relenting further on the abductee issue firmed (#6 and #11).670 
Having defenses reduced fears of a surprise missile attack (#5)
671
 and provided a calming 
effect on Japan’s populace, however, eroding North Korea’s doctrinal advantages of 
surprise and terrorizing an opponent (#10 and #11).
672
 For the first time Japan’s BMD 
provided a credible capability to defend itself, though BMD testing was not perfect (#12 
                                                                                                                                                                             
regional BMD systems faced by those buyers. Pollack, in fact, makes such an argument for the impact of 
BMD explicitly to reduce buying incentives (Pollack J. , 2011). Page 416. 
669
 Japan’s BMD system has drawn sharp criticism from China, not only because it thinks its limited 
ballistic missile arsenal is no longer as credible, but because China retains images of Japanese imperialism 
and brutality. Japan’s BMD may be early protection for a later Japanese offensive posture that could 
threaten China directly or at least undermine China’s goals of resolving regional issues, such as island 
disputes, with minimal resistance or conflict. 
670
 Robert Powell argues BMD, since it can significantly lower possible costs to the defender against 
ballistic missile attacks, makes the defender more resolute and willing to tolerate risk and escalate if 
necessary. However, this can work in two opposing ways. On the one hand, this could lead to nuclear 
confrontation or preemptive nuclear attack from large states like Russia. On the other hand, increased 
resolve of a BMD-possessing state could lead smaller regional actors to back down (Powell, 2003). Pages 
88, 106-7. While Japan is hardly so risk-tolerant to accept nuclear risks in conflict with North Korea, BMD 
might, however, create sufficient perception of reduced costs of pushing harder with North Korea in 
general deterrence, sub-conflict conditions. 
671
 Any potential North Korean doctrinal position of using surprise, or a history of surprise action, 
complicates Japanese planning, particularly in scenarios involving North Korean use of ballistic missiles 
that can strike in mere minutes. This provides North Korea a great advantage in coercing Japan through 
unspoken threats of sudden terror from the sky, a scenario with which Japan is all-too familiar. Roberts 
defines “crisis” in terms of threats under time stress. In this way, “short decision time distinguishes a crisis 
from a non-crisis, and increasing stress further heightens the salience of time” (Roberts, 1988). Page 60. 
Japan’s BMD, as defensive capabilities, also reduce stress and increase time in the decision-making of 
both actors, thus reducing crisis potential or its duration. 
672
 Like others, Handberg states the August 1998 North Korean TD-1 missile flight showed Japan’s 
vulnerability, a situation magnified by a lack of offensive retaliatory capabilities. He argues, however, that 
an attack with WMD would be a game-changer to Japanese society as it would be slow or unable to 
deliver retribution upon North Korea while it struggled domestically. BMD helps sooth those fears 
(Handberg, 2002). Pages 133-4. 
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and #13).
673
 Technologically, Japan’s expertise with BMD helped to undermine the 
advantages North Korea seemed to be gaining with its long-range missile capabilities 
(#16).
674
 On the down side, North Korea apparently worked to develop BMD technical 
countermeasures and field many more ballistic missiles (#15); these could be factors both 
in general deterrence and wartime conditions. Japan affirmed its reliance on U.S. 
detection capabilities and also demonstrated weakness in its BMD command and control 
during this time (#28)
675
 possibly emboldening North Korea to be increasingly conflictual 
during this period. 
                                                          
673
 Stephen Quackenbush argued missile defenses that become “increasingly effective” deny the 
adversary capacity to exert influence over the defender (Quackenbush, 2006). Pages 533, 535, and 538-
40. Japan’s missile defenses have become increasingly effective throughout the course of their 
development and deployment. Both examples can be considerations in which Japan’s missile defenses 
contribute to deterrence and stability against North Korea. Many have claimed the unreliability of BMD 
over the years. Critics of Japan’s BMD system, or specific missiles or components of the system, take issue 
with missile failures or intercept misses. As reliability has increased, the credibility of Japan’s BMD system 
in North Korea’s assessment may also have increased. North Korea has, in the past, disclaimed 
involvement in certain actions, such as covert naval operations. So, it is possible it may not acknowledge 
involvement in ballistic missiles that strike or land in Japan, or at least not acknowledge culpability or 
hostile intention. This could occur by accident where a missile flies off-course (as has happened with 
other Taepodong missiles) or, less likely, flies to a pre-loaded target in Japan, launched “accidentally” or 
without KJI authorization. This could be done to test Japan’s BMD under surprise conditions or the 
political resolve of Japan’s leaders. It could also be done to stimulate Japanese compliance in some way 
toward a North Korean aim. BMD can provide benefits including protection against accidents (Krepon, 
2003). Pages 191 and 195-6. Gordon Mitchell, in his examination of the BMD debate from a rhetorical 
perspective, argues the U.S. hides and lies about U.S. military capabilities and foreign threats in order to 
protect and aid the “military industrial complex.” This is done by masking the lies in Cold War jargon of 
jeopardizing deterrence. The debate, and support for, BMD in the U.S. is but the latest, but biggest, 
example of this deceptive strategy (Mitchell, 2000). Pages 2-3. He cites three main missile defense “cases” 
of deception from public statements to support his argument, including: experimentations with the X-ray 
laser; accuracy of the Patriot missile during the Persian Gulf War; and, whether the U.S. Theater High 
Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system violates tenants of the 1972 ABM Treaty (Mitchell, 2000). Page 24. 
Each of these cases receives a full chapter of material used to illuminate Mitchell’s view of deception. 
674
 While North Korea possesses hundreds of ballistic missiles, only a portion of them can reach Japan. It is 
not known how many of these would be used against Japan in wartime scenarios, but North Korean 
planning against Japan, even in limited raid-type crisis scenarios, could be complicated or undermined or 
at risk of falling short of North Korean operational objectives. Political objectives, however, would be 
much harder to deny as simply launching against Japan may be sufficient in the North Korean calculus to 
create the needed coercive climate. 
675
 To be effective, Japanese BMD requires credible sensors, weapons, command and control, and 
doctrine (O'Donogue, 2000). Page 15. Attaining these would raise Japan’s position in regional and global 
arms control and nonproliferation activities. 
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 Perhaps the period with the widest qualitative support for the theoretic arguments 
was the TD-2 BMD period. This also supports the statistical analysis indicating Japan’s 
BMD strengthened deterrence during this period. In the most pronounced event 
timeframe—the 2009 North Korean TD-2 missile launch—Japan, at the direction of its 
national leadership, employed its BMD for the first time (the term employment meaning 
the interceptors were manned and ready to fire). This had many effects and is related to 
several of the theoretic arguments in the TD-2 BMD period: Japan’s populace was 
assured (#1),
676
 an important military and psychological advantage given North Korea’s 
strategy and wartime targeting of Tokyo and other urban areas; it demonstrated a 
defensive posture that, coupled with North Korean early announcements and compliance 
with UN requirements, stymied any real prospect for U.S. preemptive strikes on the 
North Korean missile preparations (#3, #4, and #8);
677
 it raised North Korean 
uncertainties
678
 and reinforced North Korea’s plan to conduct future missile tests from the 
                                                          
676
 According to Japanese governmental sources, Japan’s land-based PAC-3 missile groups defend Japan’s 
major cities and all major Japanese islands (Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 2013). See the section entitled, 
“Land-Based Missile Defense.” This supports the idea that Japan’s BMD is not meant simply to protect 
U.S. forces and bases in a U.S-North Korea deterrence relationship, but they are there for the protection 
of Japan’s interests including its population, governmental, and economic centers. 
677
 John Rood, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, in response to 
a question in a press briefing suggested missile defenses have benefits before the crisis posed by an 
adversary’s launch of ballistic missiles, including both deterrent and dissuasive benefits. For example, 
BMD could help deter their use and provide a non-offensive option to respond to a missile launch if 
deterrence failed. Citing a 2006 case in which North Korea was stacking a missile for launch, Rood 
confessed the U.S. neither knew whether a munition was atop the North Korean missile nor whether 
North Korean intentions were hostile or otherwise. Possessing BMD, and placing them on full alert during 
that time, allowed the U.S. to avoid considering a preemptive strike or traditional “overwhelming 
retaliation” options. As such, BMD provided a purely defensive escalation control tool and was essentially 
a stabilizing capability (Rood, 2008). Rood’s comments are in response to a question from Mounzer 
Sleiman with Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi. These are the types of benefits most likely considered by Japanese 
leadership for the value of missile defenses in Japan. In addition, North Korea deems deployment of 
offensive assets close to its border as provocative and has acted aggressively against such assets in the 
past: the USS Pueblo naval incident; shooting at the EC121 aircraft; the killings on the ground at the 
Panmunjom joint security area. 
678
 According to the U.S. State Department, missile defenses both complicate adversary decision-making 
and work to deny his objectives for using ballistic missiles or WMD. The way BMD does this was captured 
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Sohae facility in western North Korea (#6, #7 and #11),
679
 though testing the TD-2 in any 
fashion allowed North Korea to claim success in advancing its space capabilities; 
permitted operational defenses against North Korean missile threats to Japan, regardless 
of North Korean intent or Japanese target (#13 and #14); it compounded North Korea’s 
ballistic missile-based planning, contributing to North Korea’s pursuit of a road-mobile 
solid propellant missile system that can move to the field and launch more quickly and 
possibly undetected—a cost and a complication for North Korea, but if deployed a 
challenge to Japan’s BMD (#15 and #30); it tempered Japanese inclinations toward 
offensive or nuclear capabilities (#21);
680
 it gave Japan confidence in its actions 
                                                                                                                                                                             
this way: “By complicating his calculation of success, these defenses add to a potential aggressor’s 
uncertainty and weaken his confidence” (Department of State, 2001). See the heading entitled, “Emerging 
Threats and the Need to Diversify our Approach to Deterrence.” Such calculations rely on estimates of the 
probability their missiles will get through the defensive system. In this way, it could be argued Japan’s 
missile defenses create such uncertainty and lower confidence in North Korean leaders’ decision-making, 
possibly contributing in a significant way to alter North Korea’s choices in launching the TD-2 in 2009 and 
other behaviors. See also: (Office of Technology Assessment, 1986). Pages 87-8. 
679
 Samson describes the features of the 2009 North Korean TD-2 missile test, providing a clear contrast 
with the 2006 and 1998 launches. First, in the 2009 missile test, what it called the Unha-2 space launch 
vehicle intended to place a satellite into orbit, North Korea provided prior warning and transparency of 
the test, informing both the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) weeks in advance of the test and included danger areas where missile stages 
could fall. It also announced it would join the Outer Space Treaty and the Registry Convention for space 
objects. Second, North Korea apparently used a different trajectory in the 2009 test or a higher altitude, 
such that Japan’s largest urban and economic centers were not in the missile’s flight path or were not 
threatened sufficiently to pressure Japan to engage the missile with Japanese BMD available for the first 
time in the 2009 test. Lastly, some assess the 2009 missile employed a new and different booster, 
apparently incorporating Iranian SLV technologies to reflect a space, rather than an offensive missile, 
purpose for the 2009 missile. After the launch, U.S. General Victor Renuart admitted the missile was a 
space test and not an ICBM test and, therefore, was not engaged with U.S. BMD either (Samson, 2010). 
Pages 13-4. Further, fear of getting even its testing missiles shot down by Japan may increase North 
Korean uncertainties sufficient to warrant change in its missile testing patterns. For example, the change 
in 2009, or moving its missile testing facilities to a new launch site in western North Korea so it can shoot 
missiles south, may indicate North Korean preferences for greater certainty in its missile tests and 
reduction in potential complications. 
680
 Ballistic missiles, either directly or indirectly, serve a valuable coercive purpose for North Korea against 
Japan. Coercing Japan can bring several political, tangible, and psychologically emotive benefits to KJI, 
though he does not act independent of the influence of multiple factors. However, an interesting dilemma 
in North Korean behavior given Japan’s deterrence strategy is that to deny Japan success in deterring 
North Korea is to stoke the fires inside Japan of sentiments of such erosion of effect upon North Korea 
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elsewhere, including assertiveness with China over disputed islands (#24);
681
 and, it 
demonstrated a political willingness and military capacity to defeat a limited, “cheap-
shot” strike with ballistic missiles if needed (#28),682 increasing Japan’s credibility 
(#29).
683
 Other drawbacks included: the gain by North Korea of technical data of its 
missile and Japan’s BMD response by testing the TD-2 (#11 and #27); pushing North 
Korea to make other choices unfavorable to Japan, including BMD technical and 
employment countermeasures and development asymmetric coercive capabilities, such as 
competencies in cyber warfare (#30 and #31);
684
 and, BMD could further disincentivize 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that Japan needed offensive conventional strike, and possibly nuclear, capabilities to sufficiently deter 
North Korea—an unwelcome prospect inside North Korea. 
681
 Part of Japan’s rise in autonomy has involved an increase in its freedom of action. This is characterized 
militarily by increased capabilities, longer and further deployments, and more assertive operations 
including engagement with North Korean ships. But it is also shown in greater flexing politically, such as 
pursuit of a UNSC permanent seat. It is difficult to gauge North Korea’s views of such Japanese 
assertiveness or its causes. See also: (Crouch, Joseph, Payne, & Roehl, 2009). Pages 1, 3, and 8. 
682
 North Korean ballistic missile use for coercive purposes may not involve direct attacks or raids with 
missiles upon targets inside Japan. If it did so, it likely has sufficient missiles to overwhelm Japan’s BMD 
system but North Korea would need to use a considerable number of its missiles or empty its stores 
completely. On the other hand, limited missile raids or tests used for coercive purposes could not 
effectively overcome Japan’s defenses unless they were used against undefended, or under-defended, 
targets. This is another area where North Korean ballistic missile production levels might offer insights 
into the North’s thinking about its ability to overwhelm BMD. 
683
 North Korea occasionally seeks to make its opponents look the aggressor, providing it justification for 
other actions or compensation. For example, North Korea claimed ROK control of certain islands the 
North claims as disputed gave it the right to shell those islands with artillery. Defensive strategies, 
however, give regional actors opposed to North Korea ways to confound the North’s approach as 
defenses can be merely responsive in nature. Under certain circumstances, it is possible North Korea 
could launch a missile toward Japan with the expectation Japan would engage it with its BMD. In this case, 
North Korea would be counting on credibility of Japan’s political resolve and technical capability of its 
BMD. North Korea could invite such a response possibly to isolate Japan from the U.S., give the North 
cause for some other premeditated action, or claim damages for losses. Such scenarios would require 
North Korean dependence upon Japan’s credibility. See Barak Mendelsohn’s discussion of this theoretic 
argument in an examination of the 1991 Gulf War (Mendelsohn, 2003); pages 84-8 and 96-7. 
684
 One way North Korea could enhance the capability of its offensive ballistic missile force is through 
development and deployment of various countermeasures on the missile to defeat an opponent’s BMD 
system. While doing so involved costs, such countermeasures may pale in cost to deploying a much larger 
number of BMD interceptors, new or enhanced radar systems, or developing new interceptors altogether. 
Some analysts suggest North Korea has in fact developed some countermeasures. According to Philip E. 
Coyle, the three easiest ways to defeat BMD are to build more offensive ballistic missiles to overwhelm 
the defensive system, use countermeasures to confuse defenses, and to go around known BMD systems 
with surprise methods of attack such as employing cruise missiles or terroristic strategies. The Achilles 
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China from agreeing to arms control measures of its offensive ballistic missiles and 
nuclear weapons in the future (#34).
685
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
heel of BMD, however, is effective countermeasure (CM) capabilities, options North Korea has been 
developing and fielding since 1999. Such North Korean CM capabilities could include: separating RVs, spin-
stabilizing RVs, RV reorientation, using radar-absorbing material (RAM), booster fragmentation, low-
power jammers, chaff, and balloon decoys (Ghoshroy & Neuneck, 2010). Pages 43-8. For ideas on how 
countermeasures address an adversary’s perceived costs of restraint, see: Kenneth Watman and Dean 
Wilkening (Watman & Wilkening, 1995), pages 22-3; and, Roberta Wohlstetter (Wohlstetter, 1962), pages 
354 and 356-7. While ballistic missiles have been a centerpiece for North Korean intimidation tactics, not 
only against Japan but ROK and others, one fear is that effectively devaluing the North’s ballistic missiles 
might have unintended and unpleasant side effects. For example, in addition to simply building more 
missiles to overcome defenses, North Korea could rather choose to use other means of delivery of 
conventional or WMD munitions, such as use of artillery or ground-based or seaborne delivery vehicles 
for WMD. It used artillery attacks against ROK sites in 2009, for example. It could also seek to coerce 
through other violent acts, as it did with the sinking of the Choenon ROK naval vessel. Or, it could use 
cyberspace attacks, as was done against ROK networks. Of note, however, is the lack of violent coercive 
attacks against Japan during the years such activity rose against ROK. See also: Julian Palmore and 
Francoise Melese (Palmore & Melese, 2001), page 214; and, Raymond Franck (Franck, 2002); page 222. 
685
 The UK’s Ministry of Defence suggested in 2010 a high likelihood effective BMD would undermine 
“some states’ nuclear deterrence” in the long-term (UK Ministry of Defence: Development, Concepts and 
Doctrine Centre, 2010). See the section entitled “Hot Topic – The Future of Deterrence.” Page 77. Stephen 
Cimbala argues, from an arms control perspective, missile defenses create unnecessary “friction” for 
deterrence (Cimbala, 2002). Page 201. See also: John Newhouse (Newhouse, 2001); pages, 97, 101, 104, 
and 109. 
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